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ABSTRACT
al-Hedaithy, Mesaid Ibrahim. Ph.D., University of Durham, 1989.
Modernization and Islam in Saudi Arabia: a Sociological Study of
"Public Morality Committees".
This is a study of the dynamics of institutional religious
change in Saudi Arabia. Its aim is to analyse the effects of
institutional differentiation on the ability of official religious
organizations to continue playing their public role. The theoretical
framework is drawn from studies in sociology of religion which deal
with religious change in the modern world.
Three main approaches have been utilized to test the hypothesis
that there is a positive relationship between institutional
differentiation and secularization (loss of religious influence in
public life). Firstly, there is a general review of the main
sociological arguments dealing with modernization and secularization.
The aim is to test the applicability of these arguments to the
situation in Saudi Arabia. Secondly, a comparative and historical
approach is adopted to ascertain the changes that have taken place in
the public role of religion over the past five decades. And thirdly, a
detailed case study is presented of hay'at al-amr bi-'1-maerrif
wa-'1-nahy Can al-munkar (Organization for Enjoining the Acceptable
and Forbidding the Reprehensible): a unique religious organization
modelled after the traditional Islamic institution of hisbah, and
commonly known as "Public Morality Committees".
The case study provides basic information, much of which has
never been published in translation, about the hay'ah. The evidence,
collected during fieldwork in Saudi Arabia, demonstrates that a
traditional institution can continue playing its unique role in a
changing environment with an increasing degree of institutional
differentiation. The main hypothesis is not, therefore, supported by
what appears to be taking place in present-day Saudi Arabia. There has
been a high level of functional differentiation between the various
public spheres, but not to the point where religion might have become
a separate institution and lost its dominance in public life.
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Chapter One 
General Introduction
Religion, as a social phenomenon, has been one of the most ancient and
controversial aspects of human life. It also remains one of the least
understood. Many believed that the modern age, with its scientific and
technological advances, would take the mystery out of religion and
eventually lead to its demise. The world we live in today, however,
points to the fallacy of those beliefs. Religion is not showing signs
of being about to disappear. In fact, it appears to be taking new
forms and playing different roles in a modern world that is deeply
ambivalent towards it.
The dynamics of religious decline, religious revival, new
religious movements, and the problematic relationship between religion
and politics have been the focus of many sociological studies in
recent years. The aim has been mainly to assess the effects of the
clash between religion and modernity. The whole argument has been
coloured by the Western-Christian experience. There are good grounds
for believing, however, that the effects of modernization on the
changing place and meaning of religion in the modern world now need to
be understood from non-Western, non-Christian viewpoints as well.
The religion of Islam is today one of the major religions of the
world. Political events in the past ten years have brought it more and
more to the attention of those trying to explain religious ideologies.
It is becoming increasingly evident that religion in general and Islam
in particular are exercising considerable influence on political
15
events at a time when many thought that the force of religion as a
political ideology was almost spent. The recent turmoil in many parts
of the Muslim world points to a growing tension between Islam, as a
political and social system, and capitalist and socialist models of
modernization and development. The outcome is far from clear, but it
will have serious implications for Islam as a traditional system
trying to cope with the challenges of modern life, and for Muslims as
people caught up in the struggle between the demands of their faith
and the necessity of coming to terms with the modern world.
My research is an effort to contribute towards the process of
searching for answers to questions about the social meanings of
religion. My work is also an attempt to widen the scope of the
sociology of religion beyond the confines of the Western experience.
Furthermore, the decision to study the role of Islam in modern Saudi
Arabia has been largely determined by a combination of personal,
practical and scientific reasons. My personal interest in this topic,
coupled with the paucity of sociological studies of the role of
religion in Saudi society, have made this topic both important and
challenging to me.
A. Objectives of the Study 
The Arabian Peninsula is the heart-land of Islam and the place of its
birth. Current socio-political and economic developments in Saudi
Arabia seem to present a unique setting for a serious clash between
traditions and modernity. Indeed, the Saudi state is the product of
politico-religious factors that are still in operation.
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The Kingdom remains one of the few countries in the world that
officially considers religious ideology to be the constitution of the
land and the source of most of its laws. The importance of these
factors is further strengthened by the growing significance of Saudi
Arabia as a world economic power, and by its increasing contribution
to international affairs. Recent socio—economic developments in the
Kingdom have also begun to create a new environment that appears to be
increasingly insensitive to the traditional role of religion in public
life. The pressures of modern life are putting to the test the ability
of religion to continue playing its prominent role in Saudi Arabia.
This study is an attempt to find out how the religious establishment
is responding to these pressures.
A project of this nature is potentially limitless, so we have
narrowly focused our attention on one aspect of the relationship
between religion and modernization in Saudi Arabia. The main focus
will be on the effects of modernization on the role played by official
religious organizations in public life. The arguments will be placed
within the context of the general ideological, historical, political,
and social factors that characterize the Saudi experience. A secondary-
objective will be to relate the study of Islam in Saudi Arabia to the
wider field of the sociology of religion by subjecting some of its
central concepts and theories to an empirical test. For it is time
that the sociology of religion expanded its scope to deal with the
role of Islam in modernizing societies. This study will be helpful if
it leads the way to creating more interest in the clash between
religious traditions and modernization in a society that seems to want
to hold to the former and achieve the latter.
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We shall adopt three interconnected approaches to testing the
applicability of the sociological theories of secularization and
modernization to the situation of modern Saudi Arabia. Firstly, there
is a review of the main sociological arguments that deal with the
phenomena of modernization and secularization. The major themes will
be highlighted, and the limitations of the theories' applicability to
the study of Islam and Saudi Arabia will be illuminated.
Secondly, a comparative and historical approach will be taken to
assess the changes that have occurred in the religious situation of
Saudi society over the past fifty seven years. I*The, czmpartsvn ,Aill. be
mainly between the present and the period immediately before 1932.
There will be no attempt to compare modern Saudi Arabia with the
"ideal" Islamic state, or to decide whether Saudi Arabia today 'truly'
represents an Islamic state. 2
 This is altogether a different topic.
Our main aim here is to compare the place and role of religion in
modern Saudi Arabia with the situation before the birth of the state
and the process of political modernization. This is an appropriate,
but not unproblematic, way to assess the effects of modernization on
religion. The analysis will be mainly confined to the effects of
modernization on official organizations with religious functions. The
effects of modernization on the individual consciousness or on the
religious involvement of groups and individuals will not, however,
fall within the scope of this study.
* The Endnotes to each chapter are grouped at the end of the thesis,
beginning on p.342.
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Thirdly, there will be a detailed case study of one particular
religious organization. The subject of the case study is the religious
organization called hay'at al-amr bi- 1 1-ma c r-uf wa-'1-nahy can al-
munkar (Organization for Enjoining the Acceptable and Forbidding the
Reprehensible) hereafter referred to as the hay'ah. 3 Studying the
evolution of this organization and its changing role in society will,
it is hoped, give us the opportunity to evaluate the effects of
political modernization on religion in Saudi Arabia. The case study
will be preceded by a discussion of the historical deve/agmectts af
Islam in the Arabian Peninsula and of the religious situation today.
The place of the hay'ah within the structure of government and its
interaction with other government departments are important because
they indicate the effects of institutional differentiation on the
ability of religious organizations based on traditional principles to
function in a modernizing society.
The above three approaches have been selected in order to
elucidate the relationship between modernization and religion.
Religion, in the scope of this study, will be defined very narrowly to
mean: a system of beliefs and practices by which a group of people
interprets and responds to what they feel is supernatural and sacred
(Johnstone 1975:20). That system of beliefs and practices is the
religion of Islam as defined and practised in contemporary Saudi
Arabia. This study, is not, therefore, concerned with other religions
or belief systems, and its findings cannot be generalized beyond the
limits set here. The analysis will also be limited to the case of
Saudi Arabia and the dynamics of religious change in its unique
political and social environments.
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The choice of this topic was influenced by the paucity of
scientific studies dealing with the effects of modernization on
religious institutions in Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries.4
Another reason for choosing this topic is the scientific importance of
understanding the effects of mOdernization on the religious life of a
modernizing (transitional) society 5 like Saudi Arabia. And the last
reason is that it is time for the sociological analysis of a
phenomenon like secularization to include the experience of Saudi
Arabia. The combination of the above factors has encouraged us to
discuss the problematic relevance of the western-dominated sociology
of religion to religious phenomena in non-western, non-Christian
countries. The apparent uniqueness of the Saudi experience has also
provided us with a pretext for questioning some of the generalizations
developed by sociologists of religion over the past few decades.
Statement of the Problem
The process of social change always gives rise to questions dealing
with the part played by religion in that process, and with the effects
of change on religion. Does religion foster or impede social change?
Can religion maintain its influence in society at times of change?
What are the effects of institutional differentiation on the ability
of official religious institutions to function in society? Does a
government's control over religious institutions and personalities
mean a loss of influence? Finally, is it possible to have total
institutional differentiation in an Islamic country? The research
question will, therefore, be: what are the effects of political
modernization on the influence of religious institutions and official
religious organizations in a modernizing society?
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Orientating Hypothesis
The study will be guided by one general hypothesis, the rationale for
which appears in Chapter Two. It states that there is a positive
relationship between political modernization and secularization in a
modernizing country. A minor hypothesis will be tested in relation to
the hay'ah. It states that the higher the level of institutional
differentiation in a society, the lower the capacity of official
religious organizations to shape public life.
Definitions of Concepts
The general hypothesis gives us three basic concepts to define.
Firstly, political modernization will be defined as the process of
institutional differentiation of political structure which enhances
the capability - the effectiveness and efficiency of performance - of
a society's political system (Coleman 1968:395). In the case of Saudi
Arabia, political modernization is the process that began in the 1930s
with the establishment of independent ministries to perform specific
functions. The establishment of the Council of Ministers in 1953 was a
major turning point in that process. It culminated in the creation of
ministries and independent bodies to perform specific religious
functions that had previously been performed by individuals and groups
on a voluntary basis. This process of institutional differentiation in
the Saudi political system is what we mean by political modernization.
The second concept, secularization, is defined as the process by
which religion becomes one institution alongside other institutions
and loses its overarching claim to speak for the whole of society
(Dobbelaere 1981:11). The essence of the process of secularization,
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for our purposes, is that religion becomes canalized into one
institution in society (the church in the western experience) and that
religion loses its influence in public life. We shall assess the
degree of secularization in modern Saudi Arabia by examining these two
changes.
The third concept is that of a modernizing country. It is
defined as a country going through a process of social change which
involves economic advancement, specialization of political roles,
technological development and fundamental alterations in social
patterns (eg.	 urbanization,	 social mobility and educational
advancement) which, together, enable a society based primarily on
traditional values and institutions to assume the characteristics of
developed, or modern, societies (Roberts 1971:127).
B. Organization of the Study 
The study consists of four parts. The first part will contain a single
chapter which presents a general review of the main sociological
arguments about religious change, modernization and socio-economic
development. The relevant theories of secularization, modernization
and development will be reviewed. Before that, an attempt will be made
to define and assess the sociology of religion. The status of Islam
within that discipline will be discussed, and the main weaknesses of
the theories will be identified. Part I will conclude with a brief
analysis of the interplay between religion and modernization, and of
the distinctive features of both Islam and Saudi Arabia.
Part II will have three chapters, the first of which will
contain an historical sketch of the rise and development of Islam in
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the Arabian Peninsula. The meaning and major institutions of Islam
will occupy the first half of the chapter. The second half will deal
with the decline of Islam in central Arabia, the religious movement of
Shaykh Muhammad b. cAbd al-Wahhab, and the first two Saudi states.
Chapter Four will be about the development of the modern Saudi state
with an emphasis on the role played by religion, and the outcome of
the modernization process. Chapter Five will contain a descriptive
account of the religious situation in Saudi Arabia today. The main
religious institutions will be identified, and their role in society
will be assessed in the light of the information available.
The case study of the hay'ah will be presented in Part III. The
introduction to this part will contain a brief review of the treatment
of the hay'ah in Western literature. Chapter Six will be historical in
nature. It deals with the ideological basis of the hay'ah and its
relationship to the Islamic institution of bisbah. 6 The chapter will
also deal with the historical evolution of the modern hay'ah. The
structure and activities of the hay'ah today will be described in
Chapter Seven. This chapter will also analyse the information
collected about members of the hay'ah and its regulations and
activities.
Chapter Eight will give an account of the relationship between
the hay'ah and a number of government institutions. The aim is to see
how the hay'ah functions as part of the structure of the state. The
relationship between the hay'ah, the Saudi public, and expatriates
will occupy the second half of this chapter. Chapter Nine assesses the
impact of modernization on the ability of the hay'ah to continue
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playing its unique role. The case study of the hay'ah will provide us
with a unique example of the effects of modernization on religious
organizations in the Kingdom. It is also important because it provides
a wealth of accurate information about the hay'ah that has never been
published outside Saudi Arabia.
The above mentioned chapters will be mainly descriptive in
nature, but the single chapter of Part IV will analyse the findings
and assess their significance. A test of the applicability of the
theory of secularization to the situation of Islam in modern Saudi
Arabia will be the main task of this final chapter. The guiding
hypothesis will be tested in the light of the evidence presented in
the first three parts. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of
the study's limitations, and of suggestions for further research.
The appendices contain a description of the writer's experience
of doing field work in Saudi Arabia as well as some important
documents relating mainly to the hay'ah. Most of these documents have
never been published in translation, as far as we know, and they
provide an interesting insight into the structure and workings of the
hay'ah.
C. Methods of Study 
The study is based partly on content analysis of a large number of
unpublished documents obtained during the field trip which the writer
undertook in Saudi Arabia between January and June 1988. Participant
observation, however, was the main method employed in order to collect
information about the hay'ah. The lack of information in published
materials made this the most appropriate method. Doing field work in
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Saudi Arabia is an experience with its own unique problems (see
Appendix B). The information collected, however limited, has made this
study a pioneering work in the West when it comes to detailed
information about religious institutions in Saudi Arabia. 7 The
intention is to clarify the mystery surrounding this unique
organization and, where necessary, to correct the image often found in
Western literature. 8
The methods of interview and survey were used to collect data
mainly for the case study. A number of interviews were conducted with
officials and members of the hay'ah. The notes specify the source of
information collected from interviews. Two minor surveys were
conducted during the field trip to collect information about the
relationship between the hay'ah and the Saudi public. Some of the
findings are presented in Chapter Eight.
The utilization of these various techniques for gathering data
was a matter of necessity rather than convenience. The lack of
sufficient published information about the hay'ah and other religious
institutions in Saudi Arabia could only be overcome by trying any
useful technique. The problems associated with studying a familiar
setting, taking things for granted (Burgess 1984:22), working in an
environment not easily susceptible to investigative studies (see
Niblock 1982:11), and not knowing what to expect all helped to make a
systematic study of the members and activities of the hay'ah more
difficult (see Appendix B).
The technique adopted for selecting informants during the field
trip was a non—probability opportunistic sampling which involved the
random selection of persons, places and events within the limits set
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by officials of the hay'ah and by the researcher's judgment as to
where the most useful information would come from (Burgess 1984:55).
D. Sources of Information
The information for this study came from a variety of sources. It has
a mixture of historical, theoretical, comparative, and analytical
approaches, but the emphasis was placed on those primary sources which
were considered reliable. The limited number of primary sources made
it necessary, however, to utilize many secondary sources as well.
Primary Sources
I. Official documents: Since the study deals mainly with official
religious organizations that are part of the Saudi government, it was
necessary to consult a large number of official documents. Official
documents have been the main and, sometimes, the only source of
information for a large part of the case study. Information about the
structure and regulations of the hay'ah (see Appendix F), about the
development of the hay'ah, and about the general state of political,
economic and social developments comes mainly from sources published
by the government. We are aware of the problems associated with the
excessive use of official documents, but in the case of this study it
was a matter of necessity rather than a matter of choice.
Part of the information collected for the case study came from
official sources which are not published. Official communiques,
circulars, and letters consulted by the writer during field—work give
important indications of the inner workings of the hay'ah, and its
relationship with other government departments. Any information
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presented in the text which comes from one of these sources is
followed by a note indicating the number and date of the document and
its location. The use of official documents is limited to matters
which are not dealt with in any other source of information.
2. Historical Documents: Information about the evolution of the hay'ah 
and the government decisions that have affected it were obtained from
a number of historical documents. The documents are located in the
Archives of King cAbd al-cAziz Dgrah (research centre) and the
Document Centre of ma c
 had al-idarah al- cimah (Institute of Public
Administration) in Riyadh.
3. Interviews: A total of ten informal interviews were conducted with
officials and members of the hay'ah. Each interview focused on a
different topic relating to the particular job of the interviewee.
Whenever information obtained from an interview is cited, the source
of the information will be identified in a note.
4. Participant observation: During the six months period spent in
Saudi Arabia doing field-work, the writer observed and documented a
number of events and activities. This was limited main17 to the case
study of the hay'ah, and, to a lesser extent, to the religious
situation in the Kingdom. Taking part in the activities of the hay'ah
and visiting a number of government institutions, gave the writer the
opportunity to observe and experience the situation at first hand.
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Secondary Sources
1. Published Material: All published books and articles that deal with
the topic of this thesis and that were available to the writer have
been utilized. They constitute the majority of the sources and are
referred to in the main text or in the notes by the author's name and
the date of publication.
2. Unpublished Materials: This category contains mainly Ph.D. and
Masters theses which have not been published. They are identified in
the Bibliography as such.
3. Newspapers and Magazines: Part of the information about
contemporary Saudi Arabia comes from newspapers and magazines. They
are mainly Saudi Arabian publications, but a number of items originate
from the Western media. Reference to each item is found in the notes.
E. Notes on Transliteration and Dates 
The classical scheme for transliterating Arabic letters into the
English language has been adopted in this study. Attempts are made to
be as consistent as possible. A problem, however, arises from quoting
sources that use a different scheme or did not use one at all. We
considered it wrong to correct the quotes, and we hope that this will
not cause confusion to the reader. The complete scheme and some
important notes can be found in Appendix A. All Arabic words (but not
proper nouns) have been underlined.
As for dates, the general rule is to use the Gregorian Calendar
to which we refer as the Common Era (C.E.). Exceptions are made when
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the Islamic or hijrah Calendar 9
 (H.) has to be employed, either
because it is found in the original document or because its use gives
an historical dimension to the event or the life of the person within
Islamic history. Hijrah dates are given first followed by an oblique
0 and then the corresponding C.E. date. In places where the complete
date is given (viz, day, month, and year), the hijrah date is given
first followed by H., and the Gregorian date follows it in brackets.
Dates were calculated using the tables compiled by C.S.
Freeman—Grenville (1963).
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PART I
Theoretical Bases
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Chapter Two 
Review of the Main Sociological Arguments 
The general aim of this chapter is to provide a review of the main
sociological arguments that deal with the place of religion in the
modern world. Religion has been part of the human experience
throughout history, and attempts to understand and describe its role
in society are the subject matter of what is known today as the
sociology of religion. The first and second sections of this chapter
will deal with the main features of the sociology of religion, and
with the meaning that it has accorded to Islam. The emphasis will be
on the limitations of the sociology of religion as it relates to
Islam, and on the improvements that have occurred in the past few
years.
The modern age of industry, urbanization, nationalism and
technology has brought new challenges to the role played by religious
ideologies and institutions all over the world. The third section of
this chapter will, therefore,
	
deal with the theories of
secularization. The process of secularization will be analysed in
terms of its meanings in sociological literature, and in terms of its
relevance to the study of Islam.
The fourth section will deal with modernization and development
as processes of political, economic and social change. The major
theories and the main features of modernization will be discussed with
the aim of trying to understand the relationship between political
modernization and secularization. The same thing will be attempted in
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dealing with the process of development in general and economic
development in particular as they relate to the case of Saudi Arabia.
The literature that deals with the above concepts is vast and
full of contradictory views. This review, therefore, is narrowly
focused and selective. The focus is on the material that is relevant
to either Islam or Saudi Arabia or both. Our aim is to establish a
theoretical base that will provide a framework for the main body of
this thesis.
The fifth section of the chapter will contain an attempt to
bring the theoretical pieces together as they relate to the
interaction between religion and modernization. The distinctiveness of
the Saudi case will be examined in an attempt to evaluate the
usefulness of the sociology of religion, in its present form, to the
understanding of the relationship between religion and modernization
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
A. Sociology of Religion: General Assessment 
The study of religion within sociology is as old as sociology itself.
Religion, as a social phenomenon, was dealt with by the pioneers of
western sociology such as Durkheim, Weber and Pareto who "were
concerned with religion for sociological reasons. Religion was
perceived by them as a central phenomenon of social reality,
therefore, necessarily central for sociological understanding in
general" (Berger and Luckmann 1969:64). The subject matter of the
sociology of religion is not religion itself but the social vehicles
of religion and its functional aspects within society. '
Sociologists have found it difficult to come up with a uniform
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definition for religion not only because there are so many competing
ideas about what religion is, but also because religion takes
different forms and shapes in different parts of the world. It is the
kind of difficulty which Smith (1962) tried to overcome by preferring
not to use the term 'religion' at all, and instead by dealing with the
concept of religious tradition. 2 In our opinion, this is an extreme
position. Instead, we shall adopt the definition provided by Johnstone
(1975:20), which is best suited for the purpose of this study. He
defined religion as "a system of beliefs and practices by which a
group of people interprets and responds to what they feel is
supernatural and sacred". 3 This definition is general enough to
describe most religions without attempting to favour any of them. It
also seems appropriate to the religion of Islam, and distinguishes
between, on the one hand, religion as involving the sacred and the
supernatural and, on the other, ideologies (e.g. communism and
scientism) which are different from religion in many aspects
(Johnstone 1975:21). 4
 Not all definitions are quite so applicable to
Islam.
The sociology of religion, according to Turner (1983:38),
developed in response to, and was influenced by, the "social collapse
of Christianity as a dominant institution in western society" in the
19th century. 5
 The early ideas which sociologists developed were very
much influenced by Christian categories of analysis and by what
happened to Christianity as a result of industrialization and the
separation of religion from the state. They assumed that the Christian
case "provided the paradigm by which all other cases might be
analysed" (Wilson 1982:24). The early conceptions of religion (such as
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the distinction, made by Durkheim (1969:45) between the sacred and
profane) affected the way in which sociologists have dealt with, and
continue to deal with, the social functions of religion.
It goes without saying that religion is a human-global
phenomenon. The sociology of religion, therefore, must develop a
global approach that deals with all religions in such a way as to
account for their similarities and differences. Western sociologists
cannot be blamed for being influenced by Christianity, simply because
Christianity provided them with a religious case study by virtue of
being the dominant western religion. We question the generalizations
that sociologists have tended to make about religion in general,
however, without attending to the differences between religious
systems. It would have been better if those studies that dealt with
Christianity alone had been part of a discipline that was called the
sociology of Christianity rather than the sociology of religion.
The above argument implies that it is difficult to try to apply
the theories developed by western sociologists of religion to the
study of the religion of Islam. It is true that there are major
similarities between Christianity and Islam as meaning systems, but
there are also fundamental differences in their meaning, operation and
function as social systems. The view that Islam is not a 'religion'
but a 'socio-political system' is problematic because "it takes
Christianity as a privileged model of what is to count as 'religion'
in the first place" (Turner 1983:20).
The general approach to the study of religion by western
sociologists is also far from being uniform. Some have expected
religion to continue to contribute towards the stability of the new
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industrial societies even in modified forms. Others have regarded
religion as problematic and in need of being swept away before a new
social order could be created. The rest, however, have refrained from
reaching any conclusions and have preferred, instead, to examine the
changing relationship between 'religion and the practical affairs of
everyday life. We think that the last approach is the most useful one
for our analysis of the place of religion in modern Saudi Arabia. It
does not involve any value judgments, but rather it tries to explain
the dynamics of the interaction between religion and the changing
socio-economic environment. Our approach will deal with religious
change as "a symptom of social change and as a source of change
itself" (Beckford and Luckmann 1989:1).
Sociologists have also differed in their approaches to the
meaning and social function of religion in human societies. The
functionalist approach of Durkheim, who viewed religion as a way of
creating social bonds, 6 was different,	 for example, from the
historical approach of Weber, who was more interested in the
relationship between socio-economic experiences and different modes of
religious expressions. 7 Karl Marx was different again in regarding
religion as a form of social opium that suppresses or masks the
conflict of interest between antagonistic social groups. His view,
that religion must be "explained away", was shared by Freud who saw
religion as an "institutionalised mass neurosis" (Wilson 1982:4).8
The study of religion has been approached from historical,
economical, psychological, anthropological as well as sociological
perspectives. The sociology of religion is distinctive but does not
display a uniform approach that can guide empirical studies. This
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remains a major shortcoming which is compensated for only by "a narrow
empirical focus on western forms of religion" (Turner 1983:3). But
religion today has "acquired distinct importance in its own right as a
sphere of activity where efforts are deliberately made to influence,
manipulate, and control people's thoughts, feelings and actions in
accordance with various religious values" (Beckford 1987a:34). There
is an urgent need, then, to develop strategies that can cope with the
changing role of religion in the modern world. 9 We shall have occasion
at many places in this thesis to show how a consideration of Islam in
Saudi Arabia calls for modification of the Western approach to the
sociology of religion.
B. Sociology of Religion and Islam
Islam has yet to occupy an appropriate place within the academic
discipline of the sociology of religion. In fact, "There are hardly
any major sociological studies of Islam and Islamic society ... There
are no firm traditions of Islamic studies grounded in the roots of
modern sociology" (Turner 1974:7). Islam has not been totally
neglected, however, by western social scientists. A huge number of
books and articles have been written about Islam mainly from the point
of view of its beliefs and practices. It is impossible to mention all
of them, but we will focus on the few that have contributed
significantly to the western image of Islam. 10
Islam has received considerable attention from western
historians and philosophers. David Hume, for example, fitted Islam
within his theory of the development of religion from polytheism to
monotheism and the continuous oscillation between the two. 11
 Hume's
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theory could be helpful to our assessment of the history of normative
Islam as a continuous process of decline and revival. It also goes
against the views, held by many sociologists of religion, that the
decline of religion (i.e. secularization) is a continuous and uniform
process which will lead to the eventual disappearance of religion from
human society. The more recent writings of Gibb (1953), Watt (1968),
Hodgson (1974), and Hitti (1970) are prominent examples of historical
approaches to understanding Islam. 12
Max Weber was one of the first sociologists to deal with Islam
as a social system. It was unfortunate, however, that Weber used his
analysis of Islam mainly to prove his argument that Protestanism was
the only religion suitable for the development of a capitalist
economy.
13
 Weber believed that the economic stagnation of Muslim
societies was due to religious values in Islam itself rather than to
external factors. 14 The theories of Max Weber, in relation to Islam,
were influenced by Orientalism as an approach to the study of Asiatic
societies. 15
The study by Reuben Levy (1962) is important for providing the
first detailed account of the social institutions of Islam. It is
mainly a descriptive study of how Islam shapes the basic institutions
of society. Rodinson (1974), by contrast, tried to come up with an
assessment of the relationship between Islam and capitalism. His
approach was "Marxist in orientation" (p.7) and he concluded that it
was hard to "see quite simply the influence of the ideology on the
socio—economic structure [of the Muslim community]" (p.186). This was
an indirect response to Weber's argument, but it provided no
alternative explanation of why rational capitalism did not develop in
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Muslim societies.
The most important sociological studies that have offered a
theoretical base for the understanding of Islam are those of Gellner
(1969, 1981). Gellner brought together the political theory of Ibn
Khaldun (733-808/1332-1406) 16 and the historical theory of Hume in an
attempt to understand the uniqueness of Islam as a political and
social system. Gellner's basic claim is that Islam, as "a blueprint of
a social order", provides us with an "interesting test case for
theories concerning the relationship of belief and social reality". He
argued that Islam, unlike Christianity, never acted as the corrosion
of empires, but as the cement of their foundations. Islam is the
ideology that can unify a tribal society and create a new dynasty, but
always remains unattached to them. "It is thus seen that the start of
Islam is re-enacted by new movements within Islam" (Gellner 1969:137).
The fact that the theory of Ibn Khaldun and Gellner's empirical
application are based on the Islamic society of North Africa does not
diminish their usefulness to our study of Islam in Saudi Arabia. The
society of the Arabian Peninsula is also tribal in nature, and Islam
has operated as the ideology uniting the tribes and establishing a
dynasty (see Chapter Four). The important points in Gellner's argument
which deal with Islam in its "scriptural" and "normative" state, as
contrasted with "popular" Islam, 17 are very much relevant to Islam in
modern Saudi Arabia. This "normative" Islam of the urban, literate
c'ulami' which has a kind of independent existence and "cannot simply
be equated with the practices of a society in which it occurs"
(Gellner 1969:127), is exactly the kind of Islam which concerns us in
this study. The conclusion reached by Gellner (1981:69) that;
38
old-style puritanism prevails where a traditional elite
survives but is still fairly close, in time and spirit, to
its own origins which had brought it to power in a fusion
of religious enthusiasm and tribal aggression,
seems to be a plausible basis for our analysis of Saudi Arabia.
Accepting the arguments of Gellner that normative Islam is
capable of surviving the political and social changes of the society
in which it is practised, and that it "manages to make the least
concessions, despite being identified with the larger community"
(Gellner 1969:138),	 means that the secularization thesis is
problematic when applied without qualification to Islam. The ability
of Islam to remain independent of its socio-political environment and
to "maintain its pre-industrial faith in the modern world" (Gellner
1981:4) explains the fact that Gellner considers Islam to be closest
to modernity of "the three great Western monotheisms" (Gellner
1981:7).
Another important study of Islam as it relates to the modern
world is that of Geertz (1968). It is an anthropological study of a
comparative nature dealing with the impact of Westernization on the
Moroccan and Javanese (Indonesian) societies. Part of the study deals
with two young Muslims, from both societies, who came in contact with
the West and attempted to reconcile their religion with the realities
of modern life. They presented examples of the "mixed up" individual
of the modern world who does not know what to do when his traditions
begin to falter. The attitude of both individuals showed that they
were attempting to retain their links with Islam while, at the same
time, adopting modern (Western) ways of behaviour. Greeley (1972:69)
reviewed Geertz's study and argued that religious symbols must now be
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interpreted to provide a comprehensive system for life.
Gilsenan (1982) provides another important anthropological
contribution to the study of Islam in the modern world. The most
important part of Gilsenan's study, for our purposes, is his
discussion of the fate of the Culamrin two Islamic societies (Turkey
and Morocco). It gives an example of the different roles played by the
c ulami' in different political environments, and concludes that
institutional differentiation tends to distinguish religion from other
views of the world and may, in the long run, make it "more vulnerable
to the challenges of social and cultrual transformation" (Gilsenan
1982:46). This process has already started in modern Saudi Arabia. But
whether or not the outcome would be similar to what has taken place in
Turkey is not yet clear. We believe that it will be different because
of the social and political differences between the two countries.
In yet another approach, Bryan Turner (1983) used what he called
a "materialist perspective" to study the relationship between religion
and social theory. Islam occupied a major part of this study alongside
Judaism and Christianity. The comparisons that Turner drew between
what he called "Abrahamic" faiths, and his extensive discussion of the
theories of the major contributors to the sociological studies of
religion make this work a model to be followed by further analysis and
discussion. Turner's comparative approach and his challenge to some of
the accepted methodologies of the study of religion suggest new ways
in which the sociology of religion can escape its Christian
limitations and become a global discipline for the study of religion
as a human phenomenon. His criticism of the Orientalist
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approach to the study of Islam, and his evaluation of Hume's theory
(Turner 1983:21, 35) have had a direct bearing on the present study.
In response to the Weberian notion that rationality is a
Western-Christian characteristic 18 Turner (1983:35) cites Hume's
argument that Islam is "conformable to sound reason" because it is a
stricter form of theism, and concludes that "In regard to rationality,
therefore, Islam is favourably contrasted with Christianity".
In addition to these theoretical reasons for studying Islam, the
political events of the past ten years (1979-1989) have brought Islam
more to the attention of the world, and have created an added interest
in the study of Islam especiakly as a political system. Books such as
those written by R. Martin (1982), D.S. Roberts (1981, 1982), Fry and
King (1980), and M. Kelly (1984) provide the Western reader with a
new, more objective, account of Islam as a religion. Muslim scholars
and writers such as Maududi (1969, 1983), K. Ahmad (1976), Gauhar
(1978), and Abdalati (1980), to name but a few, have presented the
much needed Islamic perspective on the study of Islam. This marks a
new era in the study of Islam in the West and ends the monopoly held
by western non-Muslim writers who have been "the chief interpreters of
Islam to the West" (Peters 1982:43).
Within the specific area of social sciences, the focus has been
mainly on Islam and politics. This trend was influenced mainly by the
Iranian revolution and by what appears to be a movement of Islamic
resurgence in the Muslim world. Piscatori (1983b, 1986), Esposito
(1980, 1984), and Arjomand (1984, 1989) are among the pioneers of the
study of Islam and politics in the 1980s. 19 A discussion of some of
their main arguments can be found later in this chapter. The
41
subsequent discussion of secularization, modernization and development
will also contain more references to works dealing with Islam in its
relationship with one of the three areas mentioned above.
As this brItf review has indicated, Islam is becoming central to
an increasing number of new sociological studies and publications. 20
But, despite these improvements, the sociological study of Islam still
lacks a clear and uniform approach that can guide empirical studies.
Another problem is that a lot of time and energy is spent correcting
the image of Islam in the west after centuries of misrepresentation
(Fry and King 1980:36). Part of the importance claimed for the present
work is that it not only exposes the shortcomings of earlier studies
of Islam but that it also suggests a new and less distorting
perspective on religious developments in an Islamic heartland.
C. Theories of Secularization 
As the world moved into a new era in the wake of the industrial and
political revolutions, religion, in the Western world, began to lose
its dominant grip on many societies. In countless attempts to explain
religious decline, sociologists frequently had recourse to the
controversial term "secularization" 21
 to explain what has happened to
religion in the modern world. This concept eventually became the
central theme of the sociology of religion under numerous guises and
in various applications. It will not be necessary for us, in the
context of this study, to review in details all the various
definitions or their contradictory implications. 22 We shall, instead,
concentrate on assessing the usefulness of this concept to the study
of the changing place of the Islamic religion in modern Saudi Arabia.
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The concept of secularization, like the sociology of religion,
came out of the Western experience of the clash between religion and
social change. The process of secularization accelerated with the
Reformation movement within Christianity, and eventually led to what
Weber called the "disenchantment of the world" 23 in which "capitalism,
as an economic embodiment of rationalization, produces institutional
and cultural differentiation and specialization of different social
spheres — politics, economics, religion, [and] morality ..., each
sphere ... is autonomous and has no claim to universal relevance or
communal authority" (Turner 1974:155). It is this differentiation
which interests us in the phenomenon of secularization. We shall deal
with it in detail later in this section.
In its most general form, secularization has been defined by
Bryan Wilson (1987a:160) as: "the process in which religious
consciousness, activities, and institutions lose social significance".
But this classic definition is so general that it tells us almost
nothing. It does not explain the beginning of the process, does not
differentiate between individualistic and institutional forms of
religion, and does not identify what is meant by loss of social
significance. More psychological approaches are not necessarily more
satisfactory. Johnstone (1975:295), for example, defined
secularization as a mental process meaning: "the displacement of
religious interpretations of reality which results in seeking
explanations for human behaviour and other phenomena in scientific and
rational terms". Again, this conceptualization leaves unanswered many
questions about the causes, manifestations and consequences of
secularization.
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Nevertheless, refinements in conceptualization have occurred.
For example, Peter Berger (1969:107) pointed to the importance of
differentiating between the secularization of culture and the
secularization of consciousness. 24 Thus began the essential approach
of seeing secularization as multi-dimensional and not as a uniform
process.
25
 Dobbelaere (1981) took the approach further by suggesting
that secularization has three dimensions. It can happen through a
process of "laicization" which means institutional differentiation; 26
it can be assessed on the basis of the religious involvement of
individuals; and it can take the form of religious change within
religious institutions involving beliefs, morals, personnel and
rituals.
The multi-dimensional approach of Dobbelaere (1981) gave
secularization more specificity, and, at the same time, identified
three processes that can take place independently of each other. This
approach is useful because it provides us with a conceptual framework
for looking at the process of laicization in particular and not at
secularization in general. We can assess the degree of laicization in
Saudi society without having to deal with the religious involvement of
individuals or changes taking place within religious institutions. We
have neither the time nor the necessary information for analyzing
these two aspects of secularization in the context of this study.
Dobbelaere (1981:11) defined laicization as:
a differentiation process: institutions are developed that
perform different functions and are structurally
different. Religion become one institution alongside other
institutions and loses its overarching claim.
This definition is useful because it identifies institutional
differentiation on a functional basis. It accepts the notion that the
44
performance of different functions is the reason for the
differentiation. There are, however, two inherent problems in the
definition as it relates to the religion of Islam. Firstly, it
associates religion with only one institution (it took the form of the
church in the West); and secondly, it assumes that religion had an
'overarching claim' over all other institutions in society. 27
Social institutions, according to Dobbelaere (1981:16) not only
become independent of each other, but each one "develop [s] its own
rationale". Laicization is seen as an ideological differentiation and
not just as a functional one. Furthermore, laicization is not "a
mechanical evolutionary process, but one that depends upon the
cultural context in which it unfolds and upon the persons, groups, and
quasi—groups, who manifestly, but more especially latently, secularize
social institutions (Dobbelaere 1984:217). The laicization process
leads to the creation of social institutions with functionally
rational principles. Traditional religion loses its social
significance because "it is incompatible with these functionally
rational principles ... [and] religious pluralism develop [s]" (ibid).
The notion that "individuals and groups are responsible for
secularization: not impersonal or abstract forces like technology or
education" (Fenn 1978:xii) tends to refer the process of
secularization (in its institutional form) back to the intentions and
actions of human actors. It is not an automatic outcome of social
structural changes, but seems to be a process that can be directed and
controlled. This challenges the assumptions that modernization and
development in their materialistic (technological) form necessarily
lead to a secularized society. 28
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In trying to assess the changes of religious influence in Saudi
society, we will look for signs of institutional differentiation on an
ideological and not just functional basis. In the absence of any
secularizing groups in Saudi Arabia, 29 we will concentrate on
assessing the influences of abstract forces (modernization and
development) on the ability of religious institutions to continue
functioning in society. If it is found that independent institutional
spheres (e.g. law, education, morality and economy) have developed
their own rationale and rejected the dominance of the Islamic ideology
(i.e. the sharicah) as the primary meaning system, then there is a
case for arguing that Saudi Arabian society has been secularized. But
if, on the other hand, it is found that the shari cah continues to be
the dominant ideology in society, then we cannot conclude that
secularization has taken place, regardless of the level of
institutional differentiation. The dominance of religious ideology
over all institutions (political, economic, and social) is the main
indicator of the presence or absence of secularization. It means that
the overarching claim of religion has not been rejected.
In sum, we believe that the problems associated with the concept
of secularization are many. It is problematic because it assumes a
continual and uniform historical process of religious decline that
will lead to the eventual disappearance of religion (Hill 1973:229).
Weber saw its beginning in Protestantism and Capitalism (Turner
1974:156); Meland (1966) believed that it began with the political
struggle for freedom among nonconformists in 19th century England; and
Mcguire (1981) traced the process to the collapse of the hierarchical
structuring of religious institutions. Berger (1967:127) supported
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Weber's argument and thought that Protestantism served as
	 "an
historically decisive prelude to secularization".
The argument that secularization as a process had a known
beginning implies that religion had previously been strong and
dominant. Those who believe in the base-line approach assume that a
religious "Golden Age" had existed, 30 and that primitive man was by
nature deeply religious (Dobbelaere 1981:34). From a comparative
historical perspective we know that religion, as a dominant force in
society, has waxed and waned countless times in many societies. It has
ruled empires, justified wars, guided civilizations, and transformed
societies. There have also been times when religion has lost its
significance, and its followers have faced prosecution and death. 31
Religion has always been influenced by political and social
considerations, and has therefore been the product of its own
environment. If Christianity ruled over Europe in the Middle Ages and
created its own Golden Age, then there is some reason to accept the
base-line argument but it must be kept in mind that it was not a
global base-line for the onset of secularization (Dobbelaere 1981:31).
Another problem with the concept of secularization is the
contention that it is a global phenomenon which arises in all
societies as soon as they start to modernize. Secularization "came to
seem to many to be a necessary condition for the transformation of
society" according to Gilsenan (1982:37). This approach does not take
into account the differences between cultures and religions in
different parts of the world. 32 It is no longer valid, and
sociologists have come to realize that the way in which secularization
occurs in one society might not explain how it will occur in another.
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The application of the theory of secularization is also problematic
because of the lack of scales to measure the levels of institutional
differentiation (see Dobbelaere 1987:17).
The secularization thesis has, nevertheless, been useful in
opening the way for our attempt to understand what has happened to
religion in the western world. Its global application, however, is
becoming more and more questionable in the light of more evidence and
changing circumstances. Hammond (1985:1) argued t?lat new religims
movements, growth of religious conservatism, and the increasing
politicization of religion (eg. Iran, Lebanon and N. Ireland), all
require a revision of the secularization thesis. A recent collection
of studies from different parts of the world (Beckford and Luckmann
1989) challenges the "triumphalist scenario of secularization,
according to which the declining significance of religion is a
necessary feature of modernizing and modern society" (p.2).
There are those who believe that "religion has a future to the
extent that humanity has a future" (Johnstone 1975:344), and those who
recognize the fact that religion "must be reckoned with in politics"
(Stackhouse 1987:410). Whether taking the form of a "civil religion"
(Mcguire 1981:158), giving rise to revival movements (Hopwood 1983),
or justifying revolution (e.g. Iran), religion is showing no obvious
signs of disappearing in the foreseeable future. 33
 The case of Saudi
Arabia has special significance for all the variation of
secularization theory, although it would be unwise to treat it as any
form of crucial or decisive test.
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Secularization and Islam
The aim of this section is to outline the special problems associated
with applying the concept of secularization to the study of Islam. The
nature of Islam as a "complete way of life" 34 makes it difficult to
apply the term secularization without qualifications. We agree with
Voll (1987:157) that the term secularization "can provide a basis for
seeing the interaction of the political and religious within the
Islamic context", only if it is "conceived as part of the broader
socio-historical dynamics ... and is seen as ... repeatable process".
Viewing the secularization of Islamic society (not ideology) as
a repeatable and reversible process solves the problem of dealing with
revival movements. The history of Islam is filled with examples of
periods of religious decline and revival movements (Hopwood 1983).
Secularization has occurred (where normative Islam loses its dominance
on society as was the case in 18th century Arabia), but it has always
been connected with political decline (Badeau 1959:61). The re-
establishment of a strong political system in some parts of the
Islamic world has usually been accompanied by an increase in the
dominance of religion over social institutions. At times of political
decline, popular forms of Islam have tended to become the dominant
force in society (Waardenburg 1978:318).
Normative Islam cannot become dominant without political
support. It is the form of religion that "must be public and
organized, a potential source of all collective and public concerns,
influencing the social system to operate in conformity with religious
principles" (Wilson 1987a:161). Only then can Islam be significant in
a modern society. The notion of a complete distinction between public
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and private spheres is not acceptable in normative Islam. Islam can
not accept willingly "a public sphere where rational, secular concepts
and principles are dominant and a private sphere where religious
principles prevail ... This is a concept indigenous to Western
Christian civilization" (Crecelius 1980:69). Incidentally, the
distinction between a public (secular) sphere and a private
(religious) sphere has not been complete even in the most modern,
secular societies of the West (Beckford and Luckmann 1989:2).
The separation between church and state is the most important
form of institutional differentiation between religion and other parts
of society. Islam has no church (in the western sense), but it does
have a number of functional institutions that cannot be separated from
the state. The main Islamic institution known as the shari cah (Islamic
Law) must be the dominant ideology of the state. Under the rule of the
sharI c'ah, there is room for "a kind of built in separation of powers.
The legislative is distinct from the executive power, for the simple
reason that legislation is in principle ready—made and in theory
complete, and pertains to God alone" (Gellner 1981:42). This
separation also creates an independent judiciary who "may be appointed
by the ruler, [but] they apply a law which cannot be the ruler's"
(ibid). The key to understanding the place of religion in Islamic
society is the relationship between the political and the religious
establishments.
Islamic history gives clear examples of a limited form of
institutional differentiation on a functional rather than ideological
level. 35 At times, "religious institutions and officials have been as
fully a part of the state as the army and generals" (Borthwick
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1979:154). At other times, a kind of dependence of the religious
leadership on the rulers developed and "became the accepted norm in
Islamic history" (Tibi 1980:210). That dependence does not diminish
the role of the culamP in determining cultural and political
value-orientations. Nor does it support Donald E. Smith's (1970:86)
contention that "the dominance of the polity over religious beliefs,
practices, and ecclesiastical structures in itself is a form of
secularization". That cannot be the case in Islam as long as the
polity maintains the normative beliefs and practices, and applies the
shari cah law (see Chapter Three).
The adaptability of the shari c ah to changing social and
historical conditions, "may help to explain why Islam has 'kept' so
much better than Christianity under the disintegration of traditional
community structures and cultural patterns brought about by modern
developments" (Kielstra 1985:13). In other words, the ability of the
sharicah to adapt and the fact that it "contains a minimum of
mythology, ritual and archaic symbolism" (ibid) create a built-in
resistance to loss of dominance under different circumstances.
It is important to emphasize that we are not going to assess the
process of secularization in Saudi society in religious terms. We are
only dealing with institutional differentiation as it 'elates to the
dominance of religion over social institutions. The ideological
position of Islam on the relationship between politics and religion
(see Chapter Three) is not the indicator by which to assess the
secularization of Saudi society. It only provides us with an
understanding of how the "ideal" Islamic state should be. Religion can
still be dominant in states that are less than the ideal.
Secularization is not measured by the distance between the actual and
the ideal. It is measured by assessing the ability of religious
institutions to continue playing their role and the ability of
religious ideology to continue providing meaning, legitimacy and
social control.
The conclusion reached by Wilson (1987a:162) provides us with a
useful, albeit Christian, model against which we can evaluate the
Saudi experience. He wrote that:
as long as supernaturalist conceptions (of whatever sort)
were effective in everyday life, or as long as religious
institutions were sustained by the secular authorities and
fulfilled functions as agencies of legitimation, official
ideology, and social control, society had not yet
experienced any radical modern process of secularization.
Dobbelaere (1987:13) has also recognized the problems associated with
attempting to apply the secularization thesis to Islamic countries. He
wrote that "we can expect secularization only in those societies in
which a process of differentiation has already set in to segregate
several institutional domains ... This is only partially the case in
most Islamic countries." (See also Voll 1987).
D. Theories of Modernization and Development 
In all its various guises, the term 'secularization' is inseparable
from notions of modernization and development, although the logic of
the inter-relationship between these concepts remains obscure. An
important task for this study is to try to disentangle these inter-
relationships by clarifying the concepts. The focus will be on
economic development and on political modernization as they lead to
institutional differentiation. The relationship between the two
processes of economic development and political modernization will be
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discussed in an attempt to arrive at a unified approach to our study
of the case of Saudi Arabia.
The term modernization is a new term for an old process - the
process of social change whereby traditional 36 or less developed
societies acquire characteristics common to modern or more developed
societies (Roberts 1971:127). This process used to be called
Europeanization during colonial times; then the term Westernization
was used until the development of Eastern countries (especially China,
the Soviet Union, and Japan) necessitated the use of a more general
term. There is a general agreement that the process began in the West
with the scientific and industrial revolutions of the 18th and 19th
centuries. This is the main reason why many theorists equate
modernization with Westernization (see Lerner 1958 and Eisenstadt
1966).
The process of modernization has been defined as a process of
the total transformation of a traditional, agrarian or premodern
society into a society displaying the types of technology and
associated social organizations that characterize the advanced,
industrial, economically prosperous, and politically relatively stable
nations of the modern world. 37
 The Western nations have been the
pioneers of the process, but today they are not the only models.38
They continue, however, to be the dominant model and the one that most
traditional societies try to imitate. Lerner (1958:VIII) claimed that
modernization appears as Westernization only by an "historical
coincidence", but that the West is still the only useful model for
traditional societies to follow. This position has been shared by
Patai (1962), and Eisenstadt (1966).
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Modernization theorists have typically argued that modernization
has led to an adaptation of "historically evolved institutions to the
rapidly changing functions that reflect the unprecedented increase in
man's knowledge permitting control over his environment" (Black
1966:7). The main social aspects of modernization, according to Black
(1966), are urbanization, a high rate of literacy, nuclear family,
growth of mass media, industrialization, institutional
differentiation, and social mobilization. Lerner (1958) had already
gone further in suggesting that modernization involves the "end of
ideology whether sacred or secular ..., and creates a new type of
personality, the mobile personality, who can rearrange his identity to
meet the challenge of new situations in a rapidly changing world"
(quoted in Turner 1974:160).39
The notion that modernization is a total process that affects
all sectors of society and leads to a total transformation is both
problematic and interesting in the context of the present study. Our
main concern is the effect of modernization on the meaning system and
values of the modernizing society. Must the technological and
organizational transformations be preceded or accompanied by "a state
of mind — expectation of progress, propensity to growth, readiness to
adapt oneself to change" (Lerner 1958:VIII)? Or can the people of a
traditional society maintain their values and their cultural identity
while adapting their institutions to modern functions? This is the
important question to which a convincing answer is urgently required.
Its relevance will become clear when we discuss the effect of
modernization on religion later in this chapter.
Hodgson (1974:425) believes that as a result of the scientific
54
impact of modernization we all "face a steady erosion of old norms and
loyalties". Berger, Berger and Kellner (1973:109) similarly argued
that modernization is a process by which "specific clusters of
institutions and contents of consciousness are transmitted". They
believed that this would be worse in Third World countries 40 because
the process of modernization "has reached them, and to a large degree
still reaches them, from the outside" (Berger, Berger, and Kellner
1973:110). The point to make here is that if old norms and values can
not continue to supply meaning and to withstand the pressures of
social change, and cannot accept and foster developments that lead to
a better way of life, then they must be abandoned. We, however, do not
accept the a priori notion that modernizing countries must also become
Westernized. It is essential to make a distinction between the
organizational aspects of modernization and its cultural aspects. It
remains to be proven that people from traditional societies have to
look, think and act like Westerners in order to become modern. 41
A major problem with most of the theories of modernization,
then, is that they view modernization as a uniform process.
Consequently, they see modern society as the total opposite of
traditional society. But it is logically difficult to identify a
society as either totally modern or totally traditional since the
process of modernization has presumably not reached its end yet. 42
What is modern today may be seen as traditional tomorrow and so on.
Another problem is the
misleading distinction currently used between rational and
traditional ways of looking at things. The implication is
frequently given that the traditional is irrational or
varies randomly relative to rationality. Nothing could be
further from the truth (Levy 1967:193).
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In fact, modern societies continue to display signs of their past in
many spheres of life. Modernization does not have to take place at the
expense of traditions. Tradition is also important because it
"involves memory of the past and it can make sense of the present and
provide a direction for the future ... If a society loses tradition
and therefore loses effective memory it is left adrift without
direction or purpose" (Bellah 1983:19).
The theories of modernization have been based, for the most
part, on the theories of Durkheim and Max Weber. 43
 The emphasis that
Durkheim placed on the processes of social evolution and on the fact
that societies can be studied as a functioning whole gave rise to the
idea that studying the experience of Western countries would explain
how traditional countries can become modern. Weber's idea that
people's religious beliefs can explain whether or not they have the
potential to become modern was behind the notion adopted by many
modernization theorists (Daniel Lerner and R. Patai are prominent
among them) that the people of traditional societies must abandon
their cultural identities before they can succeed in the modernization
process (see Barnett 1988:26).
Development is the other process of social and er:onomic change
that has been discussed by many social scientists, although it must be
admitted that it is difficult to find a uniform distinction between
modernization and development. There are those who regard
modernization as the general process of social change and development
as the economic component of modernization (Lerner 1968:387, and
Germani 1968:343). Jacobs (1971:10) took the reverse position and said
56
that "modernization may be considered as an integral part of the
process of development, but not necessarily vice versa . " Hoogvelt
(1978:61) did not see any difference between the two processes, and
listed the same indicators of modernization given by Black (1966:7) as
the indicators of development. 44
Regardless of these definitional difficulties, the problems
associated with the theories of modernization inspired a totally
different approach to the study of socio-economic change in Third
World countries. Based mainly on Marxist ideas, 45
 the new approach
looked for external factors in studying the problems of
"underdevelopment". 46
 Most of those who adopted this approach became
known as dependency theorists, for they argued that colonialism and
imperialism made Third World countries dependent on their exploiters.
This allegedly gave rise to the development of underdevelopment. The
proposed solution was not to adopt Western ways of government and
economics, but to redress the uneven balance between the rich and poor
countries. Dependency theorists "moved the discussion of development
away from individual societies taken in isolation. They proposed that
each society's development problems could only be understood in
relation to its place in a 'world system ! " (Barnett 1988:33).
The main problem with the dependency theory is tbat it gave a
simplistic explanation to a complicated problem. If we explain the
economic problems of the Third World as the outcome of exploitation by
the developed countries, then it becomes difficult to account for
internal factors such as class exploitation, regional imbalances and
overpopulation. The theory is useful in so far as it applies to the
economic problems of most Third World countries, but it does not
57
account directly for the social and political aspects of development.
Dependency theory pointed out the limitations of the theories of
modernization, but failed to provide an entirely satisfactory
alternative.
One of the main reasons for the limited usefulness of both
approaches is that they attempt to provide a single explanation for a
problem that involves many societies and different cultures . Each
society should be viewed within the context of its historical and
cultural factors. What works in the case of one country is not
necessarily going to work in the case of another. There should also be
a distinction between the various aspects of modernization and
development. Economic development (for example, growth of GNP) is
different from political development (mass participation); and the two
of them are different again from social development (for example,
urbanization and the growth of the nuclear family). Any one of these
developments can happen independently of the other two, and each one
should be studied separately.
There is no doubt that all three areas are connected, but they
do not necessarily change at the same pace or at the same time. A
country can have a high GNP without having full political
participation, and another country can have a high level of
urbanization without having either economic or political development
(see Eisenstadt 1970). These distinctions have a bearing on our study
of the place of Islam in the modernization and development of Saudi
Arabia. For, by keeping these phenomena conceptually separate, we can
investigate the processes of change without prejudging the outcome
through the indiscriminate use of dense and highly general concepts.
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Economic Development
In this study, the term development will be used in a limited sense to
describe the economic component of modernization. Its use will be
limited since the study is mainly concerned with the effect of
political modernization (ie. institutional differentiation) on
religious institutions. We will continue to use the term modernization
to describe the overall process of political, social and economic
change because "it more readily draws attention to the total nature of
social change, and ... it avoids presuppositions of improvement or
teleological views of the modernization process inherent in concepts
of development" (Roberts 1971:127).47
Economic development constitutes a very important component of
the modernization process. "Economic development is a high priority
objective of every modernizing society - the prime mover, when indeed
it is not the only motivation, for modernization" (Lerner 1968:388).
Lehmann (1979:26) regarded national income as a development indicator
and considered that a country was developing when unemployment and
poverty were declining. 48 Development is usually measured, however, by
economic indicators such as gross national product and per capita
income. 49
 It is more difficult to achieve development than
modernization in the sense that the former requires "the attainment of
self-sustaining growth" (Lerner 1968:388). Many Third World countries
have become modernized before achieving the real development of
creating and operating an economy of self-sustaining growth. 50
The economic factor in the modernization of Saudi Arabia is very
important because, unlike most modernizing countries, Saudi Arabia
suddenly acquired wealth as a result of the discovery of oil in 1938
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and of the huge increase in oil prices in 1973. Oil brought in a high
level of national income, and this made it easier to acquire the
technological aspects of modernization over a short period of time.
The important question here is whether what has taken place in Saudi
Arabia over the past twenty years can be considered real development
or modernization without development. The Saudi government claims that
it is real development that is taking place in accordance with
development plans designed to achieve maximum benefits for the country
and its citizens. 51 Critics, however, contend that what is taking
place is only a process of
copying the superficialities of culture from the advanced
countries; spending was directed towards building and
construction and importing up-to-date luxury products.
Such 'development is fallacious, for it has the
appearance of development but lacks the substance (Osama
1987:17).
The above argument may have some validity, but it does not take
account of the real developments that have taken place in areas of
industry, agriculture, commerce, and technical education (see Table
One in Chapter Four). The creation of a society of consumers who
depend on the state for most basic needs and who rely on foreign
labour to develop the economy may have been the main negative aspects
of the Saudi experience. The fact that Saudi Arabia has relied mainly
on one source of income (oil) may explain the urgency with which
modernization has taken place over the past two decades. The important
point here is to recognize the limitations of both the modernization
theories and dependency theories for providing a useful framework with
which to understand the Saudi case. The reasons that make Saudi Arabia
a unique case will be discussed later in this chapter. We now turn to
the specific process of political modernization and its implications
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for institutional differentiation.
Political Modernization
The process of political modernization is very important to this study
because it was the main source of institutional differentiation in
Saudi Arabia. Political modernization has been defined as the process
of differentiation of political structure which enhance the capability
- the effectiveness and efficiency of performance - of a society's
political system (Coleman 1968:395). This definition is useful for our
purposes because of its focus on institutional differentiation. It
seems to be the main process that indicates whether or not a country
is modernizing its political structure.
A modern political system is characterized by differentiation,
equality, capacity, 52
 democracy, and nation-state. Traditional polity
is predominantly ascriptive, particularistic, and diffuse in nature.
Modern polity,
	 on the other hand,
	 is achievement-oriented,
universalistic, and specific (Coleman 1968:396).
	 distinction
raises again the problem of viewing the modernization process as a
movement from the pole of traditionalism to the pole of modernity. The
fact of the matter is that "traditional patterns of power and
authority tend to resist fundamental change" (Bill and Leiden
1984:10). It also seems to be the case that "traditional institutions
and values have an extraordinary resilience and persistence" (Coleman
1968:399).
The general process of modernization does not depend entirely on
political modernization. According to Bill and Leiden (1984:25), the
"processes of modernization run far ahead of advances in political
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development in the Middle East". Their conclusion is that "Many
traditional political systems are able to foster modernization while
maintaining ongoing political patterns" (Bill and Leiden 1984:15).
This seems to be exactly what is taking place in modern Saudi
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The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has come a long way in adopting such
modern forms of government as functional differentiation, central
bureaucracy, and integration. It has also created a nation-state with
a national identity and political legitimacy based on Islam. Political
participation is limited to the traditional institution of the
majlis, 55 but more and more people are sharing in the decision-making
process (mainly through the bureaucracy). The Saudi government is not
democratic in the Western sense of the word, but it has demonstrated
the ability to meet all the functional requirements made of a modern
political system.°
There are no elections and no political parties in Saudi Arabia,
and the King has an absolute authority limited only by the place of
the Islamic sharI cah as the constitution of the country and by the
power of political groups (for example, members of the royal family,
the Council of Ministers and the culaia) (see al-Farsy 1986, Huyette
1985, and al-Juhani 1984). But over the past t6t9 five years
(starting with the establishment of the Council of Ministers in 1953)
the Kingdom has witnessed a continuous process of what can be called
institutional differentiation. Twenty national ministries and a number
of general presidencies and independent departments have been created
as part of the process of political modernization (see Chapter Four).
This process of differentiation is the departure point for our attempt
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to evaluate the influence of modernization on religious organizations
in Saudi Arabia. Our contention is that the Saudi government functions
like a modern political system even if it does not look like one. It
has achieved a high level of institutional differentiation but not to
the point where each institution creates its own independent
rationale.
Saudi Arabia can still be described as a transitional society. 57
It is not yet a modern country (politically speaking), and it has
modified the traditional arrangements for governing to a certain
extent. 58
 The political leadership has directed and controlled the
pace and nature of the modernization process. The country has never
been colonized, 59 and the government grew out of indigenous social and
political circumstances (see Chapter Four). The political elites have
acted as the modernizing elites, and they "largely determine the
extent to which tradition is harnessed to modernization" (Coleman
1968:400). The whole system is based on traditional principles (of
legitimacy and relationships), and it has to maintain those principles
in order to survive. "Traditional societies", according to Lerner
(1968:390), "can respond effectively to internally generated demands
for institutional change articulated over a relatively long period,
but they are typically incapable of rapid institutional changes to
meet externally induced demands."
E. Religion and Modernization
The dynamics of religious change at times of rapid socio—economic
development are at the centre of this thesis. The literature gives the
impression that religious influence has no choice but to decline at
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times of modernization. But we will briefly review some of these
arguments and try to expose their limitations.
In its more general form, modernization supposedly undermines
religious authority. According to Douglas (1982:8), religious decline
has been attributed to four main features of modernization: science;
bureaucracy; challenge to religious regulations; and human separation
from nature (we no longer experience religious inspiration found in
nature). 60 In the case of Middle Eastern societies, Patai's (1962:369)
argument is that a new technical order brought about by modernization
will inevitably lead to the creation of new moral orders modelled on
the Western experience. These are the secularizing influences of
modernization.
Germani (1968:362) is more specific in his claim that
secularization was "an essential condition of deeioTment, meligion
also acquires a specific sphere, that is, it must be transformed into
a specialized institution". The result would be that "religion became
one institution alongside other institutions and loses its overarching
claim" (Dobbelaere 1981:11). Instititutional differentiation
(separation of religion from political, economic and social
institutions) is the method by which religion apparently loses its
overarching claim. It is becoming clear today, however, that things
have not developed as the early theorists of modernization
anticipated. It is still not clear, for example, "whether modern
conditions really favour laxity and liberalism or rigorism and
centralization, in the long run. The question remains open, and need
not have the same answer everywhere" (Gellner 1981:65).
Studying the process of secularization in Muslim countries is
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difficult because the sociology of religion lacks a clear theoretical
perspective for dealing with non-Christian societies. Theories of
modernization looked for internal factors to explain secularization,
while dependency theories ignored the question altogether, and
concentrated on the economic aspects of development. The problem is
further complicated by the growing number of what Peter Berger
(1969:109) called the "carriers of secularization". 61
 In short, we
need an approach which combines internal and external factors, and
which views each society as possessing its unique combination of
internal and external circumstances.
Some commentators believe that secularization takes place in
most Third World countries by means of the influence of a small elite
exposed to Western education (Smith 1971:2). 62
 Others believe that
bureaucracy and urbanization are responsible. By contrast, Douglas
(1982:9) criticized those who accused bureaucracy of having a negative
effect on religious beliefs; and Arjomand (1989:110) has demonstrated
that in Muslim societies urbanization has "stimulated the movements
for orthodox reforms in this century".
The major question in the case of many Third World countries is
whether or not religion can continue to provide ideological legitimacy
for governments committed to modernization. Can we find the answer in
the nature of the religion itself, in the position of the government,
or in external factors? These questions are important, but they exceed
the limited scope of the present study. Our findings about religious
institutions in Saudi Arabia will supply only part of the material
that is required to answer the general questions in the long-term. We
move now to the nature of Islam as it relates to modernization, and
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then to the distinctiveness of the Saudi political system in the hope
of clarifying some of the prevalent confusion.
Modernization and Islam
The religion of Islam, being the dominant ideology of the Saudi
political system, holds some of the keys to understanding the Saudi
experience. It is a total system that does not recognize ideological
separation between a public and a private sphere. It also deals with
various aspects of public and private life, and cannot be confined to
one independent institution. Islam, furthermore, has room for
functional differentiation between institutions while maintaining its
dominance through ideology rather than just through the functions of
specific institutions (see Chapter Three).
An important point of departure in understanding the
relationship between Islam and modernization is to recognize the
static and dynamic aspects of the Islamic sharI c ah. 63 A distinction
must be made "between the integral and essential parts of the
doctrinal structure and those that are secondary and changeable"
(Alatas 1972:42). This distinction has a bearing on the accusation
that Islam is a backward religion which stands in the way of
modernization and is "at odds with all the possibility of creative
moral growth" (Hodgson 1974:418). Many Western writers (for example,
Smith 1971:204 and Turner 1978:394) 64 have refuted this accusation by
drawing attention to the distinction between the essential and the
changeable components of Islam. The religion is, therefore, more
flexible and adaptable than Hodgson recognizes.
Islam has allowed institutional differentiation to take place in
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Saudi Arabia, and even seems to be benefiting from it. It apparently
continues to supply legitimacy for the political order and an ideology
for the state (see Chapter Five). It seems today that the threat to
the dominance of Islam in Saudi Arabia is not internal, at least in
the foreseeable future. Any threats are likely to come from outside
the country. For example, the impact of Western education received by
Saudi students abroad, the world economic system, the mass media, and
foreign labour working in the country cannot be underestimated. Their
effects may start on the individual level (secularization of the
consciousness) and then spread to groups and institutions.
The reverse is also possible. Saudi individuals may find
religion a useful way to counteract the pressures for giving up their
traditional way of life and searching for a new identity. Both
scenarios are beyond the scope of this study. But it is important at
least to recognize the existence of other factors that might influence
future developments.
Our study of the hay'ah (see Part III) will be located within
the context of political modernization. The development of the hay'ah
into an independent national organization, and the modernization of
its structure and methods of operation will help to explain the
interaction between religion and modernity in Saudi Arabia. But other
features of this unusual country must be sketched before the analysis
can begin.
F. The Problematic Case of Saudi Arabia
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is part of what is called the Third World
mainly for political and geographical considerations. However, it
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possesses a number of distinctive characteristics that challenge most
of the generalizations of the theories of modernization and
development. The aim of this section is to highlight some of these
special characteristics, with particular reference to the
accommodation that has been made between modernization and tradition.
Saudi Arabia remains one of the few nations whose official
constitution is a religious scripture (the Qur l dn). This gives
religious ideology a dominance over most public and private
institutions. The homogeneity of the population on ethnic, religious,
linguistic and cultural grounds is also virtually unparallelled
(Looney 1982:2). Islam is the religion of the entire population, 65 and
religions other than Islam are not officially recognized. Non-Muslims
are certainly not allowed to practise their religion in public (see
Chapter Five). Religious pluralism is virtually non-existent in Saudi
Arabia.
Politically, Saudi Arabia is a monarchy with no political
parties or legislative body. There is, however, a council of ministers
presided over by the King who is also the prime minister (see Chapter
Four). Political innovations have taken place over a long period of
time (over fifty years) in response to internal conditions with
limited external influences (see Huyette 1985). The Kingdom has
escaped colonisation, and has never experienced the kind of political
upheavals that characterize the experiences of most Third World
countries. The stability of the regime over the past 57 years (the
country was officially unified in 1932) is a major factor in the
relative success of the modernization process within a traditional
context (see al-Hamad 1985).
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On the economic front, Saudi Arabia has the benefit of enormous
wealth generated by oil. The modernization process was consequently
easier than in most other developing countries where developments have
usually been impeded by poverty or a lack of natural resources. Wealth
has certainly created its own problems in Saudi society, but the
benefits can be seen in many areas of life. The relatively small size
of the population (estimated by an official source to be 9,118,000 in
1985) 66 is another factor that made modernization easier than in
countries which suffer from overpopulation and overurbanization (e.g.
India and Egypt).
The Saudi government is unique in the sense that its legitimacy
is mainly based on its commitment to the Islamic religion. Being the
custodian of the two holiest mosques of Islam (the sacred Mosque in
Makkah and the Prophet's Mosque in al-Madinah) made that commitment an
international rather than just a domestic one. The government is
careful not to appear anti-religion in any way. Religious institutions
have been incorporated into the structure of the state, and many
religious functions are handled by the state bureaucracy (see Chapter
Five and Part III). The culamg ' (religious leaders) enjoy influence
and prestige rarely found in other Islamic countries. This is due in
part to the unique relationship between the Royal Family and the
religious leaders of central Arabia (see Chapter Three).
All of the above factors in combination have made Saudi Arabia a
unique case among modernizing countries. Its uniqueness will become
even clearer as we deal in detail with the changing place of religion
in modern Saudi Arabia. But the theories of secularization,
modernization, and development do not take adequately into account
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most of the distinctive features of the Saudi experience. A country
that seems to be trying to modernize within the framework of its
traditions, appears to want to maintain the overarching claim of
religious ideology, possesses great wealth, and has never been
colonized, is a country that puts a severe strain on existing
theories.
Conclusion
The main theme of this chapter is that the sociology of religion is in
a process of transformation following recent developments in different
parts of the world that challenge some accepted approaches and
generalizations.
The religion of Islam has been particularly badly neglected in
specific sociological studies of religion in the modern world. The
trend is changing, however, and more attention is being paid to Islam
today than ten years ago. This was largely in response to political
developments in the Islamic world rather than to a planned change to
make the sociology of religion a global discipline rather than mainly
a Christian one.
Similar shortcomings have marked the major types of theory
relevant to the present study. Theories of secularization, for
example, fall short of providing a uniform approach to the study of
religious change as a global phenomenon. They also fail to provide
useful explanations for religious revival and new religious movements.
Modernization theories have tended to concentrate on internal factors
in attempts to assess socio—economic change, while development
(dependency) theories have tended to utilize externalist accounts as
70
the main explanations of underdevelopment in most Third World
countries. An approach that takes account of both internal and
external factors is urgently needed. This would go some way towards
meeting the objection that, "Our modernity has not yet been analysed
in a way that explains religious decays and renewal " (Douglas
1982:5).
The religion of Islam and the Saudi political system both
possess unique characteristics that challenge the current theories.
These characteristics will be examined below in an attempt to show the
major limitations of the theories which could serve as the theoretical
backdrop for this study. In the light of these /imitations, our study
will try to specify more precisely the configuration of religious,
political and economic factors which have shaped the development of
certain Islamic institutions in Saudi Arabia. The question of whether
this amounts to secularization, modernization or development will be a
leitmotiv.
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PART II
Religion and State in Arabia:
Past and Present
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Introduction
This part deals with the history of Islam and the state in Arabia. The
aim is to provide an historical background for the place of religion
in contemporary Saudi Arabia. The focus will be on the rise of Islam,
its main institutions, the revival movement of Shaykh Muhammad b. cAbd
al-Wahhab, the evolution of the modern Saudi state, and the religious
situation in Arabia before the birth of this state and today.
This part is designed to provide sufficient information to
enable us to assess the changes that have taken place in the role and
influence of religion in Saudi society. Using a comparative approach
we will try to trace the effects of the establishment of a central
government and political modernization on the ability of religious
institutions to continue playing their role in society. An attempt
will also be made to trace the evolution of the modern Saudi state and
the development of the various official organizations that perform
religious functions.
Chapter Three deals with the early history of Islam and with its
main institutions. The discussion covers the political, social, and
economic aspects of Islam. The second half of the chapter is about the
decline of Islam in central Arabia, and the revival movement of Shaykh
Muhammad b. cAbd al-Wahhab (commonly known as Wahhabism;. Chapter Four
will be about the evolution of the modern Saudi state. The focus is on
the role of religion in the establishment of the state, and on the
process of political modernization. The development of official
religious organizations will also be dealt with as part of that
process. The chapter will conclude with a brief discussion about Saudi
Arabia today in terms of political structure and the major
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socio-economic developments in the past twenty years.
The religious situation in present-day Saudi Arabia will be the
topic of Chapter Five. The focus will be on public manifestations of
religion, the main religious institutions in the country, the
international Islamic role of Saudi Arabia, and modernization and
religious influence. The chapter concludes with a brief assessment of
the unique features of religion in Saudi Arabia today. This part will
provide the general background for our specific look at the history
and status of one particular religious organization in Part III.
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Chapter Three 
Islam: Theological and Socio-Political Developments 
This chapter is designed to -give a brief survey of the central
meanings and institutions of the religion of Islam. The focus will be
on the rise of Islam and on its fundamentals as a religion and as a
political system. The meaning and sources of the Islamic shari cah will
be discussed before the relationship between religion and politics in
Islamic ideology is introduced. An understanding of that general
relationship is essential in the context of trying to understand that
particular relationship in present-day Saudi Arabia. The following
section will look at the sources of authority in the Islamic community
especially the culama', and how their authority is gained and
exercised.
The second part of the chapter will deal with the recent history
of Islam in the Arabian peninsula. The decline of Islam as a result of
the political decline of the state paved the way for the dacwahl
 of
Shaykh Muhammad b. cAbd al-Wahhib (known as the Wahhabi movement).
This dacwah marked a major turning point in the history of Islam in
the Arabian Peninsula. It is also very important in understanding the
place of religion in modern Saudi Arabia. The alliance that developed
between Shaykh Muhammad b. cAbd al-Wahhab and the leader of the Al
Sucild ruling family, Muhammad b. Suctid, created the politico-religious
environment for the establishment, once again, of an "Islamic" state
in the heart-land of Islam.
This is a sociological study of the effects of development and
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modernization on religious institutions and not a study in theology.
The discussion of Islam in this chapter is limited to the information
that is necessary for our understanding of the history and ideology of
the religion that is followed and practised in Saudi Arabia. In order
to understand concepts like shari ah, tawhid, al-amr bi_tl_maC riif
wa-'1-nahy can al-munkar, and zakih, some knowledge of their sources
and development is very important. This chapter is deliberately
selective in dealing with a mixture of historical, theological, and
sociological aspects of Islam. The aim is to provide a general
background to the main topic of the study. 2
•
A. The Rise of Islam:
It was in the seventh century C.E. that the religion of Islam was
born. The prophet Muhammad of the Quraysh tribe proclaimed his message
around the year 610 C.E. in the town of Makkah (Mecca). He had been
born forty years earlier to a poor family and had lost both his
parents before he reached the age of six. He grew up under the care of
his uncle, and worked mainly as a merchant in the commercial
environment of Makkah. At the age of forty Muhammad declared himself
as the messenger of Allih (God) to mankind. He called the people of
Makkah to give up their pagan practices and to believe in the tawhid
(unity of God).
He preached that there was only one God, the creator and
sustainer of the universe, and that the duty of man is to worship Him.
Only few people believed and followed him at first. They received
harsh treatment at the hands of the leaders of Makkah who saw in this
message a challenge to their authority. After thirteen years of
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preaching in Makkah with limited success, the Prophet and his
followers made the migration (hijrah) in 622 C.E. to the town of
Yathrib, north of Makkah. The people there had embraced the message of
the Prophet and had accepted him as their new leader. The town was
re-named al-Madinah, meaning the city, and the first Islamic ummah
(community of believers) developed there ( cAzzam 1984:23).
In al-Madinah, the Prophet Muhammad established the first
political entity based entirely on religious principles, i.e. he
established an Islamic state. He was its religious as well as its
political leader. The Prophet organized the affairs of his religion
and his state on the basis of what Muslims believe to be revelations
from God through Jibril (Gabriel). Those revelations are regarded as
divine and eternal, and they are collected in the Holy book of Islam,
the Qur'an (Koran).
After eight years in al-Madinah, the Muslims became better
organized and stronger. The Message spread to all parts of the Arabian
Peninsula, and the tribes embraced it one after another. The Prophet
organized an army, went back to Makkah and conquered it without any
opposition. He destroyed all pagan idols around the Ka cbah, 3 and
proclaimed Makkah a sacred town (haram) and its Mosque a holy place,
to which all Muslims must face when they perform sallh (prayer). The
Prophet Muhammad went back to Makkah for the last time in 632 C.E. to
perform the hajj (pilgrimage). He delivered his farewell message to
the Muslims in which he emphasized the important aspects of Islam.
After completing the hall, the Prophet went back to al-Madinah where
he died a few months later in 632 C.E. at the age of sixty three
( cAzzam 1984:29).
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The Prophet made no provision for a successor after his death,
leaving the choice to the consensus of the community based on the
Qur rinic notion of shur.g. (consultation). 4
 One of the first Muslims
and a very close companion of the Prophet, AbU Bakr, was selected as
khan:fah (successor) to the Prophet in his political capacity as
leader of the community. The Islamic state continued to expand, and
before the end of the first century after the hijrah of the Prophet it
had taken over both the Byzantine and Persian Empires. After the end
of the rule of the first four khulafi' (caliphs) the capital of the
Islamic state was moved from al-Madinah to Damascus under the founder
of the cUmayyad dynasty (41-132/661-750).
Islam had grown from a small state, maintained by a central
leadership, to a very large entity too big to be managed by one
central administration. Various powerful families and tribes embraced
the new religion and "became its champions by exporting it to new
territories and founding new dynasties" (Roberts 1981:31). The growth
extended to China in the East and to Spain in the West, and culminated
in great empires in various parts of the World that were dominated by
Islam. It was an unfortunate development for the Arabian Peninsula,
however, which went through a period of political and religious
decline due to its isolation from the centres of power. The only
exceptions were the holy cities of Makkah and al-Madinah which
benefited from their religious significance.
B.The Meaning and Institutions of Islam:
The word Islam is an Arabic noun which means submission and obedience.
As a religion, it means total submission and obedience to the will and
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laws of the one true God, Allah. Muslims in general believe that Islam
was not a new religion brought by the Prophet Mubammad to the Arabs,
but the same divine message brought by Niib (Noah), IbrAliim (Abraham),
MUsg (Moses) and cIsg (Jesus). 5 The Islamic message of tawbid
(monotheism) holds that this universe was created by the one true God,
and that He created human beings to know Him and to worship Him
alone . 6
According to the Qur ign, God had chosen Islam as the din for
mankind and as the only way to obtain success in this life and
salvation in the life hereafter. 7 The Arabic word din not only means
religion in the restricted sense of the word, but also implies a total
way of life based on the laws of God. Roberts (1981:35) has tried to
explain the meaning of the word din as follows:
Din does not mean simply the spiritual fulfilment or
eliTightenment of the individual, it means all matters
pertaining to a way of life. Din encompasses theology,
scripture, politics, morality, law, justice and all other
aspects of life relating to the thoughts or actions of
men. For the Westerner, used to viewing religion as a
matter of private conscience, this is the fundamental
point to grasp in trying to understand Islam. It is not
that religion dominates the life of a faithful Muslim, but
that religion, in this comprehensive sense, is his
life. (8)
Islam, therefore, neither taught nor accepts that religion is only a
private relationship between God and human beings. It is a complete
code of beliefs and conducts for those individuals and groups who
submitted their lives to God by becoming Muslims. Watt (1968:3) wrote
that Islam:
is not a private matter for individuals, touching only the
periphery of their lives, but something which is both
private and public, something which permeates the whole
fabric of society in a way of which men are conscious. It
is — all in one — theological dogma, forms of worship,
political theory, and a detailed code of conduct,
including even matters which the European would classify
as hygiene or etiquette.
79
An understanding of the comprehensive meaning of Islam is
essential, in the context of this study, to our grasp of Islam as a
religion as well as a political, a social and an economic system. The
important role that Islam plays in the life of individual Muslims and
Muslim scoieties comes from the fact that Islam has rules and
regulations for all aspects of life.
It is important to understand some of these rules and
regulations before we can understand how Islam functions in society.
The remainder of the first half of this chapter will deal with the
major Islamic concepts and institutions.
Articles of Faith (arkan al-iman) 
The first and most important belief on which a Muslim bases his faith
(imam) is the belief in tawhid. "Tawhid is a revolutionary concept and
constitutes the essence of the teaching of Islam. It means that there
is only One Supreme Lord of the universe. He is Omnipotent,
Omnipresent and the Sustainer of the world and of mankind " (Ahmad
1976:29).
The other five articles of imin are: belief in the Angels of
God; belief in the Revealed Scriptures from God to mankind through the
Messengers of God; belief in the Messengers (Prophets) of God that
were sent before the Prophet Muhammad; belief in the Day of Judgment
(al-yawm al-akhir); and belief in the Divine Decree (al-qadar). 9 Any
person who believes in these articles of faith becomes a Muslim and is
required to practise Islam by carrying out the Five Pillars of Islam
which are obligatory for the individual Muslim, constituting the main
acts of worship (  ibadat) in the Islamic Religion (see al-Zarqa 1976).
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The Five Pillars of Islam (arkan al-Islam) 
The Five Pillars are the basic duties of the individual Muslim, male
and female, towards God. They are designed to test the sincerity of a
Muslim's faith by requiring him or her to demonstrate it in their
actions. These pillars are:
1. Shahadah: This is the recitation of a short creed by the individual
declaring his belief in God and his willingness to follow the example
(sunnah) of the Prophet Muhammad. That creed is: I bear witness that
there is no god but Allah, and that Muhammad is the Messenger of
Allah. Once this profession qf faith is said in public, the person
saying it will be considered a Muslim.
2. Sarah: This is prayer which is offered five times every day at
designated times and following a set pattern. The Muslim is encouraged
to pray with a group (jama cah) in the mosque (masjid), but prayer can
be offered individually in the home, or anywhere else. Before praying,
a Muslim is required to make the wuclii' (ablutions) and to raise the
adhan (call) to prayer. He is also required to face Makkah wherever he
may be in the world.
The daily prayers are offered at fajr (dawn), zuhr (noon),
(afternoon), madrib (suns
sunset). On Fridays, the
(Friday) prayer which can
and is preceded by discourse (khutbah) given by the imam (the leader
-21EC
et), and cisha' (about two hours after
zuhr prayer is replaced by the jumCah
only be performed in congregation (jamacah)
of the prayer). Beside these regular prayers, there are special
prayers for the two annual religious festivals ( cids), for funerals
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(jangzah), for the nights of Raman (targwih), and prayers to ask God
for rain (istisqg '). It is also recommended for a Muslim to offer
supererogatory (nawifil) prayers at any time for extra rewards.
3. Zakgh (alms-giving): This is an annual tax of 2.5% of one's net
saving from income and property. The amount is calculated after
deductions for personal expenses. The amount saved must reach a
certain amount and be kept for a whole year before it becomes
obligatory upon the individual to pay zakgh. It is to be given
directly to eight categories of people identified in the Qur'gn
(9:60).
4. a-wm (fasting): This means abstaining from food, drink and sexual
relations from dawn until sunset during the month of Ramadan. Muslims
are also encouraged to abstain from all evil thoughts, actions and
sayings with the stated purpose of learning taqwg (piety). 1° Children,
the elderly, the sick, expectant and nursing mothers, women in
menstruation, and those on a journey of about fifty miles or more are
exempted from this duty (Abbara 1987:41). Some of them, however, have
to make up for it at a later date.
5. tlajj (pilgrimage): This is a duty upon every able Muslim to be
performed once in a lifetime. It takes place in and around Makkah for
four days starting on the ninth of the last month of the Islamic
calendar (Dhill-Hijjah). Those who cannot perform the tall for physical
or financial reasons are exempted.11
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The Sharicah
The comprehensive nature of the Laws of Islam as a complete "way of
life" is best demonstrated in the concept of shari cah, an Arabic word
which can be translated as "the path in which God wishes men to walk"
(Roberts 1981:54). Shari cah basically is the total of all Islamic laws
dealing with both public and private spheres, which apply to all
Muslims and the non-Muslim citizens of an Islamic state. 12
 It has been
described by Weeks (1978:24) as:
so comprehensive that it has rules for nearly all human
activity, personal and interpersonal. It sets forth rules
for government, fighting wars, and settling disputes. It
decrees who not to marry and what foods not to eat. There
being no area of activity not covered by law, there is no
accommodation in theory for a separate secular, as against
religious, jurisdiction.
The shari cah derives its laws, rules and regulations from four
-
main sources. The two major sources of the shari c ah are:
1. The Qur'En (lit. the "reading" or the "recitation"). This is the
holy book of Islam believed by Muslims to be the word of God revealed
to the Prophet Muhammad. The revelations came down over a period of
twenty-three years, and were collected in one book by the Caliph
CUthman in 28/650. The Qur'in is divided into 114 chapters each of
which is called a sUrah consisting of a number of ayit (verses). It is
recited by Muslims as a blessing to both reciter and hearer , and it is
studied as the key to the knowledge of God and the knowledge of Islam
(see Brohi 1976). Muslims are also encouraged to memorize the whole
text or parts of it, and today there are Muslims who know the entire
Qur'an by heart.
From the Islamic perspective, the Qur l in embodies the divine law
and "is therefore superior to any man-made law of the past, present or
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future" (al-Buraey 1985:62). The shari cah derives from the Qur'an the
basic divine laws of Islam dealing with all aspects of the Muslim's
life. The Qur'an also deals with historical events such as the
creation of the Universe, the people who lived before the time of the
Prophet Muhammad, and the Prophets who were sent to them. It speaks
about the end of this world, life after death, and man's duty towards
God and towards other human beings.
2. The Sunnah (lit. 'the path' or 'the way'): The sunnah is the
example of the Prophet Muhammad which he set by his sayings, his
actions or his approval during his life-time as a prophet. The role of
the Prophet was to demonstrate, explain and pactise the laws of the
Qur'an so that Muslims would know how to live an "Islamic" life. He
not only transmitted the revealed Qur'an, but he also interpreted and
explained it.13
Beside the Qur'an and the sunnah, which constituted the main
sources of the sharIcah up to the death of the Prophet Muhammad, two
other sources have become accepted by Muslims as legitimate sources
from which the shaficah can derive new laws and regulations. This was
made necessary by the appearance of problems and situations for which
the Qur ign and the sunnah have no specific instructions. The two minor
sources of the shari cah are: ijma c, consensus of the culaia' regarding
a question of law; and qiYas, analogy, by means of which the laws of
the Qur qn and the sunnah are applied to situations not explicitly
covered by these two sources (Glasse 1989: 182, 325).
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The cUlami°
The word culama' is a plural of calim which means learned,
knowledgeable or scholarly. It is used to describe the religious
scholars of Islam and "embraces all who have cultivated the religious
disciplines or fulfilled certain practical functions such as
judgeship" (Algar 1987: 115). The culama' are considered the heirs of
the prophets by virtue of teaching people and guarding religious laws.
The Qur'in and the sunnah have both indicated the important role of
the learned and also the virtue of knowledge. Seeking knowledge is
considered an act of worship, and learning the fundamentals of Islam
is an obligation for every Muslim.
It was not until the 3/9th century that a distinct class of
learned men identified as culatha' crystallized. This development came
about as a result of the expansion and elaboration of the various
branches of religious knowledge, and the desire to codify the
provisions of Islamic law. The %l•ma' had to be recognized by the
community as such. They worked as judges, teachers, leaders of
prayers, muftls, 14
 or just authors of religious books.
The  culatha' "derive their religious authority not from a
religious organization or an established institution, but from the
knowledge they have of the data of revelation, that is to say from
their religious learning" (Waardenburg 1978:327). That knowledge does
not give the %lam• ' a special status or privilege in society, but
rather makes them responsible for guarding the shari cah by making sure
that it remains in its original form. As guardians of the knowledge of
the shari cah, the  culana' occupy a unique place in the political
structure of the Islamic State. They can decide the legitimacy of the
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State, and can lead the public in supporting or rejecting a particular
ruler on the grounds of religious justification. The fatwi, which
means "a published opinion or decision regarding religious doctrine or
law made by a recognized authority" (Glass e 1989:125), is one of the
major channels through which the %lama. ' exercise their authority.
The relationship between the culamD and the political authority
of the Islamic state has always been a contentious one. There are
those who have argued that the culami' lose their authority once they
become part of the structure of the state. 15 We believe that this is a
simplistic view influenced by the Western notion of separation between
politics and religion. No such thing can be possible in a state that
wants to apply the sharIcah in public affairs. The "official" role of
the culamD becomes essential as a result of their own religious
learning, their upholding of the shari c ah as the absolute norm and
ideal, and their official status which enabled them to impose the
sharicah without a separate organizational machinery (Waardenburg
1978:326).
The institution of culana l does not have any structure or
organizational hierarchy (at least in Sunni Islam). 16 It has taken
different forms in different Islamic states and at different times.
The position and power of the culami' are always influenced by the
political environment and the attitude of the political elites towards
them. The culami' usually do not aspire to hold political power, but
they tend to influence political personalities and policies of the
state. Our discussion of the particular case of the culami' in modern
Saudi Arabia in Chapter Five will bring this point into sharper
focus. 17
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The Madhahib (sing. madhhab)
This is a term used to describe the four schools of 11211
(jurisprudence) that succeeded in codifying the shail cah. These
schools were named after the four scholars who established them. The
first madhhab was the Vane" one founded by the imam Abr.: klanifah
(81-150/700-769). It has the largest following among Muslims today.
Imam Malik (97-179/716-795) founded the second school in al-Madinah,
which is known today as the Maliki school of Jurisprudence. The third
school was founded by the imam al-Shafi ei (150-205/767-820), and is
known as the Shafic iyyah school. And the fourth madhhab was founded by
the imam Ahmad b. Uanbal (164-241/780-855). The last one is considered
the most conservative of the four schools, and is followed mainly in
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States.
The differences between the four schools are minimal. They
amount to different interpretations of basically the same principles
for all decisions are based on the Qur qn and the sunnah. These
schools of jurisprudence made certain laws and regulations easier to
practise by codifying them, but the individual Muslim is not obliged
to follow any particular school.
C. Islam as a Socio-Economic System
Islam sought a total transformation of the structure of the Arab
society of al-Madinah immediately after the Prophet's migration to
that city. "The Islamic ethics were combined with a strategy to form a
new social relationship (community), institute a new set of liturgical
and social action (religion) and legitimisation of community and
religion through war (state) " (Askari 1978:41). The most fundamental
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change took place in the notion of loyalty which had previously been
based on family and tribal connections. "The social order was
transformed by abolishing the blood relationship as the principle of
identity, loyalty, enmity and revenge" (Askari 1978:55).
The prophet Muhammad started the process by stressing that all
believers are brothers in faith regardless of their tribal or social
background. According to the sharI c ah, all human beings were created
equal and are equal in the sight of God; they differ only in the
degree of taqwg (piety). The principle of equality was in fact
practised in a society that was used to slavery and discrimination
against non—Arabs. Bila1, 18
 an Abyssinian slave freed by Abu Bakr,
became one of the closest companions of the Prophet and the first
mil'adhdhin in al—Madinah. Islam restricted the trade in slaves and
made freeing them an act of worship (see Qutb 1976).
The shari c ah set out detailed regulations to organize
relationships between individuals and groups. The institution of
marriage was given special attention with rules to specify whom a
Muslim can and cannot marry. The number of wives a Muslim can have at
one time was limited to four on condition that he should treat them
equally. 19
 Divorce is allowed as a last resort but is described as the
most disliked lawful act in the sight of God. Segregation between the
sexes in public was made a religious duty, and is widely considered
necessary for protecting public morality and preventing unlawful
relationships that could destroy the fabric of society. 20
The community was made responsible for the welfare of its
members, especially the poor and orphans. The institutions of zakah
and  adaqah (charity) were established to facilitate the exercise of
and criminal
-
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that responsibility. The practice of female infanticide (wa'd
al-banit), which had existed in Arabia before Islam, was condemned and
forbidden. 21 The group was also made responsible for the actions of
individuals. It was prescribed as an obligation for every Muslim to
engage in al-amr wa-'l-nahy can al-munkar (enjoining the
acceptable and forbidding the reprehensible). 22 The Qur'an (3:110)
describes Muslims as: "the best of peoples, evolved for mankind,
enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in
God." This principle was meant to involve members of the community in
the practice of enforcing the laws of God and guarding public
morality. Such a principle led to the creation of the Islamic
institution of hisbah. 23
The actions of the individual are further limited by a detailed
code of lawful (halal) and unlawful (arm) behaviour. Certain types
of food and drinks were made unlawful in view of their harmful effects
on either the body or the mind (see al-Qaradawi 1960). A number of
actions and relationships were classified as crimes, and punishments
were prescribed for each crime. Little distinction was made between
crimes of a religious nature (e.g. eating during the day in Ramadin)
and crimes against individuals or property. Any violation of the laws
of God is considered a crime, and the state was given the authority to
prosecute those who commit it. The Islamic judicial system which is
based on the shari cah has a jurisdiction over all civil
cases, and capital punishments are prescribed in the Qur
In dealing with economic matters, Islam started by
the idea that everything in the universe belongs to God
of God's ownership of resources and His bestowing on man the faculties
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to utilise these resources is one of the starting points of Islamic
moral economy" (Askari 1978:122). Islam regulated the economic
activities of Muslims through general instructions dealing with
ownership, commerce, trade and loans. It, however, placed economic
activity second to religious activity,
accountable to God as to where he gets his wealth from and on what he
spends it.
Private ownership is permitted, and commercial activity is
encouraged. A basic norm is that an individual's work, manual or
mental, is the primary means of acquiring income or wealth. Islam, on
the other hand, views public resources that involve collective
interests (eg. water and mines) as the property of the state and
denies that they should be controlled by individuals. Distribution of
wealth among members of the community is an Islamic principle with the
aim of preventing the creation of a gap between the rich and the poor.
"Islam lays down clearly that wealth be neither hoarded nor
concentrated into few hands, but distributed among all people" (Askari
1978:130). The laws of inheritance, and the institutions of zakah and
sadaqah were all designed to achieve a better distribution of wealth.
Islam laid down strict prohibitions against rib a (usury), games
of chance and commercial fraud, 27 to prevent people from acquiring
wealth at the expense of the less fortunate. Islam regards wealth as
only a means to living a good life and to "spend in the way of God", 28
and not as an end in itself. It creates a balance between the right
of the individual to acquire wealth, encouraging him to share it
with others, and the responsibility of the state to guard the
collective interests of the group and to cater for the welfare of all
26
and made the individual
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its citizens. Islam thus presents a middle way between the extremes of
capitalism and communism.29
D. Islam as Political System
The establishment of the first Islamic ummah (community of believers)
in al-Madinah under the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad is regarded
by Muslims as the model for the Islamic state. The ideals of a state
run by the laws of God through shuri (consultation) constitute the
basic principles of what can be called an "Islamic" state. The Prophet
Muhammad, through his sunnah, demonstrated how Muslims should live in
a community where the sharIcah is the supreme law that must be obeyed
by all. He gave an example of a state where politics and religion are
one and the same, and he became the spiritual as well as the temporal
leader of the ummah.
Islam praises order and organization, and the Prophet taught the
importance of leadership and the importance of obedience in
maintaining social order.
The Prophet exhorts Muslims to select a leader (an amir)
even if three of them were travelling together. The leader
is to be listened to and obeyed, as long as there is no
conflict between his directions and Islamic law (Hopwood
1983:120).
The Qur'in (4:59) states:
0 ye who	 believe, obey	 God, and	 obey the
those charged with authority	 among you. If
Apostle,
ye differ
and
in
anything	 among	 yourselves, refer	 it	 to God	 and His
Apostle.
The madhhab of Ibn Hanbal "held the view that obedience was due to the
imam whether or not he was a good man, provided that he did not
require his subjects to disobey God or the Shari C a" (Crawford
1982:233).
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—cThe sham ah did not give details of how the leader of the state
is to be selected, and the Prophet died without appointing a
successor. It was left to the Muslims to choose a leader from among
them according to the circumstances at the time. "The shari cah", wrote
Azzgm (1984:119);
laid down only a few basic principles pertaining to the
office of the head of state. These principles include the
installation of an imam, who should be of mature age and a
man of wisdom, enjoy popular support ... draw on the
assistance of good citizens and ... [be] an upholder of
the law.
That leader does not have any 'spiritual' authority, but "is only held
to create the external conditions under which the shari ca can be
applied. The Guiana' only formulate the content of the shari ca and
each believer is expected to follow its injunctions freely"
(Waardenburg 1978:326).
Islam does not accept the notion of a Divine Right to rule by
certain individuals. It does not really specify who should rule or
what title is given to a ruler as long as the shari cah is made the
basis of rule. The basic principles of consultation, equality, freedom
and justice have all been stressed as important within the Islamic
system of government. Cragg (1964:16) has described the Islamic
political system as democratic in that "it proclaims that (earthly)
power stands under law." Maududi (1969:134), on the other hand,
describes it as "theo-democracy" which means "a divine democratic
government, because under it the Muslims have been given a limited
popular sovereignty under the (sovereignty) of God."
The authority of the leader is limited by the shaFi cah, and kept
in balance by the natural leaders of the community referred to as ahl
al-ball wa-'L- caqd. 3° This group is made up of culama', senior members
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of government, and individuals respected and recognized by the public
as wise and as trustworthy. As for the controversial issue of the
relationship between religion and state, cAmmirah (1980:103), who
tried to explain the Islamic position after the end of the prophetic
period and the period of the first four caliphs, argued that Islam,
according to the sharicah, does not accept a unity of political and
religious authority. It also does not separate the two, but only
creates a functional distinction between religious and political
authorities with the two forces working together to implement the
sharI cah in society.
The culami' provide the ideological guidance for the state, and
the umari' (governors) use their executive powers to implement that
guidance in public life. It is a delicate balance that can only be
maintained when the two authorities are totally committed to the
ideals of Islam. "Since the purpose of the state is to enforce the
Holy Law," wrote Crawford (1982:228), "political legitimacy is
correspondingly derived from the observance and implementation of
God's Law and from the enforcement of the regime of godliness."31
E. Decline of Islam in Central Arabia 
The process of decline began after the 3/9th century mainly as a
result of political factors. The great expansion that the Islamic
state experienced made it difficult for the central authority to
control all parts of the Empire. Smaller independent states began to
develop, and regions isolated from the major cities went into a long
period of political and religious decline. The central part of the
Arabian Peninsula was one of those areas that experienced such a
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decline until the middle of the 12/18th century.
The consequences of this decline can be seen in the way the
people of central Arabia practised Islam. "Belief and practice in the
Peninsula had strayed from the purity of early Islam. Trees, saints'
tombs, and various sacred shrines were widely venerated, if not
actually worshipped, there was a general laxness in religious practice
and devotion" (Kluck 1984:106). This state of affairs existed mainly
among the nomads and in most towns, with the exception of a few that
had some active c ulama' and a very basic form of religious education
(al—cUthaymin 1986:17).
It is believed that the main reasons behind the decline of
Islamic practices in parts of central Arabia were both the absence of
any form of systematic religious education and the lack of political
systems interested in applying and protecting the shari cah. "A number
of petty rulers controlled various towns and there was continuous
inter—tribal feuding" (Hopwood 1982:25). The rulers of the towns were
interested in political survival in a difficult environment, and they
left religious matters in the hands of a number of prominent culana'
who were powerless in the face of what Waardenburg (1978:318) called
"popular Islam". This "popular Islam" became part of the life of the
people, and was based on beliefs and practices that contradicted
"normative or official Islam" which is represented by the sharicah.
The normative type of Islam
implies that people in certain offices can perform
specific actions which are religiously binding and
juridicially valid. For example, the ulama establish the
conditions for a jihad and the caliph carries it out, the
mufti gives responses to legal questions (fatwas) and the
cladi administers justice (Waardenburg 19787325):
The absence of "normative Islam" from central Arabia at the beginning
94
of the 12/18th century permitted a form of separation between religion
and state. The culama' who taught religion and worked as muftis or
qidis did their work without formal connection with the political
authority in the towns. That separation and the limited influence of
religious ideology on the lives of people, established the
pre-conditions for what can be called a process of secularization in
central Arabia. Religion lost most of its meaning and its
significance, and jahiliyyah 32
 (state of religious ignorance) existed
among the tribes and the urban populace (Hopwood 1982:26).
It is possible to argue here that Islam, as a religion, cannot
be practised in its ideal form without the existence of a political
system that would create the conditions for such a total practice.
Islam is a collective religion, and the "normative" form of it cannot
survive without certain basic institutions to enable people to
practise it and to enforce the observance of its "pillars". A judicial
system to implement the civil and criminal laws, an institution of
hisbah to enforce practices and guard public morality, a form of
religious education to transfer religious knowledge from one
generation to the next, and an authority to collect zakah, they are
all essential requirements for a minimum degree of religious influence
in society. Those requirements cannot be maintained and cannot
function effectively without the support of the state and the full
participation of the culama'. The situation in central Arabia two and
a half centuries ago illustrates this argument.
F. The Dacwah of Ibn cAbd al-Wahliab 
The situation in central Arabia at the beginning of the 12/18th
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century created the ideal environment for the most successful revival
movement in the modern history of Islam. It was not the first or the
last such movement in Islamic society, but it achieved a major
transformation which has lasted right up to the present time in the
political and religious conditions of central Arabia. That is why it
is important to examine the dacwah of Shaykh33 Muhammad b. cAbd
al-Wahhab at some length.
The writer has chosen the term dacwah (call) 34 to describe the
movement because that is the name by which the followers of the
movement prefer to designate it (Kluck 1984:106). It is known in the
West as Wahhabism, but that is an inaccurate term because it implies
that Muhammad b. cAbd al-Wahhab established his own religion in
central Arabia. "The term Wahhabism", wrote Wahba (1964:89);
generally used in countries outside, is almost unknown in
Arabia itself. It was coined by the opponents of the
movement, as a means of implying that it was a new sect
instead of, as it really is, a return to the original
faith preached and practised by the Prophet
[Muhammad]. (35)
It should be added that Muhammad b. cAbd al-Wahhab was Hanbali in
fiqh, (i.e. he followed the madhhab of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal), and in
theological matters adhered closely to the teaching of the famous
7/13th century Islamic theologian and reformer, also a Hanball, Ibn
Taymiyyah (661-728/1263-1328).
The founder of this reforming movement, Muhammad b. cAbd
al-Wahhab, was born in 1115/1703-4 in the town of al- cUyaynah, north
of Riyadh (Al al-Shaykh 1974:21). He received his early education in
the fundamentals of Islam from his father, who was the judge of the
town. He subsequently travelled to seek religious education in
al-Madinah, al-Basrah and al-Ahsa' for a few years, after which he
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became an authority in the sciences of the shari cah. He returned to
Najd convinced that its people had strayed from the original teachings
of Islam, and that the situation must be corrected. He began to teach,
write books and send letters to the culathi' of other towns asking them
to join his movement (al-cUthaytin 1986:29-32).
In 1158/1745-6 Shaykh Muhammad b. cAbd al-Wahhib moved to the
town of al-Darciyyah where he received the total support of its amir,
Muhammad b. SucTid. The two men agreed to work with each other in order
to restore the original teachings of Islam and to implement the
sharI cah in the town. The protection and support of the mar enabled
the shaykh to continue his efforts to bring people back to the
teachings of Islam. Within a few years, the movement had spread to
other towns and began to have a major impact on the life of the people
of Najd. "A holy tree near the village was cut down and a woman caught
in adultery was stoned in the market-place, and the Governor himself
threw the first stone ... [thus] ... began a great period of revival
and reformation of the religious and political life of Arabia" (Muelen
1957:32).
Muhammd b. Sucid had found in the movement an ideological
legitimacy for his rule, and religion and politics were brought back
together, in central Arabia, for the first time in centuries. The
ideology of the da cwah centred around the idea of tawbid (strict
monotheism) so as to counter-balance the spread of what was regarded
as shirk (polytheism) practices such as the worship of 'holy' trees
and tombs. 36
 The Shaykh preached a return to the fundamental sources
of Islam, and declared war on all bidac (innovations). He taught that
enjoining the acceptable and forbidding the reprehensible (al-amr
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bi- 1 1-macrilf wa-'l-nahy Can al-munkar) was a religious duty incumbent
upon all believers, and obtained from the mit- an agreement that it
was the duty of the state to enforce that principle (al-cUthaymin
1986:154).
The Shaykh had realized the benefits of such an alliance. "If
uncompromising monotheism were to be enforced, polytheism eliminated,
jihad waged, the good [ma cirlf] ordered, the evil [munkar] forbidden,
then the support of men of the sword was necessary" (Crawford
1982:228). The importance attached to the principle of enjoining the
macra and forbidding the munkar by the Shaykh and his followers paved
the way for the return of the role of the traditional Islamic
muhtasib, and the eventual establishment of a similar organization in
present-day Saudi Arabia (see Part III).
G. Restoration of the State Based on Religion 
The success of the da c wah of Shaykh Muhammad b. cAbd al-Wahhib gave
the Ai Sucal family an ideological force that helped in the expansion
of their rule to most of the Central parts of the Arabian Peninsula.
Within sixty years of the beginning of the movement, all of Najd was
under the sovereignty of the House of Al Su ctid. The first Saudi state,
committed to the ideology of Islam, became the main force in the
Arabian Peninsula. In addition to the political success of the
alliance, there were major changes on the religious front. Wahba
(1964:113) described the outcome of the movement as follows:
Whatever may be said of its methods, the religious revival
undoubtedly had very pronounced effects in Nejd ... It
made people more attached to religion, more inclined to
let it arbitrate for them in all things, more respectful
towards the administration of justice, [and] more
law-abiding.
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The relationship that developed between the political leader
(the amir) and the religious leader (the Shaykh), and the respect they
had for each other's role in society established a unique form of
politico-religious structure that worked to the benefit of both sides.
It was a new form of relationship between politics and eligion that
was unique to the Arabian Peninsula and a product of its environment.
The framework for such a relationship, however, was based on the
theory of the Islamic state advocated by Ibn Taymiyyah in his famous
work al-Sifisah al-Shar ciyyah (The politics of the shari cah) (see Ibn
Taymiyyait1970). In the new arrangement, the Shaykh was much more than
just an advisor to the amir or an issuer of official fatwis. He played
a major part in the affairs of the state by appointing judges,
receiving and sending delegations, directing the policy of the state
in certain areas and collecting and distributing zaklh which was the
main income for the state (al-cUthayiin 1986:78).
The state, on the other hand, became involved in the enforcement
of religious observance and public morality for the first time since
the first Islamic state in al-Madinah. That unique relationship has
continued to the present time through the descendants of both leaders.
It has been rationalised, and formal organizations have been
established to keep religion and politics working together in a unique
and effective way (see Chapter Four).
The Shaykh died in 1206/1791-2 after having laid down the
foundations of a strong revival movement that was extended by his sons
and students. He wrote a number of books outlining his da cwah, and
established a following in other parts of the Islamic world. The
Ottoman Empire felt threatened by the emerging state and, therefore,
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sent its Viceroy in Egypt to Najd to put an end to the movement. The
campaign was successful, and the capital of the Saudi state, al-Dar_
ciYYah , was destroyed in 1234/1818-19.
Another member of Al Su ciid re-established his family's rule in
Najd in 1824. He moved the capital to Riyadh, and the second Saudi
state ruled over Najd and other parts of the peninsula until
1308/1891. The ruling family of Ibn Rashid took over Najd from their
-
base in	 forcing Al-  Suc ud to leave Riyadh for exile in Kuwait.
The exile did not last for long, and in 1319/1902 -Al Sucild regained
Riyadh through cAbd al-cAziz b. cAbd al-Rahniin Al Sucgd. The third
Saudi state was established, and the da c wah of Muhammad b. cAbd
al-Wahhab obtained another opportunity to bring Islam back to the
public life of the people of the Arabian peninsula.
H. Religious Situation Before the Modern State 
There is very little information available about the religious
situation in the Arabian Peninsula before 1902. It is clear, however,
from the few accounts given by travellers that the role of religion in
public life was virtually non-existent especially among the nomads
(see, for example, Wallin 1979:311 and Blunt 1985:125). Very few
changes took place in regard to religious influence as a result of the
movement of Ibn cAbd al-Wahhib outside the main towns of Najd (see
Niblock 1982a:87).
The lack of a system of education and of a central power that
could enforce religious laws limited the effects of the movement among
the nomads. Tribal laws and customs were mainly the laws of the land,
and wars between the various tribes were common (see Iqbal 1977). In
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this kind of environment, normative Islam was very weak in the central
parts of the Peninsula. Religion was mainly absent from the public
domain as a source of laws, morality and legitimacy. In the private
domain, however, things were on the move towards a new era of revival
and dominance.
During the two periods of political decline after the fall of
the first two Saudi states, the principles of the da wah lived on
athrough the efforts of some culan' nattaW e ah (volunteers) and
teachers who continued their activities mainly among the townspeople.
"Wahhabism", wrote Muelen (1957:36), "was not dead , [it] had been
forced back into the desert whence it started. There it smouldered on,
just alive and waiting for a quickening wind to kindle its smouldering
ashes."
Conclusion
This chapter has given an idea of the historical importance of Islam
in the Arabian Peninsula. Islam was born there, and the da Gwah of Ibn
cAbd al—Wahhib brought the influence of Islam back once again. The
history of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula, on both occasions, had been
connected strongly with politics, demonstrating the point that Islam,
as a religion, cannot be separated from its political environment. The
situation in central Arabia before the da cwah was an example of how
Islam can be influoced by the social environment rather than Islam
itself influencing that environment. The result was a form of "popular
Islam" which most Muslims regard as a deviation from the original
teachings of the sharicah.
Our look at the meaning and basic institutions of Islam reveals
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that the religion of Islam has the capacity to be what Muslims regard
as a "total way of life". There is no room for a competing way of life
based on other sources or ideologies. Islam, on the other hand,
accepts no division between its various aspects. It must be practised
in its totality or, otherwise,- the whole system would collapse and
lose its influence. This is an important point that must be remembered
when trying to apply theories of secularization to the case of Islam.
As for the relationship between the spiritual and the temporal,
Islam tried to maintain a balance between the two. It encourages
Muslims "to build for yourself in this world as if you would live
forever, and build for your after—life as if you would die tomorrow.
This world is but the means (matiyah) to the next" ( cAzzam 1984:248).
There are a number of examples in the teachings of the shari cah,
discussed above, pointing to how Islam gives practical guidelines to
how a Muslim can maintain a balance between the spiritual and temporal
aspects of life.
The information given about the rise, meaning and institutions
of Islam, and about the revival movement in central Arabia
demonstrates why Islam has become such an important and dominant force
in the lives of the people of Saudi Arabia today. It has become clear
that, despite the da c wah of Shaykh Muhammad b. cAbd al—Wahhib,
religion remained very weak in public life in central Arabia. This
state of affairs continued until the beginning of the 20th century.
The establishment of the modern Saudi state signalled the return of
religion as a dominant ideology in the public realm. How that happened
will be the focus of the following chapter.
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Chapter Four
The Modern Saudi State
This chapter is an account of the major political, social and economic
developments in Saudi Arabia between 1902 and 1989. There is a great
deal of information to be covered in this one chapter, but the writer
believes that it is important to mention all major developments in
order to set the stage for our consideration of the religious
situation in the country at the present, and for our case study in the
subsequent part. The chapter begins with
considerations dealing with the area, the
some basic geographical
major regions and the
population of Saudi Arabia. The next section will summarize the
process of political unification of the country by cAbd al—cAziz
Suciid which began in 1902. Special attention will be given both to the
role of religious ideology in the process of unification and to the
ikhwan movement.
The modern state of Saudi Arabia became one political entity in
1932. Before that, however, the various parts of the country had been
under the control of a number of ruling families. The writer will use
the term Saudi Arabia to refer to the country only when talking about
events that happened after 1932. The names of the four main
geographical regions will also be reserved for events that happened
before 1932.
The second half of the chapter will be devoted to the
development of a central government and the process of political
modernization. The period between 1932 and 1953 witnessed a slow
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transformation of the country from four separate regions ruled
individually by governors appointed by the King to a polity with a
central government and a national structure. The discovery of oil and
the institutionalization of religion were the two main events that
would have major impacts for the future of the country and the place
of religion within the structure of government. The establishment of
national ministries, a system of general education, a uniformed
structure for the judiciary, and a council of ministers further
highlighted the intentions of the leadership to modernize the
structure and functions of the central government. These developments
will be examined from an historical perspective with an emphasis on
what they have meant for the place of religion in society.
The last three sections will be a survey of the period between
1953 and 1985, and of the situation today. All the important
political, social and economic developments during that period will be
discussed briefly. Developments in the structure of government,
education,	 urbanization,	 transportation,	 the	 mass	 media,
communication, agriculture and basic industries will be discussed
briefly so as to establish the transformations that the country had
experienced in the past four decades. The emphasis will be on what
happened to the religious organizations during that time, considering
their place within the structure of government and their role in
society.
A. Geographical Considerations 
The area under study in this chapter (present-day Saudi Arabia)
comprises roughly three quarters of the total area of the Arabian
Peninsula. The size of the area is over one million square miles,
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about one-third the size of the United States of America. The main
four regions that make up the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia today were
independent of each other until they were brought together through a
process of war and diplomacy that lasted for almost thirty years. A
brief sketch of the social and political differences between the
regions will help in explaining the role played by those differences
in future developments.
The largest of the four regions is called Najd, or 'highlands'.
It is largely a sedimentary plateau in the heart of the Peninsula.
Most of its area is barren desert very sparsely populated by people,
the majority of whom have been nomadic tribesmen. There have been a
number of towns with a settled population working mainly in farming
and commerce. Each town was ruled by a family using the tribal basis
of authority which depended mainly on the personality of the athir
(governor). The region was isolated from the outside world for
centuries in consequence of its difficult environment and the lack of
natural resources. Its importance today stems from the fact that the
-family of Al Suc
 ud comes from this region.
The Hejaz or 'barrier' is the second region both in size and
importance. It lies to the West of the Peninsula with 700 miles of
coastal plain along the Red Sea. This region has a special
significance to all Muslims due to the existence there of the two holy
cities of Makkah and al-Madinah. The Hejaz has a highly cosmopolitan
society. For centuries the Muslim Pilgrimage to the holy cities has
drawn people from all over the world. Many stayed in the region
permanently making the population of the Hejaz an ethnic mixture of
Arabized people from all parts of the Muslim world. The region has
also had a long tradition of organized central government due to the
influence of the Ottoman Empire.
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Figure 1 
Map of Saudi Arabia showing the geographical
regions and major cities.
SOURCE: Bindagji, H. (1978) Atlas of Saudi Arabia.
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The third region is cAsir, which means 'difficult'. It is a
semi-mountainous region in the south western corner of the Peninsula
north of North Yemen. Long (1980:98) describes the people of cAsir as
"hardworking people who still terraced hillside farms and live in
villages constructed of stone": This area is the most populated region
of the Peninsula, and its people have liberal social customs in
comparison with the people of Najd. cAsir came under the rule of the
Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, and was influenced a great deal by
the dacwah of Shaykh Muhammad b. cAbd al-Wahhib during the period in
which it was under the dominance of the first Saudi state. '
Al-Hasa or the Eastern Province, as it is officially known, is
the fourth region. It lies beside the Arabian Gulf, and was
traditionally an area of oasis farmers, fishermen and mariners. Its
significance lies in the fact that it contains all the oil wells of
the country. The influx of workers from all corners of the world who
came to work in the oil fields has altered the social make up of this
region. It shares with Najd a very similar environment and the fact
that it possesses a large percentage of Bedouin estimated by AbU
cAlyyah (1986:14) to be about 75% of the population early in this
century.
The population of the four regions was entirely Muslim around
1900, and the majority were of Arab origin. They all spoke the Arabic
language and they shared similar customs and strong tribal
affiliation. The family occupied a central position in most social and
economic relationships. Lipsky (1959:4) described the life of the
people as "impregnated with the spirit and practices of Islam. Such
universal adherence is in large measure due to the prevalence and
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strength of puritan Wahabi doctrine." There are no estimates of the
numbers of people who lived in the four regions at the beginning of
this century. The first official census was held in 1974, and it
estimated the population to be a little over seven million. An
official publication of the government gives the figure of 9,118,000
in 1985.2
The large percentage of nomadic or semi-nomadic people in the
country, estimated by Lipsky (1959:24) to be around 66% of the total
population, may account for the difficulty of knowing the exact size
of the population. The government has encouraged the sedentarization
and detribalization of the nomads, but it reported that about 27% of
the population were still living a migratory way of life in 1974. The
percentage, however, is believed to be much smaller today.
B. Unification of the Realm 1319-1352/1902-1932 
The process of unification began in 1902 when cAbd al-cAziz Al Sucad
returned with a small army from exile in Kuwait to capture the town of
Riyadh and reclaim the rule of his family in the area. By 1906, cAbd
al-cAziz, holding the religious title of Imam, had managed to forge a
series of alliances with tribal leaders and governors of neighbouring
towns, most of whom accepted his inherited right to rule. Pe extended
his authority over most of Najd, and by 1913 extended his rule over
the Eastern province (al-Hasa) after taking advantage of the weakness
of the Turkish garrison in the area. This was achieved in part as a
result of the development of a mobile force of Bedouin brought
together by dedication to the religion of Islam and obedience to the
Imam (i.e. c	 cAbd al- Aziz Al Sulid).
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Wahba (1964:165) reported that the Turks evacuated the eastern
part of cAsIr in 1919, and cAbd al- cAzlz promptly annexed it. He went
on to capture Hail in northern Najd in 1921 thus putting an end to the
rule of the al-Rashid family in that area. This was a major victory
for him because it was the al-Rashid family who had forced his father
to take exile in Kuwait after the fall of the second Saudi state in
1891. In 1921, cAbd al-cA •lz took on the title of sultan and
proclaimed himself Sultan of Najd and its Dependencies. In 1922, he
annexed the rest of cAsir and secured his rule over three-quarters of
the Arabian Peninsula.
For religious as well as political reasons, cAbd al-cAzTz had
always been interested in the Hejaz region. He knew that it would very
much enhance his religious position as imam of the Muslims if he could
manage to bring the two holy cities under his control. The commitment
of his army, which was made up mainly of the ikhwin (see the following
section), and the apparent weakness of the Shareefian family in the
Hejaz gave him the opportunity to annex the Hejaz to his sultanate.
The campaign began in 1924 with the capture of the town of al-Ta'if.
He took over Makkah without war in 1925 because the Shareef avoided
armed conflict and left the city. By the end of 1926, al-Madinah and
Jiddah came under the rule of cAbd al-cAziz. A year later, he declared
himself King of Hejaz and Sultan of Najd and its Dependencies. He
appointed his second son, Faysal, as his viceroy in Hejaz and began to
develop an organized structure of government in the region in line
with existing political and social institutions.
The two main regions, Najd and the Hejaz, remained politically
separate for about seven years. The differences between the two
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regions made immediate unification somewhat difficult. Furthermore,
the lack of means of communications and transportation between the two
regions made it easier to rule each one separately. Saleh (1975:75)
wrote that the four traditional regions were ruled independently until
1953 "as a consequence of their differences in history, environment
and contact with outside powers". Official unity, however, came in
September of 1932 when the King, after consulting with the culaMal
tribal leaders and his advisors, decided to rename the united regions
as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 3 This established in principle the
first and most important stage in the development of the modern Saudi
state.
C. The Role of Religion
Our understanding of the process of state formation will not be
complete without a detailed look at the role of religious ideology and
religious personalities in that process. That role was based on the
alliance between the religious and temporal authorities of central
Arabia in 1745 (see Chapter Three). The ideas of Shaykh Muhammad b.
cAbd al—Wahhab had lived on in the towns and villages of Najd and were
strengthened by a basic system of religious education given in the
mosques by the culaia' (Niblock 1982a:87). People's respect and
obedience to the culama' were as strong as ever, and the support of
the  culaia' was vital for the efforts of King cAbd al—cAzlz to
succeed. He won that support easily because he based his authority on
religious foundations and he gave the culaia' a role to play in the
affairs of the new state.
The prominent culaia' of Najd at the beginning of this century,
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mainly descendants of Shaykh Muhammad b. cAbd al—Wahhab, saw in the
development of the modern Saudi state a great opportunity for a
continuation of the process of religious revival that had begun a
century and a half previously. That revival was made possible and
effective by the support of the political power of Muhammad b. Sucad
at that time. Another manifestation of political support from the same
family was what the culami' of Najd were waiting for.
King cAbd al—cAziz was himself a very religious person. He
received religious education in his youth, and showed a great
understanding of religion on a number of occasions. He even used to
preach a short sermon on a text from the Qur'in after the noon
prayers, on a daily basis (Busch 1943:80). He always emphasized the
fact that the religion of Islam is the only constitution for the new
state. He used to consult the culama' regarding all major decisions,
and even changed some of his policies when they objected to them. In
1951, he abolished the annual celebration of the anniversary of his
capture of Riyadh. The religious leaders had passed a resolution that
this celebration was an innovation contrary to the teachings of Islam
(Wahba 1964:170).
The King understood what the culamD wanted, and he seemed to
appreciate their sensitivity. He was much more open minded, however,
when it came to change and what he saw as progress within the
boundaries of religion. When the culami' opposed the introduction of
the radio on the basis that it was an innovation, the King convinced
them that it was not harmful to religion. He had someone read the
Qur'an over the radio demonstrating that this modern machine could in
fact be used to advance the cause of religion in the country.
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The most important role played by the culaii' was in the area of
education. Religious education was the only available form of
education in central Arabia prior to 1925. This medium was utilised in
the policy of settling the nomads into agricultural communities to
prepare them for life as part of a modern state. The appeal of
religion was found to be a strong force in convincing the nomads to
give up their nomadic way of life and to settle down. This policy will
be discussed in the following section.
Another important area influenced by religion was the judiciary.
Tribal customs in settling disputes were to be replaced by a uniform
set of religious principles drawn from the sharIcah. The process began
with the appointment of shari C ah judges in all major towns, and in
1926 "all qadis were expected to base their legal decisions on the
Hanbali rite [school of jurisprudence]" (Goldrup 1971:284). The
rationalization of the judiciary based on the sharI c ah was another
important area where the influence of religion was strong and
consistent. The third major area of religious influence was the
establishment of an organization to enforce religious observances and
public morality (see Part III).
The Ikhrin Movement
Beside their influence over education, judiciary and the enforcement
of public morality, the culaia' also played a major part in the
development of what became known as the ikhw-in movement. The idea
behind this movement came after the King and the culaniD realized that
the nomadic lifestyle of the majority of the population of Najd was an
obstacle to the development of a stable form of government. The King
had won the loyalty of the people of the towns, but the nomads owed
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their loyalty to the leaders of their own tribes.
The movement began when King cAbd al-cAiiz decided that the only
possible way to control the nomads and to educate them in the
fundamentals of religion was to convince them to settle down into
agricultural communities in various parts of Najd. These communities
were called hujar (pl. of hujrah), and the first one was established
at Artiwiyyah in 1912, then followed another one at al-Ghatghat. The
total reached about sixty before the end of the movement in the early
1930s (Wahba 1964:126). 4 These settlements were given the name hujar
based on the religious concept of the Prophet Muhammad's hijrah 
(departure) from Makkah to al-Madinah in 622 C.E. The idea was that
the nomads were to depart from their nomadic way of life and adopt a
better one. Those who agreed to settle down were given the title of
ikhwan (pl. of akh) which means brothers in faith.5
The movement was very successful at the beginning. Abli cAlyyah
(1986:143) attributed that success to a number of factors. Among these
were the strong appeal of religion to the Bedouin and their emotional
nature which made them support any cause that they believed in.
Another factor was the role of the culami' who issued a fatwi in 1916
making it a religious obligation for the nomads to settle down in the
hujar. Furthermore, economic factors played a major role.	 The
prospects of an easier way of life, the availability of water and
basic tools to cultivate the land, and the supply of food and clothes
from the King to the leaders of the nomads made the policy work and
achieve some of its main objectives.
The role of the culami' in the success of the movement was both
fundamental and decisive. They supported the King's plan, and made
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sure that the nomads understood that the aim was to make them better
Muslims. The leaders of the tribes that settled down were invited to
live in Riyadh, and to receive an extensive course in the fundamentals
of Islam. Shaykh cAbdullih b. Muhammad Al al-Shaykh compiled a number
of books on the fundamentals of Islam and strict monotheism and "saw
that they were distributed to all the tribes. He organized armies of
mutawa ca who carried these tracts and treatises to the various towns
and tribesmen of the area" (Goldrup 1971:237). Furthermore, scores of
young religious teachers spread out among the bedouin, teaching them
the word of God and the sayings (hadith) of the Prophet Muhammad
(Habib 1978:47).
The results of these efforts by the culami' were phenomenal. The
settled tribes began to compete with each other in abandoning the life
of the desert. Many sold their livestock and took to farming as an
alternative way of life. The ikhwin "gave themselves up to prayer and
the listening to readings about the life of the Prophet" (Wahba
1964:126). They adopted a uniform dress of white robes and white
turbans, and changed the basis of their loyality from the tribal
leader to the religious leader, the imam. Before the movement, "more
than ninety per cent of the bedouin had never heard of religion", said
the King to Colonel Dickson (quoted in Niblock 1982a:87). After years
of education and practice, the transformation had taken place, and
"for the first time in the long history of Islam in central Arabia,
Islam had finally come to the Bedouin" (Goldrup 1971:240).
The significance of the movement went beyond making the nomads
better Muslims and extended to the political role that they played in
the unification of the country. It is not clear whether the King
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started the movement initially with political objectives in mind or
whether in fact he saw what it might lead to after it had begun. The
Bedouin, who were an unpredictable social element were turned into a
reliable and loyal fighting force. The ikhwan became such a force
under the command of the King that "they could put 25,000 soldiers in
the field although normally not more than 5000 were called up to take
part in a military action" (Meulen 1957:66). They played a major part
in the King's conquest of the Hejaz and other parts of the Kingdom,
and they constituted "the largest and most strong military force in
the Arabian Peninsula" (Abil cAlyyah 1986:147).
The ikhwin movement had achieved some major social and political
aims, but, at the same time, it caused problems for the government.
The positive consequences of the movement can be found in the changes
that took place in the outlook and lifestyle of a large segment of the
population of Najd. Peace between the tribes became possible, and the
government was able to apply law and order among the Bedouin for the
first time. Religion became the dominant ideology in their life, and
religious education and jihid were major means of keeping them busy
most of the time. The movement "was eventually to alter radically the
social and religious life of the Bedouin and to aid in the development
of a national idealism" (Goldrup 1971:138). The actual authority was
taken from the tribal leaders and given to the King and government
officials.
The negative consequences of the movement were limited and
temporary. Paramount among these was the fact that the ikhwan began to
view themselves as the only true followers of Islam. They "adopted the
tenets of unitarianism with a severity that equalled the harshness of
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the desert" (Goldrup 1971:24). They only received a very basic form of
religious education, but they regarded it as the whole of religion.
They became fanatical in their attitude and behaviour. They wanted to
go on spreading what they believed to be the true form of Islam
outside the Arabian Peninsula, and even raided Iraq and Jordan many
times. They caused some problems in the Hejaz, and the King ordered
them to go back to Najd. He realised in the mid-1920s that the
movement was no longer serving the purpose for which it had been
established.
Some of the leaders of the ikhwan no longer accepted King cAbd
al-cAziz as an imam, and they declared their rebellion against him.
The King could wait no longer, and in 1929 the two sides met in battle
at Sibilah in central Najd. The King won and "effectively curbed the
movement which had run out of the control of its creators" (Niblock
1982a:88). Those ikhwan who did not take part in the rebellion formed
the basis of the more organized force called the White Guard (later
the National Guard). Many continued to live a settled life in the
hujar, and some of the famous hujar grew into small villages and are
still inhabited by the families and descendants of the original
The decision of the King to crush the ikhwan that rebelled
against his authority was supported by the culaig.' who also realised
that the movement had served its purpose. The culania' "sided with Ibn
Seud [the King] and neutralized the rebels' ideological significance
and, hence, their political effectiveness" (al-Hamad 1985:301). The
ideological differences that arose between the King and the leaders of
the ikhWin regarding relations with non-Muslims and the limits of
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jihad worked for the benefit of the culania'. "In 1929, the King
announced that all matters which concerned religion - fatiZs,
principles, commandments and prohibitions - must in future be decided
by the c ulamq " (Wahba 1964:141). This was only a recognition of a
practice that already existed
	 but it gave the culathD an official
authority within the developing structure of government as the only
people with the right to decide all the religious matters of the new
state.
This official role of the culami' is still in force at the
present time. They were no longer a marginal force whose authority was
sanctioned through consultation and advice, but were recognised as
officials of the government who made decisions at the national level
concerning the suitability of policies and actions. Another important
outcome of the disagreement between the King and some of the ikhw-in
leaders was that the Organization for enjoining the acceptable and
forbidding the reprehensible was given the authority to deal with
objectionable acts in public, something for which the ikhwn had taken
responsibility before 1926 in the Hejaz (see Part III).
D. Political and Social Developments 1352-1373/1932-1953 
When King cAbd al-cAziz took over the rule of the Hejaz in 1925, he
realised that he must use the political structure that already existed
in order to administer efficiently the affairs of the region. He
appointed his second son, Fay§al, as Viceroy in the Hejaz and
established a consultative council (maais shuri) to function as an
advisory body to the Viceroy. These developments marked a great change
in the King's way of governing the country. This change, however, only
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affected the Hejaz and was in response to its more advanced political
environment. The King reorientated the various institutions of the
Hejaz so that they became compatible with the philosophy adopted by
the new state. He appointed some culania from Najd to lead the prayers
in the two Holy Mosques in Makkah and al—Madinah, appointed new Najdi
judges in the major cities, and established a hay'ah centre in Makkah
to carry out the duty of enjoining the acceptable and forbidding the
reprehensible (see Chapter Six).
During the period between 1932 and 1953 very few political
developments took place. The King continued to rule the country in a
Personal way through his governors in the four major regions. The
revenues of the state were at the King's personal command until the
1950s when the increasing complexity of government obliged some
separation of state and family finances (Buchan 1982:107). The
political structure that took shape during the 1930s and 1940s was
dominated by the personality of the King. The new state was to be a
monarchy "in which paramount authority is in the hands of an executive
who fills three traditional roles, that of tribal leader (sheikh),
religious leader (imam), and King (malik)" (Lipsky 1959:5). The King,
however, could not continue to involve himself in all the minor
details of the decision—making process, and more people began to share
that responsibility with him on a formal basis. A directorate of
finance and a directorate of education were established and,
gradually, a basic bureaucracy began to develop. The system of
government, however, continued to rely on personalities rather than
institutions, and the King drew on the advice of his close advisors
and the culaii' to make governmental decisions (Long 1980:104).
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As the need was perceived, national ministries were created, and
by 1944 there were two ministries, one for finance and the other for
foreign affairs, both based in the Hejaz (Huyette 1985:59). Later that
year, the Agency of Defense became the Ministry of Defense with
national jurisdiction. In 1951 the Ministries of Health and Interior
grew out of the Ministry of Finance. In October 1953, just a month
before his death, King cAbd al—cAiTz decreed the formation of the
Council of Ministers, thereby marking the creation of a modern
central administration. For the first time, all the ministries joined
together in a single body.
But these major developments did not include any national
organization with religious functions. The personalities of the
culaMD continued to fulfil these functions through education, the
judiciary and the hay'ah. Religious education received some attention
when in 1950 the King issued a Royal Decree establishing the
Directorate General for shari cah Colleges and Scientific Institutes
under the leadership of Shaykh Muhammad b. Ibrlhim Al al—Shayky 6
 (Abii
cAlyyah 1986:245). The first sharl c ah college was established in
Makkah in 1949, and scientific institutes were established in Makkah,
Riyadh, and al—Ti'if in the late 1940s.
The discovery of oil in 1938 was a major turning point in the
history of Saudi Arabia. It was not until 1945 that oil began to
produce some revenues for the state following World War II. The
country had previously been very poor, and the only income for the
state came from the religious sources of zakah and Jiajj. The new
wealth, which was slight when compared to the income of the 1970s,
began to have some major impacts on the new state and its people.
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Thousands of foreigners, mainly from the West, came to work in the oil
fields, and many Saudis experienced paid employment for the first
time. The government was able to finance its public projects dealing
with basic developments in education, health and agriculture. By 1953,
political, economic and social developments were still very limited
and never affected areas outside the two main cities at the time,
Makkah and Riyadh. King cAbd al—cAzlz, however, had established the
basis for a united realm and a central form of government. His death
in 1953 marked the end of a great era of fundamental changes in the
Arabian Peninsula.
The four regions were brought together to form one political
entity, sharing an ideology based on religion, for the first time in
centuries. Law and order was restored between the tribes; a large
percentage of the nomads had settled down; and tribal and family
loyalties were supplemented by a new national identity. The legal
system was rationalised, and religious beliefs and practices began to
be standardised. These were fundamental changes that permanently
altered the fabric of the Peninsula's society. It was a great
achievement, and was only the beginning of more things to come. The
patrimonial leadership of King cAbd al—cAziz, legitimized by religious
values and cultural norms, and helped by skill and diplomacy, created
the preconditions for further developments in all fields.
E. The Basis of a Modern State 1373-1390/1953-1970 
This period of the history of the modern Saudi state began when the
founder of the state died and his oldest son Su ciid b. cAbd al—cAzlz
became the new King. The process of political modernization continued
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with the official launching of the Council of Ministers in March 1954.
This marked "the first step in the transition from Abd al-Aziz's
informal and patrimonial style to a more formalized bureaucratic
government" (Huyette 1985:65). The formalization of government,
however, was not an easy task in a country that had never experienced
a bureaucratic form of government. The ministries began as primitive
one-man agencies and gradually acquired a basic bureaucratic
structure.
The Council of Ministers did not have any real power until 1958.
The constitution of the Council of Ministers of 1958 authorized the
Council to issue internal rules for each of the ministries and for
provincial administration (al-Farsy 1986:105). It began to acquire
more authority in the development and implementation of government
policies. The approval of the King, however, remained essential for
the implementation of all the Council's decisions.
The early 1950s also witnessed major organizational developments
on the religious level. In 1953 the second institution for higher
education was established in the form of a sharI cah college (kulliyyat 
al-sharicah) "for the purpose of meeting the demand for qualified
Ulama and preachers throughout the country" (al-Farsy 1986:179). A
year later the first religious organization with a national
jurisdiction was created under the leadership of Shaykh Muhammad b.
Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh. It was called Tar al-if t' wa-q-ishn:f Cali 
al-diniyyah wa-q-ma cihid (House of ifti' and Supervision
of Religious Affairs and Institutes). It was responsible for issuing
fatiiis and the appointment of judges and imams of mosques. It was also
in charge of the two courts of appeals (mahakim al-tamyiz) in Makkah
-cand Riyadh and of all the sham. ah courts in the country. Furthermore,
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this organization became the parent organization for the Directorate
of shari cah Colleges and Scientific Institutes that were established
in 1950.
The years between 1958 and 1964 witnessed a struggle for power
between King Sucrid and Crown Prince Faysal. King Su clid was allegedly
perceived by members of the Royal Family and the culama' as unfit to
rule the country. These individuals who occupied the traditional
position of ahl wa—'l— c aqd7
 gathered together and decided to
grant Crown Prince Faysal all the powers usually exercised by the
King. The decision was based on a fatw g
 issued by twelve senior
culamia' and a statement signed by sixty eight members of the Royal
c—Family. 8
 King Su ud accepted the decision of the culana' and members
of the Royal Family and gave up his executive authorities to Crown
Prince Faysal who was eventually proclaimed King in 1964 (see Holden
and Johns 1981:198).
The role played by the senior culatha' in solving the political
crisis of the early 1960s was another prime example of the important
role of the culaMi l
 in the politics of Saudi Arabia. The fact that
they sided with Crown Prince Faysal and issued a fatiii giving him the
authorities of a king showed that even the highest political decisions
were based on religious opinion. The fatsi g
 declared that the decision
was taken "in conformity with the laws aimed at safeguarding the
general interest" (Wahba 1964:179). The religious concept of 'the
common good' (al—maslatiah al— cgmmah) was the justification for the
interference by the cularia' and the decision which they took.
During the crisis period, Prince Faysal was in charge of the
government as the president of the Council of Ministers. In 1960 he
decided to open public schools for girls. It was a brave decision on
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the part of Faysal which was met by limited opposition. Faysal may
have anticipated the opposition, and that was thought to be the reason
behind his decision to keep girls' schools separate from boys'
schools. He also won the approval of the culama' by placing the new
schools under their supervision, rather than giving the Ministry of
Education responsibility for their management.
The introduction of public education for girls was an example of
the government's intention to proceed with social programmes within
the boundaries of traditions. The Islamic religion encourages
education for males as well as females, yet at the same time it places
great emphasis on the separation between the sexes. The way in which
public education for girls was introduced in Saudi Arabia showed that
it was possible for the government to modernize the society while
maintaining religious prohibitions in certain areas.
In 1962, Crown Prince Faysal expanded the Council of Ministers
by adding three more ministries, bringing the total to twelve
ministries. The new Cabinet reflected the new place given to religious
affairs on the ministerial level. The newly established Ministry of
Pilgrimage and Religious Endowments (al-hajj wa-'1-awclif) was the
first ministry responsible for what can be classified as religious
affairs. It also gave religious establishments a place ia the national
structure of government. The second important development was the
appointment of the first western-educated Saudi, Ahmad zaki Yana:11,9
as the Minister of Petroleum and Minerals. "Thus, Faysal's new Cabinet
balanced the traditional and emergent political groups" (Huyette
1985:71).
When Faysal became King in 1964 he retained the position of the
president of the Council of Ministers (ra i ls majlis al-wuzara') which
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"thus eliminated the inherent conflict between the King, as head of
state, and the President of the Council of Ministers, as head of
government" (Huyette 1985:74). This development gave the Council of
Ministers more powers, and it became the only arena of political
activity on the national level.
The King also issued a ten-point programme in which he outlined
his policies for the development of the country. He gave religion a
prime consideration in his policy starting with a reference to the
"need to maintain Islamic values", and declaring that "it has become
imperative for us to give greater attention to jurisprudence and for
our jurists and cularria' to play a positive and effective part in the
discussion of important matters of State". He went on to promise the
creation of a Supreme Judicial Council "to look into the matters
referred to it by the state", and to create a Ministry of Justice to
supervise the administrative affairs of the Judiciary. The programme
went on to emphasize the duty of the government towards the spread and
protection of Islam, and the need to "reform the Committees of Public
Morality iihe hay'ahl in accordance with the shari c ah and Islam's
lofty goals, for which they [the committees] were originally created"
(quoted in De Gaury 1966:148).
The implementation of the King's programme started in 1965 with
the establishment of the High Judicial Institute (al-machad al - 
li- q-qada') for the purpose of graduating qualified shari cah judges.
The period of study is three years, after which a student receives a
Master's degree in judicial affairs and jurisprudence" (al-Farsy
1986:179). The institute was the first institution in the country to
give a post-graduate degree. It was a continuation of the process of
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establishing higher religious education in the Kingdom which had
started with the establishment of the faculty of shari cah in Makkah in
1949.
The establishment of a ministry of justice and a judicial
council did not take place until 1970. To implement the government's
commitment to "spread the call (da cwah) of Islam", as the programme
stated, an Islamic university was established in al—Madinah with an
emphasis on educating students from Muslim countries in the
fundamentals of the sharI cah and in the methods of da cwah. The reform
of the Public Morality Committees (the hay'Et.) culminated in making
them subject to the rules and regulations which applied to the civil
service as well (see Chapter Six).
King Faysal took an important decision to introduce television
into the country in 1965. The oil company, ARAMCO, had introduced its
own television station in the Eastern Province in 1957, and that
probably prepared sections of the population for this new development.
The government presented television as a medium that could be used for
educational purposes to help with basic literacy and health training
(Boyd 1982:128). It was placed under the control of the Ministry of
Information, and broadcasting did not cover the whole country until
the mid-1970s. "Each telecasting day starts with a kuran reading.
Evening prayer calls are heard over a slide or short film of the
famous mosque in Mecca" (Boyd 1982:135). These factors reduced the
opposition of the culada' to television, helped by the fact that "King
Faisal promised religious leaders ... that television would be used as
an important means of disseminating religious doctrine". Furthermore,
"the first programme to be video—taped [was] a regular question-
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and-answer programme on religious subjects [by] a distinguished aim,
Shaykh cAli-Tantawi" (Boyd 1982:135). That programme was still as
popular as ever in 1989.
By the late 1960s, King Faysal was continuing with his ambitious
programmes to modernize the structure of government and to develop
socio-economic resources. The King had recognized the need to reform
the administration of government in accordance with modern methods.
Most government employees who staffed the growing bureaucracy lacked
basic education and the essential skills to do their work. The
solution to this problem was found in the creation of a government
agency responsible for administrative reforms in the Kingdom. The
Institute of Public Administration was founded by Royal Decree in
1961. It was to use educational methods and training programmes in
order to "raise the degree of efficiency among the government's
employees" (al-Farsy 1986:130).
The King went on to enlarge the civil service attracting
technicians, teachers and economists from the Arab states to fill the
shortage in skilled labour. As more Saudis returned from abroad with
higher degrees, they were enticed into the state bureaucracy to fill
high-level administrative positions. The King also took major steps to
reform the bureaucracy, "inviting foreign consultants to recommend
changes in the administrative system" (Huyette 1985:73). The outcome
of these policies and the perceived need to establish priorities for
the country's development played major roles in the formation of the
Central Planning Organization in 1968. It was given the task of
creating development plans for the country, and it became the Ministry
of Planning in 1975.
126
The event with the most serious implications for the place of
religious institutions as part of the structure of government was the
death of Shaykh Muhammad b. Ibrahim -Al al—Shaykh in 1969. He was a
very powerful figure in the public life of Saudi Arabia. He occupied a
number of important positions and was considered the highest religious
authority in the country (see Figure 2). It is obvious that the strong
personality of Shaykh Muhammad b. Ibrahim was, in part, responsible
for the wide authority that he enjoyed for many years. His death,
however, signalled the end of the era when an individual's strong
personality could serve as the basis of religious powers and, at the
same time, it also marked the emergence of institutions that would
come to rely on procedures and regulations rather than on families or
individuals.
The judiciary and religious education lacked a clearly defined
structure and relationship with the rest of the government until the
establishment of the Ministry of Justice and the Imam Muhammad b.
Sucrid Islamic University. The changes that occurred in the structure
of religious organizations plus the development plans dominated the
1970s and set the stage for important changes that will be discussed
in the following section.
The period between 1953 and 1970 witnessed important
developments especially at the political level. The changes were slow
and cautious and they maintained a similar pattern to the developments
that had taken place before 1953. The traditional foundations of the
state survived this period without any major challenge. The King and
the culaig.' continued to be the dominant forces in the country, but
they began to share power with the increasing number of young and
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educated Saudis who graduated from the newly—established colleges and
who came back from abroad with higher degrees. The religious
establishment was on its way to becoming more specialized and more
differentiated. The emphasis on planning, higher education and a more
rational bureaucratic machine set the stage for the socio—economic
developments that dominated the 1970s.
F. The Transformation Years 1390-1405/1970-1985
This era of major changes began with the implementation of the first
Five—Years Development Plan. This plan was designed to set priorities
and to direct the government's policy for social and economic
developments. It came as a result of the realization by the King and
government officials that "development and progress are not overnight
creations, rather they are the result of sound, long—range planning"
(al—Farsy 1986:149). The stated objectives of the plan were "to
maintain religious and moral values, and to raise the living standard
and welfare of the people, while providing for material security and
maintaining economic and social stability." 10
 The emphasis was on
building the infrastructure of the country to make development
possible, as well as on reducing the country's dependence on oil as
the only source of national income.
Major projects were started to	 improve roads	 and
telecommunications in order to bring the country's various regions
into closer contact with each other. A public investment fund was
established to finance investments in production projects, vocational
training and progress in social services like health care. Social
security and social centres for orphans and handicapped persons were
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given major priorities (al-Farsy 1986:149). Projects to develop the
country's water resources using desalinization facilities and the
building of dams culminated in the construction of twenty-four water
supply systems throughout the Kingdom. In the area of transportation,
a total of twenty new projects were authorized to complete over 1400
kilometers of new roads by the second year of the plan.
A number of other projects and programmes dealing with various
areas of social and economic developments were approved by the
government. The plan was not without problems caused by the lack of
manpower and the inability of the bureaucratic structure to deal with
such major developments in a short period of time. The huge increase
in oil prices in 1973 made financing the plan much easier, and helped
in completing most of the projects on time. The achievements were
great in a number of areas, but the most significant outcome was the
planning experience gained by the Central Planning Organization.
No major political developments took place during the first half
of the 1970s. More administrative powers were given to the Council of
Ministers to enable it to implement the development plans. This was a
reflection of the fact that the country's economy was dominated by the
public sector because the huge oil revenues go directly to the
government. In the early 1970s, over 90% of the country's gross
national product was oil-related, and the government was in charge of
all the revenue which increased from $212 million in 1952 to about
$30.7 billion in 1976. 11 The second development plan which started in
1975 reflected the huge increase in the wealth of the country. The
government allocated $140.9 billion to new developments. The plan put
much emphasis on educational and training programmes in order to meet
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the shortages in the skilled labour force. Another fundamental
guideline was the construction of large factories in the two new
industrial cities of Jubayl and Yanbuc . The second plan continued the
projects that were started during the first plan, and achieved major
developments in communications, industry, agriculture, education and
social services.
The 1970s began with major developments in the area of religious
institutions. The death of Shaykh Muhammad b. Ibrahim 11 al—Shaykh in
1969 gave the government the opportunity to fulfil the promises made
by the King to create a central administrative body for the judiciary
and a supreme judicial council. A royal decree created the Ministry of
Justice under a distinguished calim who had been a judge. 12 A supreme
Judicial Council (majlis a1—qa4a" al—a cl-i) was also established
consisting of twenty senior judges under the leadership of the
Minister of Justice. The authority to issue official fatsias was given
to the president of the newly—formed Presidency for the
Administrations of Scientific Research, ifta', da cwah and Guidance
(ri'asat idaiat al—buhlith al— cilmiyyah wa—q—ifta' wa- 1 1—da c wah wa 
q—irshad) hereafter referred to as Presidency of iftP. Shaykh
Ibrahim b. Mutiammadll al—Shaykh, 13 became the first president of the
Presidency of ifta' in 1971 (al—Muhaydib and al—NXsir 1985:14).
"The creation of the new ministry [of justice] ", according to
Huyette (1985:76), "brought about the all—important area of Islamic
jurisprudence within the framework of the Cabinet, and it began to
codify and administer shari/ah law on a countrywide basis." This was
an important development for the place of religion in the structure of
the Saudi government. The judicial system in the country is based
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totally on religious principles, and the creation of a ministry was a
serious test for the ability of the traditional nature of the Saudi
judiciary to make the important transition to a central and
bureaucratic structure. Major steps had preceded this development, but
it was still considered necesiary for the whole system to function
more efficiently on a national level.
As for religious education, the next major development came in
1974 with the establishment of the Imam Muhammad b. Sucild Islamic
University. All the sharlGah colleges and scientific institutes around
the country were made part of its structure. In turn, the university
was incorporated into the structure of the Ministry of Higher
Education that had been established late in 1975. The institutions of
religious education became part of this single university which was
also expanded to offer first degrees in the social sciences,
communications and foreign languages. Students obtaining first degrees
in religious topics were required to take courses in other subjects
which were studied from an Islamic perspective. Subjects like Islamic
Economics and Islamic History were introduced to give students the
opportunity to use religion as the basis of knowledge and to close
what is seen as a gap that is created in the western educational
system between religion and science.
King Faysal died in 1975 and his brother Khilid replaced him.
Khalid began his reign with an expansion in the structure of
government. Six new ministries were created with a number of
independent agencies to manage the huge projects introduced by the
second development plan. A ministry of planning was established to
replace the Central Planning Organization. The shortage in housing
13 2
necessitated the creation of a Ministry of Public Works and Housing.
Ministries for Higher Education, Municipal and Rural Affairs, Industry
and Electricity, and Telegraphs, Posts and Telephones were the other
four ministries created. The total number of ministries rose to
twenty, and the new ministries reflected the importance that the
government placed on modernizing the country.
On the religious front, the Presidency of if t' was expanded and
given the status of a general presidency. Shaykh cAbd al—cAziz b.
Bgz 14 became its new president, and, therefore, the principal
religious authority in the country. The all important Commission of
Senior %lama' (hay'at kibãr al— cUlama') became part of the structure
of the Presidency of if t' under the chairmanship of its president.
The other important development was the establishment of the General
Presidency for the Organization of Enjoining the Acceptable and
Forbidding the Reprehensible in 1976 (see Part III).
After the expansion of 1976, the Council of Ministers took total
charge of the development programmes. The powers of the council were
only limited by the power of the King who presided over most of its
weekly meetings in his capacity as Prime Minister. By now, the Council
has emerged as the only body in the Kingdom with executive and
legislative powers.
The composition of its members reflects the ability of the
leadership to accommodate individuals representing each of the three
main power groups in the country today. Prominent members of the Royal
Family control positions dealing with security and foreign affairs.
The traditionally educated (including some of the culania') remain in
charge of the judiciary, !ail and awqaf, education and finance. The
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western-educated technocrats have taken charge of ministries dealing
with economic and social developments such as planning, industry,
petroleum and agriculture. The mixture of traditionally educated and
western educated ministers has given the government the ability to
issue and implement policies that reflect modernization within the
framework of a traditional political culture. It can also be seen as
another indication of how the government of Saudi Arabia has tried to
make use of modern technology to develop the country without having to
give up its traditional foundations (see al-Hamad 1985).
The seizure of the Great Mosque of Makkah in 1979 constituted a
serious test of the government's ability to function as the guardian
of the Holy Mosques. A group of religious extremists occupied the
Mosque for two weeks claiming that the expected mandi had come. 15
 The
government was faced with the dilemma of how to end the rebellion
without violating the sanctity of the Holy Mosque. It was a national
crisis that warranted quick action, but religious considerations
forced the government to deal carefully with the situation. The
c ulaia' had to be consulted on the matter, and thirty of the senior
culama' issued a fatwi clarifying the legal points involved in
clearing the Mosque by force. 16
 The political role of the culamiii had
been demonstrated yet once more. Kechichian (1986:66) summed up the
importance of that role when he argued that the culaMa' "demonstrated
a keen awareness of how best to adapt to an explosive situation by
[calling] upon the authorities to place the interests of the entire
community above those of an exclusively religious nature."
The religious aspect of the incident was very limited. It was
based on the claim made by the militants that the mandr had come to
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restore religion among the Muslims. The culami' were quick to negate
that claim and, therefore, prevented the movement from gaining any
public support. The incident had also strengthened the role of the
government as protector of the Holy Mosque. The government gained the
support of the culaMD, the population and the majority of the
governments of Muslim countries in putting an end to the crisis. That
support for the religious legitimacy of the state came at a time when
it made a strong impact. It came at the end of a decade that had
witnessed huge development programmes, and it indicated that the place
of religion in the priorities of the Saudi government was still as
important as it had been over the previous six decades.
The third development plan came into effect in 1980. The plan
set itself three fundamental objectives: structural change in the
economy by permitting maximum investment in agriculture, industry and
mining; increased participation of the private sector and the
expansion of social services;
	
and increased economic and
administrative efficiency. The third plan emerged as a rational
development of the previous two plans, and showed that the government
had gained useful experience from implementing them. About 782.7
billion riyals* were allocated as a 'civilian expenditure' of the plan
to strengthen the social and economic developments	 (al-Farsy
1986:158-160).
In 1982 King Khilid died and Crown Prince Fand became the new
king. The immediate and peaceful transfer of power suggested that the
* One US dollar = 3.75 riyals.
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foundations of the political system of the Kingdom had achieved
stability. No further expansion in the structure of the government
took place. The development programmes continued as planned, and the
boom of the second half of the 1970s began to slow down. By 1985 the
revenues of the government had decreased in line with the fall in oil
prices and the fall in the market-demand for oil. After reaching a
peak of 328.6 billion riyals in 1980, oil revenues in 1985 amounted to
only a little more than one third of this figure. But the country has
had fifteen years of impressive growth in the non-oil gross domestic
product. That growth has been estimated at 10.6% as a compound annual
rate of growth. 17
Major infrastructural projects were completed in the areas of
transportation, communications, industry and agriculture. Education on
all levels has gone through a period of impressive growth. Foreign
trade and the growth in GDP both demonstrate the huge increases in the
wealth of the country between 1970 and 1985 (see Table 1).
Developments in a number of areas show that the country has gone
through a period of rapid growth and transFormation. Table 1 gives
examples of some of the major indicators of socio-economic
developments over a fifteen year period. The transFOrmation took place
over a relatively short period of time, and apparently with limited
negative implications for either the political or the social
structures of society.
In 1985, the Fourth-Development Plan was started. The emphasis
of the fourth plan (1985-1990) is on the development of productive
citizen workers to maintain the achievements that have been made, and
to reduce dependence on foreign labour. AL-Farsy (1986:172) reported
136
Table 1
Indicators of Socio-Economic Developments
in Saudi Arabia, 1970 and 198-5
1970 1985
Estimated population 5,859,0001 9,118,000
No. of Government Ministries 13 20
Government Budget 13,200.0 MR2 200,000.0 MR
GDP 17.4 BR3 339.2 BR
Foreign Trade - Exports 8,952.9 MR 99,535.8 MR
- Imports 2,804.0 MR 85,563.6 MR
No. of Universities 3 7
No. of Students in Higher Education 7,000 94,000
No. of Schools 3,107 15,268
No. of Students in Pre-University Education 547,000 2,000,000
No. of Hospitals 74 177
No. of Hospital Beds 9,039 30,707
No. of Physicians 1,172 14,335
Length of paved Roads (kilometers) 8,000 30,000
No. of Students in
Adult Education Programmes
(erradication of illiteracy)
35,231 141,792
No. of Students in Vocational
Training Centres 578 10,527
No. of Pilgrims 1,042,000 1,601,000
No. of Hotel Rooms 4,522 22,129
No. of factories in operation 207 1,804
Wheat Production (tons) 26,000 2,000,000
No. of Vehicles in the Country 144,768 4,144,245
No. of Telephone Lines 76,600 1,219,852
1. United Nations Estimate (Johany et.al . 1986)
2. Million Riyals
3. Billion Riyals
Source: Compiled by the Writer from a number of sources.
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that 17% (18,501 million riyals) of expenditure on social and cultural
development sectors were allocated to what he called "Judicial and
Religious Sectors". The first two objectives of the fourth plan are
specified by the Council of Ministers as follows: To safeguard Islamic
values ... duly observing, disseminating and confirming Allah's
Shari'ah; and to defend the faith and the nation (al-Farsy 1986:163);
this is a further example of the government's commitment to the
religious principles of Islam, a commitment which appears to remain
firm after years of rapid socio-economic developments and
modernization.
G. Saudi Arabia Today
After our historical sketch of the process of development through
which the country has passed over the past eight decades, we will look
briefly at what has been achieved. The process of development and
modernization is far from complete, but this section will assess how
far the modernization of Saudi Arabia has proceeded.
Major achievements have been made in the political sphere. The
political structure was transformed from a fragmented set of local
governors under the personal command of the King to a central
bureaucratic structure. The King has retained much of his power, but
the day-to-day administration of the country became the task of the
growing bureaucracy. The bureaucracy has become more organized and
more rational, but the influences of the social environment on it are
still evident. 18
 "The creation of a government bureaucracy has not
greatly diminished the personalization of government decision-making
however. Rather it has rechanneled the traditional personalized system
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through more modern bureaucratic institutions" (Long 1980:104). In any
case, family connections and traditional loyalties still play a part
in the appointment of top civil servants. This factor is decreasing
all the time, however, and the actual ability of the individual to do
the job is becoming the most important criterion in an increasing
number of appointments.
The Council of Ministers can be seen as a prime example of the
political development in the past thirty five years. It has emerged
with the approval of, and under the influence of the monarchy, and it
has played a major part in the development of the country both
socially and economically. The Council enabled the King to remain in
charge of all developments, because of the power he possesses to
approve all decisions taken by the Council. That arrangement has made
it possible for a "highly traditional, tribally—oriented, patriarchal
Muslim elite ... to retain almost completely undiminished control over
the progress and process of change" (Wenner 1975:181). That form of
control, which persists today, is one of the major factors that have
enabled the government to modernize the country within the limits of
tradition. Another important factor is the wealth of the country which
has made it possible to meet the demands of both the traditional and
the emergent groups. Both groups were brought together tn co—operate
in the development of a modern and stable form of government (see
Niblock 1982a).
The central government is made up of the King, the Council of
Ministers, and the various ministries, general presidencies and
independent departments. There are no elections and no political
parties and most government officials are appointed by the King. The
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Council of Ministers combines both executive and legislative powers.
The judiciary is semi-independent, but is becoming more limited to
_dealing with aspects of the law that are based on the sham c ah (see
Chapter Five). The Kingdom has no written constitution, and the
_
official position is that the Islamic shari c ah is the constitution of
the country (Lackner 1978:74).
On the local level, the Kingdom is divided into fourteen major
amarit (regions). Each amara is headed by a governor who is regarded
as the representative of the King. Each region is further divided into
smaller amgrit in cities, towns and villages. The complete network of
aniara is part of the structure of the Ministry of the Interior.
Governors of the major regions hold ministerial status and enjoy a
limited degree of power and autonomy from the central government. The
personality of the governor, however, is sometimes more important than
the actual formal structure of government (Rudolph 1984:214). Regional
amarit work in coordination with regional branches of most ministries.
This has decreased the degree of centralization, and has given each
region the necessary structure to run its own affairs (see al-Saliim
1988).
The structure of the Saudi government continues to function
using traditional methods of governing. The relationship between the
King and the governors on the one hand and the notables of the country
(tribal and religious leaders) on the other remains very important to
the ability of the government to implement policies, introduce
changes, and solve disputes. Securing the loyalty and support of
tribal leaders was the first step in achieving the loyalty of the
majority of the people. Tribal leaders continue to enjoy a degree of
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authority in their own tribes, and they perform the informal task of
delivering, to the officials of the government, demands and grievances
on behalf of the people they represent.
The traditional institution of majlis 19 demonstrates best the
persistence of traditions despite the growth in modern forms of
governing through bureaucratic organizations. The majlis is a personal
way of establishing direct contact between officials of the government
and the populace. The bureaucracy made this institution lose some of
its significance, but it continues to function as a unique way of
dealing with segments of the population not used to bureaucratic
procedures. Officials of the government find it useful because it
keeps them in touch with public opinion, and ensures the personal
loyalty of most prominent members of society (see Rudolph 1984:214).
Urbanization has been one area of impressive change associated
with a high level of social mobility. In 1980, the Ministry of
Planning reported that about 42% of the total population resided in
cities of 10,000 or more: an increase of 22% since 1970. 20 By 1986,
about 3,460,000 were living in the three major cities (Riyadh, Jiddah
and Makkah).21
Socially, Saudi Arabia managed to achieve substantial progress
in welfare programmes while maintaining most of the basis of social
relations. Tribal and family connections, the extended family,
polygamy, arranged marriages, and segregation between the sexes are
still present and strong. Social welfare has been provided through
programmes for social security and local centres for orphans, the
handicapped, the aged and delinquents throughout the Kingdom. Social
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security payments, for example, rose from 42 million riyals in 1970 to
2200 million riyals in 1984. 22 Economically, the Kingdom today still
depends on oil as one of the main sources of income. "The dominance of
oil in the country's foreign exchange earnings, government revenue,
and as a source of growth of the national income, is the most obvious
characteristic of the economic system" (el-Mallakh 1982:27). Some
progress has been made, however, in the government's attempt to
decrease the country's dependence on oil. Having constituted about 90%
of the country's income in the early 1970s, oil revenue in 1986
accounted for only 42.46 billion riyals out of a total revenue of
76.45 billion riyals (less than 48%). 23 The Gross Domestic Product on
average "has grown at the dramatically rapid rate of 20.3% per annum
between 1964 and 1978" (el-Mallakh 1982:28). GDP rose sharply from
17.4 billion Riyals in 1970 to 524.7 billion riyals in 1982. 24 That
growth has slowed down to about 4% per annum for the second half of
the 1980s. Industry, finance and agriculture are said to contribute
about 30.5% of that growth (al-Farsy 1986:174).
Economic growth has made it possible for the government to
increase the standard of living of its citizens and to contribute
large sums of money to aid developments in other Islamic and Third
World countries. AI-Farsy (1986:200) reported that the Saudi Fund for
Development, established in 1974, was financing twenty-three projects
in fourteen different countries in Asia and Africa with a budget of
over two billion riyals in 1983 alone. Saudi Arabia has also signed
loan agreements with a number of countries totalling more than one and
a half billion riyals that same year. 25
 Internally, "the average
citizen has been enjoying a better standard of living as shown by the
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growth of real per capita consumption at an annual rate of 8%" (el-
Mallakh 1982:35). Sirageldin et. al. (1984:5) reported that "average
real earnings rose 71% during the second half of the 1970s" (see also
Kavoussi 1983:65). There are no taxes, the major food commodities are
subsidised, and education and health care are free for citizens as
well as for expatriates.
Farming has long been the main occupation for many of the people
of Saudi Arabia especially in the Eastern and Southern regions. It was
limited to basic crops for purely local consumption. The lack of water
made farming grow slowly, but today all of that has changed. The
availability of water through desalinization plants and dams, and
government loans and subsidies, have made Saudi Arabia an exporter of
agricultural products for the first time in its history. "Trade
statistics tend to affirm that Saudi Arabia is now self—sufficient in
wheat, eggs and dates. In fact it has a small exportable surplus in
all three commodities, with sale and donations of wheat abroad now
exceeding 2 million tons/year." 26
Today, there are 2022 producing—factories in the Kingdom with a
total capital of 86.3 billion riyals. Electricity has reached 90% of
the population, with a total capacity of 18,000 megawatts in 1987 as
compared to only 418 megawatts in 1970. 27 The country has two
television channels (one in English), six radio programmes (three are
devoted to religious broadcasting), and eight national newspapers. 28
There is no doubt that the country has made substantial
progress, socially and economically. People are enjoying a high
standard of living comparable with that of advanced countries, and the
benefits of development have reached most sections of society. The
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small size of the population and the great wealth acquired by the
country have made the transformation possible in such a short period
of time. The important questions in the context of this study concern
the implications of these rapid socio—economic developments for the
religious traditions of the country: what changes have taken place in
the commitment of the state to religion? And what have been the
consequences of social change for the religious commitment of the
individual Saudi Arabian? This study will attempt to give an answer to
the first question. The second question, however, calls for more
specialized studies.
The modernization of Saudi Arabia was not without its own
problems. The escalation of the process in the second half of the
1970s exposed the difficulties associated with rapid socio—economic
developments. Inflation, a shortage of housing due to a high level of
social mobility, dependence on foreign labour, and increase in
consumerism due to huge increases in per capita income (estimated by
Sirageldin et. al. [1984:5]	 to be about 71%), were some of the
short—term consequences of the process.
29
 The long term consequences
remain to be seen.
It is possible perhaps to maintain that the government retained
control over the modernization process and even planned for it using
the five—year development plans. Thus it can be argued, the government
was able to limit what are seen as the negative consequences of rapid
modernization. The ironic thing was the ability of the government to
foster a high level of socio—economic developments with a limited
degree of political modernization." The apparent success of the
government in modernizing the country within the bounds of tradition
144
may also account for the fact that the influence of secularization
generally associated	 with modernization	 and	 institutional
differentiation has been somewhat limited.
Conclusion
It can be concluded from the evidence presented in this chapter that
religion has been integral to the process of uniting the various parts
of the Arabian peninsula under one central government. This was
achieved for the first time since the decline of the first Islamic
state in al-Madinah following the moving of the capital to Damascus.
Religious ideology provided, once again, the effective means by which
the various tribes of Arabia could be brought under the command of one
leader.
Religious ideology also helped in changing the lifestyle of a
large segment of the Bedouin of central Arabia. The importance of
religion continued to manifest itself through a number of
developments. The official stand of the government, the role played by
the culaMi', and making religious institutions part of the structure
of the state all point to the fact that religion would continue to be
a dominant force in public life even at times of rapid modernization.
The modernization process took place under the aegis of the
government who regarded it as a national goal and who planned for it.
It was a slow process on the political front, and only accelerated on
the socio-economic front in the second half of the 1970s. The
political system today appears to be coping well with socio-economic
changes and with the demands of emergent groups. Modernization has had
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its own benefits and its own problems. What is unique about the
modernization of Saudi Arabia, however, is the fact that the process
originated internally and was in response to the perceived needs of
the country. All groups participated in it, and "fractionalization
along theological, political, and intellectual lines has been
relatively less [sic] than in other countries" (Ochsenwald 1981:272).
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Chapter Five 
The Religious Situation Today
Religion in Saudi Arabia contihues to have great influence on the
policies of the state as well as on the life of the individual. The
Kingdom is identified with Islam more than is any other country in the
world. The aim of this chapter is to discuss the place of religion in
Saudi society, and the role of the state in making Islam the dominant
ideology in its internal and external policies. The religious
situation today has been the outcome of a long process of developments
and policies of rationalization on the part of the government. These
developments and policies, along with the historical factors involved,
have been discussed in the previous two chapters.
This chapter starts with the public manifestations of religion
in areas such as the constitution, the flag, and public morality. The
first section also briefly considers religion in everyday life with an
emphasis on the daily prayers, the month of Ramadan, religion in the
media, and various social occasions regulated by the shail cah. The
bulk of the chapter, however, will deal with the main religious
institutions in the Kingdom and with the government agencies that have
a religious basis or religious functions.
The second half of this chapter will deal with the role of Saudi
Arabia in promoting Islam in other parts of the world. ' Following
these descriptive sections, we will attempt to evaluate the changes
that have taken place as a result of modernization and development. A
consideration of the place and influence of religious institutions in
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Saudi society today as compared to the situation before 1970 will give
an idea of the size and direction of any change. The chapter will
conclude with a brief discussion of the distinctiveness of the Saudi
experience in comparison with the experiences of some other Islamic
countries.
This chapter is designed to provide a general picture of the
religious situation in Saudi Arabia today, and not to deal with any
particular institution in detail. The aim is to set the stage for our
case study in the following part, and to provide basic information
that will help us evaluate the changes that have taken place over the
past two decades. The emphasis will be on the role of the government
and its official agencies. The changes that have taken place in the
religious commitment of groups and individuals are beyond the scope of
this work. It is also impossible to discuss here the private
establishments and voluntary organizations that have religious
functions.
The greatest difficulty encountered in writing this chapter
involved the classification of certain government organizations as
religious in a country where religion is part of almost everything.
The distinction has always been difficult, and the classification used
in this chapter is based on the writer's own judgment. There are
organizations and institutions that have clear religious functions
(eg. mosques and the bajj), and there are organizations that are more
difficult to classify as religious mainly because they have other
functions that have no ostensibly religious basis (eg. the Ministry of
Finance and National Economy which is responsible for collecting zakih
from companies and businesses). I shall, therefore, structure the
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following section in terms of the major institutions of religion in
Saudi Arabia rather than in terms of particular organizations with
religious functions.
A. Public Manifestations of Religion 
Wherever one looks, there are strong indications of the role of
religion in public life of Saudi society. From the constitution of the
country to the way people greet each other, 2 Islam plays a prominent
role. The influence cannot be exaggerated, but the problem will always
be how to distinguish between pure religious influences and social
customs that have "taken on, in many minds, the indivisibility of
divine Law" (Buchan 1982:107). Another problematic distinction is
between officially stated policies and actual practice. There are a
number of discrepancies between the two, but they should not concern
us here (Kay 1982:180). Our aim is not to evaluate the religious
nature of what the Saudis see as religious, but merely to describe it
as such.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has no written constitution. The
official policy since the unification of the country has always been
that the Islamic sharl cah is the only constitution and "the supreme
sovereign to be obeyed by all, including the King himself" (Buchan
1982:107). 3
 The Flag of the Kingdom has written on it, in Arabic
script, the Islamic creed "there is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is
the messenger of Allah". The official calendar is the Islamic one,
that is, the lunar calendar which begins with the hi .rah of the
Prophet Muhammad in 622 C.E. The use of this calendar has been made
necessary because it marks the Muslim religious festivals such as the
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month of Ramadan and the Pilgrimage. The beginning of each month is
still decided using the traditional method of moon sighting by the
naked eye following the instructions of the shari c ah. There are
developments, however, in the direction of using modern methods for
sighting and calculations.4
The most apparent influence of religion can be found in the
areas of religious practices and public morality. 5 The loud call to
prayers five times every day is a constant reminder of the importance
of this religious duty. Government offices, shops, businesses, and
even television broadcasting come to a halt for a few minutes when it
is time to pray. Prayer in Saudi Arabia takes precedence over other
activities in a fashion not found in any other Islamic country. Social
occasions, business hours, and even football matches are scheduled
around the times of prayer. 6
Another area of profound influence is the public role of women.
Women still go veiled in public, and the official policy is one of
segregation between the sexes in government offices, 7 universities,
schools, restaurants and public transport. 8 Women are not allowed to
drive or to travel without an accompanying male relative (matiram).
There is a strong trend towards the establishment of separate
businesses and shopping centres that are exclusively for women. One
national company has even announced that it is going to establish a
factory that employs women only. 9
There are no public theatres, cinemas or social clubs. The sale
of alcoholic beverages and pork meat is illegal. Strict compliance
with Islamic social norms is required from citizens and expatriates
alike. During the month of Ramadan, all restaurants and food—outlets
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close during the day. Non-Muslims are requested not to eat, drink or
smoke in public "to respect the feelings of Muslims", and any
violation is subject to punishment. 10
The daily broadcasting of television and radio stations opens
and closes with a recitation from the Holy Qur'an. Three of the six
radio broadcasting services are devoted to religious programmes. 11
Both television stations broadcast religious programmes averaging in
each case about 25% of the daily broadcast which increases to 37.5% on
Fridays and religious occasions (e.g. Ramadan) (al-Hamad 1985:309). 12
The national airline, Saudia, starts each flight with a
broadcast of the travelling prayers that the Prophet Muhammad used to
say when he travelled (Alireza 1987:453). Most national newspapers
devote one or more pages to religious topics, discussions, and
questions directed to the culang ' from members of the public
concerning social and economic matters. 13
The design of the average Saudi home also reflects the influence
of religion on social relations and modes of interaction. Each home
has two separate entrances and two separate living rooms to keep
guests of both sexes, even relatives, separate from each other. This
practice still continues today, although an increasing number of young
couples choose to live separate from their parents: something that
very rarely happened twenty five years ago. The regulating of
-c
marriage 14
 and divorce is based on the sham. ah, and ceremonies for
birth, circumcision, marriage, and death are all practised in
accordance with the teachings of Islam.
The institution of marriage in Saudi Arabia reflects the overlap
of religious and civilian authorities in dealing with a number of
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social institutions. The marriage ceremony has to be performed by a
religious specialist known as ma'thUn al-ankihah who is usually
licensed by the Ministry of Justice through the local sharI cah court.
The marriage certificate is issued by the person who performs the
ceremony and then has to be apliroved by the local judge, and kept in
record at the court of law. The ma'thiin al-ankihah is considered a
part-time employee of the government. His main occupation is usually
religious in nature (e.g. judge, teacher, or an imam of a local
mosque).
B. The Main Religious Institutions 
The Islamic religion has an influence on public life through
political, social and economic channels. A number of specific
institutions were developed at the time of the Prophet Muhammad to
facilitate religious practices; others came into being over the
centuries, and many are of recent origin. 15
 The common denominator
between all of them is their religious justification or function. The
religious institutions that will be described in this section are
concepts, personalities, places, or modes of interaction (see Figure
3). The religious significance of each one is enough to warrant
labelling them as religious institutions.
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Inas of the Muslims (imam al-muslimin)
This is one of the main institutions with a religious basis. It is a
position occupied by the King and it makes him the highest religious
authority in the country. It used to be the official title of the
Saudi rulers until King cAbd al-cAzlz adopted the title of King in the
1920s. The King, as imam al-muslimin, has the power to declare jihqd,
appoint judges upon the recommendation of the High Judicial Council,
give permission for the istisqa' prayer to be held, 16
 and approve
court decisions in cases that require capital punishment. "The highest
legal official is the King who serves as imam" (Long 1980:102). The
King appoints members of the Commission of Senior culamP, and top
officials of religious organizations (eg. the minister of justice and
the president of ifta').
Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques (khadim al-baramayn al-sharIfayn)
This is both a title of the King and a responsibility of the state.
The location of Islam's two most sacred mosques (i.e. the sacred
mosque in Makkah and the Prophet's mosque in al-Madinah) in Saudi
Arabia has given the government both a source of legitimacy and a
unique place among Islamic countries.
In October 1986, King Fand officially adopted the title of
"custodianof the two Holy Mosques" in place of His Majesty ,, . 17
 The
King, along with the ministers concerned, move their offices to Makkah
during the annual Pilgrimage to receive delegates from other Islamic
countries, attend the annual conference held on that occasion, and
supervise the activities of over two million Muslims who perform the
bajj every year. Before the bajj begins, the King usually performs the
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ceremonial washing of the ka cbah prior to the annual change of the
kiswah. 18
It is ironic that about fifty years ago the annual Pilgrimage
was the main source of income for the government through taxes paid by
pilgrims. Today, however, the two holy mosques and the areas and
services that are part of the 1}ajj will cost the- government an
estimated 8,743 million riyals between 1985-1990. 19 Despite the large
sums of money that the government spends each year to host the 122.11,
the Saudis "retain feelings of pride and a special religious purpose
through their role" (Ochsenwald 1981:279). The Saudi authorities have
always regarded the successful administration of the pilgrimage as
their main responsibility, and they recognize that as an important
factor in maintaining a leading position among Islamic countries. The
availability of great wealth has helped the Saudis to honour this
responsibility without major difficulties.
The General Presidency for the Affairs of the Sacred Mosque and
the Prophet's Mosque (al-ri'gsah al- cEmah al-masjid al-harm
wa-'l-masjid al-nabawi) is responsible for the administration of the
two mosques. It has a president with the rank of a minister of state,
and it employs a number of imams, mila'dhdhins, guides, and maintenance
staff for the two mosques. There are also special police centres in
each mosque for security purposes.
The Holy Qur'in
As the main source of Laws and as the constitution of the country, the
Qur' gn is assigned a special place in Saudi Arabia. It is taught in
schools, and competitions to memorize and recite it are held every
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year inside and outside the country. 20
 Qur t anic schools are part of
the educational establishment, and the government provides financial
support to voluntary organizations known as jamac it ta4fiz al—Qur'an
(societies for the memorization of the Qur'an). It is estimated that
about 100,000 students attend these part—time schools. 21
In 1986 the government established the King Fand complex for
printing the holy Qur'an which has been described as "one of the
biggest printing complexes in the world". 22
 The cost of the buildings
and equipment was about 1,000 million riyals. The complex employs
13,200 people, and has the capacity to produce 8 million copies of the
Qur'an every year. 23
 It has printed over 27 million copies in the past
four years of which 23.5 million copies have been distributed free,
inside and outside the Kingdom. 24
 It also produces translations in a
number of languages and cassette tapes of Qur'anic recitations.
In a step that was described as a policy to encourage the study
and memorization of the Qur'an, the King issued a decree in early 1988
authorizing public security officials to halve the prison sentence of
any prisoner who memorizes the Qur'an. It was reported afterwards that
each prison had established its own Qur'inic school to help those who
wanted to take advantage of this unique offer. 25
The CUlaml"
The %lama' in modern Saudi Arabia still retain their traditional
position and role. 26
 It is not possible, however, to give a precise
number of those who can be classified as %lama in view of the
elusive nature of this religious institution. We will, therefore,
limit our discussion to the senior culania' who are members of one of
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the three main official bodies that will be identified later in this
section, and to the changing composition of the culaMa' due to the
availability of religious education.
The c ulama' of Saudi Arabia have played an important part in
Saudi political and social life and continue to do so. "No social or
political change can take place without the consent of the religious
establishment" (al-Hamad 1985:302). Their great influence on the
judiciary, education and the enforcement of public morality has been
maintained if not even strengthened in the past two decades. Bligh
(1985:42) identified these three areas of public life as the main
"religious institutions" in the Kingdom. It is important to add here
the institutions of ifta' and da cwah as two other areas where the
senior culama' enjoy authority and control.
The three main official bodies that constitute major platforms
for the public role of the senior culaia' are: the Commission of
Senior c ulaMa' (hay'at kibar al- culama'), the High Judicial Council
(majlis al-qada' al-a c li), and the Permanent Committee for ifta'
(al-lajnah al-da'imah li-l-iftal. The first one was established in
1971 as "a permanent forum ... to serve the King in his future need
for religious authorization and approval" (Bligh 1985:39). This body
consists of twelve members of the most senior culaia' in the
Kingdom, 27
 and is considered the highest religious body in the land.
It is responsible mainly for issuing official fatWas for the
government upon the request of the King. 28
The High Judicial Council is part of the structure of the
Ministry of Justice. Its main functions are judicial in nature, and
the Council is staffed by senior judges. 29
 The Permanent Committee for
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ifta' is part of the presidency of ifta'. It deals with requests for
fatwis from the public. Some of the c ulath-a.' are members of two or even
all three of these religious bodies.
The make-up of the senior  c ulatha' has undergone few changes in
the past twenty years. Prior to the creation of the Commission of
Senior  c ulatha' in 1971, the senior culatha' were "ten to fifteen
religious judges unofficially headed by the Grand Mufti" (Bligh
1985:38). Today the number is much larger and the expansion of higher
religious education will further enlarge the size of the culatha' and,
presumably, their influence on public life. Their main task will
continue to be to "act as guardians against the intrustion of alien
values and practices, seeking to preserve the purity of Islam and play
a restraining role in the Kingdom's social life" (Huyette 1985:117).
The relationship between the c ulama' and the royal family
continues on the same level ever since the creation of the state. The
mutual respect and cooperation, based on the alliance of 1158/1745-6,
between the King and the culatha' "helps to guarantee the political and
ideological structures ... as being Islamic, as having legitimacy"
(Gilsenan 1982:31). The question of legitimacy based on Islam is very
important for the Saudi state, and the culatha' have a vital part to
play in making that legitimacy possible. This factor will ensure that
the power of the  culatha' will persist as long as religion is the
dominant ideology of the state. The power and influence which the
senior culami t enjoy in Saudi Arabia today reflect the influence of
the political and social environment on their role in society. The
role of the culathi' has differed from one Islamic society to another,
and even from time to time in the same society. There have been a
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number of studies about the c ulaia' in various parts of the Islamic
world. The collection of studies edited by N. Keddie (1972) and the
study by Gilsenan (1982) provide good examples of how the culamD
influence and become influenced by their political and .social
environments.
In addition to the senior  culami' in Saudi Arabia, there are
thousands of Saudis who fulfill a number of religious functions and
who can be classified as junior or middle—ranking culama'. They work
as judges, teachers, preachers, imams, guides, enforcers of religious
observances and public morality (members of the hay'ah). Alternatively
they may possess religious knowledge but work in secular occupations
(e.g. as doctors or engineers). These people constitute a part of the
religious establishment in Saudi Arabia, and they work in different
ways to maintain the religious influence on public life. Their role
should not be under—estimated because they are increasing in number as
more and more graduates of religious universities join their ranks
every year.
However, the increasing number of graduates from religious
colleges might eventually create problems. The limited number of
religious occupations those people can work in could create a kind of
unemployment unless there is a balance between supply and demand. The
number of influential culaMD will always remain small, but it is
possible that the existence of an increasing number of people
qualified to fill senior positions will decrease the prestige of these
positions in the future. More research is needed to better understand
the impact of this process on the quality of the culamia l of the
future.
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The Judiciary
The judicial system in Saudi Arabia" is based totally on the Islamic
sharicah. It is made up of a system of shari cah courts that deal with
all criminal and civil cases. The draft law of the judicial authority
states that: "judges shall be independent and there shall be no power
over them in exercising their judicial functions except the power of
the shari ah, and no one shall interfere with the judiciary" (quoted
by al-Rasheed 1973:37).
Judges receive their religious education and training in a
number of sham
_
. 
c 
ah colleges. Some receive higher education in the High
Judicial Institute in Riyadh. The government has adopted the Hanbalr
madhhab (see Chapter Three) as the basis of all legal decisions
allegedly in an attempt to unify court decisions and to standardize
the judicial system (al-Farsy 1986:75).
The Ministry of Justice is the central body which administers
all courts in the country. The Ministry deals mainly with bureaucratic
procedures, while the appointment of judges is done by the King upon
the recommendations of the High Judicial Council. Major decisions are
reviewed by one of the two courts of appeal (mabakim al-tamyiz), and
have to be approved by a royal decree.
Saudi Arabia today is one of the few Islamic countries that
still apply the hudal (capital punishments) prescribed in the shari-
cah. 31 Minor crimes, civil disputes and moral crimes are all dealt
with in accordance with the injunctions of the shall.ah. 32
The Fourth-Development Plan discusses the establishment of
specialized juvenile, conjugal and traffic courts to lighten the
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burden of general shari cah courts. There are already commercial courts
and labour courts, and more changes are on the way. "Female graduates
of the shari c ah colleges will be trained to work in juvenile and
conjugal courts", according to the Fourth Plan. 33 Assurances are
always given that all courts will continue to apply the shari cah, and
the implication of the planned changes cannot be assessed at this
time. It should be noted, however, that graduates from shari: cah
colleges still work in all types of courts in the Kingdom.
Mosques
The Mas id (place of worship) is one of the oldest Islamic
institutions. Its importance stems from being the centre of religious
activities and social interaction in neighbourhoods and small
communities. Muslims are encouraged to perform their daily prayers in
the mosque for extra spiritual rewards, but prayer can be performed
anywhere else. The mosque does not have the same organizational
structure as a church, but is only a place reserved for prayer. Each
mosque usually has a designated imam to lead prayers and a mil'adhdhin
to announce the time of prayer, but those functions can be performed
by any qualified member of the group attending the prayer.
In Saudi Arabia today all mosques, with the exception of the two
holy mosques, are under the supervision of the Ministry of Pilgrimage
and Endowments. The Kingdom had an estimated 20,376 mosques of various
sizes in 1986, the majority of which had been built by the government
(see Table 2).
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Table 2
Number of Mosques in Saudi Arabia
Year
	 1974	 18
Built by Government Private Total Government Private Total
No. of
Mosques 6144 4689 10833 12268 6310 20376
Source: Based on official documents obtained from the Ministry of
Pilgrimage and Endowments, May 1988.
The government employs 20,357 imams, 20,810 mU'adhdhins, and
11,723 servants to work in the mosques, with an annual expenditure of
894 million riyals on salaries. 34
 Most of these officials are employed
on a part—time basis, in addition to their regular jobs. The
government also supplies mosques with carpets and loud speakers, and
the larger mosques usually have separate sections for women. The
control exercised by the Saudi government over mosques is very similar
to what M. Berger (1971:10) found in Egypt. In Saudi Arabia, however,
all imams of mosques are employees of the state, and are subject to
government rules and regulation. The variety of functionaries who work
in mosques in Egypt do not exist in Saudi Arabia.
If t'
This institution, which is basically a method of answering questions
of a religious nature, has developed into an organized and popular
form of value—rationalization by the culami'. The General Presidency
for the Administrations of Scientific Research, ifta', da c wah and
Guidance is the official organization responsible for the affairs of
ift1: 35
 It has a permanent committee for ifta' made up of a number of
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ulama', and it gives permission for any e alim who wants to issue
fatwas outside the jurisdiction of the committee, provided that he is
qualified to do so.
The eulama'give fatvias through the media, 36 through one of the
centres of if t' around the country, or through personal contact with
people. A new and convenient method of contact is the telephone, and
the telephone numbers of the homes of some prominent culara are
displayed in mosques and published in some newspapers on a regular
basis. 37 The telephone has proven to be useful in a religious sense
although some culam-i' objected to its introduction into the country
about sixty years ago. Ma' is increasingly used as a method in the
rationalization of religious values, and in solving some social
problems. Most people usually seek the advice of the  eula •a' and
follow it without hesitation.
FatwW has also been an important method in influencing certain
policies of the state. We discussed in Chapter Four how the culama'
played a major part in some political decisions by using the method of
issuing official fatWas. Today, the Commission of Senior culama' is
the body that issues fatWas for the government. In 1987, the
commission issued a fat4a signed by twelve senior eulatha' ruling that
the government had the authority to execute those found guilty of
smuggling or selling illegal drugs. 38 A similar fatwi was issued in
1988 which "prescribed the death penalty for anyone proved guilty of
sabotage or hijacking ... The need for the ulema edict was presumably
based on the fact that sabotage can be classified as a "modern" crime
[This fatwa] sheds an interesting insight into the relationship
between the clergy [sic] and government." 39
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Dacwah and Guidance
The institution of da G wah (see Chapter Three) is another method of
spreading and strengthening the Islamic way of life. It is closely
connected to the activities of irshad (guidance) which is intended to
show Muslims the right way of practising their religion. Both
institutions are part of the structure of the Presidency of ift-i'. The
Directorate of dacwah and irsh-id has 15 centres inside the Kingdom and
17 offices around the world (al-Muhaydib and al-Nasir 1986:16).
The activities of dacwah and irshad are mainly carried out by
means of books, pamphlets, lectures, and media programmes. Experts in
dacwah are sent to all parts of the country to give lectures, hold
seminars and answer queries. Others are sent to Muslim minorities in
other countries to do similar things and to lead prayers. The
Directorate also works with new converts to Islam inside the country.
Two specialized journals40 are published by the presidency, and all
religious books are reviewed before being allowed to be published or
to enter the country. The presidency also supervises religious
programmes on television, radio and newspapers, and manages the Saudi
Library in Riyadh which is a public library specializing in religious
publications. 41 The activities of the various organizations that deal
with dacwah are supervised by the High Commission for Islamic dacwah
(al-hay'ah al- c ulyi li-l-dacwah al-islamiyyah) which is under the
Chairmanship of the Minister of Defence (al-Muhaydib and al-Nisir
1986:9).
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Religious Education
Education in Saudi Arabia is influenced by religion in many ways.
Religious education used to be the only education in the country, and
the first institutions for higher education were the shariGah
colleges. Today, however, a form of differentiation has developed
between religious and general education. But the differentiation is
not complete because religion is still a major part of the curriculum
of general education;
religious courses are taught at the high school level and
are accorded high status. At the university level,
reasonable religious courses are taught along with other
secular courses in all years, and are required of all
students (al-Farsy 1986:192)
There are a number of specialized institutions for religious
education. The Qur rinic schools (madgris tahfiz al-Qur'in) are part of
the structure of the Ministry of Education with an emphasis on
religious subjects. There are also the scientific institutes (macihid 
cilmiyyah) which are the equivalent of secondary school and are part of
the structure of Imam Muhammad b. Su cad Islamic University. Five
institutes have also been established in other countries.42
Three of the Kingdom's seven universities are devoted to
religious instruction. These are Imam Muhammad b. Su cild Islamic
University in Riyadh, the Islamic University in al-Madinah, and
Umm-al-Qurg University in Makkah. The number of students in all three
accounts for roughly 25% of the total university enrollment. 43 The
faculties include shari cah colleges, theology, Islamic da cwah, Arabic
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language and social sciences. These universities supply the judges,
imams, muftrs, teachers and preachers for service throughout the
country and in other parts of the Islamic World.
Zakih Collection
As a religious duty, zakah (see Chapter Three) is to be paid
voluntarily by individuals and businesses. It is, however, the
responsibility of the state to make sure that zakah reaches those who
need it most. The state also has the right to collect zakah and to use
it for social expenditures in the areas specified by the sharTcah.
The Department for zakah and Income (maslahat al-zaklh 
wa'-l-dakhl) was incorporated into the structure of the Ministry of
Finance and National Economy to facilitate the collection of zakah
from companies and businesses (al-Farsy 1986:32).
Endowments
The Ministry of Pilgrimage and Endowments (awqaf) is responsible for
the management and investments of religious endowments. Awciaf is an
old Islamic institution whereby wealthy individuals give property to
the state to be used for pious works, or for the public good (Glasse
1989:417).
In the Kingdom today, awqaf include buildings, pieces of land,
or arbitah (hospices for the poor). Awqaf in Saudi Arabia are worth
hundreds of millions of riyals and constitute a major part of the
income of the Ministry of Pilgrimage and Endowments which it spends on
the building and maintenance of mosques and hospices.44
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C. The International Islamic Role of Saudi Arabia 
As the custodian of the two holy mosques of Islam, Saudi Arabia has a
special role in the Muslim World which it tries to perform by various
means. The foreign policy of the Kingdom reflects this special
position and "has been aimed at promoting Islamic values, and
decreasing tension between Muslim states" (Ochsenwald 1981:275). The
Kingdom has no diplomatic relations with Communist countries, and has
been active in supporting what it sees as the legitimate struggles of
the Palestinians against Israel and of the Afghan mu'Rhidin against
the Soviet Union. Economically, the Kingdom offers financial aid to a
number of Islamic countries, and its "aid programs show a clear
distinction between God-Cearing and Godless states" (Long 1980:105).45
The Kingdom is also an active member of the Organization of Islamic
Conference which is the equivalent of a United Nations for Islamic
states.
On the religious front, the Kingdom has been active through a
number of organizations which it helped establish and which it
continues to support. The largest of these is the World Muslim League
(rabitat al-lam al-islimi), established in 1961. It is located in
Makkah and relies on the Saudi government for financial support. The
League has representatives from all Muslim countries and Islamic
minorities, and works to "spread the message of Islam, explain its
fundamentals and protect its followers and their interests all over
the world". 46
The League has a number of offices in different parts of the
world, and works with local mosques in non-Islamic countries through
the World Council for Mosques (al-majlis al- calami li-l-masijid). It
helps build mosques, supplies imams, organizes seminars and camps, and
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trains individuals to carry out the tasks of dacwah and guidance.
The Islamic fiqh4 Academy (majmac
 al-fiqh al-islamT) is another
organ that is part of the structure of the League. It has a large
number of c ulamq ' members from different Islamic countries who meet
regularly to discuss religious issues and try to provide "the Islamic
world with effective jurisprudential solutions in all affairs of life
based on the Holy Qur'an and the Prophet's traditions." 48
In 1972, the Kingdom sponsored the creation of the World
Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY). It is defined as "an independent body
and a forum for coordinating the efforts of the Muslim Youth under
Muslim youth and students organizations throughout the world." 49
 The
offices of WAMY are located in Riyadh, and its finances come from the
annual grant given by the Saudi government. Its activities include the
hosting of annual conferences and the publication of religious books
(al-Yassini 1985:73).
The Kingdom has also tried to influence religious developments
in other countries by the establishment of the Islamic University for
international students. The University, established in 1961, has six
faculties and 3,000 students belonging to 92 nationalities. 50
 Its
constitution specifies that 85% of students must be from countries
other than Saudi Arabia, and those who graduate are encouraged to go
back to their home-country and utilize their knowledge in helping
their people become "better" Muslims. The aim of the University is to
" spread the Islamic spirit, belief and message" (Huyette 1985:116).
The government has also given direct grants in excess of 1,510,161,215
riyals for the building of mosques and Islamic centres in over 78
countries. 51
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D. Modernization and Religious Influence 
It would be difficult for any observer not to agree with Kluck
(1984:110) that "despite the dramatic changes in some sectors [sic] in
the 1970s, religious practice and opinion remain firmly conservative."
There are indications that the government of Saudi Arabia is becoming
more committed to its Islamic ideology and role in recent years, as we
have seen in the above discussions. The effects of modernization on
the religious commitment of the average Saudi are not clear, however.
In the absence of relevant information on this topic, we will
concentrate on the role played by the government. The basic question
in this respect deals with the influence of religious ideology and
practices on public life.
There has been a gradual increase over the years in the number
of official institutions having religious functions (see Figure 3),
and religious activities have become one of the major areas of
expenditure for the government. The reasons for these developments
cannot be attributed solely to political reasons or questions of
legitimacy or prestige because the process is not limited to one
specific period but has continued since the creation of the modern
state in 1932. Gellner (1981:67) has warned against attributing the
dominance of Islam in some countries to purely economic factors. He
wrote that:
The puritan version of Islam has enjoyed a considerable
revival and vogue, in conjunction with quite diverse forms
of modernizing policy ... It would be quite wrong to
explain this success in terms of whatever oil—financed
subsidy it may receive.
It is possible that the availability of money and the political
events of the late 1970s (ie. the Iranian revolution and the Makkah
mosque incident) have made the government more aware of the importance
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of stressing its role as an Islamic government in order to maintain
legitimacy. This argument, however, becomes weaker as soon as we
acknowledge the consistency of the government's commitment over the
past sixty years. The importance of the shari cah, the official stand
against the separation of religion and state, the role of the King and
the culama.', the influence of religion over education and the
judiciary, and concern over public morality have all persisted and
even expanded. It would be reasonable, based on the evidence presented
in this chapter, therefore, to argue that religion has more influence
on public life today than it had twenty five years ago. 52
Modernization has made it possible for religious education and
religious programmes on television and radio to reach remote areas of
the Kingdom that had been out of reach a few years ago. The education
of women has been possible without giving up the requirement for
segregation of the sexes. The religious establishment has benefited
from the modernization programmes, and has proved able to function
alongside modern-bureaucratic organizations. This, according to Hudson
(1980:15), has been the case in more than one Islamic country. "Rural
people in the Middle East", he argued,
are undoubtedly more conscious of and educated about their
faith than ever before, owing to the modernization of the
countryside. The very instruments of Western technology
which some scholars thought would hasten the decline of
Islamic consciousness have surely strengthened it.
The implications of bureaucratic developments for the religious
establishment have been discussed by a number of writers who seem to
doubt the ability of the culama' and their organizations to adapt to,
and survive, the changes. Al-Awaji (1971:122), for example, claimed
that "the development of a complex bureaucracy whose routines and
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operations are very alien to the orientation of the ulama has
practically marked a serious, though gradual, beginning of the
curtailment of the ulama's sphere of influence." It is clear that
eighteen years later, the  c ulam-i's influence has in fact increased
rather than decreased.
Kluck (1984:113) also went on in the same way to argue that "the
conservative ulama frequently felt threatened by the technocrats and
bureaucrats". There are two problems with the above arguments.
Firstly, the authors have taken an approach that lays emphasis on the
conflict between what are regarded as the forces of traditionalism
(mainly the culaMD) and the forces of modernism (Western-educated
bureaucrats). Niblock (1982a:75) has rightly warned against such an
approach which "does not take into account the extent to which the old
and the new are interlinked, with both 'forces' serving common
purposes". Secondly, the traditional forces cannot be viewed as
distinct and outside the modernization process. They have played an
important role in establishing and controlling the pace and direction
of change. The c ulami', and other traditionally educated Saudis also
created and directed the first organs of the central bureaucracy.
The traditional forces in Saudi Arabia were among the first
groups to receive education and official employment, and a large
segment of government employees has also benefited from traditional
education. The Western-educated Saudis are limited in numbers, and
they cannot be assumed to be anti-traditionalist just because they
have obtained secular education in the West. Ochsenwald (1981:278) has
argued against such an assumption:
It is perhaps incorrect to assume that Saudi students
abroad necessarily become more secular minded than their
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cohorts in Saudi schools ... also, the old stereotype that
engineers, physicians, and others of the new middle class
are more secular in their values than the traditional
middle class of ulama and merchants can no longer be
automatically assumed to be true.
Huyette (1985:79), more specifically,
	 showed that	 "Saudi
technical experts have manifested an ability to apply modern methods
to promote the general welfare without foresaking traditional value."
She went on to question the validity of the assumption that secular
education necessarily fosters secular values.53
It is not our aim here to try to resolve the above question.
What we can do, however, is to argue that at least in the case of
Saudi Arabia the evidence of a confrontation between the forces of
traditionalism and the forces of modernism is by no means conclusive.
Moreover, it is even difficult to draw a clear distinction between the
two forces in terms of education alone. Those classified as
traditionalists have in fact played an important part in the
modernization and development of the country. A number of culaMD
preside over several large bureaucratic organizations, and they have
proven to be successful administrators. 54
 Religious organizations have
expanded their structures and their activities without showing signs
of becoming weaker or disorganized as a result of becoming
bureaucratic. Every year hundreds of religiously educated Saudis
graduate from universities and become part of the bureaucracy
implementing modernization programmes alongside their "secularly"
educated colleagues.
The argument advanced by Mortimer (1982), al-Yassini (1985),
Bligh (1985), and al-Awaji (1971) that the religious establishment
tends to lose power when incorporated into the state machinery has
also proven to be weak in the light of the findings of this study.
172
What is meant by the religious establishment in their arguments is the
culania' themselves. Al-Yassini (1985:59), for example, wrote that
because of institutional differentiation between religion and state,
"the ulama lost many of their traditional functions and became a
pressure group limited to exerting influence over the governemnt's
activities and policies but never acting as an autonomous centre of
power."
The problem with the above argument is that it does not specify
the traditional functions that the Saudi cularra' allegedly lost
because of political modernization. We could not identify any area of
public life which the culami' used to control before modernization but
over which they have lost control at the present time. What happened
was, in fact,
	 functional differentiation.
	 This process is
indispensable to the development of a modern state. It is the kind of
differentiation that has been part of the Islamic state for
centuries, 55
 and which has nothing to do with what Kechichian
(1986:54) called "the functional authority of the sharicah."
It is the place of the shari c ah and its influence in society
which determines the influence of religion on public life. Functional
differentiation, in itself, cannot decrease the influence of religion
if the shareah continues to be the dominant ideology of the state and
the culture. In Saudi Arabia today the government has managed to
maintain the dominance of the shaii cah despite the major institutional
differentiations that have taken place since the early 1950s.
Kechichian (1986:54) has concluded that the unique relationship
between the culami' and the state authorities in Saudi Arabia "has
survived centuries of testing and still seems to function in our
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times."
Before the creation of the modern Saudi state, the culami' had
very limited influence on public life, and very few functions. Today,
they enjoy the support of the political authorities and play an
important part in the affairs of state. It is important, however, to
make a distinction between, on the one hand, the role of the  culama' 
as guardians of the shari c ah, legitimizers of political power, and
rationalizers of religious beliefs and practices, and, on the other,
their role as employees of the state. The traditional role which they
play by virtue of their religious knowledge cannot be controlled or
changed by the political environment in which they live. "The sacred
tradition [for which the c ulama' are responsible], could never simply
be taken over by the state through the control of a compliant or
dependent body of scholar-lawyers" (Gilsenan 1982:33).
The culama' have always been responsible for the sacred
tradition even at times of political decline or non-Islamic rule. 56
This responsibility becomes easier to fulfil when the political
authorities give the culama' the support they require in order to
perform their role as guardians of the sharT cah. The functions that
the  c ulama l
 fulfil within the structure of the state as public
servants usually strengthen that role rather than contradict it.
Working as judges, teachers, mufti's, imams, and mubtasibs gives the
ulaia' effective means to accomplish their main task. Both the degree
of proximity to the political authorities, and the level of
institutional differentiation usually have limited influence on the
ability of the c ulama' to maintain their position as guardians of the
sharTcah, arbiters of social conduct, and models for ideal Islamic
behaviour.
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E. Islam in Saudi Arabia in Comparative Perspective 
The uniqueness of Saudi Arabia as an Islamic state must not be allowed
to obscure the fact that there are more than forty countries with a
majority Muslim population. Other Islamic countries have experienced
(and many are still experiencing) the same problems that Saudi Arabia
face today. A brief comparison of the religious situation in three
Islamic countries, however, will help illuminate the fact that each
case is unique in one way or another. The political, social, and
economic environments influence and are influenced by the place and
role of religion in each particular society. There are various ways of
making the comparison, but we will concentrate here on the official
role of the culaia' in each country and their relationship with the
political authorities. The countries were chosen because of the
availability of studies dealing with the position of the culaMi i
 in
each one.
Firstly, Turkey represents an extreme case when compared to
Saudi Arabia. It is also a unique case which highlights the importance
of the political attitude to religion and its influence on public
life. The policy which Gilsenan (1982:46) called "official
secularization", has been followed by the Turkish government since
1924 and has expunged the official role of religion in Turkish public
life. Religion became to the ruling elite "an irrelevant irritant at
the state level, a sign of backwardness to be superseded by reason and
science" (Gilsenan 1982:43). According to Turkey's new ideology
(Turkish nationalism), the aim was to abandon the traditions of the
country in order to become part of Europe. In response, popular forms
of Islam developed and filled the vacuum created by the absence of
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official religion.
In Saudi Arabia, by contrast, the political elite never
"believed that the West had reached a higher stage of civilization and
that the world of Islam must follow it" (Mortimer 1982:174). Unlike
the Turkish elite, the Saudis remain convinced of the ability of Islam
to provide a viable social and moral system for society even at times
of social and economic development.
Secondly, popular forms of Islam became weaker in Morocco as a
result of modernization in the twentieth century, and "the cUlema
became more influential as the central government grew slowly
stronger" (Gilsenan 1982:50). This is very similar to what happened in
Saudi Arabia after the development of the central government, and it
supports our argument that the cularg ' tend to gain power rather than
lose it when official Islam is dominant and when the cularg ' become
part of the structure of the state. 57
Thirdly, the culams opposition to modernization in Egypt cost
them their public influence according to Crecelius (1972:208). The
c
ulama' "became completely isolated from the modernizing segment of
society and their traditional views were almost totally rejected." 58
In contrast, the Saudi %lama' have managed to influence the process
of modernization without having to delay it or stand in its way. The
difference can be partly understood in terms of the unique
relationship between the political and religious elites in Saudi
Arabia, and the fact that "both the Saudi Arabian population and the
political elite identify with Islam, which helps to bind together the
elite and the population on ideological and cultural levels" (al—Hamad
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1985:310). Another important factor might have been the flexibility
that the culamg ' adopted to social change as followers of the HanbalT
madhhab. 59
Colonialism is another factor which has shaped modernization in
important respects. The influence of colonial powers on the politics
of many Islamic countries probably helped to create the official
separation between religion and the state which we observe in many of
them today. The rule of the culami' under colonialism became limited
to the area of religious practices, and popular forms of Islam (mainly
Sufism) gained more influence over the lives of the general
population.
The distinctiveness of Saudi Arabia is further enhanced by the
unique relationship between the Royal Family and the prominent Guiana'
in the country. The political elites continue to appreciate the need
for religious ideology as a source of legitimacy and national unity,
and they deal with the religious establishment in accordance with that
perceived need. Furthermore, the official policy of the government has
always been consistent in dealing with the question of other religions
in Saudi Arabia. Non—Islamic religions are not allowed to have public
places of worship, and their followers are not allowed to practise
their religion publicly. 60 Religious pluralism is virtually absent in
Saudi Arabia. Popular forms of Islam (e.g. Sufism) do not exist in the
country to any measurable degree as a result of the official stand
against them which is enforced by the teaching of the culam7).
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Conclusion
The limited aim of the foregoing description of the religious
situation in modern Saudi Arabia was to give a general account of the
main religious institutions of Saudi Arabia as preparation for our
attempt to understand the inflUence of modernization on the religious
life of the country. It is clear that religion continues to dominate
public life, and that the commitment of the state to religion shows no
sign of weakening despite years of rapid socio—economic developments.
The role of the  culama' remains at least as important and as
powerful as it has ever been over the past six decades. Institutional
differentiation has given the culaMa l
 more organizations to control
and through which to function, but contrary to widespread arguments
and expectations, the %laria t
 continue to play a major role in the
politics and social life of the country.
The systematization of religious education, practices and
enforcements through the state bureaucracy has resulted in the growth
of religious influence in public life. The fact that religious
functions can be integrated into modern bureaucracy is evidence that
calls in question the possibility of applying most current theories of
secularization to the case of Saudi Arabia. The success of religious
organizations in functioning as part of the modern bureaucratic
structure of the Saudi state supports the argument that modernization
does not necessarily weaken the influence of religion on public life
in all societies. The case of Saudi Arabia supports the contention
that there is a need for a new approach that would take into account
the unique features of the Saudi experience.
The distinctiveness of the Saudi experience in terms of unique
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political, social, and economic conditions raises the difficulty of
trying to apply the theories of secularization. It also strengthens
the view that each society is unique; that religions are different;
and that religions are inseparable from their own environments.
Generalizations about the process of secularization tend to overlook
important factors inherent in the experience of each society. It is
hoped that we have succeeded in illuminating the distinctiveness of
the Saudi experience, and that our case study in the following part
will further highlight the ability of religious institutions both to
adapt to, and to survive, the difficult process of modernization.
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PART III
A case study of Hay'at al-Amr bi- '1-Ma crrif wa-'l-Nahy an al-Munkar
(Organization for Enjoining the Acceptable and Forbidding the
Reprehensible)
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Introduction
This part is a detailed case study of the unique religious institution
called officially hay'at al-amr wa-'l-nahy Can al-munkar
(Organization for Enjoining the Acceptable and Forbidding the
Reprehensible), and known commonly as "Public Morality Committees".
Instead of using the complete name, the term hay'ah l (pl. hay'at) will
be used in this study to refer to this organization.
The hay'ah, has been referred to in literature published in the
West as "public morality committees" (Niblock 1982a:75), as "religious
police" (Piscatori 1983b:69), and as "the matawain" (Mackey 1987:68).
The full Arabic title has also been translated variously in accordance
with the general meanings of the concepts which are part of the name. 2
It is important to realize that this study and all of those sources
are talking about the same institution: the official organization
which is responsible for the enforcement of religious observances and
public morality in Saudi Arabia.
The Importance of the Case of the Hay'ah
The hay'ah has been chosen for this case study for a number of
important reasons:
1. The hay'ah presents us with a classic case of an institution based
on religious principles (the Qur'inic notion of enjoining the
acceptable and forbidding the reprehensible as a religious
obligation), 3 and performing religious functions. It is uniquely
Islamic in its ideological basis and the role it plays in society. The
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hay'ah is a modern version of the traditional institution of hisbah,
and its existence today demonstrates the possibility of adapting a
traditional institution to modern circumstances.
2. The hay'ah is one of the oldest religious organizations in modern
Saudi Arabia. It represents a good example of the effects of
modernization on a religious (traditional) institution.
3. The hay'ah is unique to Saudi Arabia. No other Islamic country
today has an official organization that performs the same functions.
4. The hay'ah has not yet been studied scientifically in Western
literature. 4
 Little information is known about it outside Saudi
Arabia, and it has been given a bad and mostly inaccurate image in
most of the sources that discuss it (see review of the literature
below).
5. An understanding of the present situation of the hay'ah, and the
changes it has gone through will, it is hoped, give us some
indications of the effects of modernization on official religious
organizations in Saudi Arabia. It might also help us assess the
secularizing influence of modernization on an Islamic society (see
Chapter Two).
This case study is divided into four chapters. Chapter Six is
historical in nature. It traces the historical evolution of the modern
hay'ah back to the rise of Islam where its ideological bases are
found. This is followed by a brief discussion of the Islamic
institution of hisbah, its historical evolution in general and in the
Arabian Peninsula in particular. The second half of the chapter deals
with the historical evolution of the modern hay'ah in different parts
of the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
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Chapters Seven and Eight are mainly descriptive. Chapter Seven
deals with the hay'ah today in terms of structure, regulations,
members, and activities. Chapter Eight deals with the relationship
between the hay'ah and other government and public institutions in
present-day Saudi Arabia. The last chapter, Chapter Nine, contains the
analytical part of this case study. It deals with the effects of
modernization on the hay'ah's influence and ability to play its role
in society. This chapter also discusses the significance of the case
study to the broader theoretical questions raised in the thesis. It
prepares the ground for the complete analysis in Chapter Ten.
The case study of the hay l ah is based on information collected
by the writer during six-months field-work in Saudi Arabia (between
January and June 1988). The information was obtained through
participant observation in the activities of the hay l ah, through
office work in two local centres in the city of Riyadh, through
interviews with officials and members of the organization, and through
a content analysis of a number of historical and official documents.
The study is mainly descriptive, and many basic details are given
because they are not known outside Saudi Arabia. Some of the important
documents have been translated into English and included in the
Appendices. The problems associated with the field-work have limited
the scope of this study (see Appendix B).
This case study is only part of the complete topic of the
thesis. Its aim is to provide a narrowly focused, empirical example of
the effects of modernization on a religious institution. It is
intended to complement the discussion of broader theoretical issues
relating to secularization.
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Before we proceed with the case study, a selective review of the
literature, published in the West, that has dealt with the hay'ah in
one way or another will be provided. The review will show how little
is known about the hay'ah in the West, thereby enhancing the need for
a study of this kind.
The Hay'ah in Western Literature
This review of the literature will be limited to books and articles,
published in the West, 5 that deal with the hay'ah as an official
organization that functions today as part of the Saudi government. 6
An extensive search has yielded little. No complete work has
been found that deals with the hay'ah in great detail. Goldrup
(1971:409) gives historical information about the development of the
hay'ah in the Hejaz. His information seems to be accurate, but he did
not go beyond 1932. 7 Al—Yassini (1985:68) gives the most updated
information about the modern hay'ah. In a three—page section of his
book, Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 8 al—Yassini
briefly traces the historical evolution of the hapah, and talks about
its present status. He concludes that the hay'ah today is "relegated
to a status subservient to that of the state bureaucracy" (D.70), that
King cAbd al—cAzIz created it only to "consolidate his authority", and
that today the government has "incorporated this institution into the
civil service and stripped it of effective power" (p.70).
The main criticism of al—Yassini's conclusions is that they seem
to be based on impressions rather than facts. He seems to have based
his arguments on what happened to the hay'ah in 1930 (when the
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government incorporated the hay'ah into the police force in the
Hejaz). That is certainly not the case today, and this study will give
a more accurate description of the position of the hay'ah today based
on direct observations.
Another picture of the hay'ah is presented by Mackey (1987:68).
This one is also inaccurate and seems to represent a journalistic
rather than a scientific approach. Mackey refers to the hay'ah as the
matawain. 9 She relates some stories of encounters with members of the
hay'ah, but has a weak sense of their organization and their exact
role in society. She wrote that the government "has little control
over [the hay'ah's] membership or its actions", and that the hay'ah 
"has tremendous power" (p.69). She also confused the hay'ah with other
religious organizations when she asked how much "the matawain garner
from government coffers for salaries, mosque construction, purchase of
Korans, educational functions and so on" (p.70). The hay'ah, in fact,
has nothing to do with mosque construction, and has no formal
educational functions at all. 10
Between the two extremes, presented by al—Yassini (1985) and
Mackey (1987), the hay'ah has received little coverage in Western
literature. Holden and Johns (1981:87)	 traced the historical
development of the haT'ah, but ended up confusing it with the ikhwin
(see Chapter Three). The two institutions had little in common, and
there are no historical proofs that the early members of the hay'ah
were actually part of the ikhwin organization. 11 Holden and Johns
(1981:261) went on to argue that Saudis who want to modernize the
country "resent the activities of these baton—wielding zealots." That
is a possibility, but such a statement is not supported by empirical
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data.
Ochsenwald (1981:275) views the existence of the hay'ah as a
sign of the government's support "for the strict enforcement of
Wahhabi doctrines on social behavior". Kluck (1984:112), Piscatori
(1983b:69), and Rugh (1973) have referred to the hay'ah as "religious
police". This is a popular term to describe the hay'ah, but it is not
accurate. The hay'ah is similar to the police because of the type of
activities it carries out. It is, however, a completely civilian
organization which only employs policemen (from the Ministry of the
Interior) to help in its activities.12
In an earlier study, Rugh (1973:19) wrote that "the growth of
the new middle class [in Saudi Arabia] ... probably was one factor in
the decline of the hay'ah's power during the past two decades." A
similar argument was made by Edens (1974:62) who wrote that "the
government has curtailed the influence of the mutawwa's through reform
of the Public Morality Committees". Both arguments may have been based
on the decision taken by King Faysal (ruled 1384-1395/1964-1975) to
incorporate members of the hay'all into the civil service. 13
 That
decision gave the government more control over the hay'ah, but the
evidence today shows that the influence of the hay'ah has not been
completely curtailed, as was alleged in the early 1970s.
A more accurate image of the hay'ah was presented by Niblock
(1982a:75) who introduced the hay'ah into his discussion of the
"forces of traditionalism" in Saudi Arabia. He said that the job of
the hay'ah is to impose social mores advocated by the culami', and
that the power of the culaMi' to "regulate public conduct through the
hay'at" was a sign of the significant authority that they still
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enjoyed in Saudi society. A number of other writers have mentioned the
hay'ah briefly as part of their discussions of Saudi Arabia, but the
limited scope of their analyses makes it unnecessary to consider them
here. 14
This brief review of literature indicates how little and how
inaccurate, in some respects, is the information available in the West
about the hay l ah. The intention of this study is to provide a sounder
and more detailed picture of the hay'ah, based on direct observations.
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Chapter Six
The Traditional Hisbah and the Modern Hay'ah: Bases and Historical 
Evolution 
This chapter is comparative and historical in nature. It is an attempt
to trace back the origins of the institution of the hay'ah as a
religious organization. It is widely accepted that the modern hay'ah 
is very similar to the traditional Islamic institution of hisbah. The
similarity comes from the ideological basis used to justify the role
played by the two organizations.
The first section of this chapter will deal with that ideological
basis. Section two will be a discussion of the meaning of hisbah and
its development followed by a brief account of its historical
evolution in different parts of the Islamic world. The fourth section
will be about the revival of hisbah in the Arabian Peninsula following
the dacwah of Muhammad b. cAbd al-Wahhib (see Chapter Three). The
evolution of the hay'ah in the modern Saudi state will be dealt with
in the last section of this chapter. It is going to be divided into
three sub-sections dealing with the evolution of the hay'ah in Najd,
the evolution of the hay'ah in the Hejaz, and the hay'ah after 1976
respectively. The reasons for this division will be discussed in due
course.
A. The Ideological Basis 
After the establishment of the first Islamic state in al-Madinah
around the year 622 C.E., the Prophet of Islam, who was also the
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political leader of the state, felt that it was necessary to reshape
the institutions of society that were in conflict with the teachings
of the new religion. The first task was to build an ummah (community
of believers) whose members are drawn together by loyalty to the new
religion rather than loyalty to race or tribe. The Prophet Muhammad
succeeded in establishing a community of believers in al-Madinah
during the ten years period he lived there. The foundations for a new
civilization to be ruled by religion were in place by the time he died
in 632 C.E. (see cAzzim 1984)-
The Prophet Muhammad taught and implemented the Principle that
Islam is a total way of life dealing with the religious, political,
economic and social affairs of both the individual and the community
(see Chapter Three). Part of that totality was the notion of
collective responsibility for the establishment of a practical and
comprehensive social order. The guidelines for establishing such an
order can be found in the Islamic sharI cah. The word sharrcah
literally means 'a clear pathway' (see Chapter Three). As a concept it
is used to describe:
The detailed code of conduct or the canons comprising ways
and modes of worship, standards of morals and life, laws
that allow and prescribe, that judge between right and
wrong (Maududi 1983:108)-
The judgment between right and wrong makes the shari c ah the
comprehensive ideological base for the Islamic institution of hisbah.1
This unique religious institution that existed as part of the Islamic
state during most of its history was the model upon which the modern
hay'ah2 was established.	 The similarities between the two
organizations in terms of ideology and practices make it beneficial to
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discuss in details the institution of hisbah. The comparison between
the two institutions will assist us in our attempt to try to
understand the effects of modernization on a traditional institution.
But before we proceed with our discussion of hisbah, it is important
to understand the religious concept of al-amr 	 wa-'l-nahy
%.n al-munkar	 (enjoining the acceptable and forbidding the
reprehensible) on which the institution of hisbah was based. That
concept is regarded by Muslims as a very important tool for the
realization of an Islamic social system. It is also a religious
obligation that every Muslim, male and female, must understand and
practise.
The Islamic shari cah places a lot of emphasis on the human
behaviour in public as well as in private. The Islamic code of conduct
is characterized by total obedience and compliance with the commands
and prohibitions of the sharIcah. Every believer, from the head of the
Islamic state to the ordinary citizen, is obliged to live in
accordance with the injunctions of the shari cah. This was seen as the
only way for the ideal Islamic state to exist and to survive.
In the shari cah all human beliefs, acts and relations fall under
one of the two major categories of mac rUf (good, right and acceptable)
and munkar (evil, wrong and reprehensible). One of the basic teachings
of the shari cah is that all members of the community must work
together to enjoin what is macia and to forbid what is munkar. The
Qur'En states (9:71):
The believers, men and women, are protectors, one of
another: they enjoin what is just, and forbid what is
evil. (3)
The Prophet Muhammad was reported to have said in a hadith that:
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Whoever of you sees an evil action, let him change it with
his hand; and if he is not able to do so, then with his
tongue; and if he is not able, then with his heart and
that is the weakest of faith (cited in An-Oawawi
1977:110).
Al-amr	 wa-'l-nahy can al-munkar is, therefore, regarded
by the sharI cah as a religious obligation upon every Muslim, male or
female, each one according to his/her ability (Williams 1961:125). The
mission of the Prophet Muhammad has been described in the Qur'in
(7:157) as a mission to teach believers what is acceptable and to
forbid them what is reprehensible.
The state itself is also regarded as an agent for the
implementation of the sharI cah in general and of that obligation in
particular. Ibn Taymiyyah (661-728/1263-1328), who was one •of the most
influential Muslim scholars of his age, wrote in his famous work
AL-Hisbah fl-'1-Islam4 that: "All Islamic authorities have the sole
aim of ordaining what is proper and forbidding the improper" (Ibn
Taymiyyah 1983:23). Ansar (1984:130) reinforced the argument of Ibn
Taymiyyah by saying that all departments of the state should be
created with a view to performing the principle of al-amr 
wa-'l-nahy Can al-munkar. He said that the state will not be an
Islamic state until all its departments work together to implement
that task in society.
The argument here is whether the task is the sole responsibility
of the state authorities or the responsibility of every member of the
community regardless of his position. The Qur f inic injunction quoted
above gives the impression that it is an obligation upon all
believers. Muslim scholars, however, have tried to explain the verse
in light of the fact that not all believers will be able to engage in
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al-amr bi-'1-ma c rilf wa-'l-nahy Can al-munkar. That is why some
scholars believe that there is a need for an authority to carry out
the task. Others agree, but they divide the task into three major
categories. There is an aspect of enjoining the acceptable and
forbidding the reprehensible which needs force (e.g. fighting crime),
and that should be the responsibility of the state. There is an
aspect, however, that can best be achieved through preaching,
education and advice. That is the job of the culaMD (scholars) in the
community.
The third aspect involves members of the public who can take part
in the activity, each one according to his ability. They can stop a
wrong action by hand on a limited scale. If the person is not able
then he should use his tongue (to advise against the action or to
inform the authorities). And if the person cannot use his tongue, then
the last resort is to use the heart. 5 It is believed by Muslim
scholars that these methods in combination can rid the society of most
of the wrong beliefs and actions (Ansar 1984:232, 242). The ideal
situation is where everyone in society plays his part in achieving
that aim. The evidence, however, shows that this ideal is easier said
than done. Until all members of the Islamic community work as part of
that grand scheme, then there will be no substitute for the state to
do most of the task.
This fact was recognized from the start, and the Qur' gn has
specified that a group of individuals should come together to carry on
the task. The Qur' gn (3:104) states that:
Let there arise out of you a band of people, inviting to
all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding
what is wrong: they are the ones to attain felicity.
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This band of people can consist of any able individuals in the
community who are willing to work for the sake of God as part of their
religious obligation. The job of enjoining what is acceptable and
forbidding what is reprehensible comes under the category of fare
(obligatory) actions which are incumbent upon all able members of the
community. It becomes manda (recommended) for the rest when certain
individuals perform the task. But the task becomes an "individual
responsibility for the able person when no-one else undertakes it"
(Ibn Taymiyyah 1983:23).
B. The Institution of Hisbah
These ideological notions set the stage for the birth of the unique
Islamic institution known as the hisbah. It was part of the Prophet
Muhammad's plan to institutionalize the preservation of the Islamic
code of behaviour. The first step in that direction was the teaching
that the task of al-amr wa-'1-nahy can al-munkar is not
just an obligation upon able individuals but also a prime duty of the
state.
Hisbah is regarded as one of the oldest institutions of the
Islamic state. The idea for it came out of the perceived need to
implement the religious duty of enjoining what is acceptable and
forbidding what is reprehensible in regard to two major areas in
society. The first one concerns the practice of religious duties by
the public (e.g. prayer, fasting etc.), and the other one concerns the
observation of the behaviour of individuals in public places and
especially in the market place. There are also other areas in which
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those who work for the bisbah can play important roles. Their main
task, therefore, was seen as the enforcement of public morality as
defined by the sharicah.
There are a number of definitions for the institution of bisbah.
The one that Murshad (1972:16) used was found to be both clear and
comprehensive. He defined the institution of bisbah as:
An administrative surveillance by a branch of the state
through an appointed Wall (officer), who observes
behaviours of individuals to make sure that these
behaviours are in accordance with the rules and
injunctions of the shari c ah, using the methods of
enjoining what is acceptable and forbidding what is
reprehensible.
That appointed officer became known as the mubtasib: a person who
invites others to do good and forbids them from doing evil in the hope
of getting a reward in the hereafter. The religious notion of reward
in the hereafter and its grounding in the religious concept of al-amr
wa-'1-nahy can al-munkar make the institution of bisbah
basically a religious institution even though it involves some social
and economic functions, as we will see later. Other justifications for
hisbah come from the view held by Muslims that working as a mubtasib 
is part of obeying the commandments of the sharicah, and that a major
part of the task of a muhtasib involves the enforcement of religious
obligations among the people. The Islamic notion of establishing a
social order based on the teachings of the shari c ah led to the
creation of this unique institution. The actions of the Prophet
Muhammad in that regard gave his followers clear indications of how
the institution of bisbah is to function in society.
The job of those who work for the bisbah is called ibtisab. It is
different from al-amr	 wa-11-nahyean al-munkar in several
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aspects. The later is a much more general term dealing with all the
functions of the Islamic state including hisbah itself. It also deals
with the behaviour of individuals in public as well as in private. It
is also a religious duty upon able members of the community which must
always be carried out according to ability whether a formal
organization of hisbah exists or not. Ihtislb, on the other hand, is
an organized activity with specific functions in society. Anyone who
works as part of it must be appointed by the chief muhtasib who is
appointed by the head of state (al-Arifi 1987:15).
Doing the job voluntarily or working for the state is one of the
basic differences between wali (officer) and mutawi c (volunteer). The
latter is a term used to describe the ordinary citizen who carries out
some of the functions of a muhtasib on his own. He usually does it as
a religious obligation seeking the reward for it from Allih (God). A
wall has more authority and also more responsibilities than the
.cputawl. He has the authority to arrest, interrogate, punish those
found guilty, answer complaints, and employ others to help him.
Furthermore, he is responsible for looking for reprehensible actions
and those who commit them, and he is paid by the state for his work.
The mutawic , on the other hand, has none of this authority, and he is
encouraged to do the job of ihtisib whenever he is able to help the
mubtasib, at the same time keeping in mind his limited authority
(Murshad 1972:59-60).
The duties of the muhtasib cover a wide range of areas dealing
with religious, economic and social activities. They include arranging
for the common people to perform the five daily prayers at their
proper time. He has the authority to punish those who do not pray in
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the mosque without an accepted excuse. Among his classical duties were
the supervision of imams who lead public prayers and the mil'adhdhins
who announce the call to the prayers. The muhtasib also supervises the
propriety of interaction between the sexes in public places. His most
important duty involved the control of activities in the 1E2 (market
place). This became necessary because the first Islamic community in
al-Madlnah was mainly a commercial community engaged in importing and
selling goods from surrounding countries.
The Prophet Muhammad wanted to initiate a systematic surveillance
over buyers and sellers in order to bring their activities in line
with the precepts of the shaei cah. He taught against the taking of
rib-5. (interest) on loans, against fraud in dealings, adulteration of
food items, the sale of illicit items like wine, and against keeping
things in order to sell them later at higher prices. This was done by
the Prophet Muhammad, and encouraged by the shari cah as part of the
Islamic view that the state is responsible for the protection of its
citizens. This, of course, is not unique to the Islamic state, but
what is special about it is the fact that it is regarded as a
religious obligation. The muhtasib was also responsible for the
provision of the general amenities of life such as the supply of clean
water, proper arrangements for traffic, and the other needs of the
community (Ansar 1984:133).
No one could claim that these duties were specified by the two
major sources of the shari cah, but they became part of the duties of
the muhtasib because there was a perceived need for these things to be
done. The muhtasib was the officer of the state given the authority to
perform these various tasks. The traditional muhtasib, then, was
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characterized by the integration of his moral and economic and social
tasks. In fact, no specific limits were set on the things that the
muhtasib was responsible for. The division between his duties and
those of other state officials like the q5741 (judge) and the chief of
the shurtah (police) was not strictly defined. The differences lay, in
certain matters, less in their intrinsic nature than in the method by
which they used to function: the qig judged matters concerning which
there had been a complaint, and he held an inquiry to decide the
outcome of the case; the shurtah took care of offences and crimes
which demanded police action; the muhtasib, on the other hand, was
concerned with obvious and immediate violations. The latter did not
hold an inquiry and did not wait for someone to complain, but he used
to settle the case on the spot sometimes with the help of the shurtah 
(Cahen and Talbi 1971:487).
The way in which the muhtasib carried out some of his duties
depended very much on his own personal character. There were a number
of steps that a muhtasib could take in order to enjoin good behaviour
or to prevent bad behaviour. His options ranged from simple advice,
reprimand or rebuke to obstruction by force, threat, flogging,
imprisonment and expulsion from the town. He, however, was not
competent to inflict the death penalty (Ibn Taymiyyah 1983:26). This
last point was another one of the differences between the muhtasib and
the gaff.. These differences were the result of functional divisions
rather than ideological distinctions. The shar ri cah did not deal with
the differences in responsibility between the various state
departments. The differences in the functions of the various
authorities seemed to be the result of a perceived need to categorize
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the responsibilities so that a viable social order based on Islam
could be established and maintained.
The basic organization of hisbah depended on the existence of the
state to give it legitimacy and authority. It was not necessary, at
the time of the Prophet, for a separate institution to be formed to do
the job of ihtislb, but the need for one was believed to increase with
the growth of the state. 6
 In fact, the muhtasib was not able to
function in isolation from other state departments. It was essential
that there was close collaboration between the muhtasib, the yidi and
the shurtah. Indeed, there are cases where two of these offices became
the responsibility of the same person. At other times, the muhtasib 
was a specialist, subordinate to the qadi (Cahen and Talbi 1971:488).
Treating all human actions in the light of their effect on the
realization of an Islamic social order is a very important aspect of
the Islamic sharicah. Once a person becomes a Muslim, he or she must
abide by the rules of the shari cah even regarding matters considered
as personal such as prayer, fasting or dressing modestly in public.
This is all part of the Islamic view that a society is an entity which
can be affected as a whole by the actions of individuals. If
individuals are left to live according to the way they want rather
than according to the way prescribed by the sharY cah then society will
no longer be an Islamic society. The collective good is regarded as
more important than the choice of the individual.
The institution of hisbah in the community was rooted in the
above notion of the collective good. Making sure that individuals are
living in accordance with the teachings of the shari cah is one of the
prime responsibilities of the Islamic state. The Medieval Muslim
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scholar, Ibn Khaldun (733-808/1332-1406), wrote in his famous work The
Muoaddimah (1984:225) 7 that "a righteous person should be appointed
muhtasib to keep a vigilant eye on the attitude, beliefs and acts of
the populace".
The Islamic sharicah places great emphasis on the relationship
between beliefs and behaviour. The two must conform with each other in
all spheres of life. Committing a crime against an individual or
property, or being guilty of fraud in the market place are considered
not just as crimes but also examples of weak faith which resulted in
the failure to abide by the injunctions of the Islamic law. This has
established an integration between faith and socio-economic behaviour.
It means that social and economic ethics in Islam are important
aspects of faith and not just secular requirements of the state. That
view also provides a self-propelling mechanism for enforcement of
these rules by influencing human motivation. But enforcement is not
confined to that. The institution of hisbah ensured the effective
enforcement of these rules if and when faith and individual motivation
failed to do so. The above notions demonstrate the difficulty of
separating the private from the public spheres in an Islamic society,
and help explain the problems associated with trying to apply the
theories of secularization to societies dominated by the Islamic way
of life.
Historical Evolution
Most of those who have written about the institution of hisbah argue
that it goes back to the time of the Prophet Muhammad. 8
 They see the
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appointment of two persons, by the Prophet, to observe the activities
of merchants in the markets of Makkah and al-Madinah as clear examples
of his intention to make hisbah part of the organization of the
Islamic state. They also regard the actions of the Prophet Mu4ammad
during his regular inspections of the market place, as further
examples of the originality of hisbah as an Islamic institution
(Murshad 1972, al-cAriff 1987, and Ghazil 1984).
Great emphasis was placed by those writers on the above points in
response to the contention by some Orientalists that the institution
of hisbah was modelled after the Roman office of agoranomos. Others
have argued that it was based on the office of the Byzantinian
prefect. Their arguments were based on what they saw as the similarity
between the functions of mubtasib, agoranomos and prefect. Also they
pointed to the similarities between the economic functions of the
three offices concerning the inspection of markets. The first writer
to advocate that bisbah was not an Islamic institution was
Gaudefroy-Demombynes in an article in 1939. 9 In 1948 Schacht wrote an
article in which he repeated the same idea and observed that the Greek
and Islamic market inspectors had similar names and similar functions.
Crone (1987) reviewed the arguments of Gaudefroy-Demombynes and
Schacht and added that the term muhtasib was taken by the Muslims from
--fog)
the Jewish traditions (Crone 1987:10h. But Foster (1970:143) was not
convinced by the arguments of Gaudefroy-Demombynes, Schacht and
others. He reviewed their arguments and concluded that:
It is clear that historically it is meaningless and
probably inaccurate to saL that the hisbah was 'derived'
from the agoranomia Lthe two:lwere words applied at
different times to an office that dealt with many of the
same functions but with widely different bases of
authority and roles in different administrative systems.
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The arguments between the two sides will not be resolved easily,
and it is not our intention to try to resolve it in the context of
this study. But regardless of the similarities between the *terms used
to describe each institution, it is at least clear that the functions
of the institution of hisbah were fundamentally different from those
of the other institutions.
The hisbah was an institution based on religious principles, and
the scope of its activities was much wider than just inspection of the
market place. Alf/kr= (1987) emphasized this point as part of his
argument that the hisbah was an original Islamic concept and
institution. The idea of hisbah, he argued, was based on the QurUnic
injunction of al-amr bi- 1 1-ma c r-uf wa-'1-nahy can al-munkar as was
demonstrated by the actions of the Prophet Muhammad. He also pointed
to the fact that the muhtasib had a much wider scope of activities
than either the agoranomos or the prefect. He added that the
institution of hisbah took its basic shape during the time of the
Prophet Muhammad many decades before the Muslims came in direct
contact with the established Roman and Byzantian institutions. And
finally he emphasized the fact that the name of the institution was
derived from the Arabic word ihtisib which means 'seeking reward'
(allArifl 1987:21-22).
It is possible that the Muslims found some form of inspection of
markets in the cities that they had conquered from the Romans, and
that they incorporated it in the already established institution of
hisbah. Nevertheless, Cahen and Talbi (191):487) argue that "there
exists no record of the agoranomos in the Greek inscriptions for three
hundred years before the Arab conquest". The distinguishing
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characteristics of the hisbah as an Islamic institution are the
religious principles that made it an integral part of the Islamic
state. Another source of its uniqueness is its involvement in the
enforcement of beliefs and acts of worship. But no-one has claimed
that this was part of the activities of either the agoranomos or the
prefect.
We now turn back to considering the development that the
institution of hisbah has undergone since the time of the Prophet
Muhammad. During his lifetime, the Prophet used to perform the
functions of ihtiiab in al-Madinah. Ibn Taymiyyah reported a story
which many regard as an example of the Prophet Muhammad's ihtiiab
activities. The story relates that the Prophet was once in the market
place in al-Madinah where he came upon a stack of food that was for
sale but seemed to be in a bad condition. The Prophet inserted his
hand in the stack, and his fingers reached something moist. "What is
this, food-merchant?" he asked. "It has been affected by the weather,
messenger of God," was the reply. The Prophet retorted: "Then why not
put it on top of the stack so that people can see it? He who defrauds
us is not one of us" (quoted by Ibn Taymiyyah 1983:30).
Subsequently when the Prophet Muhammad became busy with other
duties, he appointed Sad b. al-cis as muhtasib in the city of
Makkah, and cUmar b. al-Khattab in al-MadInah. The main tasks of those
first two mubtasibs was to observe the commercial activities in the
market place. The appointment of official muhtasibs by the Prophet is
viewed by many Muslim scholars as an indication that the institution
of hisbah is to be part of every Islamic state based on the sharicah.
The appointment of mubtasibs was one of the few major political
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appointments made by the Prophet Muhammad. The other positions
involved the governorship of towns and cities, the collection of the
zakih, and the command of troops. The other major functions of
authority used to be discharged by the Prophet himself.
After the death of the profthet Muhammad in 632 C.E., the four
caliphs who succeeded him continued to run the affairs of the state as
he had done. They carried out the duties of muhtasib themselves, and
appointed muhtasibs in major cities to work alongside their governors
and to help them establish an Islamic social order in all parts of the
expanding state. This continued until the second Abbasid caliph Abii
Ja
cfar (ruled 136-158/754-775) established a separate department of
hisbah under the control of a full-time muhtasib (Murhsad 1972:30).
The institution continued to expand as the state itself expanded, and
took on more complex functions. As more regions came under the control
of the central government, the institution of hisbah expanded and
helped to bring the social and economic institutions of the newly
conquered territories into line with the teachings of the sharIcah.
The institution was eventually taken by Muslims to the Western
provinces of North Africa and Spain. Similarly, the office of muhtasib
became part of the state during the Muslim rule of Iran and parts of
India. The institution was very weak in India, however, because the
majority of the population consisted of non-Muslims. But hisbah
continued to play a very important role in the Muslim rule over Iran
and "did not finally disappear until the 19th century" (Lambton
1971:490). The Eatimids (297-567/909-1171) and Ayyubids (564-658/1169-
1260), who ruled Egypt and Syria kept the institution very active. The
Ottomans called it aghasi and played a major part in the maintenance
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of bisbah with limited functions until the abolition of the caliphate
in 1924. It is known, for example, that the Ottomans introduced
ihtii1b regulations at the beginning of the sixteenth century as part
of the wider regulations for the administration of provinces, the
Kanunames (Mantran 1971:489).
Historians of Islam agree that the institution of hisbah remained
part of most Islamic states, though it had been called by different
names in various regions. In some cases it was part of the judicial
system, and in other places, the shurtah (Police) and the hisbah were
headed by the same officer. At certain times, the institution went
through periods of weakness as . a result of the political situation.
But it never disappeared altogether from the political scene except in
part of the Arabian Peninsula, as will be seen later.
Despite the different terms used and the changing sphere of
influence during particular periods of Islamic history,
	 the
fundamental notion behind hisbah never changed. It was always regarded
as part of the institutions of the Islamic state, and it remained
active in two major spheres dealing with the enforcement of religious
obligations and the regulation of economic activities in the market
place. The muhtasib, however, became more and more associated with the
regulation of the Sill which, at certain times, took on greater
importance than his other duties. The decline of Islam in the last few
centuries has caused the institution of hisbah to become very weak and
ineffective. The office, however, has continued to exist in parts of
the Ottoman Empire until the beginning of the twentieth century, and
in Morocco until the present time performing purely economic functions
(Ghaz11 1984:138).
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Developments in the Arabian Peninsula
After this brief discussion of hisbah throughout the history of the
Islamic state, we now turn to our immediate concern which is with
hisbah in the major part of the Arabian Peninsula known today as the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Because the office of hisbah had always been
part of the organization of the Islamic state, its existence in
certain parts of the Islamic Empire was determined by the local
political situation.
This can be seen very clearly in the case of the Arabian
Peninsula which went through a long period of political decline
because of its geographical isolation from the central government. The
process of decline began with the moving of the capital of the Islamic
state from al-Madinah to Damascus and later to Baghdad. Another factor
was the division of the Empire into a number of political units each
with its own government. Except for the two holy cities of Makkah and
al-Madinah, the rest of the Arabian Peninsula was isolated from major
political activities in other parts of the empire (see Chapter Three).
No historical evidence is to be found that would give any indication
of the existence of hisbah in its organized form in the central parts
of the Peninsula known as Najd. There are indications, however, that
the functions of hisbah were nevertheless carried out by volunteers in
the towns (Rugh 1973:19).
Political institutions in most parts of the Arabian Peninsula
never went through major modifications as they had done in the rest of
the Islamic state. Governors were appointed by the central government
to keep law and order and to collect zaka, and they continued to
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govern using the methods employed by tribal chiefs for centuries
(Iqbal 1977:1). Moreover, no major urban centres developed other than
Makkah and al-MadTnah, and, consequently, there were no commercial
centres that would require the organized activities of the muhtasib. 10
This state of affairs continued until the middle of the eighteenth
century when things began to change as a result of the revival
movement of Muhammad b. cAbd al-Wahliab (see Chapter Three).
The political decline of the Islamic state in central Arabia had
resulted in a great decline in the influence of religion in the lives
of the people. Also the absence of any form of education and any form
of social control based on religious principles resulted in Najd
becoming "fruitful ground for superstition and heresy"	 (Wahba
1964:87).
The dacwah of Muhammad b. cAbd al-Wahhib, and the support and
protection that he received from the Al-Su ctid family enabled him to
preach a return to the original teachings of the sharI cah with a great
emphasis on the concept of tawhId (the unity of God), and the virtues
of al-amr bi-q-ma c rrif wa-'l-nahy can al-munkar. His actions were
interpreted as demonstrations of his role as a mubtasib alongside his
duties as a judge and a teacher (Murshad 1972:191).Muhammad Ibn Sucild
gave him the authority to do whatever he considered necessary for the
restoration of religion to its original form at the time of the
Prophet Muhammad. This authority enabled him to enforce his teachings,
and within a few years religion was once again the dominant force in
all spheres of life in certain parts of central Arabia.
It would be wrong to claim that a separate institution of Lsbah
came into existence at that time, but the activities of Shaykh
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Muhammad b. cAbd al-Wahhib were regarded as indications that the
traditional office of the muhtasib had been restored as one of the
institutions of the state in central Arabia for the first time in many
centuries.
C. Evolution of the Modern Hay'ah
A major turning point in the history of the Arabian Peninsula was the
return of cAbd al-cAzIz i Sucdd from exile to establish the third
Saudi state in central Arabia (see Chapter Four). Among the people who
welcomed him and appreciated his return were members of the family of
Al al-Shaykh. This large and influential family derived its unique
name from the title of its most famous ancestor, Shaykh Muhammad b.
cAbd al-Wahhib. His decendants became known as 11 al-Shaykh meaning
the family of the Shaykh, and they played an important role in the
revival of Islam in central Arabia. Many of its members found in
religion both a career and a source of influence. They continued the
process of revival that was started by their ancestor, and they gained
popular respect for the religious positions they held.
There were two main reasons why the power and importance of the
family were further enhanced by the return of King cAbd
Firstly, the two families had been connected by a number of marriages
since the alliance of 1745. King cAbd al-cAzlz demonstrated this
connection when he took his second wife from the family of -11
al-Shaykh. 11 The second factor was the commitment on the part of the
King to establishing an Islamic state based on the sharT Gah as
restored by Ibn cAbd al-Wahhib. History, in fact, had repeated itself.
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The alliance of 1745 was the foundation upon which the new
relationship between the two families was based. It had worked for the
benefit of both sides on the first occasion, and it was only logical
that it would do so again.
The combination of these factors gave the leading members of the
Al al-Shaykh family a powerful position in the emerging state. They
took advantage of that position to revive their traditional role as
teachers and enforcers of religious principles among the population.
This was a role which they had never completely lost but they merely
lacked the political support of the state at certain times when the
Saudi state lost its power in central Arabia (see Crawford 1982). But
as soon as that power was regained, the way was cleared for religion
to play a very active role in the affairs of the new state.
The activities that the leading members of 11 al-Shaykh family
undertook in Riyadh to enforce religious principles among the
population, with the approval of the King, paved the way for the
creation of the unique institution which is the subject of this study.
The leading members of Al al-Shaykh family must be given the credit
for the establishment of the hay'ah as part of the structure of the
modern Saudi state.
The relationship between the family and the institution grew
stronger with time and has continued until today. In fact, the process
of evolution which the hay'ah went through since 1902 has been
controlled and directed, to a large extent, by members of Al-  al-Shaykh
family. This unique relationship will become clearer as we discuss the
historical evolution of the modern hay'ah. The important factor,
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however, is the implication of that relationship for the institution
itself and for its role in Saudi society.
As soon as political stability had been achieved by King cAbd
al-cAzYz in Riyadh, a prominent member of the AT al-Shaykh family
(also named cAbd al-cAilz) began the process of ititisab. The political
climate, which was marked by the commitment of the King to the
establishment of an Islamic state based on the sharl cah, gave Shaykh
-cAbd al-c
 Aziz b. cAbd al-Latif the needed atmosphere in which he could
begin the enforcement of religious teachings and observances among the
population. The stage was set for a dramatic increase in the influence
of religion on the lives of the people of the Arabian state after
several decades of political instability and relative religious
laxity.
The Hay'ah in Najd
It is believed that around the year 1319/1902, while the King was busy
consolidating his power in Najd, Shay kh cAbd al-cAzTz began to carry
out the functions of the traditional mubtasib in the city of Riyadh.
Murshad (1972:194) reported that he used to observe the behaviour of
the population to make sure that no munkars were committed in public.
Anyone found guilty of missing a public prayer in the mosque, shaving
his beard or smoking cigarettes was summoned by the Shaykh and
punished according to the transgression that he had committed. The
Shaykh also re-introduced the practice of having the names of people
called out after each prayer in order to find out who was absent so
they could be questioned afterwards. 12
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Shaykh cAbd al-cAziz used to do these things with the help of
members of his family and the imams of local mosques. The job was done
voluntarily and on a part time basis. The King supported the efforts
of the Shaykh by appointing a number of assistants who would be .under
the command of the Shaykh himself. They worked in an informal setting,
using the house of the Shaykh as their main office. Their activities
were determined, to a large extent, by what was going on in public
rather than by a standard working routine. Their task was limited at
first due to the small size of the city of Riyadh and the absence of
foreigners. Anyone who committed a munkar was likely to be recognised
immediately and dealt with swiftly. People understood what was
required of them and they tried to conform if only to avoid punishment
and public condemnation. Goldrup (1971:212) quoted the historian
al-Rayhani who visited Riyadh at that time as saying that:
No one even dares to miss, except for a reason of
sickness, one of the five daily prayers in the masjid 
[mosque]. And as for tobacco, the culprit, when he is
discovered smoking is summarily dealt with.
These activities and the King's official support for them paved
the way for the birth of the current institution of the hay'ah. The
task of enforcing religious teachings came to be carried out not only
by members of Al al-Shaykh family and the mataw c ab (volunteers) who
helped them but also by the King and other prominent culam3' who took
part in the activities using various methods. Religious and literary
instruction was constantly given in the homes of the various  culam31 
mainly for the benefit of the mataw cah who were responsible for the
religious instruction of the Bedouin (Goldrup 1971:212). The King, on
the other hand, played his part by issuing communiques to the public
that used to be read in mosques. This method was adopted because there
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was no other form of mass communication in Najd at the beginning of
the century. 13 One important document that was issued by the King, but
unfortunately has no date, talked about the intention of the King to
create committees to enforce religious teaching in all towns and
villages. 14
The duties of the committees, as outlined by the King in the
above document, are considered the first official regulations that
directed the activities of the newly formed hay'ah in the central part
of the country. What is more, the declaration by the King about his
intentions to establish public morality committees in all parts of the
country was seen as a sign of his intention to incorporate the hay'ah 
into the state machinery (al—Yassini 1985:68).
This was confirmed when, after the death of Shaykh cAbd al—cAziz
in 1925, the King issued a royal order appointing Shaykh cUmar b.
Hasan	 al—Shaykh as the new president of the hay'ah in Najd. Another
royal order a few years later extended the Shaykh's authority over the
newly formed committees in the towns of the eastern and northern
regions of the peninsula (Murshad 1972:196).
The new president brought more organisation into the working of
the hay'ah. A permanent office was established in Riyadh where
volunteers and nusiab (fieldworkers) could gather to do their work.
Shaykh cUmar was in charge of the activities in which he played a
leading part. The budget of the organisation used to be given to him
directly from the King, and he had total authority to use it as he saw
fit. He used to employ assistants and to determine their positions and
salaries. There were no written rules for guiding the activities of
the institution, and, like other government institutions at that time,
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a limited form of an organizational structure began to take shape.
With the political expansion of the new state, the activities and
numbers of hay'gt in Najd also expanded. New hay rat were established
in most of the major towns, and a number of centres opened in the main
neighbourhoods of the city of Riyadh (al—Yassini 1985:68). 15 The
policy to settle Bedouins in agricultural communities and to subject
them to an extensive course of religious education (see Chapter Four)
helped the hay'ah in finding volunteers who were willing to work as
mubtasibs in their own communities. Their activities often covered a
wide range of areas similar to those carried out by the traditional
muhtasib.
The hay'at in the central, eastern and northern regions of the
country continued under the leadership of Shaykh cUmar with no major
change in structure or activities. The number of centres grew over the
years due to population growth, the increase in responsibilities that
came with the discovery of oil in 1938 and the dramatic increase in
the number of foreigners in the country, especially in the eastern
province. The exact number of centres at that time cannot be
ascertained or even estimated since no reliable information is
available, nor are there any official documents because administrative
skills were weak at that time. It was not until the early 1960s that
any form of administrative structure took shape when, for the first
time, the hay'ah in Najd became subject to the general rules and
regulations that govern the kingdom's civil service.°
A form of organisational network took shape very slowly, but the
exact duties of the enforcers remained undefined due to the lack of
any detailed regulations. The recruitment, promotion and dismissal
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policies were decided by the general president or his top assistants.
Murshad (1972) reported that the hay'ah in the central part of the
country, which remained totally separate from the one in Hejaz until
1976, had a very effective and organised method of operation. He wrote
that shifts worked during the day and most of the night patrolling
streets and public places. He also reported that there were observers
going around from one centre to another to make sure that each centre
was performing its duties, and that the hay'ah had its own prison for
holding the offenders caught by its members (Murshad 1975:196-197).
The extent and the variety of the hay'ah's activities continued
to grow all the time, even though, many of its activities were
delegated to a number of ministries that had been established in the
1950s, as we shall discuss in the following chapters. The growth in
size was a result of the ever increasing realization that it was
necessary to meet the requirements of enforcing public morality in the
expanding cities and towns. The urbanization process that began with
the development of an oil industry in the eastern province, and the
growing bureaucracy associated with newly created ministries and
public agencies in addition to the establishment of a regular army and
a national guard, have meant an increase in the movement of people
from towns and villages to the burgeoning cities looking for jobs in
one of these three major areas of employment (see Chapter Four).
The above was an outline of the evolution of the hay'ah in the
central part of the country. The decision to separate the discussion
into two parts dealing with the evolution of the institution in the
two main geographical parts of the kingdom was taken for a number of
reasons. The two parts (Najd and the Hejaz) were regarded as separate
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political entities until the final unification of the two in 1932.
Another reason is that the two hay'it went through totally different
processes of evolution as a result of their different political and
social environments, And the most obvious reason is that the two
hay'it were considered two separate departments of government, each
with its own president and its own budget until the two were united in
1976. After discussing the evolution of the hay'ah in the Hejaz, we
shall look at the major changes that have taken place since 1976.
The Hay'ah in the Hejaz
The evolution of the hay'ah in the Hejaz was a much more complicated
process than in Najd. This was due, to a large extent, to the
political environment in the Hejaz at the time when King cAbd cal-Aziz
took over its already established form of administration in 1924. The
Hejaz had a system of government that was at a more sophisticated
stage of development than the system found in the central part of the
country.
This was due to the fact that the Hejaz was in constant contact
with the outside world, especially with the government of the Ottoman
Empire which gave the Hejaz special attention because it contained the
two holy cities of Makkah and al-Madinah. Moreover the annual
pilgrimage by Muslims to Makkah kept the region open for people and
ideas that came from all parts of the Muslim world. This meant that
the government in the Hejaz had to organize itself in a way that would
enable it to meet the unique requirements of thousands of pilgrims
every year. All of this resulted in a political environment in the
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Hejaz that was similar to modern forms of government in countries like
Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. There was an established police
department, a form of health service, a directorate of education, and,
most important, a municipality that carried out some of the functions
of the classical muhtasib (Waheem 1982:110). 17
 Najd, on the other
hand, had none of these important institutions prior to 1920.
When King cAbd al-fAziz took over the Hejaz in 1924 he kept the
political structure of the region as it was before. The only
appointments he made at first were the governor of Makkah and a judge.
The judge, Shaykh Ibn Bulayhid, who had come with the King from Najd
saw the need for a committee similar to the one in Riyadh to enforce
the practice of religious duties by the people of Makkah. He wrote a
letter to the King asking his approval for the establishment of a
hay'ah made up of three of the culaia' under the leadership of Shaykh
AL-Shaybi to "observe the behaviour of people and to approve what is
in line with the sharI cah and to forbid what is against it.... and to
encourage people to perform the five daily prayers in congregation"
(Murshad 1972:197). The King wrote to his son Fayqal, who was his
Viceroy in the Hejaz, informing him of his approval of the request
made by the Judge and nominating another fourteen new members to work
in the new committee. The committee was given the same name as the one
in Riyadh, viz, hay tat al-amr bi- 1 1-macrUf wa-'l-nahy can al-munkar.
The existence of other organised institutions in Makkah, made it
necessary for the new institution to organize itself quickly so that
it would be able to function in relation to the other institutions. A
president, a vice president and a secretary were appointed, and a
school building was used as an office. Regulations were needed to
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define the role of the new organisation in relation to the other
institutions especially the police department. The judge, who was also
the highest religious authority in Makkah at that time asked a
distinguished scholar named al-Bayfir to write an article explaining
to the public and to members of the hay'ah it,sresponsibilities and how
it should function in society. 18
Another hay'ah was established in al-Madinah in 1926 under the
supervision of its judge Shaykh cAbdullih b. Hasan Al al-Shaykh who
was the brother of Shaykh cUmar b. Hasan the president of the haylah 
in Riyadh. It was through this person that the hay'ah in the Hejaz
came under the leadership of members of the il al-Shaykh family after
a few years under the control of other culami: During this brief
period, the hay'gt in Makkah and al-MadInah operated under the
symbolic guidance of the judges in these cities. A unique working
relationship between the hay'ah and the sharI cah courts was the result
of the important roles played by the chief judges in Makkah and
al-Madinah in the establishment of the two hay'it. That relationship
did not last a very long time because, as we shall see later, the
hay rit came under the dominance of the police department.
In 1927 the King appointed a new president and a number of new
members to the hay'ah in Makkah. New regulations were issued later
that year announcing the appointment of what were called "honorary
members" who would decide how members of the hay'ah should perform
their duties and deal with new problems. The new regulations also
divided the city of Makkah into a number of sections, each one under
the supervision of certain members of the hay'ah. Members were also
given the authority to supervise the enactment by the police, of
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sentences imposed by the shari cah courts (Murshad 1975:201).
A major change took place in 1929. The newly formed Consultative
Council19 decided that it would be better for the hay'at in all of the
major cities of the Hejaz to be incorporated into the police
departments. New regulations were issued by the Consultative Council
outlining the establishment of a hay'ah in each of the police
departments in the five major cities in the western province. They
also specified the number of members to be working in each department,
and limited their role to supervising the policemen in their job as
enforcers of religious observances and public morality. 20
The members of the hay'ah, who were civilians with some religious
knowledge , were also given the authority to interrogate offenders
inside the police department, and to decide the punishment that would
be exacted by the police for minor offences. This new arrangement did
not apparently get the approval of the culama; but they had to accept
it because it had been approved by the King. It was confined to the
hay'it in the Hejaz, and threatened the existence of the hay'ah as a
unique and independent institution.
The step that was taken by the Consultative Council with the
approval of the King reflects the difficulty of trying to accommodate a
new institution into an already established system of government. It
also reflects the views of members of the Council who felt that the
police department was capable of doing the job of the hay'ah with some
form of supervision by the culami' and the matawa cah. It is not clear
how successful the arrangement was because of the lack of any
information regarding the activities of members of the hay'ah during
that period. The fact that the arrangement lasted for only seven years
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also makes it difficult to draw any reliable conclusions from it. One
thing was clear and that was the objection of the prominent %lama' to
the changes, and their concern that the hay'ah would lose its unique
role if it remained part of the police department.
The response of the culanal came in 1936 when the head of the
judiciary in the Hejaz, Shaykh cAbdullih b. Hasan Al al-Shaykh,
interfered in the matter. He issued a new regulation in which he
declared that the hay'ah in the Hejaz will become part of the Judicial
Presidency rather than the police department (Murshad 1972:205). As a
result of this new regulation, the hay'ah in the Hejaz went back to
the same position that it had occupied before becoming part of the
police department. The hay'ah in the Hejaz remained part of the
judicial presidency for about sixteen years, after which it. became a
totally independent institution.
The Crown Prince issued a decree in 1952 stating that the hay'ah
in the Hejaz was to become an "independent institution connected to
the office of the Viceroy in the Hejaz." 21 The decree also appointed
Shaykh cAbd al-Malik b. Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh as a general president
for all the hay'it in the western province. The Crown Prince also
issued new regulations to "replace all previous regulations for the
hay'ah." These regulations also specified the duties of members of the
hay'ah and their relationship with the police department. 22 It gave
the hay'ah in the Hajaz a position similar to the one that it occupied
in the central region in terms of its independence and its
relationship with other institutions. The ironic thing here is that it
took the hay'ah in the Hejaz about twenty five years to reach the
stage that the hay'ah in Najd had reached only a few years after its
21 8
establishment. What is also interesting is the fact that it was a
member of Al-
 al-Shaykh family, the president of the judiciary in the
Hejaz, who worked for the independence of the hay'ah in that region
(see Murshad 1972:205).
The independence of the hay'ah in the Hejaz, the new power that
it was given by the decree of the Crown Prince, the appointment of
cAbd al-Malik b. Ibrahim AL al -Shaykh as its president, and making it
part of the civil service in the early 1960s, 23 brought the two hay'gt 
in Najd and the Hejaz to a similar status in the structure of
government. The jurisdiction of the hay'ah presidency in the Hejaz was
expanded in the early 1960s to . cover the newly established hay'ah in
the southern region of the Kingdom. 24 This also paved the way for the
government eventually to bring the two separate hay'gt into one single
organisation. This was not done immediately, however, and it is not
clear why the two hay'it continued to function as separate
organisations until 1976.
The Hay'ah after 1976
As part of the political expansion of the government which resulted in
the establishment of six new ministries and other departments in 1976
(see Chapter Four), a royal decree was issued announcing that the two
presidencies of the hay' gt in Najd and the Hejaz were to be merged in
one general presidency located in the capital city of Riyadh (see
Appendix D). The name of the new organization was chosen to be AT- ri'
asah al- ci:mmah Li-hay 'at al-amr	 wa-11-nahy can al-munkar 
(The General Presidency for the Organization of Enjoining the
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Acceptable and Forbidding the Reprehensible).
Another royal decree was issued at the same time appointing
ShayIch cAbd al-cAziz b. 
e
Abdulral b. Hasan Al al-Shaylch as a general
president for all the hay'it in Saudi Arabia. He was given the rank of
a minister of state but was not made a member of the Council of
Ministers. The new changes made the hay'ah a national institution with
direct access to the President of the Council of Ministers (the King).
They also gave it a new position in the structure of government by
bringing it into line with other important institutions with the
status of a general presidency. It is, for instance, higher in
position than the Directorate of Police, which is part of the Ministry
of the Interior.
This indicates the evolution of the hay'ah from a small
department that was almost taken over by the police department in the
Hejaz to an important institution deserving the rank of a general
presidency on a par with the National Guard, Girls' Education and
Youth Welfare, among others. This also shows that the hay'ah has grown
bigger and stronger at a time when most observers thought that
political modernitation and rapid socio-economic developments would
mean the end of a traditional institution such as the hay'ah. It was
in the mid 1970s when the huge programmes of economic and social
development were taking place in the wake of the huge increase in oil
revenues after the 1973 embargo, that the hay'ah took on the new
status of an independent national institution. The implications of
these factors will be further discussed in the following three
chapters.
For reasons which remain obscure, a new general president was
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appointed by a royal decree a few months later. The new general
president, who still holds that position today, is Shaykh cAbd
al-cAziz b. Muhammad X1 al-Shaykh. He will be discussed further in the
section dealing with the members of the hay'ah in the following
chapter. In 1980, a royal decree was issued with new regulations
defining, in general terms, the new status and responsibilities of the
hay'ah in all parts of the kingdom (see Appendix E). It also specified
that further by-laws must be issued by the General President of the
hay'ah in consultation with the Minister of the Interior specifying in
detail the functions of the institution and its relationships with
other government departments (see Appendix F). The By-laws were issued
in 1986 based on an agreement between the General President and the
Minister of the Interior (see Appendix G).
Conclusion
The evidence presented in this chapter points to a number of important
conclusions. The most important one is the fact that the modern hay'ah
is a religious organization based on religious foundations. It is
based on the Islamic notion of the collective responsibility of the
state and its citizens to enjoin the acceptable and forbid the
reprehensible in the community.
The traditional institution of hisbah and the modern hay l ah are
very similar, and yet they are very different. They are similar in
ideology and role in society, but different in terms of organization
and jurisdiction. The hay'ah is organized along modern bureaucratic
lines, and shares the activities of the traditional hisbah with a
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number of government departments referred to by Ghazal (1984:146) as
deputies of the muhtasib (see Chapter Nine).
The institution of hisbah has been part of the Islamic state for
most of its history. Its strength and weakness was the result of local
political conditions. It declined in most parts of the Arabian
Peninsula until the dacwah of Shaykh Muhammad b. cAbd al-Wahhab in the
middle of the Eighteenth Century C.E.
The evolution of the modern hay'ah in Saudi Arabia was a long
process that began with the birth of the state in 1902. Developments
went through different stages and were influenced by different factors
in Najd and the Hejaz. The experience of the hay'ah in the Hejaz
demonstrates the difficulty of introducing this kind of institution in
an already established system of government.
The hay'ah appears to have managed to survive the processes of
institutional differentiation of the 1950s and 1960s, and of
socio-economic developments of the 1970s to become a national
organization in 1976. The history of the modern hay'ah is very much
connected to the history of the modern Saudi state. Its growth and
expanding responsibility seem to show that the commitment to religion
on the part of the state has not been considerably weakened as a
result of modernization. The following two chapters will describe the
hay'ah today and how it functions as part of the government. Chapter
Nine will be an attempt to analyse the effects of modernization on the
ability of the hay'ah to continue playing its unique role in Saudi
society.
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Chapter Seven 
The Hay'ah Today
This chapter is about the hay'ah at the time of writing this thesis.
It is going to deal with the hay'ah in terms of its organizational
structure, regulations, 	 members and activities. Most of the
information in this chapter has been collected from official sources
at the hay'all during the field-trip. All the information collected was
conveyed or written in the Arabic language, and the translation was
done by the writer.
This chapter will be basically a descriptive chapter in which
information will only be given in order to give an accurate picture of
the current situation of the hay'ah. The analytical part and the
significance of the information to our study will be dealt with in
Chapter Nine, and the conclusion drawn from our case study in relation
to the general topic of this thesis can be found in Chapter Ten in
which the findings of the whole study will be discussed.
This chapter, in the meantime, will be divided into four main
sections. The first section deals with the structure of the hay'ah on
the national, regional and local levels. The second section deals with
the current regulations of the hay'ah and compares it with previous
regulations. Members working for the hay'ah will be dealt with in the
third section. The last section is about the different types of
activities carried out by members of the hay'ah. The information about
the regional and local levels is based on those located in the city of
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Riyadh. The limited time for field-work made it difficult to visit
other parts of the country. There are, however, no major variations in
the structure of branches or local centres, and in the types of
activities carried out.
A. Structure of the Hay'ah 
The institution of the hay s ah in Saudi Arabia is made up of a general
presidency in Riyadh with seven regional branches and local centres in
most cities, towns and villages in the Kingdom. For present purposes,
the organizational structure will be divided into three major levels
to make it possible to describe and understand each level in
relationship to the other two.
These levels are, first, the national level which is represented
by the general presidency in the capital city of Riyadh. The next
level is the regional one which is represented by branches of the
general presidency in the major regions of the Kingdom. Each regional
branch is composed of a number of local centres in the cities, towns
and villages of that particular region. A map of the Kingdom showing
the location of the regional branches and organizational charts of the
three levels will help bring all this information into perspective.
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The Hay'ah on the National Level
After the unification of the two presidencies of the hay'at in 1976,
the only body that represents the hay'ah on the national level today
is the general presidency in Riyadh. It is the administrative .centre
that directs and controls all the local centres in the Kingdom through
its seven regional branches. The top official of the hay'ah is the
general president. He is assisted by two deputies who hold the rank of
a deputy-minister. One of those deputies is a general deputy who has
two general directorates connected to him. They are the directorate
for education and guidance (al-taw C iyah wa-'1-tawjih) and the
directorate for cases and investigation (al-qadaiyg wa-'1-tatical).
The other deputy is called the deputy for financial and
administrative affairs. He has three directorates connected to him.
They are the directorate of inspection, the directorate of budget and
organization and the directorate for planning and information. Each of
these directorates is further divided into two departments. There is
also an assistant deputy to the general president and a director
general for administration. The director general has two directorates
and a centre under his command. They are the finance directorate which
is divided into six departments, the directorate of employee affairs
which is divided into three departments and a communication centre
which is also divided into three departments (see Figure 4).
The task of the general presidency is purely an administrative
one. It rarely involves itself in the field work undertaken by local
centres. The only part it plays in the actual activity of the hay'ah
is through the directorate for cases and investigation 	 which
sometimes happens to take part in the actual investigation of major
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cases that the local centres cannot handle. The rest of the
departments handle the financial and administrative affairs of
employees, regional branches and local centres.
The hay'ah has grown into a complex bureaucratic organization
which forced itself to delegate about twelve per cent of its most
valuable and experienced members to purely administrative tasks with
only very limited involvement in the actual activity of the hay'ah in
the field. This is one of the major changes that came as a result of
the modernization process that the hay'ah has undergone in the last
twelve years. This change has meant that the leaders of the hay'ah 
became involved more and more with office work rather than work in the
field where they are mostly needed.
The writer was told by some of those who were working for the
hay'ah long before it became a general presidency in 1976 that the
former president of the hay'ah in Najd, Shaykh cUmar b. Hasan (d.
1975), used to take part in the field—work along with other members of
the hay'ah. They said that his presence in the field was very helpful
in bringing credibility to the activity of the hay'ah and moral
support to its field—workers. He also used to inspect the units of the
hay l ah in the field to make sure that they were doing their job.' This
situation has changed, and most of the top officials of the hay'ih are
now so busy with running its administrative affairs that they have no
time to go out into the field. It is not easy to conclude whether this
has had any negative effects on the working of the hay'ah. What is
known for sure is that this change was necessary in the wake of the
bureaucratic growth that the hay'ah has experienced since 1976.
The general presidency is divided into three major sections. Two
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of them are headed by the two deputies, and the third is headed by the
assistant deputy (see Figure 4). Only one of those sections is
directly connected with the work in the field through the two
directorates of education and guidance, and cases and investigation.
The job of the directorate of education and guidance is to educate and
guide the members of the hay'ah, who work in the field, as to the best
ways they can achieve their task of enforcing religious observances
and public morality. They also concentrate on the point that members
of the hay'ah should set a good example to the public in their
personal behaviour. The education department (oism al-taw c iyah) is
also responsible for educating the public through organizing lectures
in mosques and through publishing a series of books dealing with
various religious and social topics. These books are distributed free
to the public and they are believed to be a good method of helping the
hay'ah to adapt modern methods like the publishing of books in its
attempt to continue being an active institution in Saudi society.
An official of the hay'ah, The General Supervisor of the Riyadh
Region, has said, in a published interview, that the hay'ah has plans
to use the mass media of communication in delivering its message to
all sectors of the society. 2 There is however, no evidence that this
aim has been achieved. None of these activities, of course, will
replace the main activity of the hay'ah, which is working in the
field, but it is believed to be a helping factor in educating and
seeking the support of the public. This directorate also works with
the imams and mil'adhdhins of local mosques in educating them and in
seeking their help to work with their congregations in performing the
duty of al-amr bi- 1 1-mac riif wa-'1-nahy can al-munkar. Among its annual
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activities is taking part, alongside other government institutions, in
the education and guidance of pilgrims who come to perform the annual
pilgrimage in Makkah. It helps them in performing the rituals of hajj,
in accordance with the way prescribed by the sharIcah.
The General Directorate for Cases and Investigation, on the
other hand, is responsible for the investigation of cases in which the
hay'ah is strongly involved. It also works with other government
institutions in committees usually set up to investigate and decide
major cases that involve moral offences which come under the
jurisdiction of the hay'ah (see al-Hawshini 1984:31-35). In addition,
it also works with other institutions in studying some of the new
social phenomena that are considered problematic in an effort to
understand their causes and to come up with reasonable solutions. Each
one of the regional branches has its own department for investigation.
The one in the general presidency supervises and co-ordinates the
activities of all of them.
These two important directorates were established in 1981 as
part of the implementation of the new regulations. They arose as a
result of the hay l ah's drive towards using modern techniques in
achieving its task of enforcing public morality. More emphasis is now
being placed on the importance of education and the use of books and
the media in reaching the public with the message of the hay'ah. 3 The
past seven years have witnessed a lot of improvements in the working
of these two directorates, but al-Wahbi (1982:133) believes that they
still have a long way to go before becoming wholly effective in
performing the tasks for which they were established. Their main
problem, according to al-WahbI, lies in the lack of qualified staff to
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do the job.
There is nothing which deserves a special mention about the
remaining departments of the general presidency. These departments
were established for doing purely administrative and financial . work.
They are similar to the departments found in all other government
institutions, and thus the writer feels that it is not necessary to go
into the detail about how they work nor to discuss the tasks they
perform. Figure Four gives a clear idea about the names and tasks of
the remaining departments.
The Hay'ah on the Regional Level
The establishment of regional branches in the main geographical
regions of the country is something that is not unique to the hay'ah.
Most ministries and general presidencies in the Kingdom have regional
branches. It has been found to be a useful method for the
decentralization of authority in a large country like Saudi Arabia. It
would have been difficult for one central office to keep in touch with
local centres in distant parts of the country. The hay'ah has seven
regional branches in the major regions of the Kingdom (see Figure 5).
All the regional branches are very similar in structure and in
authority. Each one is headed by a general supervisor (mushrif cim)
who holds the rank of an assistant—deputy minister. Only one of these
branches, the one in Ul'il region, differs from the form of a regional
branch in being smaller than the others.
Each general supervisor is assisted by a deputy. The supervisor
is the connecting authority between the general presidency and local
centres. In each one of the major cities that have branches, there is
also a city hay'ah as part of the structure of the branch. This seems
to result in the existence of two offices with similar tasks in each
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Figure 5
The seven regional branches of the Hay'ah in
Saudi Arabia.
1. Riyadh Region 2. Western Region 3. Eastern Region
4. Southern Region 5. aasim Region 	 6. Hciil Region
7. Northern Region
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of the regional branches: the office of the general supervisor and the
office of the president of the hay'ah of the city in which the branch
is located. This has probably created more bureaucratic organs than
the hay'ah. really needs on the regional level. The only difference
between the two is that the supervisor is in charge of the activities
of the city hay'gt and the local centres in the region, whereas the
president of the city hay'ah has authority only over the local centres
in that particular city.
To clarify the above point, let us look at the regional branch
in the Riyadh region. The general supervisor in this branch has
authority over thirteen hay'gt in the cities and towns of the Riyadh
region including the city hay'ah of the city of Riyadh itself. The
president of the Riyadh hay'ah, on the other hand, only has authority
over the thirty five local centres inside the city of Riyadh. Each
local centre is located in a major neighbourhood of the city in which
it carries out its field activities.
The organizational structure of all regional branches is based
on that of the Riyadh regional branch. As can be seen in Figure Six,
the regional branch is divided into two major sections. The first one
contains the departments of personnel, communications 	 and
administration. These departments are involved with financial and
administrative affairs, and like the ones in the general presidency,
hold no special significance for the particular tasks carried out by
the field-workers of the hay'ah. The second section is also divided
into three main departments. They are the departments of inspection
(-fattish), investigation (tabcfig), and that of patrol and watch
(dawriyygt wa-muraciabah) (see Figure 6).
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Figure 6
An Organizational chart of the Riyadh Regional Branch of the Hay'ah
General Supervisor
Office of the
General
Supervisor
Deputy General
Supervisor
President of
Riyadh Hay'ah
Investigation Patrol and
Dept.	 Watch Dept.
Communications Personnel Administration
II	
 I	
\\
Dept.	 Dept.	 Dept.	 Statistics
I I	 1	 1
Switchboard Warehouse Treasury
Local Hay'at in
Riyadh Region
Local centres in
the city of Riyadh
Source: based on official information collected by the writer,
March 1988. Writer's translation.
Inspections
Dept.
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The inspection department looks after the employees in the
branch and in local centres, and makes sure that everyone is doing his
job and that there are no problems faced by employees in their work.
The investigation department deals with cases at the local level.
Cases are usually transferred from local centres to be investigated
and decided by this department. The patrol and watch department is
responsible for the observation of local centres and field workers to
make sure that they are doing their job efficiently. They usually
visit local centres without prior notice so as to get a reliable
picture of the activity of each centre. They also go into the field to
inspect field units and to assist them whenever they need-assistance.
The regional branches are involved more than the general
presidency in the field work by virtue of directing the activities of
local centres, but, like the general presidency, the officials working
in the regional branches do not take part in the field activities.
Their job is mainly administrative and it involves dealing with all of
the financial and administrative affairs of local centres.
The Hay'ah on the Local Level
In addition to the seven regional branches of the general presidency,
there are 409 local centres in Saudi Arabia. The size of these local
centres varies from one centre to another. There are local centres in
cities (known as city hay' gt), towns and villages, and there are local
centres inside most of the major cities. The current By-Laws, issued
in 1986, divide the local centres into four different levels:
A-centres in large cities, B-centres in medium-size cities, C-centres
in small cities, and D-centres in villages (Article Ninety of the
By-Laws, Appendix G).
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All these local centres are very similar in their structure and
activities. They represent the hay'ah on the local level and they
carry out field work. The information collected about local centres
was based on the writer's actual participation in the .formal
operations of two local centres in the city of Riyadh in the first
half of 1988 (see Appendix B).
The structure of a typical local centre (see Figure 7) contains
a president, a vice-president, an administrative employee (secretary)
who handles the paperwork, a number of paid members (a cdP), a number
of policemen and one or two drivers. The centre usually functions as
one unit with no departmental divisions. Its main task is to send out
units, usually three or four members with one or two policemen, into
the field to carry out the actual work of the hay'ah. Everyone working
in the centre takes part in the field activities. But the president of
the centre and the secretary usually remain in the centre during the
official working hours to meet people who come on official business.
The official working hours of local centres are between 9:30am and
12:30pm for the morning session and between 4:00pm and 9:00pm for the
evening session. Occasionally, the field work requires that some of
the members stay in the centre for extra hours in order to finish
working on cases that cannot wait until the following day.
The presidents of local centres are usually appointed from among
the members of the centre. Education is an important criterion in that
process, and a university degree in a religious topic is usually the
main requirement. Experience and the ability to lead are also
important factors in the selection of a president for a particular
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Figure 7
An Organizational Chart of a Typical Local Centre of the Hay'ah
President
Vice-President
Administrative
Assistant
FilesCommunication
Members (acdal
Policemen
Drivers
Source: based on observations made by the writer in March 1988, and on
information collected while working in two local centres in the
city of Riyadh. Writer's translation.
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centre (al-Wahbi 1982:140). The members constitute the majority of the
employees at any one centre. Their number in each centre is regulated
by the size of the centre which, in turn, is determined by the size of
the area for which the centre is responsible. The members also do most
of the practical work of a local centre. They patrol streets and
public places on foot and use official cars. They arrest, with the
help of policemen working for the bay'ah, anyone found guilty of
committing a munkar. They also investigate minor cases, accompany
offenders to and from the police department and attend trials at
sharI cah courts as witnesses against offenders.
Each local centre has a secretary or administration assistant to
take care of the paper work involved in its daily work. He
communicates with the city hay'ah or the regional branch, with other
government institutions, and with other local centres. He also
prepares cases to be transferred to the police department or to the
office of the local governor (amir). Copies of each case is kept in
special files divided according to the type of case. Some suspects
have to be sent to a laboratory at a hospital to determine whether or
not they are drunk or have been taking illegal drugs, and some paper
work is involved in that process. These are some examples of the work
done by the secretary of a local centre. It is very similar to the
paper work involved in the working of any bureaucratic organization
that has to keep records of its activities and to communicate with
other organizations.
The car plays a major part in the field activity of any local
centre. Each centre has a number of official cars used by the members
in patrolling streets and moving from one place to another. The
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activities of each local centre are carried out within the boundaries
of a defined area of the city. That area is usually the neighbourhood
in which the centre is located. Local centres are located in small
houses which are rented by the hay'ah from individuals. The building
is used as an office and as a place for interrogation. It also has one
room for the detention of offenders until the investigation of their
case is complete.
It is clear from the information collected that the hay'ah has
grown considerably bigger since 1976. The number of local centres has
grown from 298 centres in 1976 to the current number of 409 centres
all over the Kingdom. The number of official cars has also grown from
133 cars in 1976 to 338 cars in 1988. Furthermore, the budget of the
hay'ah has increased from a total of 18,819,000 Saudi riyals in 1970
for the two presidencies at that time, to a total of 68,695,000 Saudi
riyals in 1976, then to the current total of 163,137,000 Saudi riyals
for the 1988 budget.4
B. Regulations
The emphasis in this section will be put on the current regulations
identifying the authority and activities of the hay'ah. Firstly, we
will discuss the current statute (nifim) that was issued by a Royal
Decree in 1400/1980 outlining the independence of the hay'ah, its
structure and its responsibilities. Article Nineteen of the ni;im gave
the General President of the hay'ah the authority to "issue By-Laws
for the implementation of this statute in consultation with the
Minister of the Interior" (Appendix F). The By-Laws were issued in
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1406/1986 and they will be discussed in the second part of this
section. After that, an attempt will be made to compare the current
ni;Im and By-Laws with the various regulations issued before the
unification of the two hay rit in 1976. The aim is to try to discover
any major changes in the status- or the authority of the hay'ah since
the first detailed regulations were issued in 1927.
The Current Ni*is
This niiam was issued in 1980 by a Royal Decree and a resolution from
the Council of Ministers. A translation of that Royal Decree and the
resolution of the Council of Ministers can be found in Appendix E. A
complete translation of the nizam can also be found in Appendix F.
Here,we will point out the important points in the nizam and try to
explain the major changes that have taken place as a result of its
implementation.
The most important point in the nilam is found in Article One
which says that "the General Presidency of the Organization for
Enjoining the Acceptable and Forbidding the Reprehensible is an
independent body, directly affiliated to the Head of the Council of
Ministers" (i.e. the King). It also states that the General President
of the hay'ah "has the rank of a minister" (Article Two). This is
important because it indicates that the hay'ah is recognized by the
government as a major organization that deserves to be run by an
official with the rank of a minister of state.
The nizam goes on to allow for the establishment of a branch of
the General Presidency in all the major provinces of the Kingdom
(Article Three). It gives the General President the authority to form
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committees (local centres) that will carry-out the tasks of the hay'ah 
on the regional and local levels. It gives those committees the
authority to "investigate cases" and "determine the penalty in each".
Their authority allows for "disciplinary measures which can be a
pledge signed by the culprit, a reprimand, flogging up to a maximum of
fifteen cane lashes, or imprisonment up to a maximum of three days".
The flogging and imprisonment, however, can only be done after the
approval of the local governor (see al-Wahbi 1983:114). If the
governor does not approve for any reason, then the case is transferred
to a court of law.
The hay'ah is given the authority to execute the decision of the
court in cases that are transferred by it. In decreeing this, the
niTam took away from the hay'ah the power to discipline anyone without
the approval of the amir (governor). From the cases that writer
reviewed during field work, it appears that the approval of the
governor was obtained most of the time. The only complaint that
officials of the hay'ah had was that this procedure always took a
number of days to complete, and this meant delaying the completion of
cases that were usually of a minor character.5
Section Two of the niT-im gives the General President "the
ultimate authority over all the hay'at in the Kingdom" (Article Five).
He is also given the authority to "ask the governor of a province to
refer certain cases to a court of Islamic Law" (Article Six). The
third section deals in general terms with the appointment of people to
work for the hay'ah with "proper academic qualifications" that are not
specified. It also places all the employees of the hay'ah under the
regulations of the General Bureau of the Civil Service in dealing with
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promotions and disciplinary actions. The duties of the hay'ah in towns
and villages are dealt with in Section Four. It is also the basis for
the definition of munkars that the hay'all is responsible for, and the
methods for dealing with them on "God's Book (The Qur'in) and the
sunnah (way)...set out by the Prophet (Muhammad) in the way he lived
and behaved" (Article Ten).
The hay'ah was given the authority to apprehend and interrogate
people who commit unlawful actions, to censure prohibited materials
that may influence public morality and to take charge of investigating
all related cases. No details were given of how this can be done, but
the ni;"5m went on to conclude that "the General President of the
hay'ah is to issue By-Laws for the implementation of this statute in
consultation with the Minister of the Interior" (Article Twenty).
Those By-Laws were issued in 1406/1986 and they are the subject of the
following section.
The By-Laws of the current Nizin
In May 1986, the first detailed By-Laws for the hay'ah were issued in
conjunction with an agreement between the General President of the
bay'ah and the Minister of the Interior. It is a very long and
detailed description of the authorities and the activities of the
bay'ah in relation to other government institutions, especially the
police. The involvement of the Minister of the Interior in developing
these By-Laws was believed to be necessary to allow for a practical
working relationship between the hay'ah and the police.
The General Directorate for Public Security which is the central
organ for all the law-enforcement agencies in the Kingdom is part of
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the Ministry of the Interior. Both organizations took part in
developing the By-Laws for the hay'ah , so as to avoid any overlap of
responsibilities between the hay'ah and the police. The fact that a
large number of policemen work for the hay l ah is another important
factor that necessitated close co-operation between the two
institutions (see Chapter Eight).
It will not be possible to discuss the By-Laws in detail here
because of their length. We shall, however, discuss the important
points in them. For a complete translation of the entire document
please see Appendix G. The document begins with a preamble explaining
why the By-Laws were issued and what the hay'ah hopes they will
achieve. Section one deals with the duties of the hay'ah, most
important of which is "guiding and advising people to observe the
religious duties prescribed by Islamic Law and make them carry out
these duties" (Article One). This point emphasizes the uniquness of
the hay'ah as a religious institution responsible for the enforcement
of religious practices among the population.
The hay'ah appears to have the backing of the government in
doing this task, and this illustrates the strong backing of religion
by the state in Saudi Arabia. The hay'ah is given the authority
(Article One - B) to make sure that prayer is performed in mosques and
to urge people to hasten in answering its call. Doing that is one of
the major activities of the local centres of the hay'ah (see the
section about activities in this chapter). All public places are to be
closed at the times of prayers, and the hay'ah is responsible for the
enforcement of that. A number of acts are identified by the By-Laws as
forbidden, and the hay'ah must make sure that these acts are not
committed in public (Article One - C).
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Section Two of the By-Laws concerns the methods of search and
investigation. The authority and responsibility of the hay'ah in doing
those things are very similar to those held by the police. The main
difference lies in the types of cases for which each is responsible.
Article One lists all the acts that fall under the jurisdiction of the
hay'ah. How to deal with impounded materials is explained in Section
Three. Section Four deals with punishment, detention and precautionary
arrest. It also deals in great detail with the detention and
interrogation of women. This is a sensitive area for the hay'ah
because they have no women employees to deal with female suspects (see
al-Wahbi 1983:150). This has been problematic in the past, but the
By-Laws appear to attempt to solve the problem by making the hay'ah 
transfer women offenders to detention houses for women (which is part
of the prison system in the Kingdom) immediately after interrogation
is completed (see Appendix G).
Section Five deals with the numbers and the rank of policemen
working for the hay'ah on all levels. This is determined by agreement
between the General President of the hay'ah and the Director General
of Public Security. 6
 The last section gives the General President of
the hay'ah the authority to "interpret the contents of these By-Laws,
cancel articles and add new ones" (Article Ninety Six).
The issuance of these By-Laws was very important for the members
of the hay'ah. It clarified many points and cleared the confusion that
marked the activities of the organization and its relationship with
the police prior to 1986. It also marked a very important step in the
direction of making the hay'ah a better organized and more effective
institution. There is no doubt that the current nizam and its By-Laws
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have limited the authority of the hay'ah to a certain degree, but no
one expects the hay'ah to maintain an unlimited and undefined
authority when its responsibilities and its resources are very limited
in comparison with those of the police departments. The hay'ah has
specific functions to fulfil in society, and the nizam and its By-Laws
allow it to fulfil those functions using the appropriate methods.
Knowing what is expected of it and how to do its job are essential
requirements for any effective organization. The nizam and its By-Laws
were meant to help the hay'ah meet that requirement.
Comparing the Old and the New Regulations
In order to understand the changes that political modernization has
had on the institution of the hay'ah, we must take a look at the the
major changes in its official regulations since it was established at
the beginning of this century. There are seven different regulations
to be compared, five of which dealt only with the hay'ah in the Hejaz
region prior to 1976. The comparison will be limited to four major
spheres: the tasks of the hay'ah, its authority, its official status,
and its structure.
The oldest document considered to be an official statute for the
hay'ah was a communique issued by King cAbd al-cAziz some time between
1910 and 1920, announcing the establishment of the hay'ah (see
Appendix C). 7 It specified a number of tasks that the hay'ah was
responsible for, but did not say anything about the structure of the
hay'ah or how it was supposed to function. These details were left to
the discretion of the leaders of the hay'ah who were accountable to
the King. The lack of most other government institutions in the
244
central part of the country prior to 1920 gave the haz'ah an important
role to play especially in the city of Riyadh. It was responsible for
the collection of zak1h, endowments and standards of trading in the
market place. All of these responsibilities have since been delegated
to other government institutions (see Chapter Nine). This basic
statute was the only one dealing with the hay'ah in the central part
of the Kingdom until the current statute was issued in 1980.
The hay'ah in the Hejaz experienced major changes both in
authority and in structure. Five different regulations were issued for
it between 1927 and 1980. The first document considered by Murshad
(1975:199) as a regulation for the hay'ah in the Hejaz came in the
form of an article written by a scholar named al-Bay-tar. It was
written, according to Murshad, upon a request made by the judge of
Makkah, Shaykh Ibn Bulayhid, who established the first hay'ah in the
Hejaz (see Chapter Six). This document was meant to define the
responsibilities of the hay'ah and its method of operation. It listed
a number of actions concerning behaviour for which the hay'ah was
responsible and gave it the authority to "prevent anyone from
committing those acts in public...and punish those who do not repent"
(al-BaytXr 1927:2).
The second official set of regulations for the hay'ah in the
Hejaz were issued by the Viceroy in 1927. It dealt more specifically
with the structure of the hay'ah and announced the establishment of
four more hay'lt in the major cities of the region. Five spheres were
outlined as things for which the hay'ah was responsible. They were the
enforcement of religious observances, especially prayer, the search
for illegal activities in public places and private homes, preventing
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people from committing munkars of all types, preventing people from
saying bad things and harming each other, and finally, encouraging
people to care for animals. 8 The last point was unique to this
regulation and it is today part of the responsibility of
municipalities. This regulation was the first to call for the
appointment of a number of policemen in each one of the hay'Nt to help
the members do their job, and it was in force for only two years.
In 1929, the newly formed Consultative Council issued new
regulations making the hay'ah part of the police department. 9 It
limited the authority of its members to that of observing policemen to
make sure that they carried out the task of enforcing religious
observances and public morality. The hay'ah in the Hejaz lost its
independence as a result. The regulations listed seventeen acts which
were considered forbidden and policemen were given the responsibility,
under the supervision of members of the hay'ah, to combat those acts
and to arrest anyone who committed them.
Seven years later, the president of the judiciary in the Hejaz
issued new regulations placing the hay'ah under his jurisdiction. 10
The hay'ah,
 was given the same status that it enjoyed before 1929 but
was placed under the official control of the judicial presidency in
the Hejaz. The structure and responsibilities of the hay'ah in the
regulation were very similar to those found in the 1927 regulations.
The fifth official regulations for the hay'ah in the Hejaz were issued
by the Crown Prince in 1952. They gave the hay'ah a semi-independent
status while maintaining its connection with the judicial presidency.
This replaced all previous regulations and extended the jurisdiction
of the hay'ah in the Hejaz over the newly formed hay rit in the
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southern region of the Kingdom. The hay'ah was given the status of a
regional presidency, and a president was appointed and connected
directly with the office of the Viceroy. 11
The last regulations, which are those in effect today, were
issued in 1980 for all the hay'Et in the Kingdom (Appendix F). Further
By-Laws were issued in 1986 (Appendix G). Both documents were
discussed at the beginning of this section. Table Three shows how they
differ from the previous regulations in structure, authority and
responsibility. A more detailed comparison is not thought to be
necessary in the context of this study. It will also present only half
the picture because most of the regulations dealt solely with the
hay'ah in one region of the country (the Hejaz).
A careful look at Table Three gives a general idea of the major
changes that the regulations of the hay'ah have undergone since 1927,
especially in the Hejaz region. The structure in both regions grew
from a local centre in the two major cities (Makkah and Riyadh) to a
general presidency on the national level. This is an impressive
achievement and a clear demonstration that the hay'ah has emerged from
the modernization period much larger and much stronger. The
administrative status of the hay'ah in both regions started as an
independent institution. The one in the Hejaz became part of the
police department between 1929 and 1936. After that, it came under the
supervision of the presidency of the judiciary in the Hejaz due to the
effort of the Chief Judge in the Hejaz who was a prominent member of
AL al-shaykh family. The regulation issued in 1952 gave the hay'ah an
independent status as a regional presidency, and in 1976, the two
hay'at were united in one independent general presidency.
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The responsibilities of the hay'ah have not gone through any
major changes over the years. Its involvment in the enforcement of
religious observances, fighting against reprehensible acts and
enforcing public morality can be found in all regulations. The old
regulations used general terms to refer to the responsibilities of the
hay'ah, and this has resulted in confusion and problems of
implementation. There are a number of acts for which the hay'ah was
responsible, but they were delegated to other government institutions.
Dealing with endowments, zakah, and observing imported goods at custom
points are major examples. The 1986 By—Laws are a great improvement
over the previous regulations. They give the first detailed list of
the exact responsibilities of the hay'ah and how members should carry
out their tasks (Appendix G). This is another sign that the hay'ah is
becoming more efficient and better organized.
The hay'ah's power to punish offenders since the first known
regulation has ranged from undefined to the use of necessary measures,
to ten cane lashes or detention for three days. It grew under the 1952
regulation to detention for up to one month or thirty cane lashes. Its
power is limited under the current statute to detention for up to
three days or a maximum of up to fifteen cane lashes. This can only be
done after the approval of the local governor is granted. This imposes
some restriction on the authority of the hay'ah but probably was seen
by the government as a necessary measure to make sure that local
officials of the hay'ah did not abuse their authority, as had been the
case in the past.
This restriction, however, is not unique to the hay'ah. The
police as well as the other law—enforcement agencies lack the
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authority to discipline or punish any individual unless approved by
the governor or decided by a court of law. The restrictions placed on
the authority of the local officials of the hay'ah make it possible to
standardize methods of dealing with offenders and of deciding their
punishments by allowing only governors and judges to make the relevant
decisions.
C. Members
This section will be a descriptive account of the people who control,
and who work for, the hay'ah. Their numbers, ranks, positions,
qualifications and backgrounds will be examined on the basis of
available information. It was very difficult to obtain much personal
information, simply because in a country like Saudi Arabia, most
people do not accept questions about things that they regard as
private. A questionnaire was distributed among members working in some
of the local centres in Riyadh which asked questions about age,
education, income, the number of years they had been working for the
hay'ah and several other questions. Only two people responded out of a
total of one hundred. This was one of the major disappointments of the
field work. The writer hopes, however, that the information obtained
through observation and other sources will give some useful
information about the people who work for the hay'ah.
Starting at the top of the organization, we will begin with the
General President of the hay'ah. As was mentioned before, The General
President is Shaykh cAbd al—cAziz b. Muhammad Al- 	 al—Snaykh. He was
born in 1919 in Riyadh, completed graduate education in Islamic
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Studies and went on to become the Chancellor of the Imam Muhammad b.
Suctid Islamic University in Riyadh. He was appointed a General
President of the hay'ah in 1976. 12 He is the author of a number of
books and articles about Islamic topics. One of his books deals with
the work of the hay'ah and its role in society. 13 He is one of the
prominent members of the 31 al-Shaykh family at the present time, and
deserves most of the credit for the growth and re-organization that
the hay'ah has undergone in the past twelve years.
Next in line come the two deputies to the General President who
are also members of Al al-Shaykh family. The Deputy for Financial and
Administrative Affairs is Shaykh cAbd al-cAziz b. cAbd al-Malik 31 al-
Shaykh. He is in his early fifties and has worked for a long time as
an assistant to his father who was the president of the hay'ah in the
Hejaz between 1952 and 1976. The writer has been unable to obtain
details concerning his education. The other deputy is Shaykh cAbd
al-RahniEn b. Ahmed Al al-Shaykh. He is a young man in his late
twenties and handles most of the work of the General President during
the latter's absence. There is one deputy assistant and one director
general who are also members of -Al al-Shaykh family. No specific
information is available about them because the author was not able to
meet them during the field trip, and there are no sources available
that would give this kind of information.
The general supervisors of the regional branches come next in
the chain of command (see Figure 8). Three of them hold the rank of a
deputy assistant minister which is equal to the fourteenth rank of the
Saudi civil service cadre. These three supervisors are the supervisor
of the Western regional branch, supervisor of the Riyadh regional
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Figure 8
The Structural Hierarchy of the Hay'ah in Saudi Arabia
(Chain of Command)
General President of
the Hay'ah
1
Deputies
I 
I	 I
Directors	 General Regional
General	 Supervisors
I
Heads of
	
Heads of
Departments	 Departments
1	 President of	 Presidents	 1
Administrative	 Hay'ah branches	 of Hay'ah	 Administrative
Staff at the	 in cities with	 branches in	 Staff at the
General	 two or more	 small cities,	 regional
Presidency	 Local Centres	 towns and	 Level
\.	
villages
Presidents of
Local Centres
Members working
in the Field
Source: Based on information collected by the writer, March 1988.
Writer's translation.
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branch, and the supervisor of the Eastern regional branch. The other
four supervisors hold the twelth rank of the cadre. One of these
general supervisors who was found to be an influential figure in the
hay'ah is Shaykh Ibrahim al—Ghayth who is the general supervisor of
the hay'ah's branch in the Riyadh region. He was born in 1944 in
Riyadh and graduated from the shari cah College in Riyadh in 1968. He
worked as the president of the 2E2 (market) local centre of the
hay'ah, and in 1978 he became the first general supervisor of the
Riyadh regional branch. He is very active in the field of giving
public lectures about religious topics (al—Hawshani 1984:31).
Next in the line of top administrative positions come the heads
of directorates, departments and offices. The remaining positions are
divided between twenty five positions ranging from inspectors to an
architect (see Table 4). These administrative posts make up one
category of employees known as the administrative positions (wazalif
idariyyah). They constitute about 12 per cent of the total work force
of the hay'ah. They are distributed between the general presidency,
regional branches and local centres all over the country, but the
majority is thought to be working in the general presidency in Riyadh.
The total number of administrative positions is 414 including the
general president.
The second category of positions is known as religious positions
(waza l if diniyyah). The number of members who hold religious positions
is 1086. This category covers members who mainly work in the field. It
is not perfectly clear why they have been given the label 'religious',
but the writer thinks that it might have to do with the qualifications
suitable for holding their positions, which are mainly a basic
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religious education. It is also a way of differentiating between
employees who hold administrative positions without any involvement in
the field— work and the rest of the employees whose main task is
working in the field. The religious positions rank from a local hay'all
president to an °WU' (member). It includes investigators, guides,
researchers and presidents of local centres (see Table 4).
The third and final category covers employees who are outside
the Civil Service cadre because they lack the requisite educational
qualifications. The majority of the employees working for the hay'at
fall under this category. There is a total of 2457 employees holding
positions ranging from %chi •to a number of drivers, servant and
postmen. There is a special cadre for these positions known as cadre
al—mustakhdamin with three ranks starting with rank number thirty
three and ending with rank number thirty one.
The posts in this category are a mixture of religious positions
and support staff (e.g. postmen, drivers and servants). The majority
of this group however, are a c clb."' (members) with very limited
educational qualifications. There are 2198 members outside the cadre,
the majority of whom are older members who started working for the
hay'ah long before any formal education existed in the country. The
total number of people employed by the hay'ah today is 3957. This is
in comparison to 2990 employees in 1970. 14 That total number, however,
does not include policemen, part—time employees or volunteers.
One of the major problems faced by the hay'ah today is how to
deal with the large number of old and unqualified members. Al—Wahbl
(1982:140) discussed this problem and how it affected the work of the
hay'ah. He said that the older members are neither qualified nor
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physically able to carry out the demanding work in the field. There is
no detailed information about the exact number or average age of the
older members. From conversations with various officials and members
as well as from observations, the writer got the impression that this
is becoming a serious problem for the hay'ah. The aim of the officials
is to try to replace the older members with more-qualified younger
persons.
This has proved to be difficult according to al-BawshNni
(1984:167), mainly for two reasons. The first one is the unwillingness
of most of the older members to take early retirement because this job
constitutes the only income for the majority of them. The second
reason is that young people with university degrees do not see working
for the hay'ah as good employment because of the difficult and
sensitive nature of the work. Much is needed to be done by the haylat
in terms of presenting a better image of itself to young people and
offering some kind of fringe benefits to attract young Saudi's with
university education. More jobs also have to be created in the budget
to take on extra employees rather than just waiting for positions to
become vacant.
The General President has said in a published interview that
there are serious attempts to attract more qualified employees in
consultation with the Civil Service Bureau. 15
 The plan seems to be
working slowly, and today fifteen out of the thirty five presidents of
local centres in the city of Riyadh are younger members with
Thisuniversity degrees. 16  s a good improvement considering the facts
that only a small percentage of the population hold university degrees
and that the oldest university in the country has been in existence
for only thirty years.
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As for the employees who have no proper education, there are
attempts to educate them using short-term courses designed for that
purpose. The officials of the hay'ah have made an agreement with the
Institute of Public Administration to enroll administrative employees
in its programmes designed to improve the skills of government
employees in a number of fields. Every year, a number of employees
working for the hay'ah take time off from work to enroll in these
programmes. The writer has met with some of those who have completed
the programme, and they seem to have benefited a great deal from it.
For the benefit of employees holding religious positions, mainly
-
a eca', another agreement was made with the Imam Muhammad b. Suc
 ud
Islamic University to organize special training schemes through the
branches of the university in different parts of the country. The aim
of these schemes is to instruct members with limited or no education
as to how they should carry out their tasks in the field. Two of these
schemes were completed last year in the Qasim and the Southern
regions. Both lasted for three weeks, and fifty four members took part
in the one held in the Qasim branch. The members were instructed by
the regular faculty of the univesity, mainly in religious topics
ranging from the basics of how to carry out al-amr bi-'1-ma 
wa-'1-nahy Can al-munkar in accordance with the shaFi cah, to the
fundamentals of bisbah, public relations and social change in Saudi
society. 17
The hay'ah does not have any specific policies for recruiting
new members. The current nizim says that all new positions must be
filled "with people with proper academic qualifications" (Article
Seven of the niz-im
 - Appendix F). It does not, however, specify what
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academic qualifications are accepted. Al-Hawshani (1984:166) wrote
that the hay'ah is in the course of implementing a plan which insists
that the appointment of the presidents of local centres is from among
members with a university degree from one of the shari cah colleges in
the Kingdom. The General President has also said in a published
interview that the hay'ah welcomes new members with secondary school
qualifications. 18 The problem, however, seems to be the limited number
of new positions created every year to take on new and more qualified
members. The writer was told by the Deputy for Financial and
Administrative Affairs that many requests by young people with
qualifications to join the hay'ah are turned down simply for the lack
of vacant positions in the budget. 19
In addition to the official members who work for the hay'ah on a
full-time basis, there are two other groups that have taken part in
the activities of the hay'ah in the field. The first group is
part-time employees who usually work during the evening sessions after
their regular work or studies. The size of this group is not known to
the writer, but it seemed to be very small and to consist usually of
people doing technical jobs like typing or translation. One of the
young members of al-cUlayya centre was a part-time employee whose job
was observing the public functions in local hotels. This is a job that
requires work during the evening when most activities in that area
take place.
The other group that used to work for the hay'ah are what is
known as al-mutwinUn (volunteers). This group consisted mainly of
young men who wanted to volunteer their time in helping the hay'ah to
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fulfil what they regarded as a religious obligation. They worked
without payment mainly during evening sessions, and they used to
gather in local centres and go out into the field with the regular
members under the supervision of the president of the centre. Their
involvement, however, began to Cause serious problems for officials of
the hay'ah because their growing numbers made it difficult for the
local officials to keep them under control.
Not being officially accountable for their behaviour made a few
of them take advantage of the opportunity to have the backing and the
facilities of the hay'ah either to try to impose their extreme views
on members of the public or to take the law into their own hands.
Various attempts to organize their involvement failed because the
group kept changing members all the time, and in 1986, the General
President issued an order preventing volunteers from taking part in
the official activities of the hay'ah. The Deputy to the General
President told the writer that this was a necessary step to protect
the public image of the hay'ah, even though the help offered by most
volunteers was both needed and appreciated. He also said that the only
assistance they now accept is in the form of information about any
violations that fall under the jurisdiction of the hay'ah. 20
The official members of the hay'ah (i.e. full-time employees)
are given special identification cards which they must carry with them
at all times. They are instructed to show these cards to anyone with
whom they come in contact in the course of their official duties.
Giving the official members of the hay'ah cards with their photographs
on was one step towards overcoming the problem experienced by members
of the public in not being able to differentiate between men actually
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working for the hay'ah, and those who were simply volunteers. The
problem, however, was not totally solved because official members wear
civilian clothes while doing their official job. Some kind of a
uniform would help the public identify and deal rightfully with the a-
-
cdg ' of the hay'ah.
D. Activities 
The main activity of the hay'ah is working in the field to enforce
religious observances and public morality. The prime method used to
achieve this task is for the local centres to send out groups of a_
ciEL, accompanied by policemen, to patrol streets and public places at
certain times. There are various attempts to use other methods like
the publication of books, the organization of public lectures, and the
use of the mass media in order to help the hay'ah play its role in
society. The main activity, however, remains the actual work done in
the field. This has proven to be the only effective method for an
"enforcement" institution like the hay'ah. There are different types
of activities, and this section will be divided in accordance with
those types as observed by the writer during the field trip.
Daily Activities
The most regular activity carried out by the local centres of the
hay'ah is also the activity with which the hay'ah is mostly
identified. It revolves around the times of the regular prayers
offered by Muslims five times every day (see Chapter Three). Prayer is
a very important part of the Islamic religion and one of the tasks of
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the hay'ah, like the traditional hisbah, is to enforce the practice of
prayer by the public. No shops are to be open, and no business is
allowed to work during the prayer times.
When it is time for Prayer, members go out in the official cars
of the hay'ah and, using the loud speakers placed on top of each car,
call on people to go to the nearest mosque for prayers. They also ask
the shops and businesses that have not already closed to do so. This
has become a major part of the daily routine of the hay'ah and a
normal part of the daily scene in Saudi Arabia.
Enforcement creates few problems when it comes to the five daily
prayers. Most people seem to accept the reality of the situation and
the stoppage of all businesses and public activities during prayer
times is considered a normal part of the daily life. Shops and
businesses usually close down as soon as the call to prayer is
announced from the loud speakers on top of every mosque. Most do not
wait for members of the hay'ah to come around and repeat the call
because they do not want to risk being accused of doing business
during prayer time. The latter is an offence that involves the risk of
having the business closed for a number of days, if repeated,
something all businesses naturally try to avoid.
The writer accompanied members of the hay'ah many times during
their daily activity. Nothing much was done in terms of enforcement
because people seemed to know what was required of them and they
complied without any hesitation. The hay'ah is recognised as a
representative of the state with powers to arrest and to punish, and
no one wanted to risk a confrontation with one of its members. There
are, of course, a few incidents when a shop or a business does not
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close on time or someone is found staying inside his shop or business
while locking the front door. This is not allowed, and the person is
usually given up to three written warnings not to repeat the offence.
The fourth time calls for his arrest and detention for twenty four
hours, and after that his case is transferred to a shari cah court to
take a decision which is usually closure of the premises for a number
of days or a fine or both.
The activity of the hay'ah revolves mostly around the ;uhr,
maghrib and cishV prayers. The  casr prayer, like the falr prayer,
comes at a time when there is little activity in public because the
afternoon in Saudi Arabia (between 2:00 pm and 4:00 pm) is a time of
rest when people usually have their .ghada" (lunch), the main meal of
the day, and they have a siesta right after it. This practice may have
been influenced by the climate in the Kingdom. This leaves three daily
prayers for the hay'ah to work at when public activity in shopping
centres and businesses is in full swing. The working hours of local
centres were designed around the times of the remaining prayers. The
morning session ends with the noon prayer, and the evening session
starts about one hour before the sunset prayer and ends one and a half
hours after the evening prayer.
The time before the three prayers and after the evening prayer
is spent by members of the hay'ah in doing the other important task
which is the enforcement of public morality. They go into shopping
centres, parks, hotels, hospitals, businesses, restaurants and any
place where the public goes in order to observe the activities of
people and to prevent anyone from committing an act that is considered
munkar (reprehensible). For a complete list of all the acts considered
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munkar and which fall under the responsibility of the hay'ah, see
Article One of the current By-Laws, Appendix G.
Occasional Activities
This type of activity involves the occasional inspection of certain
public places by members of the bay'ah. It does not follow any regular
schedule, but is left mainly to the choice of the centre's president.
It involves sending a group of members once in a while to inspect
certain shops and businesses.
Some of those places inspected regularly are places that make
dresses for women (khayyitUn) to make sure that they follow the
regulations set out by municipalities governing their arrangements and
working methods. Because these places are staffed by men, women are
not allowed to go inside the shops. Business is done through a small
window at the front of the shop to prevent any physical contact
between the two parties (see al-Wahbi 1983:121). There are specific
instructions against male tailors taking the measurements of women
customers and against having any fitting rooms inside the place. These
shops are also required not to keep any dress-catalogues containing
indecent pictures. 21 The licence for a dress-making shop is not
usually renewed until the place is inspected and approved by the local
centre of the hay'ah.
Other places inspected regularly are shops that sell and rent
video tapes. It is the responsibilty of members of the hay'ah to make
sure that they do not sell or rent tapes that contain pornographic
material or anything that is incompatible with religion. This job is
mainly the responsibility of the Ministry of Information which gives
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clearance to tapes before they enter the country, but the By-Laws of
the hay'ah gave it the authority to share some of the responsibility.
Members also inspect restaurants to see that they have separate
entrances and sections for families. 22 Music-shops are not allowed to
play loud music and are subject to many other restrictions that we
will not be able to list here. The random activities of the local
centres were designed to inspect shops and businesses looking for
these and similar violations that are considered contrary to public
morality.
Any activity that members of the hay'ah consider as munkar falls
under their responsibility even if other government institutions such
as the police or the intelligence agencies are also responsible for
it. The current By-Laws were an attempt to define and limit their
responsibility, but the officials of the hay'ah feel that all the
law-enforcement agencies must work together for the benefit of society
as a whole. 23
A member of the hay'ah is usually sent to observe parties,
weddings and exhibitions held in hotels or conference halls to make
sure that no violations take place, especially the intermingling
between men and women in public. Hotels and halls are required to
inform the hay'ah three days prior to any public activity of the time
and nature of the activity so that they can send a member to observe
and report any violations to the president of the centre. This
regulation was issued by the Ministry of Commerce based on a request
made by the General President of the hay'ah.24
A similar activity involves shopping centres during the peak
shopping period at weekends. The weekend in Saudi Arabia is Thursday
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and Friday of each week. Thursday and Friday night are busy times for
members of the hay'ah because shopping centres are filled with
shoppers. Members from different local centres usually come together
to patrol large shopping centres in the city in order to enforce
public morality. Some members have time off during weekends, but those
who work get paid for extra time. Each centre is required to keep part
of its force on duty during weekends.
Annual Activities
The hay'ah is also involved in three major annual occasions in Saudi
Arabia. The first one is the holy month of Raman. During this month,
Muslims are required to perform siyla (fasting) during the hours of
daylight (see Chapter Three). The task of the hay'ah is to enforce the
Islamic rule that no one eats or drinks in public during the fasting
period. The hay'ah makes sure that no restaurants or bakery shops are
open to serve food during the daytime. Shopping activites usually
switch to night time during Raman, and the task of the hay'ah 
increases as a result. Thus, the working hours of local centres
increase at night so as to meet the requirement of observing shops
and businesses that often stay open until 2 o'clock in the morning.
The amirah (office of the governor) usually instructs its akhwiyi" 
(guards) to work with the hay'ah during the night time in Ramagn,
assistance that is appreciated by officials of the hay'ah. 25
The second annual activity in which the hay'ah takes part is the
tiajj. The part that the hay'ah plays during the Pilgrimage is
educational rather than having to do with enforcement. Some of the top
officials of the hay'ah along with a number of educated members gather
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in Makkah during the bajj, period to work with other religious
institutions in educating the pilgrims about the correct way of
performing the Pilgrimage. They give lectures, hold seminars, answer
inquiries and distribute leaflets in different languages which show
those who make the Pilgrimage for the first time how it should be
performed. They also encourage pilgrims to perform prayers in
congregation (jamlcah). 26
It was not possible for the writer to take part in this
particular activity because the bajj did not occur during the six
months spent in Saudi Arabia doing the field work. The above
information was obtained from the secretary of al-cUlayya centre who
has taken part in this activity many times.
The last major annual activity is a new occasion which is not
religious in nature. This is al-JenEderiah Cultural Festival organised
annually by the National Guard (al-baras al-watinI). The first of
these festivals was held in 1985. It takes the form of a typical Saudi
village built outside Riyadh. It contains exhibitions of traditional
arts and crafts. Camel racing and traditional dancing (arclah) are
regular features of the festival. It usually lasts for two weeks with
a number of days reserved for women only. The involvement of the
hay'ah occurs during the days reserved for women. The National Guard
gave the hay'ah the responsibilty of keeping order in the festival
ground during that time. They make sure that no men enter during the
days for women, that women are dressed modestly (covering the hair and
most of the body) and that no music or photography goes on inside. 27
The hay'ah also plays a similar role during other public occasions
that call for their presence and their unique involvement.
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The last section of this chapter has been an attempt to give the
reader an idea of the kind of activities in which the hay'ah is
involved in Saudi society. It is, however, not a complete account of
all the things that the hay'ah usually takes part in. The problem with
trying to provide such an account lies in the fact that the hay'ah 
deals with many major and minor problems which cannot all be listed
here. The writer has seen cases where members of the hay'ah have dealt
with individuals who practise magic, a number of witch doctors,
gamblers, beggars, individuals caught drinking alcohol, 28 homosexuals,
drug addicts, adulterers and many other minor cases.
In short, the hay'ah tries to deal with any act or belief that
is defined as forbidden under the Islamic sharI ckh, in one way or
another. At times they handle it themselves and at other times, they
notify the authority responsible for it. No society is free from
social problems, and Saudi society is no exception. What is unique
about Saudi Arabia is the fact that many activities that are
considered normal by western standards are considered wrong and
harmful in Saudi Arabia. As long as the government of Saudi Arabia
adheres to the principles of the shari cah and applies it to public
life, then the hay'ah will always find plenty to do.
Conclusion
The information given in this chapter was intended to present, as far
as possible, an accurate account of the hay'ah today. The information
is based on official sources and documents, and on first—hand
experience by the writer.
Most of the discussion dealt with basic information about the
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structure, regulations, members and activities of this unique
organization. This was thought to be necessary because of the lack of
such information in published sources. It is clear that the hay'ah has
grown considerably bigger in the past fifteen years. There have
recently been serious attempts to improve its performance by issuing
detailed regulations, by training members, and providing better
equipment and facilities. The hay'ah, nevertheless, still suffers from
problems that require immediate solutions in order for it to continue
playing its role in society in an effective way. 29
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Chapter Eight 
The Hay'ah in Relation to Other Institutions 
The hay'ah is an organization Which is part of the structure of the
Saudi government. This position makes it necessary for the hay'ah to
work in cooperation with most of the other government institutions in
order to be able to carry out its tasks in an effective way. Some
aspects of the relationship between the hay'ah and a number of
government institutions will be looked at in the first two sections of
this chapter. The first section will be devoted to the close and
sensitive working relationship between the hay'ah and the police
forces in the country. A brief consideration will also be given to the
relationship between the hay'ah and the narcotics control
administration.
The second section will deal with the hay'ah and some of the
other major government institutions. The office of the governor and
courts of law will be the most important institutions to come under
scrutiny in this category. The third section will be concerned with
the lack of a formal relationship between the hay'ah and the media.
The fourth section will be a general disucssion of the LELE12's image,
and how it is viewed by some of the Saudi citizens who come into
regular contact with its members. The fifth section will discuss the
way the hay'ah deals with expatriates living in the country. Specific
questions will be asked about the ways in which non-Muslims and
diplomats are dealt with.
The information given in this chapter is based mainly on
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observations and interviews done by the writer in the course of field-
work. The topics are dealt with in a relatively brief and summary way
so that all the different categories can be covered in the limited
space available here. Each one of these topics deserves a separate
research project in itself, but in the context of this study it will
be possible only to take a general look at the place of the hay l ah in
the structure of the government, and in its relationship with various
groups in Saudi Arabian society.
A. The Hay'ah and Law Enforcement Agencies
The importance of the relationship between the hay'ah and
law-enforcement agencies arises from the similarities between their
methods of operation and their responsibilities. Before discussing
that, it would help if we try to clarify what is meant by law-
enforcement agencies. According to Rajehi
	
(1981:80), the law-
enforcement agencies in Saudi Arabia are the forces defined by Royal
Decree no. 30, dated 14.4.1384 H (23.8.1964) as "the armed forces
responsible for keeping the peace, order and public security in land
and sea, especially preventing crime ..., protecting lives, property
and morality." These forces make up the internal security forces which
are part of the structure of the Ministry of the Interior. Its
components are: Public security (al-amn al- c am); civil defence
(al-difeal-madanT); general investigation (al-mablhith al-cimah);
coast guard	 (silih al-hudiid);	 narcotics control (mukNfahat
al-mukhadirNt); and the special forces unit (al-qt 
The haz'ah is not considered part of the law-enforcement agencies
because it is an independent organization and is not considered an
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"armed force". Furthermore, the hay'ah is not regarded as responsible
for law-enforcement and public security per se but rather responsible
for religious observance and public morality. It is also interesting
to see that the protection of morality is considered part of the
responsibilities of the internal security forces, according to the
Royal Decree quoted above. The writer has found it both difficult and
problematic to draw a clear distinction between the responsibilities
of the hay'ah and those of the law-enforcement agencies. It is
difficult because some responsiblities are shared by both
organisations (e.g. fighting against the consumption of intoxicating
drinks and pornograpy). It is also problematic because in a country
like Saudi Arabia both law and morality are based on the same
principles drawn from the Islamic shari cah. It is not easy to
distinguish between acts that are considered immoral because they are
forbidden by religion and acts that are considered illegal because
they are against the law. The sharI cah, in fact, places unlawful acts
(jarN'im) under the general category of reprehensible acts (munkarEt).
The only difference lies in the punishment prescribed for each act.
The punishment varies directly with the degree of harm that it causes.
Officials of the hay'ah have tried to overcome this problem by
defining the specific acts for which the hay'ah is responsible without
regard for the legal and moral questions. The current By-Laws
establish a list of fifteen points covering all acts and violations
that fall under the jurisdiction of the hay'ah. These acts are
identified as religious abominations (munkarit shar clyyah), and in two
spheres of that category members of the hay'ah were instructed to work
in cooperation with "other concerned parties" (Article One of the
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By-Laws - Appendix G). This is understood to mean the police forces.
The notion that the hay i ah is responsible for enforcing action
against religious abominations further strengthens its unique status
in the Saudi society. It could imply, however, that the so called
law-enforcement agencies are concerned with what can be called secular
responsibilities. This may seem to be a realistic conclusion based on
the distinctions between the duties of the two institutions, but it
still raises a few questions when one considers the fact that all laws
that control the activities of the law-enforcement agencies are also
based on religious principles. "All religious and secular conducts,
without exception, fall under the prescriptions of Shariah Law "
(Souryal 1987:432). Religion remains the dominant force that controls
definitions of, and ways of dealing with, crimes and what are
considered immoral acts in Saudi society.
The nature of the activities of the hay'ah creates a close and
unique relationship with law-enforcement agencies in general and with
the police forces in particular. Its relationship with the other
law-enforcement agencies is limited except for the Narcotic Control
Administration.
The remainder of this section will be a survey of the
relationship between the hay'ah on the one hand, and the police and
the narcotics control on the other. The relationship between the
hay'ah and the police goes back to the first detailed regulations
issued for the hay'ah in the Hejaz in 1927. It has gone through
periods of cooperation as well as of conflict. An example of the
latter is when the police took-over the structure of the hay'ah in
1929 (see Chapter Six). Regardless of the problems, the relationship
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between the two institutions has always been important and seems to be
in the interest of the hay'ah.
The official relationship goes back to 1927 when the police
department in Makkah was asked to supply the hay'ah with policemen to
work with members of the pay'ah in the field. This was seen as a
necessary measure because the civilians who worked for the hay'ah as
members were not trained or qualified to handle the police work
involved in their activity. Members are not allowed to carry arms and
they are encouraged not to involve themselves in situations that they
cannot handle such as arresting or chasing offenders. These jobs are
done by the policemen who work in the local centres of the hay'ah 
under the command of the president of the centre. They are required to
obey him in "a manner that does not violate police service
regulations" (Article Ninety One of the By-Laws - Appendix G).
The policemen who work for the hay'ah are part of the public
security forces (the police). They are recruited, trained and employed
by the police. They hold police ranks, wear police uniforms while on
duty, and carry with them arms and handcuffs. A special police centre
in every major city called shurtat al-hay'at_ wa-q-matakim
al-sharCiyyah (Police centre for the haV5,t, and	 the sharicah courts) is
responsible for supplying the hay'ah with the required policemen.
Their numbers and ranks are determined by an agreement between the
General President of the hay'ah and the General Director of Public
Security. The hay'it police centres have special detention rooms for
holding suspects and offenders who are still under interrogation by
the hay'ah. These rooms are used as temporary prisons for the hay'ah,
and offenders are kept in them for up to seventy two hours. After
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that, the offender is either released or transferred to a general
prison.
The police forces in Saudi Arabia are much larger and more
organized than the hay l ah. There was a total force of 72,121 policemen
in the country in 1980 (Rajehi 1981:98). The hay'ah, on the other
hand, has only
 
3957 members (see Table 4). Policemen are required to
complete a special three years education and training programme at
King Fand Security College before joining the force, while members of
the hay'ah have no special training. The police force has modern
well-equipped buildings and the latest methods of instant
communications between centres and field units. The hay'ah still lacks
some of these important measures which it needs in order to fully meet
its unique responsibilities.
The differences between the hay'ah and the police can be seen in
perspective if one considers the important differences in
responsibilities between the two organizations. The police play a more
directly important role in terms of social control and keeping law and
order. The hay'ah, on the other hand, is responsible for a limited
number of tasks in society which are unique because of their religious
connection. It requires a special kind of person with special
qualitites to carry out these tasks. Members of the hay'ah are
considered to be better qualified to enforce religious observances and
public morality than are policemen. The role played by policemen
working for the hay'ah is limited to situations where there is a need
to arrest someone or to keep him in custody. They accompany the
members for that purpose alone, and do not usually get involved in the
regular work carried out by members of the hay'ah.
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The working relationship between the hay'ah and the police
involves constant contact, especially on the local level. This happens
in situations where a local centre of the hay'ah is in need of special
assistance, or when it wants to transfer a case to the police, or when
an offender is to be taken to a general prison. There are two
responsibilities that are shared by the hay'ah and the police
department. One of these is dealing with the manufacturing, promoting,
or drinking of intoxicating drinks. The other one has to do with
displays or sales of pictures, books, video or audio recordings which
are indecent or which contradict the Islamic faith. The destruction of
any impounded materials from . these categories is done by a joint
committee from the hay'ah and the local police centre (al-Hawshäni
1984:35).
The writer has witnessed a number of cases where members of the
hay'ah have dealt with violations or crimes that do not fall under
their jurisdiction as defined by the current statute or its By-Laws.
During their regular activity, members of the hay'ah sometimes
encounter situations where a crime has happened or is about to happen.
They usually try to stop the crime or to arrest those who have
committed it. After that, the case is transferred to the police who
continue with their regular procedures. This has also happened a
number of times with regard to the use or the sale of narcotics. These
cases are transferred to the Administration of Narcotics Control
rather than to the police. The help of the hay'ail has been
acknowledged and appreciated by the Director of the General
Administration of Narcotics Control. ' The regional branch of the
hay'ah in Riyadh was given an official plaque in appreciation for its
help in a number of cases in 1987.2
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The police, on the other hand, have occasionally played a major
part in dealing with cases that are considered the sole responsibility
of the hay'ah. A case in point is when Al- cUlayya police centre
arrested a number of shopkeepers found doing business during . prayer
time at a number of shopping centres. The cases were then immediately
transferred to the hay'ah centre for the completion of the regular
procedures. 3 Al-Riygd
 newspaper also reported that the police arrested
twenty one persons in the city of Riyadh found eating in public during
the holy month of Ramadan 1408 (1988).4
From the above examples, it is clear that the cooperation
between the hay'ah and the police is determined, more by what they
come in contact with during their regular activities than by what
their regulations stipulate.	 Each institution has its own
responsibilities, but at certain times each party has to act in the
interest of the other. This kind of cooperation is something that is
encouraged by officials of the government and by leaders of the
organizations concerned. 5
The writer was not able to assess whether or not there is a high
level of tension between the hay'aih and the police. No signs of
conflict were detected during field-work, and a request to interview
the General Director of Public Security was turned down for unknown
reasons. A lot of emphasis was placed on the need for cooperation
between the two organizations. Whether or not that cooperation imposes
any constraints on the hay l ah can only be determined by more specific
studies.
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B. The Hay'ah and other Government Institutions 
It is only appropriate to start this section with a look at the
relationship between the hay'ah and the unique institution known as
al-aml.rah (office of the amir [governor]). Al-am-irah is at the centre
of the administrative structure of local government in Saudi Arabia
(see Chapter Four).
The amirah plays a central role in the official business of the
other government institutions on its level, for its main role is to
co-ordinate their activities (see al-Saliim 1988:5). This co-ordination
involves the activity of the hay'ah as well as that of other
institutions. Besides responsibility for co-ordination, the amIr also
has a kind of authority over the heads of all government institutions
including the hay'ah. This system, does not apply, however, to the
General Presidency of the hay'ah which is connected directly to the
Head of the Council of Ministers and which works in co-ordination with
the Ministry of the Interior on the national level.
The relationship between the hay'ah and the amirah on the
regional and local levels is one of almost daily contact. It involves
mostly paper-work associated with the transfer of cases or with
requests for the amir's authorization of punishment in the form of
lashes or imprisonment. Any case that the hay l ah wishes to transfer to
a court of Islamic law must go through the local amirah which, in
turn, sends it to the court. The case usually goes from the local
centre of the hay'ah to the regional branch or to the city hay'ah and
from there it is transferred to the amirah. (Article Sixty One of the
By-laws - Appendix G).
The amFrah must always be notified of any arrests made by
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members of the hay'ah, and of the outcome of cases investigated,
especially cases involving foreign nationals. 6
 In situations where the
local officials of the hay'ah find it difficult to decide what to do,
then the advice of the governor is sought, and his decision is final.
The role played by the amFrah raises the difficult question of how
independent the hay'ah is in the light of these restrictions. However,
not only the hay'ah, but all other government institutions on the
regional and local levels fall under the authority of the athirah.
We now turn to the relationship between the hay'ah and shailcah 
courts. In major cases where officials of the hay'ah cannot decide the
punishment, or in cases where the amir refuses to allow the hay'ah to
punish the offender, the hay'ah has the option of transferring them to
a sharT cah court. The decision of the court is final, and the haylah 
has the authority to apply all punishments except for prison
sentences. Any offender sentenced to prison is usually sent to the
general prison through a police centre. When an offender admits his
guilt in major cases, then he must be taken to a judge to register his
confession. Copies of court rulings are usually sent to the hay'ah 
centre (see Al al—Shaykh 1981:62). Furthermore, members of the hay'ah 
are regularly invited to take part in trials of offenders whom they
act as witnesses against those who denyhave caught in order to
charges.7
The process of transferring cases
the
from the hay'ah to the court
through the anarah usually takes days to complete due to bureaucratic
procedures at each stage. It would be much easier for all parties if
each regional hay'ah was provided with a resident judge who could deal
with minor cases that fall under the jurisdiction of the hay l ah and
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who could make decisions concerning them. This idea was suggested by
a1-alibi (1982:155) who saw in it a way of dealing with cases in a
prompt manner that would save the effort and time of members of the
hay'ah, and would also save the time of offenders who usually spend a
number of days in detention awaiting trial.
The hay'ah has contacts and working relationship with a number
of other government institutions. We will briefly discuss and give
examples of some of these relationships. One such relationship is
a.
found with the Ministry of Pilgrimage and Endowments (wazalli al-bajj 
wa- q-awqaf) which is responsible for the imams and mil'adhdhina of
all mosques in the country. The hay l ah has cooperated with this
ministry in seeking the essential support of imams for its activities.
It has also striven to unify the times of the call to prayers and the
actual beginning of prayers (iqlmat al-saiah) in all mosques. This was
necessary because of the fact that shops and businesses must close
down when it is time for prayer, and it was essential to have all of
them closed at the same time so that members of the hay'ah can observe
and enforce it. The hay'ah has also asked the Ministry of Pilgrimage
and Endowments to notify the imams of all mosques that it is necessary
to close the mosques and its toilets at night time in order to prevent
them being used for any criminal or immoral activity.8
Municipalities in Saudi Arabia are part of the structure of the
Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs (wazg/Tt al-shuwa 
al-baladiyyah wa-'l-qarawiyyah). These municipalities have taken over
some of the major duties that used to be carried out by the classical
mubtasib. One of the main areas of cooperation between the hay'ah and
municipalities centres on the issuance of commercial licences for
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shops and businesses. Some of the businesses that fall under special
regulations because of the nature of their work are not given licences
unless inspected and approved by the hay'ah. Tailors of women's
clothes, video shops and restaurants are the main businesses that fall
into this category. The role of the hay'ah is to make sure that they
follow the special regulations for limiting the possibilities of moral
violations. Another area of cooperation concerns the names and trade
marks of businesses. The hay'ah consider the use of foreign names and
the display of signs that have pictures or statues of living beings on
them as violations that must be corrected. It notifies municipalities
of these violations but rarely takes part in the actual enforcement.
The Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs has also issued strict
regulations which require all shopping centres, supermarkets, hotels,
banks, airport lounges, and large companies to have their own mosques
so that people can find a place to pray when it is time for prayer.
This regulation was recommended by the hay'ah, and is enforced by it.9
The hay'ah also works with the Ministry of Commerce (wafgrt
al—ti grah) in combatting commercial fraud in goods and services as
well as the import of merchandise which is considered objectionable.
Statues, stuffed animals, gold chains that have the emblems of other
religions, products that contain pork meat or lard, and intoxicating
drinks are some examples of merchandise that is not allowed into the
country. 10
 These are all examples of the role played by the hay'ah in
relation to some of the major government institutions. Limitations of
space prevent the discussion from being extended further, but it
should already be clear that there is extensive cooperation between
the hay'ah and other government institutions.
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C. The Hay'ah and the Media 
The relationship between the hay'ah and the media in Saudi Arabia is
indirect and unofficial. The hay'ah has no direct influence over what
the media broadcast or print, nor has it authority to censor anything
before it becomes public. The role played by the hay'ah takes in the
form of reacting to items that have already been published or
broadcasted. There is a special committee in the Ministry of
Information responsible for regulating material presented to the
public through the media, especially television. There are also
regulations issued by the Ministry of Information outlining what the
media cannot publish or broadcast. Most of these limitations are based
on religious grounds such as the restrictions against Saudi women
appearing on television, or the publication of pictures of women in
magazines and newspapers. There are also restrictions against
advertisements for cigarettes, alcoholic drinks, and a number of other
matters.
The relationship between the hay'ah and the media is very
limited. There appear to be no established channels of communication,
and no official working relationship. The hay'ah, however, tries to
play an indirect role in the enforcement of the regulations that
control the activities of the media. When members of the hay'ah find
something being published or broadcast which they consider contrary to
the teachings of the shafi cah, they inform officials of the hay'ah
who, in turn, notify the Ministry of Information that they consider
that a munkar has been committed (see al-Hawshani 1984:120).
Beside the domestic media, there is an influx of material from
outside the country which, therefore, needs much more careful scrutiny
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than the domestic media in the matter of censorship. Newspapers,
magazines, books, video and audio tapes come from different countries
and in different languages. The Ministry of Information has offices in
all major airports and seaports to review these materials before they
enter the country. Officials make sure that items and pictures that
contradict the teachings of the shari cah or the policy of the state
are either removed or not given clearance. This task is a difficult
one because of the large number of items that arrive in the country
every day. This difficulty usually results in some items escaping the
detection of these committees and thus entering the country.	 The
hay'ah is usually the agency which tries to deal with the problem.
Members of the hay'ah inspect places that sell or rent these imported
items, and if they find anything which they consider a munkar, they
usually inform the Ministry of Information about it, and ask that the
item be removed or destroyed. 11
The obvious violations are dealt with quickly by both sides, but
the main problem is that the hay'ah and the Ministry of Information do
not always agree on what constitutes a munkar. The hay'ah tends to be
much more strict in its definition, and that is why its members
frequently find something to complain about. The Ministry of
Information, on the other hand, tries to accommodate to the demands of
a section of the population and to certain foreigners living in the
country who want some kind of entertainment. There are no theatres or
movie houses in the country, and video tapes have become a popular
medium of entertainment. The hay'ah recognizes the fact that the
media, especially the imported ones, are a dangerous way of bringing
into the country things that the sharI cah does not approve of. It
seems, however, to trust the job done by the committees of the
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Ministry of Information. The task of the hay'ah is also to deal with
items that have been smuggled into the country or which have been made
illegally inside the Kingdom.12
Another aspect of the relationship between the hay'ah and the
media concerns the way in which the Saudi press report the activities
of the hay'ah. Officials of the hay'ah have complained a number of
times about what they regard as a lack of reporting of their
activities by the press. 13 A full survey of newspapers and magazines
to find out the extent of this problem could not be carried out within
the limitations on the present study, but a limited survey of one
major newspaper, al-Riyi4, carried out by the writer over a two-year
period, gave the impression that the hay'ah had received fair coverage
in the pages devoted to domestic affairs. In 1987 and 1988 there were
four interviews with officials of the 11211212, four news items, and
four articles about the hay'ah itself. 14 This amount of coverage seems
to be roughly in line with that which most other government
institutions receive. Al-Yamimah magazine also published three
articles about the activities of the hay'ah which were based on
interviews with top officials of the organization.15
D. The Hay'ah and the Public 
The nature of the activities carried out by the hay'ah brings it into
contact with most segments of Saudi society. In this section, the
writer will discuss the relationship between the hay'ah and the Saudi
public. The emphasis will be mainly on how Saudi citizens view the
hay'ah. The evidence is based on a small survey conducted by the
writer using a sample of fifty one persons interviewed in the city of
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Riyadh. After that, a brief discussion will deal with the way the
hay'ah is viewed by specific groups chosen either because they
experience closer contact with members of the hay'ah or because they
create special problems for it. Offenders caught by the hay'ah,
shopkeepers, and women are the three groups that will be considered.
After issuing the current statute in 1980, officials of the
hay'ah began a serious struggle to improve the image of the
organization in public. This was necessary after years of a strained
relationship between the hay'ah and some segments of society resulting
from the actions of some unqualified members of the hay'ah or the
involvement of volunteers, especially at the end of the 1970s (see
al-Shaykh 1981:59). The situation was further complicated by the lack
of clear regulations to guide the activities of members of the hay'ah.
Educating the older members, recruiting younger and more qualified
ones, and preventing volunteers from working with the hay'ah have been
major steps taken over the past few years to improve the performance
of the hay'ah, and thus to improve its public image. The By-Laws
issued in 1986 were another major step in that direction. These
changes appear to be working, and the writer feels that the public
have become more supportive of the hay'ah and its role in society.
This conclusion was drawn mainly from the answers of the respondents
involved in the survey that will be discussed later in this section.
It is further supported by the experiences of those members of the
hay'ah who talked to the writer.
A number of officials of the hay'aida have publicaly expressed the
feeling that the public is becoming more understanding and supportive
of the role of the hay'ah. 16 It is believed, by those officials, that
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the public has begun to recognize the importance of the role played by
the hay'ah in limiting what are seen as the negative effects of the
rapid social change that the country is experiencing. These views are
also supported by the increasing number of citizens who report moral
violations to the hay'ah. These reports are becoming one of the major
methods for helping the hay'ah to keep in touch with what is going on
in society. The writer has seen and met with a number of citizens who
came to the local centres of the hay'ah to report immoral activities
or violations. Others also use the telephone to inform the hay'ah of
what they regard as reprehensible acts or behaviour. The calls are
treated confidentially,
discovery, for example
drinks, the activities
sells intoxicant drinks
and this type of information has led to the
, of a small factory for making intoxicant
of male prostitutes, and a small store that
in shampoo bottles among other things. 17
Another major problem concerning the image of the hay'ah is that
it has been associated only with the enforcement of prayer attendance,
and the closing down of businesses at prayer time. Officials of the
hay'ah, in a number of published interviews, have complained about
this by saying that the hay'ah is dealing with many other problems in
society but that the public does not seem to know about those aspects
of its work. Some of them put the blame for this on the national press
for not reporting the important contributions of the hay'ah in areas
other than religious observances. Others feel that the hay'ah is being
associated with the enforcement of prayer attendance because it is the
only activity that members of the hay l ah are actually seen to be doing
a number of times every day.
The General President of the hay'ah said in an interview that
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the enforcement of religious observances is a very important task and
one of the prime responsibilities of the hay'ah, but, he added, it is
not the only task for which the hay'ah is responsible. 18
 The General
Supervisor of the Riyadh Branch said in another interivew that the
hay'ah works with law-enforcement agencies to fight crimes and the
growing problem of illegal drugs. 19
 The emphasis placed on this point
was meant to show that the hay'ah is involved in tackling important
and serious issues in society. The officials do not want the hay'ah to
be perceived as an organization that does not contribute much to
society. Being viewed as an institution that only calls on people to
attend prayers, something which is done mainly by the mil'adhdhiniin who
broadcast the call to prayers from mosques, might undermine the
credibility of the hay'ah in the eyes of the Saudi public.
The limited survey carried out by the writer during field-work
seems to confirm the view that the hay'ah is identified mostly with
its regular activity of enforcing prayer attendance and the closure of
shops and businesses. The survey was done using the interview method
with a sample of fifty one Saudi citizens from the city of Riyadh
during the period between January-June 1988. This sample is very small
and cannot be regarded as a truly representative sample. The aim was
to get a general sense of how the hay'ah is viewed by some Saudi
citizens, and to find out whether or not there was a problem regarding
its public image. Each respondent was asked four basic questions: what
he knew about the hay'ah, whether he had been in a situation involving
direct contact with members of the hay'ah, what he thought about the
importance of the role played by the hay'ah in society, and what
criticisms or suggestions he had for the hay'ah.
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The respondents were all males ranging in age between twenty two
and fifty three years. They were interviewed by the writer who
randomly picked individuals working in three government institutions,
two companies, two police stations, and students from two colleges in
King Saud University. All of these organizations were also picked
randomly. Twenty five of the respondents were government employees,
ten were policemen, five were private sector employees, and twelve
were university students.
The results of the survey can be summarized in the following
points:
1. Only seventeen of the respondents have what can be called an
accurate image of what the hay'ah is actually doing in society.
The majority (twenty eight) associated it only with enforcement of
prayer attendance, which confirms the view held by officials of
the hay'ah. Four of the remaining six respondents held a negative
image of the hay'ah, and two declined to answer this question.
2. As for being involved in direct contact with members of the
hay'ah, eighteen respondents said that they had been through such
an experience. Three said that they were asked to go to prayer;
four said that members of the hay'ah had arrested them for having
long hair which was cut by a barber in the presence of one of the
members; 20
 one said that he was arrested and accused of harassing
women; and the other ten gave different minor reasons that brought
them in contact with the hay'ah. Seven respondents said that they
had been involved in situations where the hay'ah was dealing with
a friend or a relative. The remainder (twenty six) said they had
never been in direct contact with members of the hay'ah.
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3. In response to the third question about the importance of the role
played by the hay'ah in society, seventeen thought that it was
very important; twenty eight said that the role was important, but
that it was not performed properly and that a few things needed to
be either changed or improved; four said that it was not important
at all, and two gave no response.
4. The criticism and suggestions question elicited a variety of
responses from the respondents. Only three said that they had
nothing to say in this respect. The majority (twenty four) thought
that the hay'ah must improve the education of its members and
recruit qualified members who are able to do the job. Twelve said
that the hay'ah should adopt wise methods to make people respond
positively to it rather than using force and threats. Another
twenty two respondents said that the hay'ah needs to use modern
methods and increase its activities to meet the increasing
problems in society in a more efficient way. Six thought that the
hay'ah should treat non-Muslims in a special way. Ten said that it
should use the media in doing part of its job. Two said that it
should employ women to deal with places that are only for women,
and with women-related problems. And four said that it would be
better if the hay'ah established small centres in all shopping
areas and public places so that they could be present when needed.
Some respondents gave more than one answer to this last question.
This survey was extremely limited in several respects, but the
results indicate that the hay'ah is correct to think that it needs to
improve its image and to let the public know that it plays a major
role in society that goes beyond just the enforcement of prayer
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observance. More detailed and scientific surveys are needed to
generate conclusions that can be generalized.
We turn now to the specific question of how the hay'ah is viewed
by shopkeepers in the city of Riyadh. This group was selected because
they came in daily contact with members of the hay'ah by virtue of
their job. The writer held interviews with sixteen shopkeepers in
different shopping centres in Riyadh during the first half of 1988.
The number was small because most of those approached declined to take
part in the survey. Some of those who declined were busy at the time,
and others simply said that they had nothing to say about the hay'ah.
The majority of shopkeepers in Saudi Arabia are foreign nationals, and
one can understand why they were reluctant to express their views
about the hay'ah. Even those who responded seemed to be very cautious
about what they had to say. These factors, in addition to the small
size of the sample, limit the value of this survey. It only provides
some illustrations of the relationship between the hay'ah and the
shopkeepers as the latter group appears to see it.
Only three of the respondents were Saudi nationals, the others
came from a number of foreign countries. The questions were designed
to find out the number of times that shopkeepers see members of the
hay'ah doing their official duties every week; how important was the
role played by the hay'ah; whether they would close down at prayer
times if it were not for the presence of the hay'ah; and whether or
not their closure affects their business. The answers can be summed up
as follows: all sixteen said that the role played by the hay'ah is
important and necessary and that it should continue; eight said that
they see members of the hay'ah every day; five said that they see them
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about two or three times a week, and three said that they see them
only about once a week. The majority (fifteen) said that they would
close down their businesses even if members of the hay'ah were not
present, and that this practice is a regular part of their daily
routine which had no effect on business because customers know that
they have to leave shops when the adhan for prayer is called.
Only one shopkeeper said that his business is adversely affected
when he closes down for prayer because customers, 	 especially
non-Muslims, leave and usually do not come back after prayer. He also
said that he would not close if it were not for the hay'ah. This
survey is also very small .
 and unrepresentative. No doubt most
respondents, especially the non-Saudis, were diplomatic in their
answers because they suspected that the writer was working for the
pay l ah despite assurances to the contrary. But the findings about the
visibility of the bay'ah's public activities are at least consistent
with the account given in the previous chapter of the organization's
modus operandi.
The third group interviewed by the writer consisted of a number
of Saudis detained by al-Suwaydi centre during the one month period he
worked at that centre. They were interviewed individually in one of
the offices in the centre. The aim of these interviews was to find out
how offenders felt about the hay'ah, about the way they had been
treated, and how they had been caught and for what reason. The
interviews were conducted with seven offenders ranging in age between
twenty three and forty five. Five of them were caught either drinking,
making or selling illegal drinks. The other two were involved with the
use of narcotics. Six were caught at home when members of the hay'ah
came to them after apparently being alerted by an informant. One of
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them was caught in his car after being chased by members of the hay'ah 
in their official car. Four complained about what they called harsh
treatment and the use of unnecessary force during the arrest, and
three said that they had been treated reasonably because they did not
resist arrest.
Two respondents complained about not knowing that they had been
arrested by members of the hay'ah because of their civilian clothes,
and said that even the policemen accompanying them had been wearing
civilian clothes. The wearing of plain clothes is done, apparently, so
as not to attract attention when trying to arrest someone. Three
offenders said that members of the hay'ah were not trained or
qualified to deal with these types of crimes, and that it should be
left to law-enforcement agencies (the police and narcotics control).
They said that the hay'ah should be involved with educating the public
about the harmful effects of alcohol and narcotics, and should lecture
and counsel those who are caught by the law-enforcement agencies, but
should not be involved in the enforcement itself.
The last group that warrants special attention in this section
is women. No surveys were conducted because of the difficulties that
would be involved in a male researcher carrying out such a task. A
certain amount of information, however, was gained by the writer when
he was working with members of the hay'ah. The main problem is that
the hay'ah has no female members to deal with female offenders.
Members of the hay'ah find it difficult to arrest women offenders or
suspects because of the religious restrictions on the contact between
unrelated males and females. They are also not allowed to interrogate
women without the presence of a male relative, or to keep them in
custody at the centre (see al-tlawshanT 1984:97). The By-Laws maintain
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that women over thirty years old should be transferred to one of the
women's prisons. Younger women go to one of the special institutions
called the Institutions for Girls' Welfare as soon as they are
arrested (see the By-Laws - Appendix G).
Another problem for the hay'ah is enforcing public morality in
places set aside for women only. There are an increasing number of
shopping centres, banks, clinics and businesses that are run by women
and only for women. This is a trend that seems to meet the special
requirements of women, and to give them freedom to work and do
business in a society that stresses the complete segregation between
the sexes. The trend has the apparent support of the government and
the religious establishment, but it is going to bring to the surface
the problems of enforcing law and morality in those places. Neither
the police nor the hay'ah employ women today even for these special
tasks. This will become more necessary in the future, but it is not
going to be easy as long as the requirement of segregation has to be
met.
E. The Hay'ah and Foreigners 
The economic development of Saudi Arabia, which was accelerated in
1970 with the implementation of the first 'five years development
plan', has brought with it a new factor that seems to have caused
problems for both the Saudi government and Saudi society. This factor
is the large number of foreigners who were invited to the country to
help in the development plans as experts and as labourers.
The exact number of foreigners living in Saudi Arabia is not
published by the government on a regular basis. There are, however, a
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number of contradictory estimates ranging from 2,450,000 given by
Sirageldin et. al. (1984:32) to five million given by Souryal
(1987:434). Huyette (1985:34) estimates that they total "roughly 3
million in 1983". The precise number of foreigners living in Saudi
Arabia is not important in the context of this study. It is also not
easy to determine because of the high mobility of the labour force,
with numbers changing all the time. The number of expatriates,
however, is large enough to require special attention by the
government and to cause unique problems.
The Saudi government has considered the presence of foreigners
in huge numbers as "a necessary evil so as to fulfil their planned
objectives". It had tried with some success to keep them "relatively
restricted and isolated and have little contact with the Saudi
community or other expatriates" (Huyette 1985:34-35). This was easier
when expatriates came under specific contracts with large companies to
do a certain job and then leave the country. The situation was
complicated when they entered all spheres of life — household
servants, chauffeurs, shopkeepers, taxi drivers, construction workers,
and even farmers are some of the positions that foreigners
increasingly occupy. They entered almost every home, every shop, and
every business. Their presence in public, and their impact upon it,
eventually went beyond the control of the government and its relevant
institutions. "Expatriates", wrote Sirageldin et. al. (1984:22), "make
up a large and increasing portion of the employed workforce: from
about 27% in 1970, they have expanded to about 53% in 1980." The
percentage today is not known, by the writer, but the general opinion
is that the numbers have decreased somewhat due to the end of major
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projects and the slow-down in economic growth caused by the declining
oil prices of the mid-1980s.
Foreigners living in Saudi Arabia constitute a problematic
factor not only because of their large numbers, but mainly because of
their cultural and religious differences. The country had previously
been virtually closed to the outside world, except for the pilgrims
who came for a limited time to visit the holy cities of Makkah and
al-Madinah and to perform the hajj. It had never experienced any
colonization by an alien culture, and it had managed to maintain the
relative homogeneousness of its population. The discussion in this
section will not go deeply into the economic, political or social
implications of the presence of foreigners in Saudi Arabia. These are
complicated issues, and the limitations of this study do not permit
such an excursus. The discussion, therefore, will be limited to the
way in which the hay'ah deals with foreigners living in Saudi Arabia.
It will be divided into three small sections dealing respectively with
foreigners in general, non-Muslims, and diplomats.
The main task of the hay'ah appears to be to maintain the
influence of religion on the public scene in Saudi Arabia. In this
regard, all people living in the country are subject to the same rules
and restrictions whether they be citizens or expatriates. Everyone is
required to adhere to the basic rules which stipulate that no public
activity is to take place during prayer time, no one is to eat, drink
or smoke in public during Raman, modest dress must be worn in
public, and that intoxicant drinks and narcotics must not be used,
made or traded. There are also other restrictions which will not be
listed here for lack of space. The main point is that Saudis as well
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as foreigners, regardless of their religious affiliation, are all
subjected in the same way to these restrictions. The only difference
is in the punishment that offenders from both groups receive.
Foreigners always risk being deported by the authorities when
convicted of a crime or a moral violation. 21
Imposing these restrictions i s not only the task of the hay'ah,
but is also the declared policy of the state. The Ministry of the
Interior issues regular reminders to expatriates, through companies,
businesses and foreign missions, which stress that everyone is
required to abide by the rules and regulations that govern personal
behaviour and public morality in Saudi Arabia. 22 The restrictions
applied to women, however, seem to create problems for both female
expatriates and the enforcement agencies. Women are not allowed to
drive automobiles, or to ride taxis without being accompanied by a
male relative. Huyette (1985:35) wrote that expatriate women "resent
their immobility, aggravated by the restrictions on their activities
and dress dictated by local customs."
The experience of the writer, during field—work, was that
foreign women constituted one of the major problem areas faced by
members of the hay'ah in carrying out their job in public places. All
women are required to cover their hair in public, but some foreign
women find it difficult to meet such a requirement, and they try to
show their discontent when they have the opportunity. The writer
accompanied members of the hay'ah on their regular activity in
shopping centres in the city of Riyadh. Asking foreign women to cover
their hair was one of the most frequent activities during that
activity. This was done in a polite way and from a distance, but some
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women acted as if they had heard nothing. If the woman is accompanied
by a man, he is usually stopped and told that it is not allowed for
the woman accompanying him to go in public without proper dress. The
enforcement, however, is limited to warning and advice, and no woman
was arrested for that alone. It is considered a common problem, and
one that cannot be enforced easily.
Another problem arises from the large number of single foreign
women who go to work in Saudi Arabia as nurses for hospitals and as
stewardesses for the national airline. They live as groups in hotels
or hospital compounds, and the activities of some of them are
considered both immoral and illegal. What they do is usually to go out
to restaurants or shopping centres with male friends who are not
related to them either by marriage or blood. It is forbidden,
according to the sharI cah, for a woman to be alone in the company of a
man who is neither her husband nor a relative. The problem with
enforcing this restriction is that no one can tell whether the couple
who are sitting in a restaurant or walking in the street are related
or not. It is not logical to stop every couple and ask for
identifications, and so only a few are caught committing such a
violation. A number of foreign women have been expelled from the
country for being caught in the company of unrelated males. 23
The enforcement of modest dress in public applies to men as
well. A man is not allowed to go out in public wearing shorts. The
area between the navel and the knee is considered caUrah24 in a man,
according to the shari cah, and must be covered. A number of foreigners
have been stopped while jogging in the streets of Riyadh because they
were wearing shorts, and they were told either to wear long shorts or
major
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to jog in a place where they cannot be seen by the general public.
Another problem is the wearing of tight clothes or clothes that
attract attention, long hair for men - which is considered munkar, or
wearing gold chains or earrings especially ones that display religious
objects like the cross or the Star of David (Article 9-C of the
current By-Laws - Appendix G).
Religion is a
foreigners. This group
hay'ah in particular.
subjected to restrictions
that a way should be found
own particular religion.
factor in dealing with non-Muslim
another set of unique problems for the
felt that non-Muslims should not be
that apply to religious observances, and
to accommodate their need to practise their
This dual responsibility has created a
dilemma for officials of the Saudi government. They do • not wish to
appear intolerant of other religions but, at the same time, they
cannot allow uncontrolled freedom of religion in public life in a
country that draws its strength from the belief that Islam is the only
true religion. No easy answers have been found for this problem, and
the government has had no choice but to apply what are thought to be
necessary restrictions.
Non-Muslims are not entirely exempted from the enforcement of
religious observances in public. Of course, they are not required to
attend prayers or to fast during Raman, but they cannot do business
during prayer times or eat or drink in public during the daytime in
Ramadin. They must also dress modestly in public, and adhere to the
restrictions applied to intoxicant drinks, illegal drugs, pork meat
and things that are enjoined on Saudi citizens and other foreigners as
well.
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The other major restriction that applies only to non-Muslims has
to do with the practice of their own religious beliefs in public. The
official policy of the government is that this is not allowed in any
way or form. Religious groups cannot build a public place of worship
or hold any organized religious meetings in public. It is the task of
the hay l ah to enforce that policy, and they see it as a necessary
measure for the protection of the unique place of Islam in society.
This could also explain the absence of any new or different religious
movement in the country.
The celebration of any religious festival or occasion other than
Islamic ones is also prohibited. Christmas is one such occasion that
falls under this prohibition. 25 The hay'ah undertakes special
activities during the Christmas season to make sure that it is not
celebrated in public. Hotels, restaurants, hospitals, and company
compounds are the prime places that are inspected for any violations.
The restrictions apply only to any public manifestations of such
celebrations. Individuals and families may, however, celebrate in the
privacy of their own homes. The prohibition against celebrating
religious occasions also applies to some celebrations by Muslim groups
which the religious leaders consider contrary to the teachings of
Islam. Celebrating the birthday of the Prophet Mu4ammad (al-mawlid),
which is officially considered a bad innovation (bid cah), and the day
of ci7shuri' 26 are examples of festivals that are forbidden in Saudi
Arabia.
Diplomats are the last group to be discussed in this section.
This group is made up of all foreigners who have diplomatic immunity
by virtue of their profession. The hay'ah, as well as the law-
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enforcement agencies, have been given special instructions as to how
to deal with members of the diplomatic corps. These instructions were
issued in 1984 by the governor of Riyadh. 27 It was done in
anticipation of the removal of foreign embassies from Jeddah to Riyadh
which took place in 1985. The instructions mentioned the Vienna
agreement on diplomatic immunities and privileges that was concluded
in 1961, and ratified by the government in 1980. 28
The authorities of enforcement agencies have been limited when
dealing with diplomats. Diplomats are not to be arrested, searched or
detained for any reason. If an individual with diplomatic immunity is
suspected of committing a major crime or a serious moral violation,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must be contacted for instructions
concerning the proper measures to be taken. These restrictions have
created problems for members of the hay'ah, because they could not
easily identify people with diplomatic immunity when carrying out
their official duties. Diplomats, however, are instructed to show
their diplomatic identity cards to members of the hay'ah when
approached for any reason. The problem was eased by the fact that all
diplomatic missions have been located in a new neighbourhood built
especially for this purpose. This may limit their interaction with the
public, and could make the task of the bay'ah a little easier.
Conclusion
The evidence presented in this chapter clarifies how the hay'ah 
functions in relation to other institutions in Saudi Arabia. It has
managed to establish itself within the network of official
organizations that deal with law and order, and has demonstrated the
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ability to adapt itself to changing circumstances.
The hay'ah seems to be still suffering from a negative public
image after years of trying to survive the transformation that took
place in the country in the second half of the 1970s. It found itself
dealing with novel kinds of problems brought about by urbanization and
the large numbers of foreigners in the country. Adjustments were made,
and it seems that the hay'ah is slowly meeting the challenge helped by
other government institutions and policies adopted by the state.
The problems associated with enforcing religious restrictions in
a society that is becoming increasingly more open to external
influences are becoming more acute. Dealing with the large number of
Muslims from other countries now residents in Saudi Arabia whose
customs might be quite different from those of the Saudis, as well as
with the non—Muslims presents a particular dilemma for the government
and its agencies. The problem of how to balance the emergence of Saudi
Arabia as a modern country with the maintenance, at the same time, of
a strict code of public behaviour based on Islam is becoming one of
the main issues in the country. The role played by the hay'ah today is
at the centre of this dilemma. The future of such a role will be
influenced, to a large extent, by the policies adopted by the
government with regard to the ongoing search for reasonable ways to
make traditional requirements compatible with "a modern way of life".
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Chapter Nine 
Modernization and the Hay6
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the data given in the previous
three chapters in an attempt to understand the effects of
modernization on the hay'ah. A careful look at the changes through
which the structure and activities of the hay'ah have gone over the
past six decades might enable us to draw some useful conclusions
regarding the influences that political modernization	 and
socio-economic developments have had on a religious organization. The
•
attempt to understand those influences will also contribute to the
more general task of trying to test the hypothesis at the centre of
this study. Furthermore, it can help us in our attempt to ascertain
the effects of modernization on the place of religion in Saudi
society. Any major changes found in that role can be regarded as signs
either of a trend toward secularization, or, on the other hand, of a
trend towards a greater influence of religion in society.
The discussion in this chapter will be limited, empirically, to
the case study of the hay'ah. It presents the analytical part and the
conclusion of the case study. Before going into detailed analysis,
however, it would be helpful to point out the dual nature of the
process of modernization as it relates to the hay'ah. Firstly, there
is the general modernization of the whole structure of government
which has resulted in what is called "institutional differentiation"
(see Chapter Two). And secondly, there is the modernization of the
hay'ah itself which seems to have been planned and gradual. The latter
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use of the term refers to the changes that have taken place in
administrative structures, methods of operations and types of
activities over the past thirteen years (starting in 1976 when the
bay'ah become a general presidency).
Most of the changes that have affected the hay'ah seem to be the
outcome of a number of political, social, and economic factors.
Decisions made by the government, institutional differentiation,
social and economic changes (e.g. 	 urbanization and influx of
foreigners), and the general politico-religious environment have all
contributed to changes in the hay'ah. 	 Changes in structure,
activities, and methods of operations have, therefore, been both the
result of planning and the outcome of external factors. It is
difficult to distinguish between "Planned" changes and "forced"
changes. Both will be treated as part of a single process.
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section
deals with the implications of modernization for the structure,
activities, and regulations of the hay'ah. The second section contains
a brief look at the effects of bureaucracy on the ability of the
hay'ah to play its role. The important question of the implications of
institutional differentiation for the influence and role of the hay'ah 
is dealt with in the third section. The last section is about the
general problems that the hay'ah faces today, and the prospects for
its future. The discussions are based on the information presented in
chapters six, seven, and eight. Observations made by the writer during
field-work are the main source of most of that information.
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A. Implications of Modernization for the Hay'ah 
Implications for Structure
As we stated in Chapter Seven, the structure of the hay'ah has gone
through continuous growth in the past few decades. It has gone from a
local centre in Riyadh in 1903, to a national organization with seven
regional branches and 409 local centres all over the Kingdom. This
growth reflects the growing size and complexity of the structure of
the government itself, and has been influenced by it. The fact that
the hay'ah was divided into two separate organizations before 1976,
and that it was mainly a field agency entailed a slower growth
compared to other government organizations. The establishment of a
national organization in 1976 began the process of organized growth
which is to be seen today (see Chapter Seven).
A problematic aspect of the structural growth has been the
necessity of delegating about 12% of the most qualified members to
administrative positions. Leaders no longer take part in
field-activity because they are too busy with administrative tasks.
This situation has resulted in a kind of division of labour within the
hay'ah. There are today administrative positions, religious positions,
and positions outside the cadre (see Table 4). It is interesting that
part of the jobs, within the structure of the hay'ah, are officially
referred to as religious positions (waWif dlniyyah) in an
organization that is religious in nature. It is not possible to
determine whether or not this distinction implies a form of internal
secularization. There is a need for a comparative approach to study
the differences in qualifications, tasks, and ways of thinking between
those who hold religious positions and those who hold administrative
positions.
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The structural growth of the hay'ah was, in part, the result of
the growth of areas of responsibility that came under its
jurisdiction. The expansion into parts of the Kingdom that had
previously had no hay'ah centres resulted in a huge increase in the
number of local centres. The size of the country made it necessary for
the hay'ah to open regional branches in the major regions of Saudi
Arabia (see Figure 5). The result appears to be an improved network of
administrative apparatus on the national, regional, and local levels.
The important question here is: what are the effects of this growth on
the ability of the hay'ah to play its role in society?
A simple answer to the above question would be that an increase
in local centres means more influence. But is this the case? If we
take the number of acdi' (members) who actually do field work (2977)
and divide it by the number of local centres (409), we will find that
the average number of members for each centre is about seven.
Considering the fact that some local centres have more than twenty
members (eg. al-Suwaydr centre in Riyadh), A is possible that many
local centres do not have enough members to carry out their tasks. The
expansion in the number of local centres was not accompanied by a
corresponding increase in the number of employees. Structural growth
has limited the number of members working in the field, and has placed
those members in too many local centres. '
Further implications for the structure of the hay'ah can be seen
in the establishment of a clear chain of command on the national level
(see Figure 8). The creation of two new directorates for education and
guidance and for cases and investigation in 1981 is an indication of
the hay'ah's intention to modernize its methods of operation. Those
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departments remain understaffed, however, and unable to function
properly because of the lack of qualified staff (al-klawsh'inT 1984:
163).
The modernization of the hay'ah does have its positive points.
Giving the hay'ah an independent status within the structure of
government has been a major step towards more freedom to play its role
in society. The new nizNm (statute) and its by-laws have clarified
many areas of confusion, and have given officials of the hay'ah a much
needed point of departure in planning further structural growth. The
centralization of authority, and the systematization of methods of
operation based on clear rules and regulations can all lead to a more
effective performance and a more rational approach to carrying out
tasks. The full implications of modernization for the structure of the
hay'ah are not all clear yet because the process is far from over.
Changes are still taking place, and attempts to predict the future can
only lead to further confusion.
There is talk of further expansion and of a special cadre to
improve the performance of the hay'ah. 2 Training of members, and the
implementations of the new by-laws may help the hay'ah improve its
image and become more effective. The problems associated with the
large number of old members may not be solved so easily. There is
obviously an urgent need for qualified staff to run the bureaucratic
machine of the organization. There is also a perceived need to come up
with ways of dealing with women, non-Muslims living in the country,
and diplomats. The structural growth of the hay'ah has been limited
when compared to the growing areas of public life that demand
attention from it.
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Implications for Activity
As for its activities, the hay'ah has experienced periods of change
and confusion. It went for years without detailed regulations
identifying the exact responsibilities of the members and how to carry
them out. This fact made it easier for the hay'ah to deal with too
many activities, and to give up few without serious implications. The
changes in the nature of activities were the result of political
modernization, socio-economic developments, and changes in the
definitions of some munkars (reprehensible acts) by officials of the
hay'ah.
The General President of the hay'ah has acknowledged that the
modern way of life has imposed things on Saudi society which are not
part of its way of life and which "we used to consider munkars and to
punish fifty years ago" Gil al-Shaykh 1981:31). He did not specify the
kind of things he meant, but there are a number of acts that the
hay'ah has been forced to tolerate. As the country became more open to
outside influences, and as members of the hay'ah were no longer free
to define their responsibilities, some changes took place in the
definition of munkars. Smoking or selling cigarettes, shaving the
beard, listening to music, and photography were all regarded as
munkars about thirty five years ago (especially in Najd) (Edens
1974:62). People used to be arrested and punished for engaging in one
of those activities. Today, however, those munkars are no longer
considered punishable violations, and the new By-Laws do not include
them in its list of reprehensible acts for which the hay'ah is
responsible. The ironic thing is that most culami' still regard
smoking, music, photography, and beard shaving as reprehensible acts
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forbidden by the sharI cah. The emphasis is now, however, on advising
people not to commit these acts, rather than on forcing people to
avoid them.
It is not clear why and how the hay'ah today tolerates munkars 
which are still regarded as objectionable by most of the culami: Can
it be attributed to the realities of modern life, the position of
officials of the hay'ah, or to the inability of the hay'ah to enforce
the rules against those acts? It is not easy to come up with an answer
mainly because the changes have taken place over a long period of
time. The official position of the government allowing the import of
tobacco, and permitting the playing of music on radio and television
may account for part of the answer. The important questions to ask
here are: can that change be seen as a loss of influence on the part
of the religious establishment, and as a sign of a trend toward
secularization? How far is the hay'ah willing to tolerate the new
realities brought about by the continuing process of modernization?
And does the hay'ah in fact have any choice in the matter?
The current nizam of the hay'ah defines its duties in general
terms. It states in Article Nine that one of the most important duties
of the hay'ah is to "censure abomination in a way that prevents
commission of things which are unlawful and prohibited by Islamic Law"
(see Appendix F). The problem may, therefore, lie in the definition of
things which are unlawful by Islamic law. The ability of the hay'ah to
enforce official regulations is limited by a lack of clear definitions
of all the things which are prohibited by Islamic law. Smoking tobacco
and listening to music are among the things against which prohibition
is not entirely clear. Photography, on the other hand, is a necessity
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of modern life without which no country can modernize. The position of
the General President of the hay'ah in regard to photography
demonstrates the lack of clear consensus (ijma c ) among the  culamil
about the position of the shall: cal in regard to certain acts that are
part of modern life. 3
In attempting to find answers to the questions raised above, we
must take into account social and political factors. An important
factor may have been the isolation in which central Arabia lived for
centuries (see Chapter Three). Most things that came from the outside
world, and were regarded as harmful in one way or another, were
objected to on religious grounds even though religion had little to do
with the matter. 4 An example is the %lama's objection to the
introduction of wireless communication into the Kingdom; The famous
stand taken by King cAbd al-cAziz against the culama' demonstrated
that fear of the unknown rather than religious justifications has been
the reason behind the cautious approach of most of the culaml'to the
realities of modern life. 5
The compromises made by the culami'have been necessary in making
modernization possible. These compromises have been limited to areas
dealing with the technological aspects of social change. Religious
beliefs and practices have not been part of the compromises, and they
remain today in line with what are regarded as the "true" teachings of
Islam. Implications for religious influence have also been limited
because most of the things to which the %lade objected sixty years
ago are used today to augment religious influence in society. 6
Modernization has also brought about new realities that further
expanded the activities of the hay'ah. The growth in the size of
308
cities, social mobility, and the large number of foreigners living in
the country have all contributed to changes in the way of life.
Socio-economic developments have meant that an increasing number of
places can be defined as public. Shopping centres, 	 hotels,
restaurants, company premises, public parks, banks, video-shops, and
many other locations are all the outcome of the modernization process.
The hay'ah became responsible for the enforcement of religious
observances and public morality in these and other public places. It
found itself dealing with new realities which, therefore, required new
methods and new approaches.
The enforcement of segregation between the sexes in parks,
hotels and restaurants is a daunting task especially when a large
percentage of those who frequent these places are foreigners. Forcing
shops to close for prayer in a shopping centre that has tens of shops
is another problematic task. These are only examples to show that the
hay'ah's capacity to carry out its activities is coming under greater
strain as the country becomes more modern. The hay'ah has tried, with
a degree of success, to adapt to the changing realities, but the
situation is becoming more difficult. 7 Without more support from the
government (stricter rules, more qualified staff, and better
equipment), and without more co-operation from other government
organizations, the hay'ah might end up fighting a losing battle.
Implications for Regulations
One of the major problems that affected the hay'ah for a long time was
the lack of clear and detailed regulations. The old regulations only
gave general definitions of the hay'ah and its responsibilities (see
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Table 3). The growth in the structure and activities of the hay'ah was
mainly a response to the initiatives of its leaders. The definition of
munkars, and the enforcement of regulations against them were governed
by precedent and by haphazard procedures rather than by rational
calculations. This problem was not unique to the hay'ah, but was part
of the whole business of government. The eventual transition from rule
by personalities to rule through bureaucratic structures resulted in a
period of confusion. This confusion has still not been completely
resolved in modern Saudi Arabia, and the mixture of traditional and
rational types of authority will persist for years to come.
The new nizam, issued in 1980, and its by-laws, issued in 1986,
have been major steps in the direction of a more modern hay'ah. The
clear and specific instructions dealing with the responsibilities of
the hay'ah and with the ways to carry them out demonstrate the
positive implications of modernization for the hay'ah's regulations. A
degree of rationality has been brought about with the new ni;am, and
this will probably limit the chances for conflicts and confusion. It
is not fully clear, however, how the hay'ah will benefit from the new
regulations because the by-laws were only issued three years ago. More
time is needed before we can judge the ability of the hay'ah to adapt
to the new regulations.
B. The Hay'ah and Bureaucracy
One of the clearest influences of modernization on the hay'ah can be
seen in the growth of its bureaucratic machine. The hay'ah has
developed over the years from a local centre with all its members
working in the field to a national organization with the divisions and
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levels of authority associated with most modern organizations (see
Chapter Seven).
The bureaucratic growth of the hay'ah developed in line with the
bureaucratic growth of the whole government. The Saudi bureaucracy
went through the normal stages of establishment, growth, 	 and
modernization (see al-Sadhan 1980). Like all new structures in an
environment that was not ready for it, however, the Saudi bureaucracy
"suffered from the concentration of power at the top and incompetence
at the lower levels" (Huyette 1985:105). The situation is improving
slowly, but the Saudi state bureaucracy today still suffers from most
of the problems associated with the transformation of a traditional
bureaucracy into a rational one. 8
The adoption of bureaucratic forms of government by the Saudi
leadership was the outcome of "the need for centralized administration
serving large populations" (Wrong 1970:33). When the hay'ah became a
national organization in 1976 it had to organize in line with other
government institutions. The growth in the number of members and local
centres made it necessary for some of the hay'ah's employees to deal
with purely administrative tasks. The interaction with other
government organizations, and the need to keep records of its
activities further expanded its administrative apparatus.
The hay'ah today is a bureaucratic organization in the sense
that it is organized along the lines of what Weber called
"bureaucratic officialdom" which is characterized by fixed official
jurisdictional areas, levels of graded authority, written documents,
and general rules (Gerth and Mills 1958:196). There are still
traditional aspects in the hay'ah's bureaucracy in areas dealing with
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recruitment and promotion. 9 This also reflects a trend that is still
found in most government departments. Strong tribal and family ties
are still to be broken by the growing bureaucracy.
The effects of bureaucratic growth on the structure and
activities of the hay'ah have been mixed.	 It organized and
systematized most activities, but, at the same time, it complicated
some short and simple procedures. Some officials of the hay'ah 
acknowledged the problems created by the growth in bureaucracy which,
in the words of one official, tend to "turn work into a dead and an
ineffective procedure". 10 It is in the nature of bureaucracy to
complicate simple procedures and take longer time to do the jcibss
(Wrong 1970:34).
The hay'ah is mainly a field agency whose main tasks can only be
carried out through field work. The requirement that even minor
activities must be officially documented by members of the hay'ah 
makes their job even more difficult. It is no longer acceptable for
members to deal with even minor cases without some form of paper work.
Official forms have been prepared to be used in keeping records of all
types of activity. Copies of cases and arrests are kept in files, and
similar copies are usually sent to regional branches of the hay'ah and
to offices of governors. These things were not done in a systematic
way prior to 1976, the earliest date at which the writer was able to
get hold of relevant official documents. It is also clear that the
employees responsible for paper work in most local centres lack the
11	 .	 .basic qualifications for this job. This is further complicated by
the existence of a large number of illiterate members who cannot deal
with paper work.
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Bureaucratic procedures have helped the hay'ah function
vis-a-vis other government departments. Communications on different
levels would not have been possible between them without a
bureaucratic structure in place. The negative aspect has been that
minor jobs now take more time and more energy to complete. The old
ways of dealing with people on the spot may have been effective
measures for an enforcement agency, but they no longer work in a
modernizing society. Having to bring people to the centre, interrogate
them, write down everything that took place, and wait for permission
from the amarah (office of the governor) to punish offenders leaves no
room for haphazard judgements. It might also make the work of the
hay'ah slow and ineffective at times when activities are expanding and
novel problems are arising. What all of this means for the influence
of the hay'ah and its ability to continue playing its role is not yet
fully clear. Judging by the observations made by the writer during
field-work, the bureaucratic structure of the hay'ah has limited the
ability of members to carry out their tasks in an effective way. It
has also made it difficult to deal with minor violations simply
because most of the members no longer believe that it is worth the
effort. 12
C. Institutional Differentiation and the Hay'ah 
The process of political modernization and expansion in the structure
of government in the 1950s and 1960s resulted in the establishment of
ministries and independent organizations (see Chapter Four). This was
a normal outcome of the modernization process and a necessary one for
a modernizing state. There was a perceived need to divide the
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responsibilities of the state among independent departments that could
perform different functions in an efficient manner.	 The
differentiation was similar to that found in most modern countries,
but it retained some traditional characterisics at the highest levels
(the monarchy).
The establishment of more ministries continued until 1975 (see
al-Farsy 1986:106). The growth was dictated, to a large extent, by the
requirements of a modernizing society facing more tasks to be taken
care of, and more problems to deal with. It was not the case that more
ministries came to share the same old duties, but rather that more
ministries were created to deal with new duties for which Saudi
society had had no need before the 1930s (e.g. ministries of oil;
industry and electricity; telegraphs, posts and telephones; higher
education; planning; and public works and housing). Running the
affairs of a modern state requires more agencies and better
organization than running the affairs of small towns and semi-nomadic
populations whose main occupations were raising animals, farming, and
commerce. The leader of the town or the tribe used, with the help of
few individuals, to run the affairs of his subjects and to perform
most public duties (Daghistani 1983:27).
The hay s ah, which developed in that kind of environment, had
very little to do at the beginning of this century. The main tasks
were enforcement of religious observances, collection of zakih,
endowments, public morality, and inspection of commerce to prevent
fraud (see Appendix C). These tasks were very similar to the ones
previously carried out by the traditional muhtasib. They were a
function of the local socio-economic environment, and variations
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always occurred from time to time, and from place to place.
As the country became a state with a large territory and a
growing population, the hay'ah was no longer able to fulfil all of its
duties. Institutional differentiation was the appropriate way to meet
the demands of a modernizing society. Duties were divided between a
growing number of institutions, and the hay'ah lost some of its duties
but gained new ones. Collection of zakah became the responsibility of
the Ministry of Finance and National Economy; endowments fell under
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Pilgrimage and Endowments; and the
organization of commercial activities was shared by the Ministries of
Commerce and Municipal and Rural Affairs.
Al-Yassini's (1985:70) argument that the hay'ah lost some of its
duties to the Ministries of Health, Justice and Agriculture is very
weak because the hay'ah was never involved with any of the tasks that
those ministries perform today. If he means by the duties that were
traditionally undertaken by the enforcers, i.e. those duties that the
classical muhtasib used to perform, then that is a different argument.
The modern hay'ah is very different from the traditional hisbah in
many respects. The two share the same ideological bases, but the
modern hay'ih has a very limited jurisdiction when compared to the
hisbah (see al-cArifi 1987:15).
The comparison between the two organizations is fruitless. The
hisbah used to function in a simpler social environment than the one
we live in today. The tasks that the classical muhtasib used to
perform cannot be performed by a single organization at the present
time. Al-Hawshäni (1 984:36) recognized this fact when he argued that
the necessities of modern life require specialization and
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differentiation. He supported his argument with a quote from Ibn
Taymiyyah's famous work Al-Hisbah PT al-Islam who wrote that "there
are no limits [to specialization] in the shari cah" (p.8).
There are few writers (Murshad 1972:208 and al-Wahbi 1983:174,
for example) who argue that the hay'ah should be organized on the
lines of the hisbah to deal with all the tasks that the classical
muhtasib used to deal with. This is an unrealistic demand because it
would mean that the hay'ah would expand to take over the tasks of a
number of ministries. That is not possible in a modernizing society
with an increasingly complex socio-economic environment. The notion
that an institution such as the classical hisbah can be re-established
to meet the demands of a modern society is simplistic and out of date.
The experience of modern countries shows that specialized and
differentiated institutions are the best way to achieve the benefits
of modern life. Differentiation can be functional without entailing
ideological or cultural differentiation (secularization). There is no
reason why the different institutions in Saudi Arabia that perform the
duties of the classical muhtasib should be seen as modern forms of the
traditional hisbah. It does not matter whether it is called hisbah or
ministry of commerce as long as the aim is to regulate commercial
activities in accordance with the sharIcah.
Murshad (1972:219-222), and al-Wahbr (1983:174) both regard the
current institutional differentiation in Saudi Arabia as a form of
separation between religion and state. They see the problem not in the
institutions themselves but in the kind of people who work for them.
They both argue that the muhtasib is better suited to carrying out the
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tasks because he works from religious motivations and performs his
duties for the "sake of God". The modern government employees, on the
other hand, work for the sake of regulations, and their motivations
are connected with salaries and promotions. Murshad (1972:219) also
argues that modern regulations only deal with the material aspects of
regulating human behaviour, while divine regulations (drawn from the
sharr cah) deal with the spiritual side of behaviour, remind people of
their duty to God and warn against punishment in the hereafter.
The notion that the modern employee of government no longer
views his job as a religious obligation but rather as a way of
acquiring income, is in need of empirical support. Receiving salary
from the state and working under specific regulations does not
necessarily lead to the creation of purely secular employees. Members
of the hay'ah today receive salaries and follow regulations, but they
still perform religious tasks sanctioned by the shari cah. Indeed, the
Islamic state is responsible for the implementation and protection of
the shari cah. Paying its employees to do the job and establishing
clear guidelines to direct them can presumably enhance their
performance and achieve better results.
Connected to the above argument is al—Yassini's (1985:70)
argument that because "the process of creating a modern administrative
structure succeeded, the mutawi'a institution [the hay l ah] was no
longer needed ... Ibn Sacud incorporated this institution into the
civil service and stripped it of effective power." If the hay'ah was
no longer needed, then why is it still active today? And does making
the hay'ah part of the civil service mean that it was stripped of
effective power? The evidence presented in this study shows that the
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arguments of al-Yassini have no strong foundations. The growth of the
structure of the hay'ah was part of the process of creating a modern
administrative structure, and its incorporation into the civil service
enabled it to continue functioning vis-1-vis other government
institutions.
The fact that the hay'ah has survived the period of rapid
institutional differentiation and socio-economic developments points
to two important considerations. Firstly, the hay'ah continues to be
needed by the government, because there are things for it to do; and,
secondly, it continues to have power as part of the civil service. The
argument of al-Yassini plus similar arguments by al-Awaji (1971:122)
and Kluck (1984:113) are all based on the notions that religious
institutions cannot function as part of a modern structure of
government (characterized by bureaucratic organization) because of
their traditional nature and ways of doing things. These authors also
believe that religious institutions would function better if they
remained separate from the state.
The above arguments display a bias against religious
institutions and seem to be influenced by the Western notion that
separation between religion and the state is desirable. We have seen
that the nature of the Islamic state does not allow for a complete
separation (see Chapter Three), and we believe that there is nothing
intrinsic in religious institutions that would disqualify them from
functioning as part of a modern government. The cases of the hay'ah,
the Ministry of Justice, the Presidency of ift7', and Imam Mutiammad b.
Sucia Islamic University in modern Saudi Arabia all point to the
fallacy of the above arguments.
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We now turn back to the effects of institutional differentiation
on the influence and role of the hay'ah. The hay'ah has gone through
periods of resurgence and decline in relation to political and social
factors. This has depended on the personality of the hay'ah's leader,
and on the support that it received from the King at certain times.
Buchan (1982:108) and Murshad (1972:208), for example, both claim that
the hay'ah enjoyed a kind of resurgence during the 1950s due to the
support of King Suciid (ruled 1373-1384/1953-1964). The hay'ah also
experienced a period of growing influence in the early 1980s following
the incident at the Sacred Mosque in Makkah in 1979 (Kluck 1984:112).
It is important to point out here that institutional
differentiation did not have serious negative implications for the
hay'ah. What happened was that the hay'ah lost some of its duties to
other government institutions, but gained more responsibility in
dealing with an increasing jurisdiction covering special duties. It
never completely lost its power and influence; and it managed to adapt
to the changing circumstances. Being part of the structure of the
state gave the hay'ah more formal power and more means to carry out
its tasks. The official and financial backing by the government is
nowadays essential for the survival of the hay'ah.
The hay'ah would never have been able to function as an
enforcement agency outside the structure of government. But it has
managed to create a distinct role for itself in society (the
enforcement of religious observances and public morality).
Institutional differentiation has given the hay'ah a realistic set of
responsibilities which are compatible with the means at its disposal.
It has forced the hay'ah to organize itself, define its areas of
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operations and co-operate with other instititions for the perceived
benefits of society.
We conclude here that the process of institutional
differentiation in modern Saudi Arabia did not result in a complete
loss of power or influence by the hay'ah in particular or by the
religious establishment in general (see Niblock 1982a:92). There have
been changes,	 modifications,	 and redefinition of areas of
jurisdictions for all government institutions. The differentiation
seems to be functional in so far as it enables the government meets
its responsibilities and to carry out its duties. The process has not
yet reached the point where each institution creates its own rationale
and where religion loses its overarching claim (Dobbelaere 1981:16).
D. The Hay'ah Today: Problems and Prospects 
The institution of the hay'ah has provided us with a good case study
of the effects of modernization on a religious institution. We have
been able to answer few questions, but we have also ended up with more
questions than when we started. Some reflections on the state of the
hay'ah today might help us point to some important conclusions, and
useful suggestions for further research.
The hay'ah today is struggling for survival in an increasingly
unreceptive environment. It suffers from the lack of sufficient and
adequately qualified staff to meet its growing responsibilities. The
changing socio-economic environment also continues to present new
challenges, and the survival of the hay'ah depends, to a large extent,
on its ability to meet those challenges. We will not go into the
details of the specific problems facing the hay'ah nor will we suggest
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solutions. 13 We will simply concentrate on the wider question of what
the experience of the hay'ah means for the place of re]-igion in
modern Saudi Arabia.
The development of the hay'ah was influenced by a perceived need
to rule the modern Saudi state in accordance with the Islamic shall-
cah. That basic condition still obtains today, but in a changing
environment. If the hay'ah succeeds in modernizing its structure and
methods of operation, can its basic task continue to be compatible
with an increasingly modern way of life? Trying to function today
without qualified members and without sufficient means may only
further damage the public image of the hay'ah. There is an urgent need
•
for major modifications in the nature of the hay'ah and in its
relationships with other government and public institutions (see
Chapter Eight).
Officials of the hay'ah seem to be aware of what is needed.
There is today more emphasis on education and guidance to supplement
the enforcement activities. But can the hay'ah act as both educator
and enforcer especially when the Presidency of ift g ' is better
equipped to deal with religious guidance and da cwah activities714 Does
more emphasis on education and guidance mean less emphasis on
enforcement? And, if so, what would that mean for the future of the
haeah and its unique role?
The hay'ah today has the potential to continue expanding its
activities and its structure if the new niz gm and its by-laws are
implemented correctly. This task lies with officials of the hay'ah,
and depends on their ability to utilize the present support of the
government for the benefit of their institution. They must provide
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clear proof that their organization still has a place in a modern
society. The establishment of clear definitions of what the hay'ah 
regards as munkars, a better working relationship with other
government institutions and the media, and an improvement in its
public image are essential requirements for a more modern hay'ah.
The tendency to deal with more than it can handle (eg.
narcotics) 15 and the inability to establish clear guidelines and
methods for dealing with women, 16 non-Muslims and expatriates are
among the major problems that face the hay'ah today. Slow bureaucratic
procedures and underqualified members and administrative staff further
complicate those problems. It seems that the threats to the influence
of the hay'ah lie within its own procedures and personnel rather than
within the process of institutional differentiation.
The historical connection between the hay'ah and the Al.
al-Shaykh family is another important factor that might influence the
future of the organization. Prominent members of this influential
family established the hay'ah and have acted as its leaders for most
of its history (see Chapter Six). The three top officials of the
hay'ah today are members of this family. The important question here
is: what will happen to the hay'ah in connection with the declining
numbers of influential members of 11 al-Shaykh family within the
religious establishment (see Bligh 1985)? Is the future of the two
connected? Or is it possible that a new generation of religiously
educated members of the family 17 or other culami'from outside the
family can take over the leadership when the need arises? No definite
answers can be given at the present time.
The past thirteen years have demonstrated that the hay'ah has
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played a major part in facing the challenges to the dominance of
religion presented by rapid modernization. Saudi society today still
displays the very strong influence of religion in public life. Closing
down for prayer, segregation between the sexes, prohibition against
intoxicating drinks and pornography, veiling of women in public,
closing down of video-arcades, 18
 and the lack of public theatres are
major examples of areas where the hay'ah has played a major role. The
success of the hay'ah in enforcing these and other prohibitions would
not have been possible without the official support of the government
which had adopted the policies dealing with these matters.19
The hay'ah reflects the unique politico-religious environment in
Saudi Arabia. Its ability to grow and continue functioning is
connected to the commitment to Islam on the part of the state. As long
as that commitment continues, then a further growth in the structure
of the organization is likely. The hay'ah's involvement with the
religious concept of enjoining the acceptable and forbidding the
reprehensible has never changed or been challenged. Even the
variations in the agency's activities have always fallen within the
boundaries of that general concept. The hay l ah's role has always been
to guard the place of religion in public life. That role becomes
increasingly more apparent as more challenges to religious influence
develop.
What can be seen as the positive implication of the process of
institutional differentiation is the large number of religious
institutions in Saudi Arabia today (see Figure 3). The hay'ah is not
alone in trying to meet the challenges to the overarching claim of
religion. Increases in religious education, especially at university
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level, and the use of the media for religious purposes (ie. religious
programmes and broadcast of prayers and adh gn on a regular basis) have
also helped the hay'ah in dealing with a population that seems to be
more aware of its religious obligations.
The most important factor has been the government's policy
apparently to systematize religious practices in all parts of the
country. Another factor is the restrictions applied by the government
on the practice of religions other than Islam in public. goth factors
have made the job of the hay'ah somewhat easier. The absence of
religious pluralism and the policy of adopting Islam as the official
religion of the state were both necessary prerequisites for making the
role of the hay'ah appear both possible and meaningful.
It is not possible for an institution like the hay'ah to
function in a pluralistic society that has more than one set of
religious beliefs and practices. It would be an impossible task to
enforce religious observances among a population that observes
different religions (unless one of the religions is followed by a
clear majority). The hay'ah was able to develop and grow in Saudi
society because the sociopolitical environment was suitable for it.
This might be one of the reasons why a similar institution to the
hay'ah does not exist in most other Islamic countries, for few of them
have a comparably low degree of religious diversity.
The hay. 'ah has been a unique feature of the modern experience of
Saudi Arabia. What is going to happen to it in the future is likely to
be determined by equally unique factors for which no current
sociological theories can account. This case study has shown that
trying to apply the current theories of secularization to the case of
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the hay'ah does not give satisfying answers. It is also important to
remember that the case of the hay'ah only gives us partial indications
as to the effects of modernization on religion in modern Saudi Arabia.
The following chapter deals with the wider implications of this case
study for the major questions -that we have tried to answer in this
thesis.
Conclusion
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated the difficulty of drawing
clear conclusions from our case study of the hay'ah. We saw that
modernization has had mixed implications for the organization's role
and influence. No clear trend emerged which can point to what will
happen in the future.
The uniqueness of the hay'ah and the factors that seem to affect
it make generalizations hazardous. They also make the theories of
secularization, in their present form, questionable. Institutional
differentiation did not have the serious negative implications for the
hay'ah that might have been expected. The agency continued to grow and
to function in spite of differentiation. The public role of the hay'all
is also an indication that religion in Saudi Arabia has not yet lost
its overarching claim over public life.
The case study of the hay'ah has not been detailed and complete
enough to provide unambiguous answers to all the questions about
modernization and religious change. The fact that the hay'ah is still
going through a period of transformation and adjustments, and that the
writer was not able to get hold of more information contributed to the
limitations of this case study. The case study, however, has provided
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new insights into the dynamics of this unique institution, and has
challenged some received ideas. It has also tried to give sufficient
reasons for a new critical assessment of the theories of
secularization as they apply to a non—Western, non—Christian society
and its institutions.
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PART IV
Summary, Analysis and Conclusions
327
Chapter Ten 
Discussion of the Findings 
The aim of this chapter is to bring the pieces of the study together
and at the same time to draw some conclusions. A summary of the main
questions and arguments developed throughout the thesis will be
followed by a summary of the findings about the two hypotheses
presented in Chapter One. The second section will identify the
limitations of the present study and the reasons for them. The chapter
will conclude with a number of suggestions for further studies.
A. The Main Findings 
The information presented in the previous nine chapters has clarified
some points but has also raised new questions. We cannot claim that we
have arrived at clear and definite answers to our questions. We have
good reasons to believe, however, that the study has served its main
purposes and contributed somewhat to our attempt to understand a
complicated phenomenon like religion and its place in the modern
world.
We began the study with a brief review of the main sociological
arguments about modernization and religious change. Theories of
secularization occupied a major part of our discussions due to their
immediate relevance to the topic of this thesis. The emphasis was on
the usefulness of those theories when studying a country like Saudi
Arabia. It became clear at the outset that theories of secularization
are more useful, if at all, in understanding the experiences of
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Western, Christian societies rather than Islamic societies. 1 Many
sociologists of religion, however, are beginning to question the
usefulness of those theories even in understanding religious change in
the Western world of today. 2
The distinctiveness of Saudi Arabia further complicates the
problem of trying to use the theories in their present form. The
unique, historical, political, and cultural factors that influence the
place of religion in present-day Saudi Arabia call for a special
attention that must take these factors into account (see Salame
1987:323). This brought into focus the problems associated with
regarding secularization as a global phenomenon that is part of the
modernization process. It also highlights the need for a methodical
approach that would treat each case, where necessary, as unique and
different from others, based on that case's unique historical and
cultural circumstances.
Our strategy for testing the applicability of the theories of
modernization and secularization to Saudi Arabia utilized three
different approaches. Firstly, we reviewed the main sociological
arguments,	 emphasizing their usefulness and their limitations.
Secondly, we adopted an historical approach to assess the changes that
have taken place in the role played by religion in Saudi Arabia since
the unification of the country in 1932 and the beginning of political
modernization. And thirdly, we presented a detailed case study of one
religious organization, hay'at al-amr bi-'1-ma c rif wa-'l-nahy can
al-munkar (Organization for Enjoining the Acceptable and Forbidding
the Reprehensible), in order to determine the effects of modernization
on the ability of this organization to continue playing its religious
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role in Saudi society.
The concept of modernization was used in a narrow sense to refer
to the process of institutional differentiation which enhances the
capability - the effectiveness and efficiency of performance - of a
society's political system (Coltman 1968:395).
Secularization, on the other hand, was defined as the process by
which religion becomes just another institution alongside other
institutions and thus loses its overarching claim to speak for the
whole of society (Dobbelaere 1981:11). Secularization, as used in the
study, is only concerned with the process of institutional
differentiation. It has nothing to do with the ideology of
secularism, 3 and does not deal with religious change within religious
institutions nor with the changing involvement of individuals in
religious activities.4
The study's fundamental question was: what are the effects of
political modernization on the influence of religious organizations in
a modernizing society? The two hypotheses associated with that
question were, firstly, that there is a positive relationship between
political modernization and secularization in a modernizing country;
and, secondly, that the higher the level of institutional
differentiation in a society, the lower the capacity of official
religious organizations to shape public life.	 The degree of
secularization in modern Saudi Arabia was, therefore, to be assessed
by examining whether or not religion has been canalized into a
separate institution, and whether or not religion has lost its
influence in public life.
This study is not the first to deal with the above questions,
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but we maintain that it is distinctive and innovative for adopting a
detailed, methodical approach in order to arrive at reliable answers.
The lack of agreement among the various writers who have dealt with
religion in Saudi Arabia demonstrates both the difficulty of the
topic, and also the desirability of a unified theoretical approach to
guide future studies. A brief summary of the major approaches to the
study of religion in Saudi Arabia might help put our findings in
perspective.
The relationship between religion and politics in modern Saudi
Arabia has been approached in three ways. 5
 The first one stems from a
school of thought that tends to see the religious establishment as
part of, and not a challenge to, the regime. The advocates of this
approach are Long (1980), Niblock (1982), Quandt (1981), al-Hamad
(1985), and Kechichian (1986). This approach seems to be most
appropriate to understanding the place of religion in Saudi Arabia.
Indeed, our conclusions appear to confirm the usefulness of this
approach which seems to explain why religion in Saudi Arabia has not
been weakened significantly despite rapid socio-economic change.
The second approach is the one followed by Bligh (1985) and
Heller and Safran (1985). It is based mainly on a conflict approach
and is concerned primarily with the "effects of modernization on
replacing the sources of traditional opposition to the regime (tribal,
religious, geographic) with a frustrated middle class created by the
state and denied a political role" (Salame 1987:322). The problem with
this approach is that it places too much emphasis on a conflict
between the regime and the most powerful groups in society for which
there is actually little or no evidence (see Ochsenwald 1981:272).
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The third approach views the Saudi government as modernizing at
the expense of the religious elements in society. The main examples of
this approach are the studies by Kluck (1984), and al-Yassini (1985).
The problem with this approach is that it assumes that the religious
establishment in pre-modern Saudi Arabia (before 1932) was powerful,
organized and dominant in society. That in fact was not the case, and
religion was very weak (in the public sphere) before the birth of the
modern state (see Chapter Three). No religious organizations existed
(apart from a basic form of education), and most culaMi', judges, and
imams used to perform religious services for the public on a voluntary
basis. Al-Yassini's conclusion that "... the ulama lost many of their
traditional functions and became a pressure group ..." (al-Yassini
1985:59), lacks objective proof. The culama' continue to act as
judges, muftis, teachers, imams, enforcers of public morality, and
preachers. These were basically their traditional functions. The state
only organized and systematized the roles of the  cula, and that
does not necessarily mean loss of influence. On the contrary, it could
mean more influence for the religious establishment as a result of the
backing and support that it received from the state (see Quandt
1981:89).
In contrast to the approaches and findings of the above studies
Part II of this thesis presents the evidence of the effects of
modernization on the influence of the religious establishment. The
unique historical circumstances that shaped the relationship between
religion and politics in Saudi Arabia might help to explain the strong
commitment to religion on the part of the state. The fact that Islam
arose in the Arabian Peninsula, and that the two holy mosques in
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Makkah and al-Madinah are today part of Saudi Arabia has given the
government an added responsibility for religion. It is a question of
an international Islamic legitimacy and prestige, and cannot be
determined by internal political considerations alone.
A very important factor in the Saudi experience has clearly been
the religion of Islam itself. The adaptability of Islam to changing
social and economic circumstances has proven very useful for the Saudi
government's attempts to modernize and to continue using religion for
legitimation. The willingness of the government and of the culaMa' to
adapt aspects of Islamic law to the changing circumstances by
complementing the shml: c ah with new pieces of legislation and new
institutions has been part of the government's strategy for keeping
pace with social and economic developments (Piscatori 1983b:63). The
conclusion reached by Piscatori (1986:126) that "nothing intrinsic to
Islam prevents the development process from taking place" supports the
claim that Islam is compatible with modern circumstances (Gellner
1981:7). The fact that Islam is able to provide legitimacy for the
state, laws for social institutions, and an ideology for international
relations, and the fact that Islam has not been a hindrance to
modernization and development may explain why the Saudi government has
not found it necessary to laicize its public institutions.
Chapter Four showed that the government had managed to modernize
its political structure without undermining the traditional bases of
the whole social system. 6 The readiness to develop major organizations
for religious purpose, and to incorporate them into the state
machinery signified the intentions of the government to try to
function as an 'Islamic' state (by, for example, applying shari cah
333
rules in dealing with civil and criminal disputes, collecting the
zakqh, and administering the affairs of mosques, awclifs and the
Pilgrimage). The integration of religious functions into state
bureaucracy has apparently resulted in making religious practices more
systematic and in bringing them more in line with what the culania' 
regard as the 'true' teachings of Islam.
The discussions in Chapter Five, on the other hand, give clear
indications of the continuous dominance of religion in public life in
Saudi Arabia. The growing number of organizations that perform
religious functions, and the vast amounts of money which the
government spends apparently in order to strengthen Islam inside and
outside the country do not go to prove that religion is losing its
influence in Saudi Arabia. Economic wealth has been seen as one of the
major reasons that allowed Saudi Arabia, as well as some other
oil—rich states, "to create Islamic welfare states, to impose shariah
proscriptions ... and to give financial and political support to
conservative movements throughout the Islamic world"	 (Crecelius
1980:68).
The evidence presented as part of the case study in Part III
shows that a religious organization can continue playing its role
despite institutional differentiation. It is true that the hay'ah lost
some of its previous functions to other government institutions but,
nevertheless, it continues to function in spite of that. Modernization
has created new conditions and, therefore, the hay l ah found new things
to do (see Chapter Nine). What is suggested here is that the changes
that the hay'ah experienced cannot be interpreted as a loss of
influence for the religious establishment. The differentiation seems
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to be a functional response to the demands of a modernizing society.
After this brief review of what our study has presented as
evidence, we turn back now to testing the hypothesis. In the light of
the problems associated with the theories discussed in Chapter Two,
and in the light of evidence presented in parts II and III, we can
conclude the following:
1. The sociology of religion, in its present form, is not ideally
equipped to deal with the socio—religious experience of modern
Saudi Arabia.7
2. Theories of modernization and secularization can provide useful
starting points in the study of the effects of rapid social change
on religion. However, they usually fail to take into account the
unique historical, economic, political, and social factors that
make the Saudi experience different from that of other countries.
3. In the light of the clarifications of concepts attempted in
Chapter Two, and by focusing on the two main components of the
theory of secularization (viz, that religion becomes one separate
institution and loses its influence in public life), we conclude
that secularization, in the form specified above, has not yet
occurred to any measurable degree in modern Saudi Arabia. There
are strong indications that religion continues to dominate a
number of important social institutions (in particular the
judiciary, education, and the enforcement of public morality), and
continues to expand its influence through official organizations
(presidency of ifta' and (la c wah the hay'ah, ministry of
pilgrimage and awq-if, the media, department of zakah, and
religious universities and institutes). Religion in Saudi
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Arabia has not yet lost its influence in public life and has not
been limited to one separate institution.
Our contention that secularization, as defined by the dominant
theories, has not taken place in Saudi Arabia is analogous to B.
Wilson's (1987a:162) depiction of Christianity in pre-modern times
(quoted above on p.51). This is only an analogy, however. There is
no implication that Islam is necessarily going to follow the
pattern of Christianity's development. 8 In this respect, our
findings do not confirm Tibi's (1980:222) hypothesized connection
between industrialization and the secularization of Islamic
countries.
The main hypothesis, which states that there is a positive
relationship between institutional differentiation and loss of
religious influence in public life, is not supported by the
general findings of this study. Institutional differentiation has
in fact taken place in Saudi Arabia, but not to the point where
religion has become a totally separate institution and lost all
its influence to speak for the whole of society. 9
 What has taken
place appears to be a functional differentiation which has not yet
produced ideological effects detrimental to Islam.10
4. The case study of the hay'ah provides some support for the second
hypothesis, which states that the higher the level of
institutional differentiation, the lower the capacity of official
religious organizations to shape public life. The evidence
suggests that the hay'ah is less capable today of shaping public
life than it was before 1960. It has lost some of its functions to
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other government institutions, but has continued to deal with
increasing responsibilities of its own. The hay'ah is, however,
only one example which cannot be generalized to cover other
religious institutions in the country. Each institution (for
example, the judiciary, religious education, pilgrimage and
endowments, and iftN'and da c wah) may have experienced a slightly
different process of development and change.
5. It could be argued here that state formation, rationalization (of
state activities), and modernization have given rise to a trend
towards an increase in public religious observances. Education,
the mass-media, and the enforcement of religious observance by the
state have apparently made religion more available to people in
all walks of life. This in turn may have resulted in more
influence for religious organizations in public life during a time
of rapid modernization.
6. The Saudi experience provides examples both of the possibility of
integrating religious functions into modern bureaucracy, using
modern technology to monitor religious observance and the
performance of religious functions, as well as of the possibility
of incorporating modern education into religious structures
without destroying them.
7. Islam in Saudi Arabia is the ideology and the main source of
legitimacy for the political system. Thus, the threat to its
dominance will not apparently come from the political system
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itself. If secularization is going to take place in Saudi Arabia,
then we believe that its source will not be institutional
differentiation alone. Factors such as Western capitalism and the
world economic system, the emergence of middle-classes (especially
western-educated Saudis), and the apparently increasing degree of
secularization of consciousness among a growing number of young
Saudis (due to increasing contact with the outside world through
education, the media, and travel) may feed into the future
secularization of Saudi Arabia.
The secularization of institutions is very much connected to the
secularization of individuals (what Peter Berger (1969:107) called the
secularization of consciousness). Religion is believed in, followed,
and practised by individuals. If individuals feel that religion no
longer has much meaning to them, and if, as a result, their
involvement in religious activities declines, then religion will lose
its influence in public life even though it continues to be supported
and enforced by the state. Furthermore, the secularization of
institutions is not an automatic outcome of modernization, but rather
it takes place as a result of the actions of groups and individuals
(Fenn 1978:xii). The technological aspects of modernization and
institutional differentiation on a functional level do not necessarily
lead to a secular society.
Having said all of the above, we continue to stress the problems
associated with arriving at such conclusions. We realize the
difficulty of studying religion in Saudi Arabia because of its
inter-connection with other things. Furthermore, we recognize the
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difficulty of trying to measure processes such as modernization and
secularization. The theories do not provide instruments for making
measurements, and the processes themselves are continuously changing
the very social environment that we are trying to study. There is an
urgent need to develop better methods that will enable us to measure
those processes and to assess their relationship to each other (see
Dobbelaere 1987).
B. Limitations of the Study
We have tried to relate the topic of this study to the wider concerns
of the sociology of religion while recognizing the difficulty of doing
so. The concepts remain slippery despite our attempts to clarify their
meanings by defining them narrowly. The problems are intrinsic in the
sociology of religion itself due partly to its historical connections
with the experience of western-Christian societies.
This particular study is focused on the religion of Islam and
the Saudi experience. The findings cannot be directly generalized to
religions other than Islam, or to countries other than Saudi Arabia.
The study is further limited by focusing on only one religious
organization in Saudi Arabia. That was necessary in order to provide
an empirical focus for research, but we must be careful when it comes
to assessing general religious change in modern Saudi Arabia. The
hay'ah is only one case among many.
The focus on the process of political modernization
(institutional differentiation) and not on modernization in general
(in its broader social and economic aspects) may have been necessary
for a study of this kind, but it may also have prevented us from
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seeing other factors that influence the process of secularization.
Another limitation has been the necessity of relying on official
sources for most of the information about Saudi Arabia. The problems
associated with field research (see Appendix B) may have further
restricted the amount of information collected from fieldwork. The
last limitation comes from the fact that the study dealt with a
process that is far from complete. Saudi Arabia continues to modernize
at a rapid pace, and things continue to change as we write this
thesis.
C. Suggestions for Future Research
This study has attempted to deal with a very complicated phenomenon.
It is only a beginning, and there is scope for much more research in
this area. This study can nevertheless be seen as the first step in
the direction of establishing alternatives to the current approaches
to the study of religious change in Islamic societies. 11
In addition to general research on the subject of the
relationship between Islam and modernization, we suggest that
sociologists should continue to look for the most useful theoretical
approach to the study of religious change in Islamic societies. The
current sociological theories provide useful starting points and the
necessary material for comparative purposes, but they ought to be
modified somewhat to allow for the unique features of Islam and the
culture of the various Muslim countries. The interface between a
traditional religion and a modern state bureaucracy would be an ideal
topic for future research. Secondly, current theories are rarely
supported by techniques for measuring the process of modernization and
live in accordance with Islam.
the specific case of Saudi Arabia, fifthly, more research is
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secularization in a quantitative form. An urgent priority is to devise
appropriate techniques which are sensitive to the distinctiveness of
Islam.
Thirdly, the religion of Islam is becoming the subject of much
scholarly attention. An important area of sociological research
regarding Islam concerns the compatibility of Islam, as a
socio—political system, with the realities of modern life. It is
unclear, for example, to what extent Islam can continue to function in
a technologically modern society without having to give up some of its
basic requirements. A related topic deals, fourthly, with the effects
of the world economic system and of the globalization of certain
political and social issues on the ability of Muslims throughout the
world to
In
required on the effects of
traditions of the country. It
system (e.g. the introduction
of education (incorporating
rapid social change on the religious
is possible that changes in the judicial
of specialized courts) and in the area
religious and general education) may
seriously challenge Islam as a public force in Saudi society. There is
a strong need for more research into the degree and direction of these
changes. More specifically still, the question arises of how the
integration of religious and secular education will affect the quality
of the culami' of the future.
We should not forget that religious organizations other than the
hay'ah have gone through different processes of development and
growth. But the impact of modernization on the ability of these
organizations to continue playing their public role in society is not
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yet clear. Our sixth point is that more research in this area will
provide further insights into the effects of modernization on religion
in Saudi Arabia. Finally, an interesting area of research is the
impact of rapid social change on the people of Saudi Arabia. In
particular, we need to know much more about the impact of general
education, the mass media, travelling abroad for education and for
tourism, and the existence of a large number of foreigners in the
country on the religiosity of individual Saudi Arabians.
This list of priorities and topics for further research is
potentially endless. We have tried to indicate only those topics which
follow on directly from the research on which this thesis is based. It
is our hope that the present work will provide a foundation on which
other scholars can build.
342
ENDNOTES
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Chapter One
1. This is the period between the official unification of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932 and today. This period was
chosen because it represents the era of sociopolitical change
that began with the birth of Saudi Arabia as an independent
nation-state.
2. The "ideal" Islamic state has been the subject of numerous
writings and controversial debates. There is a wide agreement,
however, that the state established by the Prophet Mutlammad in
al-Madinah in 622 C.E. represents the ideal model that all
Muslim states must follow. See, for example, Maududi (1960,
1976), Askari (1978), C rAmmaah (1980), and al-Mehdi (1978).
3. This unique religious organization is referred to in most of the
literature dealing with Saudi Arabia as 'public morality
committees' (see, for example, Niblock (1982a:75), al-Yassini
(1985:70), and Mortimer (1982:175). We have chosen to use this
name (i.e. Public Morality Committees) in the title of this
thesis only because we believe that it is easier to recognize by
most readers interested in Saudi Arabia. It is more widely known
and commonly used, even in official government publications, to
refer to the organization. We have here given the complete
official name of the organization (the name has various
translations - see the introduction to Part III of this thesis),
and it will be referred to throughout the thesis as the hay'ah.
The complete name will only be given where necessary. See also
endnote no.1 in the introduction to Part III.
4. By Islamic countries, we mean those independent states whose
population, or the majority of the population, is Muslim by
faith. Al-Buraey (1985:55) gives a list of 46 countries where
Muslims constitute a majority of the population.
Crecelius (1980:49) has recognized the lack of studies which
have dealt with the realities of socioeconomic change on the
religious institutions in Muslim countries.
5. A transitional society is a society which although not fully
modernized contains nevertheless aspects of modernity; it is
also not traditional, yet it contains aspects of traditionality.
It is a society that appears to be moving from the polarity of
tradition to the polarity of modernity (al-Hamad 1985:15).
Roberts (1971:215) defines tradition as "some institution,
symbol, myth or other cultural element which is passed on from
generation to generation in a community."
In Saudi Arabia, the Islamic religion has shaped and defined
most of the country's traditions. A few, however, are the
product of the tribal environment and its associated values and
customs.
6. For the meaning and evolution of the 4isbah see Chapter Six.
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7. There have been various attempts to describe the religious
situation in Saudi Arabia, but most lack a detailed analysis and
scientific approach. The study by al-Yassini (1985) has been the
most comprehensive so far. A number of writers: Piscatori (1980
and 1983b), Edens (1974), Long (1980), Buchan (1982), Mortimer
(1982), Hiro (1988), Humphreys (1979) and Salame (1987) have
dealt with the relationship between politics and Islam in Saudi
Arabia. The topic of religious revival has been dealt with by
Wenner (1980), Ochsenwald (1981), and Hopwood (1982). The status
and role of the Saudi culami' is the subject of two studies:
Kechichian (1986), and Bligh (1985). Other published studies
that deal generally with religion in Saudi Arabia are Kluck
( 1 984), al-Yassini (1982), Rentz (1966), Hobday (1978), Lipsky
(1959), Holden and Johns (1981), Wenner (1975), and Souryal
(1987).
8. A review of the literature that has dealt specifically with the
hay'ah or has just mentioned it, is provided in the introduction
to Part III of this thesis.
9. The hijrah calendar (H.) is the official Islamic calendar which
starts with the hijrah (migration) of the Prophet Muhammad from
Makkah to al-Madinah in 622 C.E. It is the official calendar
used in Saudi Arabia, and most official documents are dated
accordingly. The Islamic year is eleven days shorter than the
Gregorian year, and the beginning of the year moves back eleven
days every year in relation to the Gregorian year. The year 1989
corresponds to 1409-1410 of the Islamic era.
Chapter Two
1. The sociology of religion, according to most theorists, does not
deal with the ultimate reality of religious claims to truth. It
only recognizes that religion does take the form of human
institutions, and that it is these human forms which are the
subject of the sociology of religion. Pareto claimed that
"Religions will only be considered externally in as much as they
are social facts, and entirely apart from their intrinsic
merits" (quoted in Hill 1973:36).
2. Smith (1962) defined religious tradition as the "cumulative
repository of the past religious experiences and expressions of
a people" (quoted in Johnstone 1975:14). For an Islamic
viewpoint dealing with the problems of defining religion, see
Alatas (1977).
3. This definition is very similar to the classical definition of
Durkheim (1969:46). The main difference, however, is the
functional approach of Durkheim which resulted in making him
believe that religious systems have a functional role which is
uniting its adherents into one single moral community. See
Beckford (1981) for a criticism of the functionalist approach to
the study of religion.
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4. For a discussion about major definitions of religion and their
limitations, see Mcguire (1981:9-10), and Turner (1983:242).
Berger and Luckmann (1969:69) argued for the expansion of the
scope of the sociology of religion to become a central part of
the sociology of knowledge dealing with "legitimating systems"
whether religious or pseudo-religious. See Beckford (1987a) for
an assessment of the views of Berger and Luckmann.
5. For further discussions about the early developments of the
sociology of religion, see Johnstone 	 (1975:9), and Hill
(1973:19).
6. See the discussions of Cuzzort and King (1980:54), and Beckford
(1987b) about the views of Durkheim.
7. This approach led Weber to develop his famous theory of the
relationship between Protestanism and Capitalism. See Weber
(1948), and Eisenstadt (1968).
8. For Freud's views on religion, see his book The Future of an 
Illusion (London: Standard Edn, 1953).
9. The phenomena of religious revival in the Muslim world (Danner
1980, Dekmejian 1980, and Hopwood 1983), and new religious
movements in the West (Beckford 1977, 1986) require more
analytical studies that would explain not just how but why these
movements continue to happen in a time of supposed religious
decline due to modernization and development.
10. For an extensive review of how Islam was presented by western
writers between 1100 and 1960 with a bibliography, see Daniel
(1980). See also Imran (1979) for an Islamic viewpoint.
11. See Turner (1983:35) for an argument about Hume's theory as it
relates to Islam. See also Gellner (1969:128).
12. For historical studies written by Muslims, see cAzzam (1984),
Ibn Ishaq (1964), and Haykal (1968).
13. For the views of Weber, see his book The Sociology of Religion,
translated by Ephraim Fischoff (1965)7-17;77arso Turner (1974)
for an assessment and criticism of Weber's thesis as it relates
to Islam.
14. Turner (1978:383) referred to Weber's approach as an
"internalist theory" which provides explanations for economic
growth or stagnation in terms of personal beliefs, family
structure, patterns of inheritance and so on rather than in
terms of the global context of the society within the
international division of labour (externalist theory).
15. Orientalism has been defined by Waardenburg (1985:29) as
"scholarly studies which through their analytical procedures
undermine the norms and values, the originality and essence of
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Islam." It developed as a natural outcome of the negative views
of Islam that dominated Europe after the crusades and continued
up to the middle of the twentieth century. See D. Waines (1976),
Turner (1978, 1983), and Said (1978) for discussions and
criticisms of the Orientalist approach to the study of Islam.
16. For a brief account of Ibn Khaldun's life, see the introduction
to the translation of his famous work al-Muqaddimah by Franz
Rosenthal (1967). Gellner (1981) gives a detailed review of Ibn
Khaldun's sociological theory and contrasts it with the works of
both Durkheim and Weber.
17. By normative Islam we mean the form of Islam which is based on
what the Prophet Muhammad instituted as Islamic religion, and
which is today known as the sharf c ah (see Chapter Three).
Normative Islam is connected with the Islamic state, and is
sanctioned and protected by the culamg) (religious scholars). It
implies that people in certain offices can perform specific
actions which are binding in Islamic Law (e.g. judges). Popular
Islam, on the other hand, means the forms of beliefs and
practices that develop out of local conditions when normative
Islam loses its influence on society. Sufism is an example of
popular Islam (Waardenburg 1978). See also Gellner (1969).
18. "By rationalization Weber meant the process by which explicit,
abstract, intellectual rules and procedures are increasingly
substituted for sentiment, tradition, and rule of thumb in all
spheres of activity" (Wrong 1970:26). See also Brubaker (1984).
19. For an Islamic perspective on the relationship between religion
and politics, see Ibn Taymiyyah (1970), Maududi (1960), Askari
(1978), and Hassan (1981).
20. See, for example, Beckford and Luckmann (1989), and B. Turner
(1983).
21. The term secularization refers to "a process of decline in
religious activities, beliefs, ways of thinking, and
institutions that occurs primarily in association with ... other
process of social structural change" (Wilson 1987a:159). It must
be differentiated from the term secularism which is "an
ideology; its proponents consciously denounce all forms of
supernaturalism and the agencies devoted to it, advocating
non-religious or anti-religious principles as the basis for
personal morality and social organization" (ibid). Our concern
in this study will be with the process of secularization and not
with the ideology of secularism. See Glasner (1977:46, 56) for a
further discussion of the differences between the two terms. See
also Khalil (1983), Gauhar (1978), and al-HawilT (1984) for the
Islamic position relating to the ideology of secularism
( calmlniyyah). One of the major problems associated with the use
of the term secularization in this study is the fact that it has
no equivalent in the Arabic language. The term calmaniyyah,
which is used by most Muslim writers (see, for example,
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al-ljawali [1984 1 and Khalil [19831 ) to describe separation
between state and religion, means the ideology of secularism and
not the process of secularization.
22. For the historical development of the use of the term see Shiner
(1967:207). Wilson (1982:148), Hill (1973:228), and Dobbelaere
(1981) provide useful discussions of the various meanings and
applications associated with the concept of secularization.
23. Mcguire (1981:243) defined the concept of "disenchantment of the
world" as: "the process by which things held in awe or reverence
are stripped of their special qualities and become 'ordinary'."
Weber noted three phases in the development of secularization,
namely disenchantment, fragmentation, and conflict between
partial world-views (Turner 1974:154).
24. See Berger, Berger, and Kellner (1973) for an assessment of the
influence of modernization on consciousness.
25. Berger (1969) defined the secularization of culture as "the
process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from
the domination of religious institutions and symbols." The
secularization of consciousness, on the other hand, •means: "the
production of an increasing number of individuals who look upon
the world and their own lives without the benefit of religious
interpretations". Turner (1974:156) referred to Berger's
distinction as objective (institutional) and subjective (human)
secularization.
26. In a later paper, Dobbelaere (1984) decided to abandon the term
laicization and return to use secularization in its place. He
argued that the term laicization was confusing, and that he
would refer to the three processes identified in 1981 as
"secularization in general". We believe that laicization is
still useful simply because it identifies a specific process
regardless of its linguistic meaning. The definition given to it
later in the chapter should make it clear and justify its
continued use. In the context of this study, the terms
secularization, laicization, and institutional differentiation
will be used to refer to three aspects of a single process:
differentiation between institutional spheres in a given
society.
27. Durkheim believed that "religion used to pervade everything;
everything social is religious; the two words are synonymous"
(quoted in Dobbelaere 1981:16). It is possible that the
'overarching claim' of religion over society originated in
Durkheim's argument. That might have been the case in primitive
societies (Durkheim drew most of his conclusions from studying
the aboriginal tribes in Australia) (Johnstone 1975:143), but
not in societies where Islam arose and still dominates. The
social institutions that existed in Arabia before Islam (tribe,
family, marriage, slavery ... etc) continued to exist with minor
modification by Islam (eg. limiting the number of wives a man
can have at one time to four). None of those institutions was
considered religious or was given a sacred character.
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28. This point will be discussed further in the section dealing with
the relationship between religion and modernization later in
this chapter.
29. This means individuals or groups who want to secularize society
using the ideology of secularism.
30. See Hill (1973:232) for a criticism of the golden age thesis.
Greeley (1972:5) wrote that "Primitive societies have their
share of atheists or agnostics every bit as much as does modern
society". See also M. Douglas (1982).
31. A case in point is what happened to the Prophet of Islam and his
followers during the first ten years of his mission in Makkah
(see Chapter Three).
32. Berger (1969:108) believed that secularization is a global
phenomenon that "has now become worldwide in the course of
westernization and modernization". See Tamaru (1987) for an
argument against the application of the theory of secularization
to non-Western countries and especially to Japan. See also Voll
(1987), and B. Wilson (1987b).
33. See Greeley (1972) for a lengthy argument about what he called
the 'persistence of religion' in the modern world.
34. For a discussion about the rise and meaning of Islam, see
Chapter Three.
35. See Hermassi (1978:456) for an argument that the realities of
Muslim societies have always necessitated what he called "a de
facto secularization and a dissociation between state and
society, politics and culture ..."
36. By traditional societies is meant those "societies that continue
to place preponderant emphasis on tradition as the source of
their political values". Tradition, on the other hand is "some
institution, symbol, myth or other cultural element which is
passed on from generation to generation in a community, and
which is regarded by some members of that community as being
valuable" (Roberts 1971:215).
37. This definition was adapted by Shaker (1972:25) from Moore
(1963:89). It has been modified here to fit our need to view
modernization in its technological aspects as different from
westernization in its cultural aspects. Alatas (1972:24) has
argued for distinguishing between the two terms. "It is true",
he wrote, "that the basic ingredients of modernization are
derived from the West, nevertheless it is possible to consider
them as autonomous cultural elements which are subject to
diffusion without necessarily being accompanied by western
culture. If they are, the reasons are to be sought elsewhere
rather than in the intrinsic nature of the process of
modernization."
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38. Other models are the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, Yugoslavia,
Australia, and Japan (even though Japan has followed the western
model, its experience is unique for cultural reasons).
39. Turner (1974:161-164) went on to criticize Lerner for ignoring
non-Western types of modernization and for basing his
conclusions on the experience of Turkey which is different in
that the process of westernization "was imposed by political
decree rather than emerging necessarily and automatically from
economic change."
40. Roberts (1971:214) defines Third World as: "a term applied to
the developing countries, particularly those not associated
formally with the American or Communist alliance systems, and
which includes many former colonies of European empires. The
term draws attention to the economic difficulties of these
states, and their non-committed attitude towards the eastern and
western power blocks."
41.	 This has been argued by Lerner (1968:392) and Patai (1962:370).
Lerner contended that modernization "must involve indigenous
people in behavioural transformations so manifold and profound
that a new and coherent way of life comes into operation." See
Turner (1974:160) for a criticism of Lerner's position; and see
also Lehmann (1979:82).
42. Andersen, Seibert and Wagner (1987:5) wrote that we "have to
look long and hard to find a society that is statically
traditional or statically modern. All societies are, and have
always been, constantly changing."
43. Barnett (1988:26) argues that modernization theories display
elements of Evolutionism, Functionalism and Positivism by virtue
of making the following common claims:
1. Development takes place from within a society.
2. Development follows the same patterns in all societies.
3. The end result of development is prosperity and political
stability.
4. The scientific study of history and society (positivism) will
enable us to identify patterns of development from the
experiences of developed countries.
44. See Osama (1987:7) for an argument about the comprehensive
nature of the process of development which he defines as "an
integrated process concerned with all societal activities aimed
at achieving human welfare."
45. Theorists who adopted this new approach utilized Marxist thought
to explain development or the lack of it in the light of the
interaction and conflict between rich and poor countries, and
the role played by Colonialism in that interaction (see Barnett
1988:40).
46. Underdevelopment is viewed here not only as a stage before
development, but also as a state of development in the opposite
direction of poverty and stagnation. See Hoogvelt (1978:81).
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47. See also Barnett (1988:173).
48. Lehmann (1979:26) also acknowledges that it is possible to have
a negative correlation between economic growth and development;
economic growth could mean growing unemployment and increasing
inequality.
49. A new index called the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) is
being increasingly used to measure development. It uses the
indicators of life expectancy, infant mortality and literacy
rate to decide whether a country is developed or not. Saudi
Arabia, which ranked fourth out of 23 Third World countries
using GNP in 1981, ranked eighteenth among the same countries
when PQLI was used (Bill and Leiden 1984:20). See also Barnett(1988:180) for the problems associated with the use of PQLI.
50. See Jacobs Modernization without Development (1971). In the case
of Saudi Arabia, see Osama (1987) and McLachlan (1986).
51. See al-Farsy (1986), Laney (1982), and Khuthaila (1984). See
also Chapter Four.
52. The term capacity was defined by Coleman (1968:397) as the
"constantly increasing adaptive and creative potentialities
possessed by man for the manipulation of his environment."
53. This set of distinctions was inspired by Talcott Parsons to
differentiate between traditional and modern societies. See
Martindale (1981:475).
54. For detailed studies of the ability of the Saudi government to
foster modernization while maintaining a traditional political
system, see Shaker (1972), Huyette (1985), and al-Hamad (1985).
55. The word majlis means council and guest room. As an institution
it originates in the way political leaders (tribal chiefs and
governors) used to receive their subjects in a majlis to hear
their complaints, seek their advice and maintain their
allegiance. In modern Saudi Arabia, this institution is still
part of the daily business of government. The King, the Crown
Prince and regional governors set time aside every day to
receive citizens in their majlises. Influential groups and
individuals (tribal chiefs and the c ulam7) still use this method
to influence major decisions and transmit major demands. The
effectiveness of the majlis has been affected by bureaucratic
growth, but it remains a quick way of doing some government
business based on personal contact between the rulers and the
ruled. See The Times, 29.7.1986, and The New York Times 
International, 29.4.1989. See also Rudolph (1984:214), and
al-Yamamah (1015), 8.3.1988.
56. Bill and Leiden (1984:12) have argued that "the forces of
modernization, by providing political elites [even the
traditional ones] with more sophisticated techniques of control,
can enhance their capacity to meet demands and to provide
security."
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57. For the meaning of transitional society, see endnote no.5 in
Chapter One.
58. The limited political participation has not affected the ability
of the government to meet new demands and to cater for the
perceived needs of new groups (middle-class professional's, for
example) who have been incorporated into the state bureaucracy.
Germani (1968:358) said that it was difficult to decide whether
political participation constitutes a necessary condition for
political development or whether it is an inevitable consequence
of it.
59. The Ottoman empire indirectly ruled over parts of the country,
but it was through local governors and with limited
institutional modifications. See Ochsenwald (1984).
60. M. Douglas (1982) provides a good argument in response to those
who see a strong connection between modernization and religious
decline. She does not share those views, and does not believe
that the technological aspects of modernization are to be blamed
for religious decline in the modern world.
61. These are: western civilization carried in political ideologies
(communism and nationalism); the modern world economic process;
the mass media; modern transportation and tourism; and the
advances in science and technology.
62. This was true in a number of countries. Turkey and Tunisia are
cases in point.
63. See al-Buraey (1985:7-16). For discussions about Islam and
modernism, see Qutb (1979) and Jameelah (1977).
64. Turner (1978:394) wrote that "Islamic beliefs and legal codes
did not hinder enterprise and that Islam possessed a rational
core of values and attitudes." See also Khurshid Ahmad (1978),
and Chapra (1976).
65. About 95% of Saudis are Sunni Muslims. There is also a Shicite
minority (estimated by Kluck [1984:113] to be between 250,000
and 400,000) mainly in the Eastern Province.
66. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning. Achievements
the Development Plans (1970/1985) (Riyadh:n.d.).
Chapter Three
1. The word dacwah is difficult to translate into the English
language. Literally it means 'call' or calling to something. As
a religious concept it describes the missionary work involved in
calling Muslims to practise their religion or calling
non-Muslims to embrace the religion of Islam (see Piscatori
1986). The dacwah of Shaykh Muhammad b. cAbd al-Wahhab was an
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organized movement mainly to restore religion among the Muslims
of central Arabia. A distinction should be made between this
term and the term adhan which is also commonly translated as
'call'. The latter term, however, means calling people to attend
prayer in the mosque by the mil'adhdhin (muezzin). See Glasse
(1989).
2. There is a huge collection of books published in the West about
the history and institutions of Islam. For detailed information
about the early history of Islam, see Ibn Ishaq (1964), cAzzim
(1984), Gibb (1953), D. Roberts (1981), Haykal (1968), and
Siddiqui (1969). For the ideology and institutions of Islam, see
Hamidullah (1959), Nasr (1966), Watt (1968), D. Roberts (1982),
K. Ahmad (1976), Maududi (1983), and Kelly (1984).
3. Kacbah is the name of a large cubic stone structure which stands
in the centre of the Great Mosque of Makkah. Muslims believe
that it was built by the Prophet Ibrahim (Abraham). It is
considered the holiest shrine of Islam. Muslims are required to
go round it seven times when they perform rall (pilgrimage).
4. See, for example, The Qur'an (3:159; 42:38). The first number,
in reference to the Qur'an, refers to the number of the surah
(chapter of the Qur'an), and the second number refers to the
ayah (verse of the chapter). The translation used is that of A.
Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur rin: Text, Translation and Commentary.
5. The Qur'in (2:136) states: "Say ye: we believe in God, and the
revelation given to us, and to Abraham, Ismacil, Issac, Jacob,
and the Tribes, and that given to Moses and Jesus, and that
given to (all) Prophets from their Lord: we make no difference
between one and another of them: and we bow to God (in Islam)."
See also Maududi (1983:30).
6. The Qur'in (51:56) states: "I have only created Jinns and men,
that they may serve Me."
7. See, for example, The Qur'in (3:85).
8. See Maududi (1983:108) for further distinction between din and
sharicah.
9. Al—qadar means a divine decree or predistination in which
Muslims believe as one of the articles of faith. See Abbara
(1987:99).
10. See the Qur'in (2:183-185).
11. See the Qur'an (3:97; 2:197).
12. For more information about the sharr cah, see Murad (1981),
Ramadan (1970) and Maududi (1983).
13. Each individual item of the sunnah which gives a saying or
describes an action by the Prophet is referred to as a hadith.
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14. The term muftis refers to those  culama' who issue fatws
(religious rulings) regarding matters that have no clear rulings
in either the Qur'an or the sunnah.
15. See, for example, Algar (1987), and Bligh (1985).
16. Sunni Islam is the adjective from sunnah (traditions of the
Prophet). It is used to describe the majority of Muslims (over
90%) who follow the sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad. Glasse
(1989:381) has referred to Sunni Muslims as 'the Orthodox' of
Islam. Those who are not Sunnis include the Shi cites (mainly in
Iran) and a number of smaller sects that have very small
following.
17. For discussions about the %lama' in different parts of the
Islamic world, see Keddie 7717 Gilsenan (1982), and Algar
(1987).
18. See Craig (1977).
19. See, for example, The Qur'an (4:3).
20. See, for example, The Qur'an (24:30-31).
21. See The Qur'an (6:140; 17:31; 81:8-9).
22. For more discussions about the importance of this principle, see
Chapter Six.
23. For the meaning and history of hisbah, see Chapter Six.
24. Islam as a social system has been the subject of a number of
publications. Prominent among these are R. Levy (1962), Abdalati
(1980), Askari (1978), Qutb (1953), and Ansari (1973).
25. See, for example, The Qur'an (20:6).
26. See, for example, The Qur'an (62:9-11).
27. See, for example, The Qur'an (2:275, 278; 83:1-3).
28. See, for example, The Qur'an (2:274; 24:33; 57:7).
29. For more information about the Islamic economic system, see
Chapra (1970, 1976).
30. Ahl al-hall wa- 1 1- caqd (lit, those who loosen and bind) is a
traditional term describing the people in the community who have
real political or economic power. They usually influence
political decisions in the community and limit the authority of
the ruler.
31. The relationship between politics and religion in Islam, and the
nature of the Islamic state has received a lot of attention in
the past few years in scholarly writings. See, for example,
Maududi (1960), Kurdi (1984). Esposito (1980, 1984), Piscatori
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(1983b, 1986), Mortimer (1982), Husain (1983), Thn Taymiyyah'
(1970), and Arjomand (1984, 1989).
32. The term jahiliyyah is used to describe the state of affairs in
Arabia before Islam. It means a state of religious ignorance and
laxity. Many observers regard the situation in the Arabian
peninsula before the da cwah of Ibn cAbd al-Wahhib as similar to
the jahiliyyah of Arabia before Islam.
33. The Arabic word Shaykh (sheikh) literally means one who bears
the marks of old age. It is used as a title of respect for the
culama' and tribal leaders. The descendants of Muhammd b. cAbd
al-Wahhab are known as Al al-Shaykh meaning the family of the
Shaykh.
34. See endnote no.1 above.
35. For the official Saudi position as to the use of term Wahhabism,
see al-Yamamah magazine (1034), 14.12.1988, (Riyadh); and
al-Farsy (1986:36).
36. One of the most famous books written by Shaykh Muhammad b. cAbd
al-Wahhab was Kitab al-Tawhid (book of monotheism) in which he
outlined the importance of this principle as the basis of the
religion of Islam (see al-cUthayMin 1986:82).
Chapter Four
1. For the effects of the da c wah of Shaykh Muhammad b. cAbd
al-Wahhab on the people of--TRe-gouthern region, see Abli Dahish
(1985).
2. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, Achievements of
the Development Plans (1970/1985) (Riyadh: n.d.), p.l.
3. Royal Decree No.2716 dated 18.9.1932 published in the official
Gazette Umm al-Qura (406), 23.9.1932. For more detailed accounts
of the process of unification, see Wahba (1964), Assah (1969),
and al-Mana (1980).
4. Meulen (1957:66) puts the number of settlements at two hundred.
5. Based on the Qur'Enic verse (3:103): "And remember with
gratitude God's favour on you; for ye were enemies and He joined
your hearts in love, so that by His Grace, ye became brethren."
See Habib (1978), and Goldrup (1971) for detailed historical
accounts of the ikhwan movement.
6. Shaykh Muhammad b. Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh, was born in Riyadh in
1311 H. (around 1893-4). His father was a judge in Riyadh, and
he taught his son the fundamentals of religion. He memorized the
Qur'In before the age of ten, and studied under a number of
prominent scholars. He worked as a judge and a teacher for many
years, and was made president of colleges and religious
institutes in 1950. In 1954 he became the president of ifta',
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and in 1958 a president of the Islamic University in al-Madinah,
president of the Muslim World League, president of the Judicial
Council, and president of al-Da c wah publication establishment.
Most of these positions were honorary, and his main job was
ifti' and teaching. His fatwas are collected in a ten-volume
publication, and he died 17179. He is usually referred to as
the Mufti, but that was not an official title (al-Muhaydib and
al-NEsir 1986:12). The Scientific Institutes is a literal
translation of the name al-mac ihid al- cilmiyyah which was given
to secondary schools concerned with religious education.
7. A term used to describe the people with real power in the
community. In Saudi Arabia today, senior members of the royal
family, the culaii' and some tribal chiefs are referred to as
ahl al-ball 77137id (Huyette 1985:3). See also endnote no.30 in
Chapter Three.
8. For the text of the fatwi and the decision of members of the
royal family, see Wahl7i-(T964:176-180).
9. Ahmad Zak! Yamini acquired legal training at Cairo University,
and went to the United States to finish two masters degrees in
international law from Harvard and New York University
respectively. He served as Minister of Petroleum and Minerals
between 1962 and 1986.
10. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Central Planning Organization, Report 
of the Central Planning Organization 1974 (Jiddah: Banawi
Printers, 1974), p.17.
11. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabian monetary Agency, Annual
Report 1977 (Riyadh: 1977), p.2.
12. He was Shaykh Muhammad al-Harlan, see Who's Who in Saudi Arabia 
(1976-77) (London: Europa Publication, 1977), p.66.
13. He is the son of Shaykh Muhammad b. IbrihIm Al al-Shaykh
(endnote no.6 above). He was born in Riyadh in 1344 H. (1925-6),
and was among the first graduates from the shari cah College in
Riyadh in 1956. He worked with his father as a Deputy President
of iffi l
 for most of the 1960s. He was appointed as President of
Ifta' in 1971 in place of his father who died in 1969. In 1975
he was made Minister of Justice and President of the Supreme
Judicial Council, positions which he occupied until May 1989.
(See al-Muhaydib and al-NEsir 1986:14).
14. Shaykh cAbd al-cAziz Ibn Biz was born in the year 1330 H.
(1911-12). He studied the Qur rEn and the fundamentals of Islam
under a number of culaMa in Riyadh. In 1937 he became a judge
in the town of al-Kharj, and in 1951 he took up a position as a
teacher in the sharIcah College in Riyadh (1951-1960). In 1961
he became the first Vice-Chancellor of the Islamic University in
al-Madinah until 1970 when he was made president of the
University. He was appointed as the general president of the
Presidency of iftl' in 1975, a position which he still occupies
today. He is a member of the Commission of Senior culaMit,
President of the Islamic fiqh Academy, President of the
356
International Islamic Council of Mosques, and president of the
Permanent Committee for beside some other honorary
positions. He has written a number of books on religious topics,
and has been blind for most of his life (al-Muhaydib and
al-Ngsir 1986:14). See also, Who's Who in Saudi Arabia (1976-77) 
(London: Europa Publication, 1977), p.38.
15. The Mandi (lit. 'the guided one') is "a figure that some Muslims
believe will appear at the end of time to restore righteousness"
(The Concise Encyclopaedia of Islam, p.246). For the details of
the incident, see Kechichian (1986).
16. For the text of the fatlig , see Kechichian (1986:66).
17. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual
Report 1985 (Riyadh: 1985).
18. The term tribal bureaucracy has been used to describe the
traditional bureaucracy in some Middle Eastern countries where
the structure of government still relies on traditional methods
and relations. See Osama (1987:58) for more discussions.
19. See endnote no.55 in Chapter Two.
20. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, Third Development 
Plan 1980-1985 (Riyadh:1980), p.56.
21. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Saudi Arabia - Country Prof le,
1988-89 (London: 1988), p.2.
22. Al-Riyi4 newspaper (7583), 28.3.1989.
23. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Saudi Arabia - Country Report, 
No.1 1989 (London: 1989).
24. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, Achievements of 
the Development Plans (1970-1985) (Riyadh: n.d.), P.4.
25. Saudi Arabia ranked sixth among the biggest contributers to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). It contributed about $4.0
billion as of June 30, 1989 according to Time magazine,
31.7.1989, p.32. See also Lackner (1978:130).
26. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Saudi Arabia - Country Report 
No.1 1989 (London: 1989), p.11.
27. Al-Riy574 newspaper (7583), 28.3.1989, p.15.
28. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Information, Saudi Arabia 
between Yesterday and Today (Riyadh: n.d.), p.30.
29. See, for example, A. Ahmed (1988:153), Kay (1982:180), Hobday
(1978), Lackner (1978), and Kavoussi (1983) for what they regard
as the negative aspects of the modernization of Saudi Arabia.
See also McLachlan (1986).
30. See, for example, Shaker (1972), Long (1980), al-Hamad (1985),
and Huyette (1985).
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Chapter Five
1. For a detailed account of the influence of Islam on Saudi
foreign policy, see Piscatori (1983a).
2. The popular greeting in Saudi Arabia is al-salam calyakum (peace
be upon you), the use of which has been recommended by the
sharicah.
3. This position was adopted officially by King cAbd al-cAiiz in
the 1920s and continues in operation to the present time. See
al-Farsy (1986:96), and al-JuhanT (1984:93).
4. See The Economist Intelligence Unit, Saudi Arabia - Country
Profile, No.4, 1988, (London: 1988).
5. For information about the enforcement of religious observance
and public morality, see Chapter Seven.
6. See Yamani (1987:83) for a description of the effect of the
daily prayers on the Saudis' perception of time.
7. Royal Decree No.2966/M dated 19.9.1404 H.(18.6.1984) made it
illegal for government offices and businesses to employ women in
areas that bring them into direct contact with male employees.
8. The buses of the Public Transport Company have a separate
section for women.
9. Newsweek: 46, 18.11.1985. For the changing role of Saudi women,
see Kay (1982:177), and Alireza (1987).
10. From the official regulations issued annually by the Ministry of
the Interior. See Saudi Gazette: 3, 6.4.1989.
11. These are Nida' al-Islam broadcasting service from Makkah, the
Holy Qur'an broadcasting service from Riyadh, and the
"orientated programmes which are based on the Kingdom's
commitment towards the Islamic world" (Ministry of Information,
Saudi Arabia between Yetserday and Today), p.30.
12. See also Boyd (1982:119-143).
13. See, for example, Ochsenwald's (1981:280) review of one Saudi
newspaper, al-Madrnah, which "reflects the current nature of
Islam in Saudi Arabia in a number of ways."
14. The custom for men to marry more than one wife is still
widespread in the Kingdom especially in the central part (Najd).
There are, however, no estimates of the size or changes that
have occurred in 	 this practice over the past two decades.
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15. An example of modern organizations with religious functions are
the international organizations for da cwah and Islamic
activities such as the World Muslim League and World Assembly of
Muslim Youth. Both organizations are discussed later in this
chapter.
16. See the section dealing with prayer in Chapter Three. See also
Saudi Gazette: 3, 21.2.1989.
17. The Times: 10, 25.11.1986.
18. Kiswah is the name of the black cloth which covers the holy
177n717. The kiswah is changed every year. The Saudi government
has established a factory in Makkah for making the kiswah, and
the cost of the kiswah is estimated at about 17 million riyals
every year (Ministry of Pilgrimage and Endowments, The
Accomplishments of The Ministry of Pilgrimage and Endowments -
Facts and Figures 1407/1986. Riyadh: 1986, p.20).
19. Ministry of Planning, Fourth Development Plan - 1985-1990.
(Riyadh: 1985), p.366.
20. Arab News, 17.4.1988; and al-Yariamah (1036): 12, 19.5.1409 H.(28.12.1988).
_21. c Ukaz newspaper, 14.4.1989.
22. Ministry of Pilgrimage and Endowments: Op.Cit., p.12.
23. Ibid, p.13. See also al-Riyid newspaper, 5.11.1988.
24. Al-Riyad newspaper, 17.3.1989.
25. Al-Riyad newspaper, 18.3.1988.
26. On the role of the Saudi culama' in the politics of the country
see, for example, Bligh (1985), Kechichian (1986), al-Yassini(1982), and Piscatori (1980).
27. For the names of the twelve senior %lam • ' who are members of
the Commission of Senior culania', see al-YaMamah magazine (949):
14, 3.8.1407 H. (3.4.177)7--Kechichian (1986:68) has also
published the names of the thirty senior culama' who signed the
fatwa of 1979 which gave the government the green light to use
force in ending the occupation of the Holy Mosque of Makkah.
28. See the section on ifta' later in this chapter.
29. One of the main functions of this Council is to make
recommendations for new judges to be appointed by the King.
30. For studies that deal with the Saudi judicial system, see
al-Rasheed (1973), Solaim (1971), Basha (1979), and Souryal(1987).
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31. Capital Punishments are carried out in public and are reported
by the media. See, for example, Saudi Gazette: 4, 25. 2.1989,
and 18.3.1989.
32. See Sam Souryal (1987), and Basha (1979).
33. Ministry of Planning, Fourth Development Plan 1985-1990 (Riyadh:
1985), p.364.
34. Based on official documents obtained by the writer from the
Ministry of Pilgrimage and Endowments.
35. For information about the structure and activities of this
presidency, see al-Muhaydib and al-Ngsir (1986), and al-Yassini
(1985:70-72).
36. There are a number of popular programmes on television and radio
through which the culama' receive questions from the public and
answer them. See, for example, Boyd (1982:135).
37. A recent list was found in al-Riyad newspaper: 8, 3.5.1989.
38. Al-Yamamah magazine (949), 3.8.1407 H. (3.4.1987).
39. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Saudi Arabia - Country Profile, 
No.4 1988 (London: 1988). For more discussions about the
relationship between the cnlama' and the government, see
Kechichian (1986), Bligh (1985), al-Yassini (1985), Piscatori
(1983b), and Ochsenwald (1981).
40. These are the Journal for Islamic Research (Majalat al-Buhiith 
al-Islamiyyah) and the Journal for Islamic Awareness (Majalat 
al-Taw ciyyah al-Islamiyyah).
41. General Presidency for Scientific Research, Ifta', Da cwah and
Guidance, Department of Public Relations, The Development of the 
General Presidency (Riyadh: n.d.).
42. In Ras al-Khaymah (UAE), Indonesia, Japan, Mauritania and
Djibouti (Imam Muhammad b.Suclid Islamic University, DaliL Jami-
cat al-Imam - 1407 [Guide to the Imam University, 1987] Riyadh:
1987), p.6).
-43. Ministry of Higher Education, Al-Ta c lim al- c AlT fi-q-Mamlikah
al- cArabiyyah al-Su cildiyyah (Higher Education in the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia), 3rd annual report, 1985.
44. Ministry of Pilgrimage and Endowments; op.cit.., p.8-12.
45. See also al-Farsy (1986), and Piscatori (1983a).
c- c-	 —46. World Muslim League, Rabitat al- Alum al-IslZmI: cIshriin Am Ala 
Tariq al-Dacwah wa-l-Jihad (World Muslim League: Twenty Years on
the Road of Dacwah and Struggle) (Makkah: 1981), p.4.
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47. Fioh means jurisprudence: "The Science which deals with the
observance of rituals, the principles of the five pillars, and
social legislation" (Glass 1989: 126).
48. Saudi Gazette, 21.2.1989.
49. World Assembly of Muslim Youth. WAMY: Formation, Development and
Basic Documents. (Riyadh: n.d.).
50. Ministry of Information. Saudi Arabia Between Yesterday and
Today (Riyadh: n.d.), p.81.
51. Ministry of Pilgrimage and Endowments, op.cit., p.16. And
al—Riyid, 26.1.1989.
52. This conclusion has been supported by Ochsenwald (1981:284).
53. See also Kay (1982).
54. Examples are the Minister of Justice, the General President of
ifta', and the Chancellor of the Imam University.
55. See Lapidus (1975) for a discussion of the historical separation
between religious and political functions in the Islamic state.
56. See Crawford (1982).
57. For further discussions of the Moroccan culathi', see Burke III
(1972), and Brown (1972).
58. See Marsot (1972) for discussions about the Egyptian culaMP in
the 18th and 19th centuries.
59. See Lapidus (1975:383).
60. See the discussions about the enforcement of this Policy by the
Public Morality Committees in Chapter Eight.
Introduction to Part III
1. The Arabic word hay'ah means committee, commission or
organization. It is defined in al—Mu cjam—al—Wasit as "a group of
individuals performing a specific task" (vol.2, p.1012). The
term organization has been used for hay'ah, because the hay'ah 
today is a national organization for which the term committee is
not sufficient. It is possible to describe one of the local
centres as a committee, but not the whole structure of the
hay'ah. The term hay'ah is officially used in the singular form
to describe the organization. The regional level is known as
branches and the local level as centres. There is nothing unique
about the term hay'ah. It is widely used in Saudi Arabia to
describe government departments and independent bodies (e.g.
hay'at kibar al— culaml: commission of senior culanra; and hay'at 
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al-muwasafit wa i l-maclayis: committee for specifications and
measurements). It is thought to be used for the hay l ah to give( 
it a modern appearance. Some writers, however, Murshad 1972,
Ghazal 1984, al-Wahbi 1983, and al-cArlfr 1987) still use the
name of the traditional institution of hisbah to refer to the
hay'ah, and muhtasibs to refer to those who work for it."
2. Al-Yassini (1985:70) translated the name as "committees for
commanding the good and forbidding evil"; Huyette (1985:121) as
"committee for the preservation of virtue and prevention of
vice"; Holden and Johns (1981:87) as "the society for the
encouragement of good and the prevention of evil"; and
Ochsenwald (1981:275) as "the organization for the enforcing of
good and the forbidding of evil." All of these translations give
the approximate meaning of the Arabic name which is difficult to
translate exactly.
3. See, for example, the Qur'an (3:104, 9:71, and 7:157).
4. In Saudi Arabia, however, the hay'ah has been the subject of a
number of studies (mainly Masters theses). The studies by
Murshad (1972), Ghazal (1984), al-Wahbr (1983), al-ArIff (1987),
al-HawshIni (1984), and al-Sayf (1987) represents a growing body
of studies about the hay'ah in Saudi Arabia. Most of these
studies deal more with the traditional hisbah than with the
modern hay'ah, and they are mainly descriptive in nature.
5. The review also covers an unpublished Ph.D. thesis (i.e.
Goldrup, 1971).
6. Works that deal with the Islamic concept of enjoining the
acceptable and forbidding the reprehensible, or with the
traditional institution of hisbah will not be included in this
review. Some of those works have been used as references for
parts of this study, and they are listed in the Bibliography.
7. One problem with the information presented by Goldrup (1971:403)
is his association of the activities of the hay'ah in the Hejaz
in the late 1920s with the Islamic institution of jihad. Jihad
can only be against non-Muslims, and the activities of
commanding good and forbidding evil in an Islamic society is
different from jihad in its specific meaning which is war.
8. For a review of al-Yassini's book, see William Ochsenwald's
review in the Middle East Journal, vol.40, PP.343-344, 1986.
9. The term mafawaeah means volunteers or those who obey. It is
commonly used to describe those who volunteer their time for
religious duties (eg. leading prayer or teaching). Glasse
(1989:291) defines the term as "those who enforce obedience" and
used it to refer to "a peculiar institution of vigilants who
enforce the performance of prayer and may even inflict beating
for moral laxity." The term matawa cah is no longer an accurate
term to describe members of the hay'ah, because they are no
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longer volunteers. They are paid employees of the state and part
of the civil service. Furthermore, this term can only describe
individuals not institutions. Members of the hay'ah are referred
to officially as a cdi' (pl. of 'udii) which means members.
10. See Chapter Five for information about mosques construction and
religious education in Saudi Arabia.
11. See Murshad (1972:198) for the names of the first members of the
hay'ah in Nhkkah. The majority (ten out of fourteen) were from
the people of Makkah and had nothing to do with the ikhwqn.
12. See the discussions about the relationship between the hay'ah and
the police in Chapter Eight.
13. See the historical evolution of the modern hay'ah in Chapter Six.
14. See, for example, Long (1980:99), Iqbal (1977:246), Lipsky
(1959:5), Habib (1978:119), Alireza (1987:433), Hiro (1988:123),
Mortimer (1982:175), and Wenner (1975:181).
Chapter Six
1. See section B of this chapter.
2. See the Introduction to Part Three.
3. The translation of the Qur'En used here is that of A. Yusuf Ali
The Holy Qur'En: Text, Translation and Commentary (Brentwood,
Maryland: Amana Corporation, 1983).
4. This classical work has been translated by Muhtar Holland under
the title Public Duties in Islam — The Institution of the Hisba
(London: The Islamic Foundation, 1983).
5. Forbidding a reprehensible act by the heart means to hate the
individual who insists on doing the wrong deed and to have no
relationship with him whatsoever. This is designed to create
public pressure against wrongdoers, and to isolate those who do
not conform to the group's norms.
6. In fact, the terms hisbah and muhtasib were not used during the
lifetime of the Prophet Mutiammad, but were introduced decades
later during the Abbasid dynasty (132-656/794-1258). See the
section about the historical evolution of the hisbah 4,c6fcto-siX.
7. This book has been translated by Franz Rosenthal under the same
Arabic title, The Muqaddimah (Princeton University Press, 1967).
8. See, for example, Ibn Taymiyyah (1983), al—cAmri (1984), and
Murshad (1972).
9. This article is cited by Patricia Crone in Roman, Provincial and
Islamic Law — The Origin of the Islamic Patronate (Cambridge
University Press, 1987).
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10. For discussions about hisbah in the Hejaz before the birth of the
modern Saudi state, see Ochsenwald (1984).
11. She was the daughter of Shaykh cAbdullah b. Rasan, and the mother
of King Faysal who ruled from 1964 until his death in 1975 (Lees
1980:36).
12. Philby (1928:49) related a story of a ngl ib (a policeman or a
hay'ah volunteer) and a mil'adhdhin who visited an individual at
his house to question him about why he had not been to the mosque
for the dawn prayer. See also Ghazal (1984:141).
13. A 'Tuber of these documents are kept in the Archives of King cAbd
al- AzIz Dirah (research centre) in Riyadh. Examples are
documents number 143, 192, 216, 659, 661, 1067 in the collection
of the Darah. Most of these documents contain a wealth of advice
about the importance of religion and the need for everyone to
play his part in the enforcement of religious teachings.
14. This is document number 192 in the Darah's collection. A
translation of parts of this document is in Appendix C.
15. Sometimes the opening of a new hay'ah was done in response to a
request made by the people. An example is foundin document
number 887 in the collection of King Abd al- Aziz Dirah. This
document is a letter from the King to one of his governors
instructing him to appoint riiiwib to carry out the duties of
al-amr bi- 1 1-macrlif waq-nahy can al-munkar in the town of Mart
(in Najd) because "a group of citizens from the town have
mentioned to us that their town does not have nilw -ab in it."
16. Incorporating the Ilay'ah into the civil service was apparantly
done as a result 
of 
King Fayqal l s programme for modernizing the
structure of the state. In 1962, Fay§al issued a ten-point
programme in which he declared his intentions "to reform the
Committees of Public Morality in accordance with the Shari ca and
Islam's lofty goals, for which they were originally created, and
in such a way as to extripate to the greatest extent evil motives
from the hearts of people" (quoted in Gerald De Gaury 1966:149).
See also Murshad (1972:196).
17. Ochsenwald (1984:7) has reported that the muhtasib in the Hejaz
up to 1908 was appointed by the war to "inspect the markets for
fraud ... and helped set the price of bread, meat, and clarified
butter." This made the hisbah in the Hejaz different from the
hay'ah in some respects.
18. This article was published in the official newspaper Umm al-Qurg,
issue no.113, 8.8.1345H (11.2.1927). See also Goldrup (1971:407),
and Murshad (1972:200). it is also discussed in the section
dealing with regulations in Chapter Seven.
19. See Chapter Four.
20. See the section about regulations in Chapter Seven.
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21. Decree number 5388 dated 10.2.1372H (30.10.1952). A copy was
obtained by the writer from the Deputy to the General President
of the hay'ah for Financial and Administrative Affairs.
22. These regulations cwere issued from the office of the Crown
Prince, Su rid b. Abd al- Azlz, carrying the number 5345 and
were dated 10.2.137211 (30.10.1952). A copy was also obtained
from the Deputy to the General President of the hay'ah. See the
section dealing with regulations in Chapter Seven.
23. See endnote 16 above.
24. For discussions about the developments of the hay'ah in the
southern region of Saudi Arabia, see al-Bishri (1983:144)y and
AbIT Dihish (1985).
Chapter Seven
1. The sources of this information are an old member at al-cUlayya
centre who has been working for the hay'ah for more than thirty
five years. An interview was conducted with him on 16.1.88. The
second sources is a policeman at al-SuwaydI centre who had worked
with Shaykh Umar b. Hasan for many years. An interview was
conducted with him on 23.2.88.
2. The interview was published	 in Al-Yamgmah	 magazine
(Riyadh)(813): 5,4.11.1404 H. (2.8.1984).
3. This point was emphasized by the deputy to the general president
of the hay'ah, Shaykh Abdulrahman b. Ahmad, in an interview
with Al-Riyad newspaper (7064), 26.10.1987.
4. These statistics were obtained by the writer from the office of
the deputy for financial and administrative affairs of the
general presidency of the hay'ah. A list of the official
documents that provide these information is listed under the
section "unpublished official documents" in the Bibliography.
5. From an interview with the president of al-Suwaydi centre in
Riyadh, 16.12.1988.
6. The General Director of Public Security is also a prominent
member of Al al-Shaykh Family (see Kechichian 1986:62). For more
information about the relationship between the hay'ah and the
police, see Chapter Eight and Section Five of the By-Laws
(Appendix G).
7. This document has no date but an expert working in the
documents' department of King cAbd al-cAziz Dirah (research
centre) in Riyadh told the writer that he believed that it was
written sometime between 1910 and 1920. This makes it the oldest
regulation for the hay'ah.
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8. See document No. 1381 (2) of the collection of the Documents'
Centre of the Institute of Public Administration, Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia.
9. Consultative Council resolution No.363 on 26.7.1349 H.
(17.12.1930). The document is in the collection of the
Documents' Centre of the Institute of Public Administration in
Riyadh.
10. See document No. 84/1/25 on 15.1.1356 H. (28.3.1937). It is in
the Documents' Centre of the Institute of Public Administration
in Riyadh. For more information see the section about the
evolution of the modern hay'ah in the Hejaz.
11. A copy of this regulation was obtained by the writer from the
Deputy to the General President of the hay'ah for Financial and
Administrative Affairs. This regulation was made official by
Crown Prince Decree No. 5388 on 10.2.1372 H (30.10.1952).
12. For more detailed information about the General President of the
hay'ah, see Who's who in Saudi Arabia 1976-77 (London: Europa
publications, 1977), pp.21-22.
13. This book is called AJ-amr bi- 1 1-Macrid wa-'l-nahy can al-Munkar 
bayn wa-q-11-d4ir (enjoining the acceptable and
forbidding the reprehensible between the pastand the present),
and is published by Imam Mu4ammad b. Su 5d Islamic University,
Riyadh:1981.
14. The current statistics were obtained from the department of
budget and organization of the general presidency of the hay'ah.
The 1970 information was obtained from the annual report about
the national budget published by the Ministry of Finance and
National Economy,  The State Budget for the Fiscal Year 
1389-1390H (1969-1970) Riyadh, 1970.
15. This interview was published in al-Riyid newspaper (7238): 4,
17.4.1988.
16. This information was told to the writer by the head of the
office of the general supervisor of the Riyadh regional branch.
The exact number of members with a university degree working in
other parts of the country could not be easily found.
17. See al-Riyad newspaper (7500): 4, 4.1. 1989 and (7465): 4,
30.11.1988.
18. Al-Riyad newspaper (7238): 4, 17.4.1988.
19. From an interview conducted by the writer with the Deputy for
Financial and Administrative Affairs in his office at the
General Presidency of the hay'ah on 6.2.1988.
20. Ibid.
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21. See circular number 434/4 dated 21.1.140611 (6.10.1985) sent from
the hay'ah regional branch in Riyadh to al-cUlayya Centre. See
also Al-Rifid newspaper (7295):4, 29.10.1408H (16.6.1988).
22. See circular number 259/2/5 on 19.9.140011 (2.8.1980) sent from
the General President to the President of Riyadh hay'ah 
instructing him to work with the police department in making
sure that all restaurants have separate areas for families and
women customers.
23. This point was repeatedly emphasized by officials of the hay'ah 
in an interview conducted with four of them by Al-Yamamah 
magazine (Riyadh) (813):3, 4.11.1404H (2.8.1984).
24. See circular number 13 dated 8.1.1406H (23.9.1985), sent from
al-cUlayya centre to all the hotels in the area.
25. See, for example, letter number 4113/1 dated 25.7. 140511(19.4.1985) from the Governor of Riyadh to the General
Supervisor of the Riyadh branch of the hay'ah. See also Al
al-Shaykh (1981:73).
26. Al-Riy-id newspaper (7335): 6, 10.12.1408H (26.7.1988).
27. Based on an agreement between the General President of the
ha 'ah and the Deputy of the National Guard. Circular number
1 3	 5 dated 9.8.140811 (29.3.1988), in the files of al-Suwayydi
centre.
28. See "Saudis expel more drinking women", The Times: 1, 4.11.1986.
See also al-Wahbi (1983:122-129).
29. For more discussions about some of the problems that the hay'ah 
faces today, see Al al-Shaykh (1981:52, 59),
	 al-HawshgnI
(1984:97, 166, 189), and al-Wahbi (1983:133-150).
Chapter Eight
1.	 From an interview conducted by the writer with the Director of
the General Administration of Narcotics Control in his office in
Riyadh, 6.7.140811 (23.2.1988).
2. This plaque is displayed in the office of the General Supervisor
of the Riyadh branch of the hay'ah.
3. See case number 725 SH/999 on 10.3.1g07H (13.11.1986), in the
file dealing with prayer cases in al- Ulayya centre.
4. Al-Riygd newspaper (7276), 25.5.1988.
5. See, for example, circular number 4505/4 on 14.8. 1405H(5.5.1985) sent from the President of Riyadh hay'ah to the
president of al- Ulayya centre instructing him to cooperate
fully with law-enforcement agencies. Also circular number 9152
on 15.12.140611 (31.8.1986) sent from the Governor of Riyadh
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instructing all relevant institutions to cooperate together in
fighting evil phenomena in society.
6. See letter number 2252/90/4 on 18.4.1408H (10.12.1987) from
Riyadh hay'ah to al!Ulayya centre.
7. Letter number 123/M/H on 5.2.1408H (29.10.1987) sent from the
public prosecution office of the General Administration of
Narcotics Control to the president of al-Suwaydl centre asking
him to send four members to act as witnesses against a defendant
accused of selling narcotics. The four members had taken part in
his arrest.
8. Officials of the Ministry of Pilgrimage and Endowments responded
by sending circular number 12507/8/d on 22.7.1407H (28.3.1987)
to all imams of mosques instructing them to close down mosques
and washing areas after the evening prayer. A copy of this
circular was sent to the local centres of the hay'ah.
9. See circular number 355/2 on 16.1.140711 (21.9.1986) based on a
letter from the Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs which
requires all shopping centres to have their own mosques. Also
letter number 1673/i from the president of the Riyadh hay'ah to
the president of al-Ulayya centre instructing him to enforce the
new regulations issued by the Governor of Riyadh which requires
all banks to prepare an area for prayer inside their branches.
10. Other examples of merchandise removed by the hay'ah are prayer
rugs with the sign of the cross on them, notebooks with an
indecent picture of a woman on it, Valentine and Christmas
cards, and a medical dictionary with pictures of naked human
beings. These cases were in the files of al- Ulayya centre. See
also Mackey (1987:13-15).
11. An example is letter number 24/Th/11 on 7.5.1408H (28.12.1987)
from the General President of the hay'ah to the Minister of
Information asking him to withdraw from shops a number of
magazines that contained indecent pictures. The letter isilmthe
files of al-cUlayya centre.
12. For example, case number 6722/4 on 19.11.1407H (16.7.1987) in
the files of al-cUlayya centre involves the arrest of four
foreigners found running a business of renting pornographic
movies from their house. The arrest was made by members from
al-cUlayya centre, and the case was transferred to the shaficah
court.
13. From an interview conducted by the writer with the Deputy
General Supervisor of the Riyadh branch in his office. See also
al-Yamamah magazine (813):5, 2.8.1984.
14. These interviews were published in al-Riyid newspaper,
21.8.1987, 26.10.1987, 17.4.1988, and 8.10.1988. The articles
were published on 11.1.1987, 26.2.1987, 28.1.1988, and
23.7.1988. The newsitems were published on 4.1.1988, 28.1.1988,
13.6.1988, and 30.11.1988.
15. See al-Yamimah magazine (813): 3, 2.8.1984; (1054):4 2, 3.5.1989;
and (1056): 52, 24.5.1989.
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16. See the interview with the General President of the Hay'ah,
al-Riygd newspaper (7238): 4, 17.4.1988, and the interview with
the Deputy General President, al-Riyad newspaper (7064):4,
26.10.1987.
17. Examples are case number 2959/4 on 19.5.1407H (20.1.1987)
dealing with the discovery of a small factory for making
intoxicant drinks; case number 2221/4 on 14.4.1407H (17.12.1986)
dealing with two male prostitutes; and case number 2306/4 on
19.4.1407H (22.12.1986) dealing with the sale of narcotics. All
these cases are in the files of al-Suwaydi centre classified
according to the type of crime.
18. From interviews published by al-Riyad newspaper (7238): 4,
17.4.1988; and al-Yamamah magazine (1056): 52, 24.5.1989.
19. See al-Yathamah magazine (813):3, 2.8.1984.
20. This practice used to be very common in the 1970s. It was
regarded as a munkar because members of the hay'ah believed that
young people did it to imitate western pop stars. The phenomenon
and the enforcement have largely disappeared since the early
1980s.
21. See The Times:1, 4.11.1986.
22. See Arab News newspaper: 2, 20.4.1988.
23. See The Times: 8, 7.11.1986.
24. cAtirah (lit., that which is to be hidden) "denotes those parts
of the body which Islam requires to be covered in front of
others, whether of the same or opposite sex" (al-Qaradawi
1960:154).
25. See Paul Vallely "Saudis ban expatriate Christmas festivals",
The Times: 24, 4.1.1985. See also Makey (1987:92-97).
26. cji.shura' is the name of the tenth day of the first month of the
Islamic year, Muharram. It is celebrated by the Shi cites as an
anniversary of the murder of Imam Husayn, the son of the fourth
Caliph cAli• See The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam (London:
Stacey International, 1989), p.52.
27. See letter number AD8255/S dated 29.12.140411 (24.9.1984) sent
from the Governor of Riyadh to the General Supervisor of the
hay'ah's branch in the Riyadh region. The hay'ah in turn issued
specific instructions to its members on how to deal cwith
diplomats. See "Ta limat al-Ta cimul ma a a dg, al-Bi thah
al-Diplmisiyyah" (instructions on how to deal with members of
the diplomatic corps) issued by the office of the General
President of the hay'ah in 1984.
28. The Vienna Agreement for Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges
was ratified by the Kingdom based on Royal Decree number M/38
dated 21.11.1400H (30.9.1980), and the Council of Minister's
resolution number 193 dated 13.11.1400H (22.9.1980).
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Chapter Nine
1. The city of Riyadh has thirty six hay'ah centres compared to
only eleven police centres. Al-Hawsh
	
( 
InT 1984:182) discusses the
problems associated with having too many centres and proposes a
plan for compressing the-existing centres into eleven major ones
which would make it easier to find qualified presidents to run
those centres. See also al-Wahbi (1982:159).
2. The Fourth Development Plan (1985-1990) has made it clear that
"it has been considered necessary to expand activities of the
enforcers of public morality and establish centres in parts of
the Kingdom where services did not exist" (Ministry of Planning,
Fourth Development Plan 1405-1410/1985-1990, Riyadh, 1985,
p.362). The plan allocates 79 million riyals for expansion of
services by the hay'ah during the plan's period (ibid, p.366).
The hay'ah is moving its headquarters this year into a larger
building in the centre of Riyadh which used to be occupied by
the sharT c
 ah College, and part of the building of the new
central mosque in Riyadh is reserved for a hay'ah centre which
will be the first local centre to be built by the government
(all existing local centres are located in rented houses) (see
al-JazTrah 18.7.1408H (6.3.1988), p.6). The president of ifti',
Shaykh Ibn alz, has said in a lecture he delivered in Riyadh in
March 1988, attended by the writer, that the government is
planning to issue a new special cadre for the hay'ah which, in
his words, will help improve its performance.
3. The General President of the hay'ah takes a moderate stand by
regarding photography as a necessity which is not harmful to
religion and is, therefore, permissible (Al al-Shaykh 1981:32).
For the general Islamic rules in dealing with smoking, beard
shaving, photography, and music, see al-Qaradawi (1969:79, 94,
116, and 300), and for the stand of the Permanent Committee for
iftrin Saudi Arabia see Fatawi Majalat al-Dacwah, pp.58, 232,
250, and 294.
4. See Huyette (1985:38).
5. See Wahba (1964) for information about the positions of the King
and the prominent  culaii' in regard to the introduction of
technology into the country.
6. Examples are religious programmes on radio and television (see
Boyd 1982), and the use of the telephone as a medium between the
Gulama'and members of the public who seek fatwis on religious
matters.
7. The hay'ah has helped in making the government adopt clear
policies that require, for example, separate sections for
families in restaurants, separate sections for women in public
transportation (buses), and that all shops and business close
down at times of prayer.
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8. See al-Awaji (1971), and Osama (1987:58).
9. Members of Al al-Shaykh family have a monopoly on most of the
top positions of the organization.
10. From an interview with the Deputy to
1988.
11. See al-HawshgnT (1984:187).
12. The writer got this impression from working with members of the
hay'ah in the field during field-work.
13. Al-WahbT (1982) and al-tlawshani (1984) have both discussed some
of the practical problems that make the task of the hay'ah more
difficult, and they give solutions and policy recommendations.
Both have worked for the bay l ah, and they speak from experience.
14. See al-Muhaydib and al-NA7sir (1986).
15. In an interview with al-Yamamah, (1056) 19.10.1409H (24.5.1989),
the General President of the hay'ah said that dealing with the
problem of narcotics is a responsibility of the lilay'ah even if
there is another government department The General
Administration of Narcotics Control which is part of the
Ministry of the Interior) that is better equipped to deal with
the problem. This is one area where responsibilities overlap,
and which the hay'ah is not equipped to deal with.
16. See al Hawshani (1984:97).
17. The Assistant-Deputy to the General President and the Director
of the Confidential Office of the General President are both
young members of the family (in their twenties).
18. The hay'ah played a major role in the decision of the government
to close down video (amusement) arcades in the country in 1983
(al-Hawshani 1984:129).
19. Most of the policies were issued by the Ministry of the
Interior. It also publishes rules and regulations dealing with
acceptable behaviour in public, and especially with expatriates
in the Kingdom. See 11 al-Shaykh (1981:73), al-Wahbi (1983:100)
and al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper, 7.3.1403H (23.12.1982).
Chapter Ten
1. For the problems associated with theories of secularization as
they apply to Islamic societies, see Voll (1987), Tibi (1980),
and B. Wilson (1987b).
2. See, for example, Greeley (1972), M. Douglas (1982), Hammond
(1985), and Beckford and Luckmann (1989).
the General President, June
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3. For the distinction between secularism and secularization, see
endnote no.21 in Chapter Two.
4. The three processes of institutional differentiation, religious
change and religious involvement are the three dimensions of the
general process of secularization according to Dobbelaere
(1981). This study is only concerned with the first dimension
(ie. institutional differentiation).
5. The classification used here is based on the one developed by
Salame (1987).
6. See the studies by al-Hamad (1985), and Huyette (1985). See also
Kluck (1984:203).
7. The Saudi case is not unique in this regard. See, for example,
Tamaru (1987) for a discussion of the problems associated with
trying to apply the current theories of secularization to
religious change in Japanese society.
8. See Dobbelaere (1987:13).
9. A very important problem here is the fact that we have no
technique to measure the level of institutional differentiation
and compare it with what has taken place in a modern society
(see Dobbelaere 1987:17).
10. See Ochsenwald (1981:272).
11. There is today a growing trend in universities in Egypt and
Saudi Arabia towards the establishment of an academic discipline
called "the sociology of Islam". A number of books have been
written in this area. See, for example, al-Khurayjr (1982), cAbd
al-Bgqi (1984), and al-SamglUti (1985).
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Appendix A
Scheme of Transliteration of Arabic
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Scheme of Transliteration of Arabic 
a
th
t
kh
ci
dh
3
sh
k.7
9
aw
ay
	 7
The system employed follows that of the occasional academic
publication Arabian Studies produced by the Middle East Centre,
University of Cambridge, except for the letter cayn (E) which will be
transliterated as a small c above the line ( c ),to differentiate it
clearly from the hamzah ('). In the case of most Arabic words, the
precise transliteration form has been preferred even though an
Anglicized form exists (e.g culama' and ma'adhdhin have been used in
preference to ulema and muezzin). A few exceptions, however, have been
made: for instance, imam (instead of im7m).
Proper names with a standard English spelling (e.g Riyadh and
Islam) will be spelled that way with the exception of Makkah (Mecca)
and al-MadInah (Medina). When a noun in the genitive is appended to an
undefined noun ending in a ta , marb-atah, the latter is transliterated
by 't', otherwise it is 'h'. Thus hay'ah will appear invariably as
hay'at in the title of the organisation, hay'at al-amr bi!l-macrUf 
etc.
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Appendix B
Doing Field Research in Saudi Arabia
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The aims of this Appendix are to discuss briefly the writer's
experience of doing field-work in Saudi Arabia and to reflect on the
problems encountered, in order to give an idea of the common
difficulties associated with field research in a society that is yet
to appreciate the importance of social science research. The expansion
of university education in the Kingdom has improved the situation in
the past few years, but cultural resistance to social research remains
strong especially in dealing with personal affairs. The problem has
been recognized by some of the people who have tried to study Saudi
society (see Niblock 1982:11).
The report will not be a chronicle of events, but will focus on
a small selection of methodological concerns. The field-work was
carried out in the city of Riyadh between January and June 1988. The
aim of the field trip was to collect as much information as possible
about hay'at al-amr bi-'l-ma c rTif wa-'l-nahy can al-munkar
(organization for enjoining the acceptable and forbidding the
reprehensible): a unique religious organization responsible for the
enforcement of religious observances and public morality, and commonly
known as "Public Morality Committees".
Planning for Field-Work
It was recognized from the beginning that the hay'ah had never been
studied outside Saudi Arabia. Very little was known about its
structure, leadership, regulations, members, and activities. It was
felt necessary to collect as much basic information as possible about
these aspects before one could focus on one particular area. Not
having a clear idea of what to expect, it was decided to follow the
advice of Douglas that "researchers should keep their options open at
the start of a project; and flexibility should be maintained" (quoted
in Burgess 1984:145). I decided therefore to allow my strategy to
develop during the progress of field-work.
Gaining Access
The first step taken in preparation for the field-work was trying to
gain access to the organization. It was only logical to start at the
top of the organization approaching the person who has the power to
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grant access (see Burgess 1984:48). The formal letter addressed to the
General President of the hay'ah explaining the purpose of the study
and requesting permission to observe the activities of a local centre
of the hay'ah was answered positively after a delay of two months. The
General President wrote on my original letter to his Deputy
instructing him to allow me to work in al— cUlayya local centre in
Riyadh as a muwazzaf idgri (administrative employee) where I would
have the opportunity to conduct my research.
The approval of the General President was crucial for my plans.
It only gave me access to the organization, however, but not to the
information I was looking for. I discovered after working for a few
days in al—cUlayya centre, that "entree is a continuous process of
establishing and developing relationships, not only with a chief host
but with a variety of less powerful persons" (Schutzman and Strauss
1973:22). It was necessary to continue to try to gain access to
information on all three levels of the organization (national,
regional and local). But this is not easy in a society that is still
mainly structured by networks of kinship and patronage.
Problems of Confidentiality
The hay'ah is an enforcement agency, much of whose work involves the
arrest and interrogation of offenders. Officials of the organization
feel responsible for protecting the identity of individuals who are
detained by its members. Both the Deputy General—President and the
Regional Supervisor of the Riyadh Branch told me, the first day I
began work, that I would not be allowed to see cases that contained
names of people who had been arrested. I tried to assure them that I
was not looking for names, and that the study would not benefit from
revealing the identity of individuals. The ban, however, against
seeing case—files, made it difficult for me to observe all aspects of
the office work of the organization, and limited the amount of
information collected.
Access to Information
The amount of information I was able to collect was further limited by
a number of other factors. Firstly, not all the official documents
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that I requested from the General Presidency and the Riyadh Branch
were made available. Secondly, my personal observation of field
activities was constrained by the fact that I was not able to go into
the field unless I was invited by the centre's president. Thirdly, I
did not remain with the same group for sufficient time to be able to
attempt any methodical study of field activities in a controlled
fashion. Moreover, the files which I reviewed in the local centres
were poorly kept and organized due to the lack of qualified staff (see
al-ljawshanT 1984:187).
Dual Role of Worker and Researcher
I still do not know why officials of the hay'ah treated me like an
employee of the organization. Access to the two local centres was
gained by official letters from the Riyadh Branch to the local centres
instructing their presidents to allow me to participate in activities
of the centres as an administrative employee. I believe that this made
it easier for me to be accepted by the people working in the centres,
who regarded me as a fellow employee. It created problems, however,
when it came to collecting information. Some of the members thought
that I was doing the study for the General Presidency. It is possible
that, as a result, some of the members may have been inhibited by my
presence, and that may have influenced their behaviour during the
activities in which I was involved. But a study by covert
participation would have been unacceptable.
Furthermore, it became difficult to remain detached from some of
the work that I was asked to do (e.g. paper-work or translation during
the interrogation of the few offenders who only spoke English). On
occasion, I could no longer retain my neutral position as an observer
or take notes of what was going on. This problem is not uncommon in
situations where a fieldworker is also acting as an employee in an
organization. It was aggravated in my case by the nature of some of
the work that I had to do.
Working in a Familiar Environment
Being familiar with the surroundings may have resulted in my
overlooking "situations that at first sight appear all too familiar"
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(Burgess 1984:24). I tried to assume the role of an outsider, but in
the nature of things it is impossible to know how successful I was in
doing so. Creating personal friendships with a number of the people
with whom I worked and also becoming involved with the work I was
trying to observe, may have further complicated the problem.
Cultrual Resistance to Social Science Research
Saudi society is emerging from a long period of cultural isolation and
limited educational tradition. Most people still do not understand the
importance of investigative research. Surveys dealing with personal
issues (e.g. age, income, opinions regarding social issues, and
religious practices) have a very limited chance of success. I tried to
conduct a survey about the people working for the hay'ah, but without
success. Only two questionnaires were returned out of one hundred
distributed among members working in local centres.
The aim of the survey was to elicit information about the age
and educational and social backgrounds of the members, the reasons
that made them decide to work for the hay'ah, and problems associated
with their work. The questionnaires could only be distributed through
the presidents of local centres and were supposed to be collected by
them to be returned to me. This arrangement may have contributed to
the failure of the survey. Less serious problems were encountered
while conducting two other minor surveys to discover what kind of
relationship exists between the hay'ah and members of the public (see
Chapter Eight). Yet, the people who were interviewed appeared to be
very cautious about answering even simple questions concerning the
hay'ah.
The above were some examples of the problems encountered by the
writer during field—work. In spite of these problems, a wealth of
information was collected about the hay'ah and the religious situation
in Saudi Arabia. It is possible that the attitude of the ordinary
person towards research will improve in the next few years in line
with the expansion of higher education and the dawning realization of
the importance of social science research.
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Appendix C
A translation of parts of a communique issued by King cAbd al-cAziz
-
Al-Suc ud. It has no date, but is thought to have been written between
1910 and 1920. It is considered the first official regulations for the
hay'ah. This document was obtained by the writer from King cAbd
al-cAzIz Dgrah (research centre) in Riyadh. It is document Number 192
in the Darah's collection.
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From cAbd al-cAziz b. cAbd al-Rahman to everyone who sees it from
among the Muslims ... Peace be to you, ... We intend to clarify for
you what had been agreed between us and the culaMa'. Based on that
agreement, we have decided to establish hay'at in all towns to enjoin
what is acceptable and to forbid what is reprehensible. Most important
among their tasks is to enforce the attendance, by the people, at the
five daily prayers in congregation. Also to encourage people to learn
the basics of their religion, and to keep an eye on those who commit
munkars. After that comes the matter of zakah, and trading between
people to see that it is clear of usury, cheating and transgression.
Endowments must be dealt with in accordance with the shaeVah.
As for the zakah, the hay'ah must make sure that people are paying it.
They should ask those who say that they have paid it to tell to whom
they have paid it, and the ones who have done that have done their
duty and may Allah reward them for it. If it appears to them that
someone has not paid his zakah, then they should collect it in
accordance with the ways of the shaei cah. Then they should distribute
it among the poor of the Muslims ... After that they should look at
the ways of selling and buying, and should make sure that people do
not use ribi (usury) in their tradings.
If they find any contract that contradicts the shael cah, then
they must render it void and discipline those who took part in it.
They are also to discipline anyone who is caught cheating or who does
not give people their rights in terms of measurements or weights.
After that they should look at awqaf (endowments) ..., to make sure
that they are dealt with in the right way according to the
shari cah . This is only an advice which Allah has made obligatory
upon us. Our aim is to bring good things to the people and to fight
away evil.
382
Appendix D
A translation of the Royal Decree issued in 1396/1976 establishing the
hay'ah as a general presidency.
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Ref: M/64
Date: 1.9.1396 H
(26.8.1976)
With the help of God, the most sublime,
We, Khalid b. cAbd cAl-cAziz 11-Sucal, King of Saudi Arabia,
having reviewed articles 19 and 25 of the Council of Ministers Statute
issued by Royal Decree No.38 of 22.10.137711 (11.5.1958),
And having also reviewed Council of Ministers Decree No.1394 of
28.8.1396H (24.8.1976),
We Decree the following:
First, the unification of the Organizations for Enjoining the
Acceptable and Forbidding the Reprehensible in one Organization with
one budget and under the leadership of one president appointed by a
Royal Decree.
Second, the budgets of the two current Organizations must come
together as one budget, and the name of the Organization shall be
al-ri'isah al- Camah li-hay'at al-amr wa-Il-nahycan al-
munkar (The General Presidency of the Organization for Enjoining the
Acceptable and Forbidding the Reprehensible).
Third, the Deputy Premier and The Minister of Finance and National
Economy have to put this Decree of ours into effect.
The Royal signature: Khalid
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Appendix E
A translation of the Royal Decree and the Resolution of the Council of
Ministers Issuing the current Statute of the hay'ah.
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Ref: M/37
Date: 26.10.1400H
(6.9.1980)
With the Help of God, the Most Sublime,
We, Khalid b. AM cAl-cAziz il-Sucgd, King of Saudi Arabia,
Having reviewed Article 19 of the Council of Ministers Statute issued
by Royal Decree No.38 of 22.10.1377H (11.54958), and having also
reviewed Council of Ministers Decree No.161 of 16.9.1400H (28.8.1980),
We decree the following: First, we ratify the Statute for the
Organization for Enjoining the Acceptable and Forbidding the
Reprehensible as set in the document enclosed herewith. Second, the
Deputy Premier and Cabinet Ministers have to put this decree of ours
into effect, each in as much as it concerns him.
The Royal Signature: Khalid
Decree No.161 of 16.9.140011 (28.8.1980)
The Council of Ministers, having reviewed the papers enclosed
herewith, including the letter of His Highness the Minister of the
Interior No.1/7596 of 28.8.139811 (2.8.1978), to which the report of
the Committee formed to review the Draft Statute of the General
Presidency of the Organization for Enjoining the Acceptable and
Forbidding the Reprehensible is attached, with the final draft of the
said Statute made by the Committee, and,
Having reviewed the said Draft Statute itself, decrees the following:
First, the Statute of the Organization for Enjoining the Acceptable
and Forbidding the Reprehensible, in the form attached herewith, is
hereby ratified. Second, a draft Royal Decree, in the form attached
herewith, has been made. This has been set down for the said purpose.
Second Deputy Premier
386
Appendix F
A translation of the current nicam (statute) of the hay'ah issued in
1400/1980.
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STATUTE of THE ORGANIZATION FOR ENJOINING THE ACCEPTABLE
AND FORBIDDING THE REPREHENSIBLE
Section One 
Setting up a General Presidency for
the Organizations For Enjoining the Acceptable, and Related Matters
Article 1: The General Presidency of the Organization for Enjoining
the Acceptable and Forbidding the Reprehensible is an independent
body, directly affiliated to the Head of the Council of Ministers (ie.
the King). Subordinate to it are all the Organizations already in
existence at the time this Statute goes into effect or formed
afterwards.
Article 2: The General President of the Organization has the rank of a
Minister, and his appointment and relief of duty are by Royal Decree.
Under him are two deputies who are appointed, to the fifteenth level,
and are relieved of duty by Decree from the Council of Ministers.
Sufficient numbers of inspectors, investigators, a c di.' (members),
personnel, and employees are employed by the General Presidency.
Article 3: In every Province, a Branch of the hay'ah is set up. It is
formed by an Order of the General President which names a General
Supervisor and an assistant who assists the General Supervisor and
acts for him in his absence or when the position becomes vacant.
Sufficient numbers of members, personnel, administrative staff and
employees are employed by the Branch, and a sufficient number of
Centres are formed in every city and every village.
Article 4: The General President has the prerogative to form
committees, whose members are chosen from the members of the hay'ah 
and legal investigators for the following purposes:
A. Investigating cases and unlawful violations related to cases that
are referred to Islamic Law Courts.
B. Handling moral violations and accusations and determining the
penalty in each, which can be a pledge signed by the culprit, a
reprimand, flogging as a disciplinary measure up to a maximum of
fifteen whip lashes, or imprisonment to a maximum of three days.
388
C. Province supervisors and heads of centres supervise the
disciplinary measures described in B, after the respective
governor sanctions the flogging or imprisonment penalty. If the
governor sanctions the penalty, the case is referred back to the
hay'ah to execute the penalty. If, however, he decides the case
should be settled in court, it is referred to court. When a judge
pronounces a verdict, the case is referred back to the hay'ah for
execution.
Section Two 
The Authorities of the General President
Article 5: The General President of the hay'ah is the immediate chief
and the ultimate authority of all such organizations. He is
immediately subordinate to the Premiere and enjoys the same authority
that a cabinet minister enjoys within his ministry.
Article 6: The General President of the hay'ah has the prerogative to
ask the governor of a province to refer to a court of Islamic Law any
case he believes to belong there.
Section Three
Appointment, Promotion, and Disciplinary Action Against
Members and Personnel of the Hay'ah 
Article 7: The positions of presidents, members, inspectors,
investigators, heads of religious departments, supervisors, and
assistants are filled - with people with proper academic
qualification, who have good reputation and are known to have led
lives without any blemishes - in accordance with the Bill of
Implementation issued by the General President in consultation with
the President of the General Bureau of Civil Service.
Article 8: Without violation of the regulations of Civil Service, the
service of the employees of the hay'ah terminates when either of the
following takes place:
A. When a worker is found guilty in a case that ruins his reputation
and dignity.
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B. When there are strong suspicions affecting his reputation and
dignity.
Section Four
The Duties of the Hay'ah in Towns and Villages
Article 9: One of the most important duties of the hay'ah, is to guide
and advise people to observe the religious duties prescribed by
Islamic Law and to make them carry out these duties, as well as to
censure abomination in a way that prevents commission of things which
are unlawful and prohibited by Islamic Law, and observance of bad
traditions or abominable innovations. For these purposes, the hay'ah 
may take the measures and impose the penalties listed In this statnte.
Article 10: The hay'ah must carry out the duty of enjoining the
acceptable and forbidding the reprehensible with utmost strictness and
determination on the basis of the definition of duties, taboos, and
the methods to denounce the latter given in God's Book and the sunnah
(way) of His Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, and through the
example set by the Prophet Muhammad in his life style, and later by
the Prudent Caliphs and leading reformers. The hay'ah should follow a
kindly approach with people, with the aim of fulfilling the objectives
of Islamic Law in the effort to reform them.
Article 11: The hay'ah has the authority to apprehend and interrogate
people who commit unlawful actions, are accused of doing so, or are
negligent of the obligations set by Islamic Law. A representative of
the concerned governor's office takes part in the interrogation of
serious cases which are to be defined and agreed upon by the Minister
of the Interior and the General President of the hay'ah.
Article 12: The hay'ah has the right to censor prohibited materials
that may influence the tenets of faith, behaviour, or public morality,
in collaboration with concerned party and in accordance with relevant
orders and instructions. The By—Law defines the method in which the
hay l ah takes part in such censorship.
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Article 13: Centres of the hay l ah should send any person apprehended
for something that calls for punishment to the Head Office of the
hay'ah to which they belong for further interrogation.
Article 14: A representative of the hay'ah should take part in the
investigation of cases that are related to the hay l ah's jurisdiction
and are apprehended by police authorities or the amirah. When a
sentence is pronounced in a case related to the hay'ah's jurisdiction,
such a representative should take part in executing the punishment.
Article 15: The hay'ah takes charge of investigating all cases related
to its jurisdiction. When there is a need to reinvestigate a case, the
hay'ah should be kept informed. A representative of the respective
governor's office should take part in the investigation.
Article 16: Courts of Islamic Law must inform the hay'ah of the
verdicts pronounced in cases that fall under the jurisdiction of the
Organization in order to follow up the execution of such verdicts.
Article 17: The hay'ah should be provided with sufficient numbers of
policemen. The measures and procedures that guarantee that such
policemen carry out their duties in the best possible manner are to be
determined and agreed upon by the Minister of the Interior and the
General President of the haylah.
Article 18: The various public and private institutions must cooperate
with the hay'ah in accordance with this Statute.
Article 19: The General president of the hay'ah is to issue by—laws
for the implementation of this Statute in consultation with the
Minister of the Interior.
Article 20: This Statute cancels any stipulations contradictory to its
clauses.
Article 21: This Statute goes into effect as from the date of its
publication in the Official Gazette.
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Appendix G
A translation of the By-Laws of hay'at al-amr bi- 1 1-macrilf wa-'l-nahy
Can al-munkar (Organization for Enjoining the Acceptable and
Forbidding the Reprehensible) issued in 1406/1986.
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IN THE NAME OF GOD THE COMPASSIONATE, THE MERCIFUL
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
The General Presidency of the Organization for Enjoining the
Acceptable and Forbidding the Reprehensible,Office of the President
The By-law Organizing the Activities of the Organization
for Enjoining the Acceptable and Forbidding the Reprehensible
Preamble 
Praise be to God and God's Peace and Blessings be upon the Best of His
Creatures, our Prophet Muhammad and upon his kin and Companions.
Royal Decree No.M/37 was issued on 26.10.1400H (6.9.1980) ratifying
Cabinet Decree No.161 of 16.9.1400H (28.8.1980), which enclosed the
Statute for the Organization for Enjoining the Acceptable and
Forbidding the Reprehensible.
Since Article 19 of the said Statute authorizes the General President
of the hay'ah together with His Highness the Minister of the Interior,
to issue by-laws for implementing the Statute, and since the by-law
has already been agreed upon as in the letter of His Highness the
Minister of the Interior No.16/53048 of 4.8.1406H (13 April 1986) and
the letter of His Excellency the General Preident of the Hay'ah 
No.201/1/S of 3.9.1406H (11.5.1986), which stipulates the drafting of
an organizational by-law for implementing the Statute, to make clear
to the concerned party of the hay'ah staff responsible for this
implementation what may not be clear to it, and to make plans and lay
down firm principles to be followed when implementing the Statute and
its by-law as to the duties of the hay'ah and things concerning
tackling, arrest, search, investigation, the way to handle impounded
materials, immediate disciplinary chastisement, temporary custody,
detention as a precautionary measure, the detention of women,
juveniles and girls, and organizing the relationship between the
hay'ah and the police - this detailed by-law has been drafted in a way
that makes clear to workers at the hay'ah and to concerned parties how
the hay'ah's Statute and by-law are to be implemented.
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Section One
Duties of the Hay'ah 
Article 1: Members of the Organization for Enjoining the Acceptable
and Forbidding the Reprehensible have to carry out the duties of the
Organization as defined by Article 9 of the Organization's Statute
issued by Royal Decree No. M/27 of 26.10.1400H (6.9.1980), the most
important of which are guiding and advising people to observe the
religious duties prescribed by Islamic Law, and make them carry out
these duties, as well as forbidding the reprehensible in a way that
prevents commission of things which are unlawful and prohibited by
Islamic Law and observance of bad traditions or abominable
innovations. This can be done by observing the following:
A. People must be urged to hold tight to the pillars of the True
Religion, which include Prayer, zakah (alms—giving), Fasting, and
tiajj. (Pilgrimage), and to distinguish themselves by its precious
standards of behaviour. They must also be called upon to perform
virtuous actions set as duties by Islamic Law, such as being
truthful and faithful, keeping one's promise, yielding deposits in
trust, being kind to one's parents, keeping in contact with one's
relatives, observing the rights of one's neighbours, being
charitable with the poor and needy, and helping the disabled and
the weak. People should be reminded of the account they have to
face on Doomsday, so that whoever does good, he does it for
himself, and whoever does wrong, has to bear the consequences, and
guidance and direct advice should be offered to any person who
shows signs (of negligence) or is accused of it.
B. Since prayer is the pillar of religion members of the hay'ah are
required to make sure that it is performed in mosques at the times
set for it in Islamic Law, and to urge people to hasten in
answering its call. The members should also make sure that stores
are closed and no sales take place at prayer time. When it is
proved that someone has been slack in performing prayers, he is
asked to sign a pledge (to refrain from being negligent), advice
and guidance are offered to him, and then he is released. This is
done the first and the second time, but if a person does the same
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thing a third time, he is released under bail, and the written
approval of the Governor is sought to detain that person for
twenty-four hours, which is done by the hay'ah when the Governor
approves. When further negligence of prayer is proved against the
same person, he is released under bail, and his case is referred to
the Governor's office, to be referred in turn to a Court of Islamic
Law.
C. Public shopping areas, roads, parks, and other public places are
watched to make sure that none of the following acts, which are
forbidden in Islamic Law, is committed:
1. Intermingling and smartening up which are prohibited in Islamic
Law. Intermingling means men and women mixing together in a way
that would clearly lead to evil. Smartening up means the
exposition of charms, either by making up, exhibitionism, or
tight clothes.
2. The imitation of the members of one sex by members of the other
either in clothes or in appearance.
3. Male molestation of women, whether verbal or in action.
4. Publicly using indecent or obscene utterances.
5. Turning on a radio, television set, tape recorder, or something
similar near a mosque or in a way that disturbs people while
praying.
6. Slaughter houses should be observed to make sure that
slaughtering follows the Islamic method.
7. Public displays by non-Muslims of their beliefs, the rituals of
their faith, or non-respect for the rites and rulings of Islam.
8. Displays or sales of pictures, books, or video or audio
recordings which are indecent or which contradict the Islamic
faith. In this, the hay'ah collaborates with other concerned
parties.
9. Displays of three-dimensional representations, pornographic
pictures, or the emblems of other non-Islamic religions, such
as the Cross, the Star of David, the pictures of Buddha, or
similar things. Pornographic pictures are those which reveal
the parts of the male or female body which should be covered,
as well as pictures which represent a man and a woman in
exciting situations, such as embracing, kissing and so on.
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10. The manufacturing, promoting, or drinking of intoxicating
drinks. In this, the hay'ah collaborates with other concerned
parties.
11. The causes which lead to despicable acts (such as adultery,
sodomy, and gambling), or the operation of houses or other
places where abominations or despicable acts are performed.
12. Evident innovations, such as showing veneration for certain
occasions or places, other than those specified by Islamic Law,
or the celebrations of innovative, non-Islamic feasts and
occasions.
13. Acts of Magic, charlatanism, and quackery used to cheat people
out of their money.
14. Using deficient weights and measurements.
15. Show rooms and women's dressmaking shops should be watched to
make sure that current and future instructions regulating work
in these places are observed and that workers in these places
do not commit any violation.
Section Two
Tackling, Arrest, Search, and Investigation
Chapter One: Tackling and Arrest 
Article 2: The hay'ah members should tackle all the Abominations
defined in Section One of this By-law and arrest the people who commit
them. They should also tackle any offence to Islamic Law witnessed
with the offender red-handed, as when it is witnessed while it is
being committed, or as soon as the victim shouts or the public cry and
run after the offender right after he has committed the offence, or
when the offender is caught with some of the weapons, implements, or
tools used in committing the offence, or things he has acquired
through committing it, in his possession, or when there is material
evidence that he has committed, or was accessory to, the offence.
Article 3: If the crime or sin witnessed with the offender red-handed
is not one of the abominations listed in Section One of this By-law,
the concerned authority should be given notice, in order to
investigate, and impounded materials and arrested persons are handed
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to such authority through an official report. (Examples of such cases
are those of drugs traffic, commercial fraud, and moral cases which
involve a major crime, such as murder, serious injury, or something of
the sort).
Article 4: It is within the hay'ah's jurisdiction to receive
information concerning the abominations listed in Section One of this
By—law. It has to examine and investigate this information in ways
that violate neither Islamic Law nor public morality and cause no
prejudice to the freedom and rights of individuals. All aspects of the
investigation and collection of information made and their outcome
should be recorded in an official report which is forwarded to the
concerned interrogation authority.
Article 5: When investigating and making inquiries, members of the
hay'ah should hear the testimony of the person offering the
information and of witnesses, and write that down in the record made
for that piece of information.
Article 6: All information received by the hay'ah is to be entered in
a special record which includes a summary of the content of any piece
of information. Writing down the record is done according to the
conditions and guidelines set in the way to use the information
record.
Article 7: Any items of information received by the hay'ah which do
not involve any of the abominations listed in Section One of this
By—law are to be referred to the concerned authorities for
investigation. Members of the hay'ah should by no means take any
measures to investigate such information. All they have to do is to
register it in the record of information before referring it to the
concerned party through an official memorandum.
Article 8: No suspect should be arrested unless there is evidence that
his conviction is highly probable.
Article 9: After the information is registered and the accusation is
confirmed, the President commissions a sufficient force of members and
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policemen (proportionate to the crime and the estimated number of
offenders) to arrest the people involved and bring them to the hay'ah 
centre.
Article 10: The party under whose jurisdiction the arrest takes place
detains the offenders and makes a list of impounded materials relevant
to the crime. The lists should mention the nature and quantity,
weight, or number of the impounded materials, which are placed in safe
receptacles if they fit in. If not, they are placed in a storehouse as
soon as a list is made. If the impounded materials cannot easily be
moved, they are placed in a room in the raided house after a separate
list is made for them, and the raiders have the room locked and sealed
with red wax.
Article 11: After the raid is made and the offenders are apprehended,
searched and detained, a comprehensive report is made and signed by
all those who take part in the raid and search, and all things
involved in the offence are written down, such as:
A. the names and the number of offenders and of the persons present
at the scene of the offence and the exact location where each of
them has been found;
B. the things involved in, or used in committing the offence, with
their types and quantities specified;
C. the number of persons who run away at the time the raid is made,
and the name and address of each of them (if known), and his
physical description, identifying marks if any, age, and type of
clothes; and
D. the quantity of cash or its equivalent which the offenders have
or which is found at the scene of the offence at the time of the
search.
Article 12: Those who make the arrest should sign the reports of
arrest, which are officially stamped and sent (together with the
offenders and impounded materials), after those procedures are
completed, to the department at the organization responsible for
investigation through a separate, official memorandum.
Article 13: In cases where the offenders are suspected of possessing
weapons, help of the police of the respective area should be sought to
arrest them.
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Article 14: All cases of arrest should be entered in a record made for
that purpose at the hay'ah centre to which the member enforcing the
arrest belongs. The record should include the time at which detention
begins, its reason, and the time at which it ends. Information is
entered into the record in accordance with the instructions attached
to the record of incidents.
Article 15: In case the arrested have suffered injuries or received
wounds, the person responsible for the arrest should send them without
delay to a hospital to receive immediate treatment. A medical report
of their health condition should be requested. After medical
treatment, they may be interrogated. If there is a need for them to be
hospitalized, the hospital police should be informed to keep them in
custody and guard their rooms so they may not escape during the period
of treatment. When they recover, they should be taken back to the
hay'ah offices to resume the interrogation.
Article 16: If a civil servant or a person in the military service is
arrested, having been caught red—handed, the department to which he
belongs should at once be informed of his arrest, the charge against
him, and the approximate period he needs to be detained for
interrogation.
Article 17: If a case being investigated by the hay'ah calls at a
later stage of the investigation for the detention or imprisonment of
an employee of the educational system, a summons is made in the form
of an official, confidential letter addressed to the school
headmaster. If the suspect is a student, the official request for him
to be turned in should be addressed to both his guardian and the
headmaster of the school he goes to. If it is confirmed that the
school employee or the student has not been attending school, police
authorities are asked to arrest him.
Article 18: When a suspect runs away before or after he is arrested,
and the hay'ah fails to locate him, the assistance of police
authorities should be requested, after giving them his name and
description if possible. The same thing applies when a person becomes
suspect as a result of an investigation and the hay'ah cannot locate
him.
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Chapter Two: Search
Article 19: An arrested person should be searched with the purpose of
removing from his possession anything he may use to resist or to hurt
himself or someone else, and to impound everything that is relevant to
the religious abomination he is accused of committing. If during the
search things are found which constitute another crime, they should be
impounded and safely kept, and the relevant authority should be
informed. If a person is suspected, before he is arrested, of holding
a weapon, the police are asked to assist in the arrest.
Article 20: Women are searched by two trustworthy and honest women
after they are asked to make the Islamic Oath to be honest and
truthful.
Article 21: An authorized member of the hay'ah has the right to search
houses and other places when tackling one of the religious
abominations listed in Section One of this By—law and to arrest the
person who has committed it.
Article 22: House searches are allowed only in the cases stipulated in
the regulations, orders, decisions, and instructions concerning
procedures in criminal cases, and must follow the procedure stipulated
therein, particularly the stipulations of Chapter Seventeen of the
General Security Statute. The following must be observed:
A. Unless the written consent of the head of the household is
obtained and his approval is given, or an urgent call for help is
made from inside the residence which calls for expediency, or in
cases of demolition, drowning, fire, or an assailant entering the
house — no search is allowed unless permission is granted by the
relevant authority (the General President, Regional Supervisor,
or President of the Centre) and the search is done in the
presence of the suspect, the head of the household, one of his
relatives or of those connected with him, or the cumdah (mayor)
of the neighbourhood. In towns where there are no neighbourhood
mayors, two prominent residents of the neighbourhood are
sufficient.
400
B. House searches should be made in the daytime. No house should be
entered at night unless the crime is witnessed and the criminal
is red-handed or circumstances call for expediency for fear that
one of the items of evidence may be lost or the persons that are
wanted may escape.
Article 23: If women are found in the searched house who are not
involved in any way in the case, then the person in charge of the
search must enable them to leave the house in a way that will not
influence the outcome of the search or procedures of the
investigation.
Article 24: All persons found in the house during the search must be
placed under the necessary guard until the search is completed. If
there are strong suspicions that any of them is hiding something that
is being searched for, then it is permissible to search him.
Chapter Three: Investigation
Article 25: The hay l ah investigates all cases involving the religious
abominations listed in Section One of this By-law.
Article 26: In the cases mentioned in Section One of this By-law which
require to be handled jointly by more than one authority, the hay'ah 
takes part through a representative representing it at the party which
handles the investigation.
Article 27: If concerned authorities decide that a case handled by the
hay'ah should be reinvestigated, it is the hay'ah that should take
care of that, provided that a representative of the amgrah (office of
the governor) takes part in the reinvestigation.
Article 28: When the need arises, a representative of the hay'ah may
take part in the preliminary investigation of religious abomination
listed in Section One of this By-law which are apprehended by police
authorities or by the adarah.
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Article 29: Except for cases of red-handed offences, when the
abomination is witnessed while it is being committed, the
investigation of things listed in Section One should be handled by
specialists at the hay'ah in accordance with the stipulations of the
By-law. In cities where the hay'ah has more than one centre, the
investigation must be conducted in the Head Office. The centres have
to turn over the reports of impoundment, arrest, and search, together
with the people arrested and materials impounded, to the Head Centre
as soon as the procedures of impoundment and arrest are concluded,
provided that this would not lead to the loss of evidence that helps
in proving the guilt of a person. Another condition is that the case
should be investigated within the boundaries of the Province.
Article 30: When he begins an investigation, an investigator should
make sure of the following:
A. The interrogated person's name (surname, father's name,
grandfather's name and family name), the number of his identity
card, the place and time at which it has been issued, his marital
status and his age should be written down. The same applies to
witnesses. If any of these is non-Saudi, he should be asked about
his nationality and the number, date and place of issuance of his
passport, travel document, or any other document that proves his
identity and the legitimacy of his residence in the Kingdom, and
the name and address of his sponsor.
B. A suspect should not be hand-cuffed while he is interrogated. The
investigator should order any cuffs to be removed during
interrogation. Rill precaution should be taken to guard the
suspect and prevent his escape while he is interrogated.
C. Suspects should be kept apart at the time of investigation. Each
should give his testimony separately. The same thing applies to
witnesses. If there is a discrepancy in the statements of
suspects and witnesses, the investigator should confront them
with each other and discuss the discrepancy with them until he
arrives at the truth.
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Article 31: The pages and lines of investigation pads should be filled
in the right order without any scratching, insertion, or space
skipping. The sequence of writing down in the pads should be the same
as the sequence of events and procedures written, the same way they
are conducted, witnessed, or happened. Every procedure should be
recorded as soon as it takes place or is conducted.
Article 32: At the opening of every report of investigation, the
following should be mentioned:
(1) the hour, day, date, and place at which it (the investigation)
begins and is conducted;
(2) the full name, rank, and position of the investigator(s);
(3) the thing on the basis of which the investigation is conducted
or any procedure is taken; and
(4) a summary of the charge and its source, such as the information
or communication received or the apprehension of a suspect
red-handed;
(5) at the end of every report, there should also be a mention of
the hour, day, and date of its conclusion; the reason that
caused it to be discontinued; and the time set for its
resumption.
Article 33: Investigation reports should include everything that is
related to the person and identity of the informer, unless it is in
the interest (of confidentiality) not to reveal it. Investigation
reports should also include details of the information received,
everything related to the person it involves, the statements and
actions attributed to him, the inquiries made, their outcome, the
things seen or heard, and everything that has called for the
procedures of impoundment, arrest, and search.
Article 34: Investigation reports should include a carefully detailed
description of how the procedures of impoundment, arrest, and search
have been taken, how places have been inspected, what clues and
persons have been discovered, and the marks found on them and injuries
they have suffered. The following should particularly be taken into
consideration.
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A. The materials impounded should be described, whether impounded
through search or separately. The nature, characteristics,
condition of impounded things should be mentioned, together with
everything that defines their number, measurement(s), or weight.
The methods used in impounding them, their place or condition at
the time of impoundment, the person with whom they are impounded,
and his decision or the decision of whoever acts for him
concerning them should be pointed out.
B. The persons who are arrested or are found at the site of the
abomination or the place searched, and their condition at the
time (such as being drunk or something else), the marks on and
injuries to their bodies discovered, the marks or traces found on
their clothes, the measures taken to keep and examine these
marks, the actions ande statements each of them makes, and the
things found with each of them and related to the investigated
offence or constituting, by their mere possession, another
offence should all be listed.
C. The traces and marks discovered by examining the scene of the
crime or any other location should be written down, together with
a list of any experts whose assistance has been sought, the
agencies they represent, and the content of the technical reports
they have made.
D. The samples taken from the impounded materials should be placed
in safe receptacles and forwarded to specialized technical
concerns to be examined or tested, and the technical reports made
by these concerns should be written down.
E. A list should be made of the persons who have witnessed the
abomination or some of the actions constituting it, or those who
are present when it is tackled and when the suspects are
arrested, or when some of the instruments used in committing it
or the things obtained by committing it are impounded. The
testimony of these witnesses should be recorded in detail and as
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given, without any change in the wording. All the procedure for
interrogating them and discussing their statements with them
should be written down.
Article 35: In addition to the things specified in previous Articles,
the reports of investigation should include the statement of any
suspect in detail, as it is made by him, with the exact wording he
uses. All aspects of his defence should be written down. At any time,
a suspect is entitled to make his defence in all its aspects. It is
preferable to have the answers written in the suspect's own
handwriting, if he can write, and to have him sign whenever erasure or
a change is made in his statement.
Article 36: If the statements made by a suspect include a confession
of committing a religious abomination of those listed in Section One
of this By-law, which is a major crime (such as a crime with a
specified penalty in Islamic Law, the raiding of houses for wicked
purposes, rape, molestation of someone's honour, sodomy, the making or
drinking of intoxicants, or dealing with them or offering them to
others), he should immediately be turned over to a judge of Islamic
Law to have his confession certified. If the admitted crime is not one
of the religious abominations listed in Section One of this By-law,
the suspect should be turned over to the relevant authority for
investigation.
Article 37: Every report of investigation should be signed by the
investigator(s) conducting it or sharing in the procedures of
tackling, arrest, search, or inspection. Experts who take part in
inspecting, keeping, and examining traces or marks, or who examine
impounded materials and take samples thereof, should sign the reports
covering that. Witnesses should sign the reports containing their
statements and their interrogation. A suspect should sign the reports
containing his statements and confessions. When necessary, a print of
the right thumb serves as a signature.
Article 38: When a government employee, whether a civilian or
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military, is indicted only after a period of time has passed allowing
him to attend his job at his office, his superiors are in this case
contacted to turn him in to the party in charge of investigation at
the hay l ah. A copy of the request should be forwarded to the Board of
Inspection and Investigation. When the investigation is completed, the
Board of Inspection and Investigation and the department where the
employee works are each provided with a summary of the subject,
indicting the situation concerning the employee, whether he is still
under investigation or has been freed because of his innocence. If the
Board of Inspection and Investigtion asks, in an exceptional case, for
an abstract of the investigation premises, to take appropriate
measures concerning the employee, before he is tried before a court of
Islamic Law, the party in charge of investigation at the Organization
has to supply the requested abstract.
Article 39: When there is a need to call a civil servant for testimony
in a case investigated by the bay'ah, he should be summoned by an
official memorandum addressed to him at the department where he works,
allowing him sufficient time to arrive and specifying his name and the
hour and day at which he should report and the place where he should
report.
Article 40: If a case that falls under the jurisdiction of the hay'ah 
occurs inside a school, the hay'ah's investigators should not arrive
at the school in a way that draws the attention of students and
employees, so that the reputation of the school, its employees, and
its students may not be tarnished and the trust in it as a centre of
learning may not be shaken. When there is a need for policemen to
accompany the investigating committee, they should not arrive at the
school in their uniforms. The interrogation of students should be done
in a very casual manner that would drive fear out of their hearts.
Article 41: If it is confirmed that a student is involved in a case
investigated by the hay'ah and he is not arrested red-handed, at
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the proper moment, he should be summoned for interrogation only
through the school, the Department of Education in the Province, or
the student's guardian, either in writing or on the telephone if
possible. If it is confirmed that the student is not attending school
and playing truant, his arrest by security forces is requested.
Article 42: The cawrit (parts of the body that should be covered) of
women and boys should not be exposed for the purpose of proving an act
of adultery or sodomy, unless it is in the interest of Islamic Law, as
determined by a judge, to do so, or the case is initiated by a written
petition from the women's guardian demanding compensation to be paid
by the criminal. In either case the girl is sent to a hospital to be
medically examined in accordance with the Circular of the Minister of
Health No.355/5497/57 of 10.8.139911 (5.7.1979), which is based on the
circular of His Eminence the Muftl No.3551/1 of 10.9.138011 (25.2.1961)
and fatwa (religious ruling) No.3343/1 of 17.11.1386H (26.2.1967).
Section Three
Impounded Materials
Article 43: Impounded materials that have no relation to the
abomination involved in a particular case and which do not help the
investigation should be immediately handed to the person with whom
they are found or who is their rightful owner.
Article 44: If the impounded materials involved in a case are cash,
jewelry, or valuables, they have to be deposited, until the case is
settled, with the party undertaking the investigation, after the
jewelry or valuables are placed in proper, safe receptacles. This
should be written down in the investigation report.
Article 45: Whenever possible, impounded materials, other than cash,
should be placed in a safe receptacle that matches their size and
nature. A receptacle should be sealed, in red wax, with the seal of
the party undertaking the investigation. On the outside of the
receptacle, a statement should be written defining the thing inside
it, the number of the case, the name of the person with whom the
material has been found, and the date, place and reason of its
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impoundment. The person in charge should sign this statement, and this
should be written down in the investigation report.
Article 46: The person with whom the materials are found is entitled
to receive a statement listing the impounded materials, signed by the
person in charge, and this should be written down in the investigation
report.
Article 47: When it is evident that
to be spoiled or when the expenses
are out of proportion with their
consent of their owner or whoever
the impounded materials are likely
of their maintenance are high and
value, they are sold, after the
has the right to keep them is
obtained. Their value is deposited with the party in charge of the
investigation until the case is settled. If the consent of their owner
or whoever has the right to keep them cannot be obtained, they are
sold after permission is given by a judge of Islamic Law.
Article 48: The materials which the party in charge of the
investigation decides to impound continue to be seized as long as they
are needed in the investigation or for setttling the case. When there
is an argument over that, the governor has the authority to settle it.
Article 49: When a case is settled and there is no decision to
•confisI/
 cate the impounded materials, and no concerned party orders
their confiscation, they are given back to the person with whom they
are found or who has the right to keep them.
Article 50: A safe of a reasonable size is provided to each Centre of
the hay'ah for keeping light-weight impounded materials related to
cases such as drugs, prohibited tablets, jewelry, and cash. At the
offices of every organization which undertakes investigations, a room
with impenetrable doors and windows is prepared to serve as a
storehouse for keeping other impounded materials and all the vessels,
equipment, and other things which are related to cases.
Article 51: Keeping things in the safe and the storehouse should be
done by the President of the local hay'ah or by the investigator, in
accordance with the following procedures;
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A. Information should be written down in accordance with Articles
10, 11, 44, and 45 of this By-law.
B. A memorandum, with an original and an unchangeable copy, should
be made and signed by the receiver, the person from whom the
materials are received, the President of the hay'ah, and the
person concerned, in which information as to size, weight, and
description is written down. The original of the memorandum is
attached to the papers of the case investigated, and the
unchangeable copy is kept in the Records with the person in
charge at the hay'ah.
C. The person in charge of impounded materials keeps a record of
them, which follows a special model, and it is used according to
the instructions on it back cover.
Article 52: Impounded materials are taken out of the safe or the
storehouse to be given back to their owners, destroyed, or kept in the
treasury, in the following cases:
A. When the investigator or the person in charge at the hay'ah is
satisfied that the materials have nothing to do with the crime
and that they belong to people who are not involved in the case.
B. When it is established that the suspect's possession of the
materials (if they are cash or its equivalent) poses no hazard to
the investigation.
C. When a verdict by an Islamic Court stipulates that they should be
destroyed or handed back.
D. When an order is made by the mar to that effect.
Article 53: The person in charge at the hay'ah issues an official,
numbered and dated memorandum which mentions the order made for
handling back or destroying the materials, and the justification and
the party responsible for its issuance. An orderwith an original and
an unchangeable copy is made to get the materials out, signed by the
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person who receives them, the investigator and the President of the
hay'ah if the decision is to hand them back. If it is to destroy them,
the order is signed by the hay'ah's representative at the destruction
committee. A copy of the report of the destruction is attached to the
memorandum.
Section Four
Immediate Disciplinary Punishment, Temporary Detention,
and Precautionary Arrest
Chapter One: On Imposing Immediate Disciplinary Punishment 
Article 54: As soon as an incident is tackled, or the person(s)
committing it arrested, the arrested people and the impounded
materials should be referred, through a report of the incident and the
arrest, to the party responsible for carrying out the investigation.
Article 55: The party in charge of the investigation should
interrogate the arrested person(s) and listen to all aspects of his
defence within twenty-four hours of the arrest.
Article 56: When the party who handles the investigation is satisfied
that the incident does not involve a sin or an offence that calls for
harsher punishment, he should decide to free the arrested person
either under bail or by merely taking his address, depending on the
case. The papers are then referred to the relevant authority, either
to approve the decision of the investigation party or to give whatever
instruction it finds appropriate. When it is established that the
incident does not involve a religious abomination of the type handled
by the hay l ah as in Section One of the By-law, or if it is a religious
abomination that follows a special system which defines a particular
authority to investigate it or to impose punishment for it, the case
should be referred to the relevant authority.
Article 57: In every hay'ah, a committee composed of the president of
the hay'ah, or the head of a centre, and two members is set up to
decide the immediate penalties listed in Article 4 of the hay'ah's
Statute.
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Article 58: If the incident is a simple moral case or a case of
accusation, the party in charge of investigation should refer it at
once to the committee that handles such cases and that is mentioned in
the previous Article.
Article 59: The committee mentioned above should immediately look into
the case and take the decision considered appropriate according to the
stipulations of the Statute and of this By—law.
Article 60: If the committee finds the defendant not guilty, he should
be freed at once.
Article 61: If the committee decides to discipline the offender by
whipping to a maximum of fifteen lashes or by imprisonment to a
maximum of three days, the papers are immediately referred to the
town's andr to ratify the committee's decision. The decision is
implemented only after it is ratified by the town's amTr. An offender
should receive only one of the two penalties mentioned above.
Article 62: Upon receiving the papers, a town amir should immediately
make a decision which
(a) ratifies the committee's whipping or imprisonment sentence,
returning the papers to the committee immediately, so that the
decision is executed at once and the arrested person is then
freed;
(b) refers the papers to a court of Islamic Law to take a decision
and then refers them back to the haz'ah to implement that
decision; or
(c) refers the papers to the relevant authority to continue the
investigation.
Chapter Two: On Temporary Detention
Article 63: When it is not possible, in the cases and the accusations
referred to above, to complete the investigation within twenty four
hours of the arrest of the person involved, the party in charge of the
investigation may issue an order for his temporary detention for a
period that does not exceed three days following his arrest. The order
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is entered in writing in the investigation report. The President of
the hay'ah is notified, and supplied a copy, of the order to enter it
in the special record of the arrested for investigation at the hay'ah
Centre.
Article 64: Unless the religious abomination is a major crime, the
arrested person should be
(a) referred at once to a court of Islamic Law to decide upon his
case, and
(b) released under bail (made in person), on the condition that he
has a permanent and known residence within the Kingdom, if it is
necessary to carry the investigation on for more than three days
after his arrest.
Chapter Three: On Precautionary Arrest
Article 65: If the investigation is not completed within the period
mentioned in the previous Article, the investigator should take the
steps needed for precautionary arrest described in the following
Articles:
Article 66: Unless the abomination is a major crime (such as rape;
molestation of a person's honour; sodomy; adultery; the manufacturing
of, dealing with, offering, or trading intoxicants; dealing in usury,
etc), before the end of temporary detention, the following steps
should be taken:
A. The arrested person should be indicted and a memorandum should be
addressed to the relevant authority for his precautionary arrest.
He should be sent to a detention house or general prison, and the
governor of the area and the President of the hay l ah should be
notified.
B. The papers should be referred to the office of the amir as soon
as the investigations are completed. The Memorandum of Arrest
mentioned in item A should not be issued unless there is
sufficient evidence that calls for the precautionary arrest of
the detained person, as follows:
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(1) He should be caught red-handed in the manner described in
Article 2 of this By-law;
(2) he should confess, by his free will as recognized in Islamic
Law, that he has committed the crime;
(3) evidence accepted by Islamic Law or reasonable evidence
should indicate that he is most probably guilty;
(4) his being loose poses a threat to his life or the lives of
others or an offence to public security, or causes commotion
or disorder among people; or
(5) he has no permanent and known residence in the Kingdom, or it
is feared that he may escape or may influence the
investigation procedures.
Article 67: The Memorandum of Precautionary Arrest referred to in the
previous Article is effective for a period of no more than twenty one
days starting on the date of the arrest of the person against whom it
is issued.
Article 68: If the investigation cannot be completed within the twenty
one days mentioned above, the investigating party should, at least
three days before the end of that period, report a summary of the
case, the evidence obtained from the arrested person which has called
for his precautionary arrest, the incomplete aspects of the
investigation, the reasons that have made it difficult to complete
them, and the period estimated by the investigating party as needed to
complete the investigation. This report should be accompanied with a
request for permission to continue the detention of the arrested for
the estimated period, provided that it does not exceed thirty days
from the date on which the twenty-one days period, which is covered by
the first memorandum of arrest, ends.
Article 69: The report mentioned in the previous Article should be
made to the governor of the province or any mayor of one of the towns
of the province authorized by the governor.
Article 70: The detention house or prison where the detained person is
kept should be notified of the date and number of the report addressed
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to the amarah (office of the governor) requesting a continuation of
his detention.
Article 71: The precautionary arrest of the suspect continues, and the
investigating party goes on with its investigation, until instructions
arrive from the amarah, at which time these instructions are followed.
The investigating party should notify the detention house or prison
where the person under precautionary arrest is kept of the amarah's
decision to continue his arrest or to set him free in order to carry
them out.
Article 72: Under all circumstances, the investigating party should
report the case to the war before the thirty days subsequent to the
twenty one days covered by the memorandum of precautionary arrest are
over so that the amaxah would make a decision in the light of the Bill
of Province Governors' Acts of Authorization.
Chapter Four: On the Detention and Interrogation of Women, 
Adolescents, and Girls 
A.	 On the Detention and Interrogation of Women
Article 73: When a female suspect is interrogated, it should be
observed that she be accompanied by a mu4ram* who attends all
interrogation sessions and can see everything that goes on during the
interrogation. If confidentiality is required, the investigating party
should prepare a place for interrogation where the muhram is able to
see what goes on in the interrogation room. This is done by
introducing a glass divider and allowing the multram to sit on its
other side, or by letting him stand at the window of the interrogation
room or at a distance if the place where the interrogation is held is
wide enough.
* A mubram is a male relative who is forbidden to marry that woman
according to the shari cah (Islamic Law) e.g. a father, a brother or
an uncle. Translator's note.
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Article 74: When the investigator suspects a female suspect of holding
things that would help in solving the case, the investigating
committee should commission two trustworthy women to search the
suspect, as in Article 20 of this By-law, and in the presence of her
muhram, if possible.
Article 75: The question addressed to a female suspect should be
direct, candid, and relevant to the case she is arrested for.
Article 76: The detention of women at the hay'ah centres is by no
means allowed at any times other than that of interrogation. At all
other times, particularly every day after sunset, a woman is moved
into one of the detention houses for women. An imprisonment penalty
pronounced against a woman in a moral case or a case involving one of
the charges referred to in Article 4 of the hay'ah Statute can only be
implemented in a women's prison.
Article 77: When a woman is transported from a detention house or a
prison to the place of interrogation, she should be accompanied by a
muhram of hers until she is back (at the prison or detention house).
If that proves impossible, she should be accompanied by a trusted
woman (and if by two trusted women that would be even better).
Article 78: If investigating a case of intoxication calls for smelling
a female suspect, she should be sent to a hospital and the person in
charge there should be asked to commission two female physicians or
nurses to do that in the presence of a muhram of the woman and to
write down a medical report of the outcome.
B.	 On the Detention and Interrogation of Male Adolescents and Girls 
Article 79: A male adolescent means a boy who is over ten years of age
and has not yet completed his eighteenth year. A girl means a female
who is thirty years or under. In establishing either case, a birth
certificate or identity card is the authority to be consulted.
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Article 80: The party in charge of the arrest should take any
adolescent boy to a house of social observation and any girl to the
Institution for Girls' Welfare as soon as he or she is arrested and
without resorting to any other procedure.
Article 81: The interrogation of a male adolescent should take place
only at a house of social observation and in the presence of the
relevant members of its staff. If it is in the interest of the
investigation to take the adolescent out to show the actual scene of
the crime, a representative of the House should accompany the
investigator.
Article 82: Under all circumstances, the interrogation of girls should
take place inside the Institution (for girls' welfare) and in the
presence of the principal or whoever she asks to represent her for
that purpose. The interrogation should be held in a manner that allows
the girl to feel psychologically safe and relaxed, as Article 6 of the
By-law of Girls' Welfare Houses stipulates.
Article 83: The penalties pronounced must be executed inside a house
of social observation or an institution for girls' welfare in
accordance with its by-laws.
Article 84: In the case of minor offences committed by an adolescent
over ten and under fifteen, the President of the hay'ah may find it
sufficient to reprimand and advise the adolescent and ask his guardian
to undertake that the adolescent will not repeat the offence. The
adolescent may then be set free without detention or interrogation.
Chapter Five: On the Cases in which an Arrested Person Should be Freed
and has the Right to Complain about the Memorandum for His Arrest 
Article 85: A suspect is set free in the cases mentioned in Article
60, paragraph B of Article 64, and Article 84 of this By-law and in
case he is a juvenile under ten.
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Article 86: When the investigating party at the hay'ah orders the
precautionary arrest of a suspect to continue after the validity of
the memorandum of detention has expired, or after the subsequent
thirty days are over, he has the right to file a complaint with the
governor of the province in accordance with Articles 19-21 of the
By-law of the Proper Procedures of Arrest and Temporary Detention
issued by His Highness the Minister of the Interior and attached to
Decree No.233 of 17.1.140311 (23.10.1983).
Article 87: The investigating party should allow a suspect to contact
his family and inform them of his being under arrest, when the case is
a minor one. In major cases, however, he should be allowed to contact
them only after the investigation is completed and all his partners,
if he has any, are arrested.
Article 88: A person detained for interrogation may get food at his
own expense, and the relevant party at the hay'ah should get it for
him.
Article 89: A person should not be detained beyond the period defined
in the memorandum for his arrest. He should be freed before noon on
the day following the expiry of that period, unless an order comes
from the relevant authority at the hay'ah or the amirah to continue
his detention.
Section Five
The Police Working for the Hay'ah 
Article 90: A number of policemen are to join the hay'ah according to
the following division:
1. The General Presidency
2. The Major Branches
3. Departments of Investigation and Detention at the Major Branches
4. Patrol and Watch Departments in Cities
5. Centres in major cities (A)
6. Centres in middle-sized cities (B)
7. Centres in small towns (C)
8. Centres in villages that have a police force
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The numbers and ranks of these policemen are to be determined by
agreement between the General President of the hay'ah and the
Director General of Public Security.
Article 91: Duties are assigned and locations and hours are defined
for policemen by the person in charge at the hay'ah in a manner that
does not violate police service regulations.
Article 92: Policemen's vacations are handled by Public Security in
cooperation with the hay'ah.
Article 93: In cases of emergency and special occasions, such as
feasts and special seasons, the hay'ah may seek the support of an
additional police force. It may also seek such help in accordance with
the stipulations of Articles 12 and 18 of this By-law. The relevant
chief of police should cooperate as required in each case.
Section Six
General Rules
Article 94: The General President of the hay'ah is to issue a
confidential circular addressed to the parties affiliated to him which
will be in charge of implementing this By-law concerning the manner in
which members of the Diplomatic Corps are to be treated, in accordance
with the kindly Royal Decree No. M/38 of 21.11.1400R (30.9.1980),
ratifying the Decree of the Venerable Cabinet No.193 of 13.11.1400H
(22.9.1980). It will also cover the treatment of VIPs and of
governmental offices in accordance with the stipulation of paragraph
B, Article 146, Chapter Seventeen of the General Security Law.
Article 95: This By-law goes into effect as soon as it is published.
It is to be implemented gradually, by stages, in accordance with the
resources availbale at the various hay'it, as will be determined by
subsequent instructions from the General President.
Article 96: The General president has the right to interpret the
content of this By-law, cancel Articles, and add new ones.
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(royal decree preventing the exporting of intoxicant drinks)
no.398 on 5.1.1372H (25.9.1952).
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